DISCLAIMER The following is a staff memorandum or other working document prepared for the members of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments. It should not be construed as representing the final conclusions of fact or interpretation of the issues. All staff memoranda are subject to revision based on further information and analysis. For conclusions and recommendations of the Advisory Committee, readers are advised to consult the Final Report to be published in 1995. TAB I-2 þþþDRAFT þ FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLYþþþ MEMORANDUM TO: Members of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments FROM: Advisory Committee Staff DATE: February 8, 1995 RE: Transcript of Debate on the Need for Military-Purpose Human Experimentation As previously noted, Advisory Committee Staff has discovered about two dozen transcripts of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Advisory Committee on Biology and Medicine. Included among these transcripts is a discussion of the need for military-related human experimentation that is the fullest contemporary discussion of the need for human radiation experimentation (and not, that is, simply the conditions on which it should take place) that has been located to date. This memorandum attaches a copy of the transcript (Attachment 1). As you will note, the transcript does not clearly state the date of the meeting to which it is connected, although the handwritten note at the top right corner appears to be "Fifth ACBM meeting," which took place in January 1948. In any event, the primary discussants include key AEC officials Dr. Shields Warren (head of the Division of Biology and Medicine), Dr. Alan Gregg (Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Biology and Medicine), Colonel Cooney (head of the AEC Division of Military Applications) and military radiation officials (including Admiral Greaves, and Captain Behrens, first head of the Navy's Atomic Medicine Division). The discussion is obviously related to the discussion of the need for experimentation in connection with the nuclear powered airplane (NEPA)1[The 1946-1961 Air Force program on the nuclear bomber known as NEPA (Nuclear Energy Propulsion for Airplanes).] although, because of the absence of a clear date, it is not clear whether it came at the beginning or end of the NEPA debate. While the transcript selection is relatively brief and can be quickly read as a whole, the flow of the discussion includes the following: 1 l. At pages 1-4 Admiral Greaves, Captain Behrens, and Captain Haight lay out the need for information on which to base decisions about the exposure of soldiers and civilians to radiation-related risk. 2. At pages 5-8 Colonel Cooney explains the difficulty of finding clear answers to questions on radiation risk: A few years ago I asked the radiological society of North America to give me the answer to this problem: How much ionizing radiation can a healthy soldier take and still perform his duties. They wrote letters to every radiologist in the country and received six replies. . .Most of this work was unsatisfactory because the data was so poor. I don't believe we can go too much on our Hiroshima and Nagasaki studies because there are so many complicating factors. Cooney related that "[N]ow, at every conference I attend of the military, I am asked by the line officer how much radiation can a man take?" * * * * So we are very much in a quandary and we have a responsibility that is tremendous. If this weapon is used tactically. . .and if we have, say, 5,000 troops who have received 100 r radiation, the Commander is going to want to know from me, 'Is it all right for me to reassemble these men and take them into combat?' I don't know the answer to that question. Cooney invoked prior experimentation: Personally I see no difference in subjecting men to this than I do to any other type of experimentation that has ever been carried on. Walter Reed killed some people. It was certainly the end result that was very wonderful. 3. At pages 12-15 Shields Warren responds to Cooney. First, Warren explains that animal data should be sufficient because "very fortunately the radiosensitivity of various species of animals tends to fall on either side of that of man." Second, Warren says that the "problem of getting adequate numbers for statistical significance is very great": 2 In order to get a satisfactory answer to this problem in humans, I don't see how it is possible to have an answer that means anything, over and above what we already have in or animal data and our scattered human data, without going to tens of thousands of individuals. . . .If we were considering things in the Kremlin, undoubtedly it would be practicable. I doubt that it is practicable here. Finally, Warren addresses the Walter Reed example: I think it needs to be remembered that there was no known host that could be used for such experiments, and no way of carrying it out from the standpoint of the known bacterial or viral effects. There was no way of fulfilling the postulates because there was no other way or other animals than men to be susceptible. 4. At pages 15-16 Cooney and Warren exchange views on the likelihood that information which "statistically will prove nothing," would still be of practical value to generals and troops. 5. At page 16 Admiral Greaves states his appreciation that "the idea of human experimentation within this country is certainly repugnant." 6. At page 19, Dr. Gregg expresses interest in the notion of volunteers: I am interested in that principally for this reason: I think that there is enough of the general atmosphere around the AEC affairs that it is singularly important for us to steer away from human experimentation because we never could get, or certain things could not be brought out in the public trial, which is a control. 7. At page 28 Admiral Greaves notes that the NEPA group has suggested the use of prisoners, leading to the following exchange: Dr. Gregg: Is this civilian prisoners, you mean? Ad. Greaves: Yes. Dr. Gregg: Doesn't that fall in the category of cruel and unusual punishment? Admiral Greaves: Not if they would carry out the work as they proposed at the time they proposed it. It would be on an absolutely volunteer basis, and under every safety precaution that could be built up around it. I don't think so, and it didn't strike me as being cruel and unusual. 3 Dr. Warren: It is not very long since we got through trying Germans for doing exactly that thing. Admiral Greaves: That wasn't voluntary when they did it, they made them do it. I think there were a lot of prisoners and I am given to understand that there are plenty of people in our prisons who will volunteer for that kind of work. Dr. Warren: Always for a quid pro quo. 4