DISCLAIMER The following is a staff memorandum or other working document prepared for the members of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments. It should not be construed as representing the final conclusions of fact or interpretation of the issues. All staff memoranda are subject to revision based on further information and analysis. For conclusions and recommendations of the Advisory Committee, readers are advised to consult the Final Report to be published in 1995. þþþDRAFT þ FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLYþþþ MEMORANDUM TO: Members of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments FROM: Advisory Committee Staff DATE: March 8, 1995 RE: Risk to Downwinders from Government Consideration of Plans to Understand Fallout Previously the Advisory Committee uncovered both psychological experiments and ground crawling experiments conducted at Operation Buster-Jangle (1951). Documents retrieved from the archives at Los Alamos National Laboratory shed new light on the Jangle series. In the Jangle series the AEC and the military originally planned three nuclear tests where the weapon's fireball would touch the ground. This type of test produces more local fall-out than air-burst tests and consequently it poses a greater hazard for populations around the site. Newly uncovered documents reveal that the government knew this and: (1) worried about the possible radiological hazard for people downwind of the site, (2) argued that the potential data that could be obtained on fallout patterns justified the risks, and (3) planned but later canceled a safety shot to determine the level of hazard. Furthermore, the government chose to conduct the tests in Nevada because more remote sites would make it difficult to study fallout. In "Notes on the Meeting of a Committee To Consider the Feasibility and Conditions For a Preliminary Radiological Safety Shot for Operation 'Windsquall'" [later named "Jangle"] May 21-22, 1951 (Attachment 1) and related memoranda we see a frank discussion of radiological hazard including the following points: . The AEC agreed to a series of tests as long as the first test was designated to study the radiological hazard for populations downwind of the test site. (p. 4) . Shields Warren, the committee's chairman, argued that the risks of injury from this shot were real: I would almost say from the discussion thus far that in the light of the size and activity of some of these particles, their unpredictability of fall-out, the possibility of external beta burns is quite real. (p. 41) 1 . Committee members considered the test as a "calculated risk" for populations downwind of the site, but they thought that the information they could gain made the risk worthwhile: [Dr. G.] Failla [from Columbia University] believes that the time has come when we should take some risk and get some information for the future situation. In other words, we are faced with a war in which atomic weapons will undoubtedly be used, and we have to have some information about these things. With a lot of monitoring, the end instrumentation will give us the information we want; if we look for perfect safety, we will never make these tests. (p. 40) . The test was carried out in Nevada instead of a more remote sight partly because the government wanted a location where they could study fallout patterns. The test was originally planned for Amchitka, Alaska--an isolated and unpopulated island--but that site was abandoned, in part because it would be difficult to study fallout: [Dr. A.] Spilhaus [from the AFSWP] stated that one of the really urgent reasons for abandoning Amchitka as a test site was that because of the limited extent of the island, it was felt a complete fall-out picture could not be obtained, and it would be very bad if this were omitted. (p. 47) . The committee portrayed the test as a gamble where they might lose the continental test site. As Carroll Tyler argued, Putting it in a slightly different way, I have a feeling that if this particular experiment turns out unsuccessfully, we have lost a continental site no matter where we put it. The Las Vegas site was chosen by a large group of people who studied this, as being the least hazardous and best of continental sites. If we are going to gamble on this (and it is a gamble, no matter what precautions we take), it might as well be done where it is operationally convenient. These operations are not simple. (p. 19). 2 . The committee decided to downplay their uncertainty to the public because the public would not understand scientific caution. (Thompson would like to include a statement in the final report to the effect that this is all based on conjecture and incomplete data.) [Shields] Warren: One thing I'm afraid of is that in stating our scientific caution here, we overdo it from the standpoint of lay and political feeling. Although in our final wording we have to give due regard to our gaps in knowledge, we must not make these overly prominent so as to mislead those who are not used to scientific caution. (pp. 51-52) . The committee recommended evacuating all populations within a 44 mile radius of ground zero. The notes from the meeting read, The question of whether a 25-mile radius downwind of evacuation was sufficient was debated at length. It was suggested that it be extended to 45 miles. Hempleman [a doctor from the University of Rochester] felt that any statement should emphasize that the matter should receive further detailed study. (p. 41) In the committee's report that followed this meeting they list "Some reasons for thinking that 44 miles from zero is a safe distance from any concentrated fall-out." (Meeting of a Committee to Consider the Feasibility and Conditions for a Preliminary Radiologic Safety Shot for Jangle, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, May 21 and 22, 1951, Attachment 2). Despite this recommendation no civilians were evacuated before the shot. . 260 military personnel observed this shot, and after the detonation soldiers conducted maneuvers over ground zero. The committee, however, only discussed the safety of civilians. . After the committee adjourned some of the members had a growing concern about the first safety shot. A month after the committee met Dr. Shipman writes. 3 A not inconsiderable number of people in the Laboratory have expressed definite doubts as to whether or not a deep (50 foot) underground shot can be fired at the Nevada Test Site without subjecting nearby towns such as Alamo and Caliente to an unjustifiable hazard. (Shipman to Clark, Rad Safe Considerations, Operation Jangle, 18 June 1951, Attachment 3). . The committee then met again and canceled the safety shot. At the meeting of Dr. Warren's committee which was held here in May, it was decided that Operation Jangle would open with the deep underground shot. This particular shot was added to the plan of the operation purely as a method to determine the safety of the succeeding shots. It as the major premise of this committee that such a shot would be the safest of the three, in that the radioactive cloud would be contained by surrounding mountains. After considering this matter carefully, we feel that this is a false assumption and that in all probability the deep underground shot could be the most dangerous of the lot. . . it could under proper conditions deposit dangerous amounts of activity in populated areas. (T. L. Shipman, Health Division Leader, to John C. Clark, J-Division, Special Rad Safe Problems -- Operation Bungle (sic.) Attachment 4, p. 3). . After the test was over scientists concluded that they did not injure anyone but that this was due to their good fortune rather than good planning. Dr. Shipman writes: There was considerable fallout in uninhabited areas just outside the proving ground and at comparable distances which would have given a lifetime integrated dose of approximately thirty roentgens. It was probably more good luck than good management that the Groom mine area itself did not receive a higher dose than it did. (Shipman to DMA USAEC WASHDC 8/19/52, Attachment 5) 4 In Operation Jangle, thanks to the kindness of the winds, no significant activity was deposited in any populated localities. It was certainly shown, however, that significant exposures at considerable distances could be acquired by individuals who actually were in the fall-out while it was in progress. (Shipman to Graves, Summary Report Rad Safe and Health Activities at Buster-Jangle, 12/27/51, Attachment 6, p. 7) 5