DISCLAIMER The following is a staff memorandum or other working document prepared for the members of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments. It should not be construed as representing the final conclusions of fact or interpretation of the issues. All staff memoranda are subject to revision based on further information and analysis. For conclusions and recommendations of the Advisory Committee, readers are advised to consult the Final Report to be published in 1995. TAB I-3 þþþDRAFT þ FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLYþþþ MEMORANDUM TO: Members of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments FROM: Advisory Committee Staff DATE: January 10, 1995 RE: Legal Protection of Military Research & Development (R&D) Contractors With a tradition that dates at least to Dr. Walter Reed's turn of the century yellow fever research, the Army has long sponsored research and human subject volunteer experimentation relating to infectious diseases. This research was centrally coordinated by the Army Epidemiological Board (AEB) from 1941 to 1949, and thereafter by its successor, the Armed Forces Epidemiological Board (AFEB). While the AFEB does not appear to have been a significant sponsor of radiation experimentation, the research rules and practices of the AFEB may well shed significant light on the rules and practices of radiation experimentation. Staff has therefore been reviewing National Archives collections related to the AFEB. This memorandum discusses some of the materials retrieved from the archives. The sample does not focus on particular experiments sponsored by the AFEB, but on the relationship between the AFEB and private research contractors. As shown by the documents, it appears that: 1. A 1943 law authorized indemnification of Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD1 [OSRD coordinated World War II military research & development.]) contractors against claims for property damage or personal injuries brought by third parties. It is not known whether any OSRD medical research contractors were indemnified under this law. In any event, the law expired with the disestablishment of the OSRD in 1945. 2. In the late 1940s, certain university researchers who wanted to resume hepatitis studies involving federal and state prisoners expressed their concern over potential legal liability to the AEB. Army lawyers responding to these inquiries stated that the Army could not pay the premiums on third party liability policies and, without specific Congressional authorization, could not indemnify 1 contractors. The Army lawyers recommended use of waiver forms signed by the subjects, but at the same time expressed uncertainty over their effectiveness. 3. The Army was of the view that waiver forms would not be sufficient to protect the private researchers from liability, and that specific Congresssional authorization was needed if the Army were to indemnify its contract researchers. There was concern, however, that an approach to Congress on behalf of human experimentation could result in negative publicity that would set back research. 4. During the same time period, the Senate passed a bill authorizing the Department of Defense (DOD) to indemnify its R&D contractors against claims for property damage or personal injuries. There was no mention in either the committee hearings or report of the need to protect medical R&D contractors. Although the bill had the full support of DOD, for some unknown reason the House of Representatives took no action on it. 5. There was an awareness by some researchers at this time that, in light of the Nuremberg Code, new rules would be required to govern human experimentation. 6. In 1952 Congress enacted legislation authorizing DOD to indemnify its R&D contractors against third party claims. The only hearing mention of potential its applicability to medical research was when an Army officer testified that the indemnification provision would be relevant to work such as that done by Dr. Walter Reed. 7. Responding to an AFEB inquiry, Army lawyers stated that the law would cover outside researchers using prisoners and other subjects and recommended inclusion of an indemnification clause in all pertinent AFEB contracts. This response also noted that, as a technical matter, the contractor would be indemnified but the result would inure to the benefit of the "human guinea pig". These documents shed further light on the June 1953 Secretary of the Army directive which implemented the Secretary of Defense's Nuremberg Code policy (sometimes referred to as the "Wilson Memorandum"). As previously discussed, that directive, drawing on underlying legal analysis from the Judge Advocate General's office, focused with legal precision on the questions of (l) the statutory basis for the Army's performance of human experimentation in the first place; and (2) the statutory basis for the selection of subjects. In addressing the second question it focused on the issue of whether or not the government could pay death or disability benefits in case of mishap. The answer to this question, the analysis indicated, depended upon whether or not there was clear Congressional authorization for the expenditures of funds for this purpose. In sum, the AFEB documents indicate that the 1953 Army 2 memorandum embodied continued and serious legal analysis of the relation between the use of human volunteers and the obligation to provide compensation for risks that might result in harm. It is not known how many AFEB and other DOD medical research contracts provided for indemnification; however, such contracts as the initial one with the University of Cincinnati for whole body radiation had such a clause. The documents include: Attachment 1: October 23, 1947 Memorandum from the Robert J. O'Connor, Chief, Legal Office, to Col. Frank L. Bauer, Army Medical Research and Development: Re: Protection of Research Project Volunteers In this memorandum the Army Legal Office advises that there is nothing in the standard research and development contract "which would require the Government to reimburse the contractor for payment to a prisoner as compensation for injury resulting from participation in a research project." The memorandum states that the Contract Insurance Branch had been consulted, and advised that "there was no authority for taking out such a policy [disability policy covering prisoners] and it would not be approved." This office reported that it had been advised by private underwriters that "the cost would be prohibitive." The Legal Office therefore urged that the University of Pennsylvania's Dr. Stokes be told to "protect himself, the State of New Jersey, and the Government, by means of the usual waiver. . . .This office will supply the necessary form upon request." Attachment 2: October 27, 1947 letter from William S. Stone, Colonel, Medical Corps, Chairman Medical Research and Development Board to Dr. Joseph Stokes, Jr., University of Pennsylvania In response to Dr. Stokes' inquiry regarding compensation of research subjects, Col. Stone encloses the above memorandum and responds that "there seems to be no real answer except requesting special legislation for cases as they arise." Col. Stone further notes that a proposal for compensating volunteers "when they are not on military status" will be presented to the services in an effort to see if legislation can be forwarded. Attachment 3: February 18, 1948 letter from John R. Paul, M.D., Commission on Virus and Rickettsial Diseases, to Dr. Stokes In this letter, which appears to respond to a request for comment on Dr. Stokes letter of February 11 to Dr. McLeod (Attachment 3A may be this document), Dr. Paul addresses Dr. Stokes request for 3 compensation for prisoners "who may be sufficiently disabled as a result of their acquiring experimental hepatitis to prevent their full return to gainful occupation." Dr. Paul comments: As to the second question relating to studies on humans which as you say raises a point of 'ethics', I agree with your principles but believe the timing is not as opportune as it should be. Namely, at this stage in the world situation one should proceed cautiously, until whatever standards are set up by what ever body is in 'authority.' I am not sure just what the rules are but I understand that Dr. Ivy [expert witness of what became the Nuremberg Code at the international trial] at the University of Illinois has been on some type of vigilance committee which has laid down certain principles about volunteers in order to protect this country from criticisms brought up by Germany during the Nuremberg trials. The Russians in Japan have also accused U.S. scientists of experimenting on humans. During the war we more or less made our own policies on this, but I am not sure that is possible today and if there are to be official policies, I believe, we have to know them before any official statements should be made. (emphasis added) The Nazi medical defendants at Nuremberg did launch criticisms of American prison research as part of their defense. They claimed that the Nazi concentration camp experiments were not significantly different from the experiments conducted in American state and federal prisons during the war. Andrew Ivy was appointed chair of a committee by the Governor of Illinois (hundreds of Illinois prisoners served as subjects in wartime tropical disease research). The report of the committee pronounced that prison experimentation, as generally conducted in America, was ethically acceptable (actually, the report used the word "ideal"). The report appeared in JAMA vol 136 (14 Feb. 1948): 457-458 (Advisory Committee members were presented with a copy in conjunction with an earlier staff report on the Heller/Paulsen prison experiments). Attachment 4: April 5, 1948 letter from C.J. Watson, M.D., Commission on Liver Disease to Dr. McLeod, with a copy to Dr. Stokes and others In this letter Dr. Watson explains that a survey of academic experts has indicated that the use of a waiver is not likely to provide much protection for the private contract experimenters. "I have concluded that any human experimentation must be carried out in the future as in the past, on the basis 4 of the sole liability of the individual experimenter." In a further comment Dr. Watson offers: I have given considerable thought to the matter of whether it would be advisable to approach individuals or groups in Congress with the idea of having laws passed relating either to payment of compensation for disability or release of the experimenter from liability. I am afraid that this would be a dangerous course, and that it might in fact, injure clinical investigations generally. There is a very real possibility that unfavorable publicity would quickly result. Dean Fraser [a law professor who had been consulted] and his colleagues were in thorough agreement on this point. Attachment 5: April 12, 1948 letter from Dr. Watson to Lt. Col. Bauer, Office of the Army Surgeon General In this letter Dr. Watson recounts his finding that law professors were "inclined to doubt the value" of a waiver, and asks Dr. Bauer if he can request an opinion from Army lawyers. Attachment 6: April 20 and 23, 1948 Exchange between the Army Epidemiological Board and the Legal Office, Re: Human Volunteers for Research Investigations In this exchange the Legal Office advises, among other things, that (l) it cannot give an opinion on the efficacy of a waiver in the absence of recorded cases; (2) the Army cannot obligate itself to the protection of investigators; and (3) "no branch of the Department of the Army should under any circumstances write any letters to any state offices concerning this subject." Attachment 7: October 14, 1952 Memorandum from Col. Rapalski, AFEB, to Chief, Legal Office, Re: Applicability of Section 5, Public Law 557-82d Congress, and related Memorandum from Col. Rapalski to the "Members of the Armed Forces Epidemiological Board; Directors of All Commissions." In the October 14 Memorandum, Col. Rapalski asks for legal opinion regarding a recently passed law. That law provides (the relevant portion of the law appears as Attachment 8) DOD with the authority to indemnify contractors against liability and loss from injuries to third parties arising out of the direct performance of a research and development contract. Col. Rapalski's memorandum stated: 5 l. The Armed Forces Epidemiological Board has raised the question as to a practical problem in conjunction with Public Law 557-82d Congress. Under its sponsorship, the Armed Forces are supporting crucial medical research in which human volunteers in Federal and State prisons are involved. 2. The particular question that has been raised is whether Section 5. . .is applicable to afford relief to the immediate dependents of such prisoner volunteers when as a result of these experiment [sic] they should die. In his attached Memorandum to the AFEB, Colonel Rapalski reported that the legal office had advised: From the wording of the law, and from the above quoted legislative history [which does not expressly refer to human experimentation], it can be determined that this provision was aimed at private contractors as distinguished from Government agencies. It is aimed at those functions or experiments which are unusually hazardous for which the contractor cannot obtain liability insurance, and it is a direct indemnification to the contractor and not to the human guinea pig. The charge of claims, therefore, would be for the next of kin of the deceased person to make a claim against the contractor. Attachment 8: Public Law 557 - 82nd Congress 6