Attachment 4 T.L. Shipman to John C. Clark re: Special Rad Safe Problems, Operation Bungle (sic.), 8/11/51 John C. Clark, ILLEGIBLE July 11, 1951 ILLEGIBLE. ILLEGIBLE. Shipman, Division Leader SPECIAL RAD SAFE PROBLEMS - OPERATION BUNGLE H-59 In view of your forthcoming trip to Washington, there are a few matters which I would like to send along with you, either for your own information or for ILLEGIBLE in Washington. 1. ILLEGIBLE In accordance with the conference in your office on 11 July, it can be stated that neither you as its Director nor the Rad Safe officers have specific interest in clouds tracking activities beyond a maximum radius of 600 miles. It is our feeling that beyond this distance any cloud will be sufficiently dispersed so that aircraft, commercial, private or military, can fly through it with impunity. I further feel that at these distances there can be no significant fall-out which could possibly produce a health hazard of any sort. We feel, therefore, that cloud tracking activities beyond this distance should be contracted for by the AEC. By previous memo and discussion with Walter Claus of the Division of Biology and Medicine, I have stated that we do not feel able to administer and supervise dust collecting, air sampling or ground monitoring programs beyond a 200-mile area, and that such work, if it is to be done, should be administered by someone in or appointed by the Division of Biology and Medicine. The information gained from such programs is of some academic interest to us, and copies of reports of such activities should certainly be sent here. The information gained, however, may be of specific interest and importance to the AEC and the Division of Biology and Medicine in providing data for the photographic industry and also in defending any claims or suits for damage resulting from the operations. If the Division of B & M has not started anything in this direction, they should perhaps be needled gently. 2. Evacuation It is my feeling that developing detailed plans for possible evacuation of civilian population and the carrying out of such plans is not a responsibility of the Rad Safe organization. I feel that it is our responsibility to determine in advance under what conditions evacuation should be accomplished and to state when such conditions have been attained. It should be an additional responsibility to point out which of alternate evacuation routes might be preferable. The magnitude of the operation is already placing enough of a work load on all Rad Safe personnel so that I do not feel it possible to assign specific people to this work. There is also the fact John C. Clark - 2 - July 11, 1951 that should we approach a ILLEGIBLE where the question of evacuation might come up for active ILLEGIBLE, all of our available people will be busy monitoring, etc. It will certainly not be the time to have these people wondering about how we get children, pets, etc. into vehicles. I do feel, however, that some organization should carry out specific planning for possible evacuation of civilian groups in the surrounding area. It is absolutely essential that this be done in such a way as to avoid frightening people unnecessary. We do not wish to wear out our welcome or otherwise jeopardize the cordial public relations currently existing. Technically speaking, this is the sort of thing which should be the responsibility of the Civil Defense organization on a State Level, although I doubt if any such organization actually exists. 3. Permissible Exposure For both Operation Ranger and Operation Greenhouse we used a permissible exposure of 3.0 r for the operation. If it is agreeable with Dr. Warren, we propose that this same level be used again. Experience in the two recent tests has shown this to be realistic and workable. We do not consider it a calculated risk neither does it appear to be unduly restrictive. In this connection I might point out that certain workers at Greenhouse actually got more exposure from fall-out from operational activities. This situation was totally unexpected, and was more or less handled by ILLEGIBLE looking the other way. In other words, workers were not credited with fall-out exposure in determining the extent of their activities, although it meant that a number of people came home with quite significant total exposures. In the cases of Los Alamos personnel this has been entered in their exposure records. I do not feel that we can afford to adopt a similar policy again. (This does not imply criticisms of the decisions made at Greenhouse). I feel that using the 3.0 r permissible exposure for the operation does not seriously violate the spirit of the AEC directive on this matter. Actually we are giving ourselves a little leeway to permit the concurrent beta exposure which is not measured. There has already been expressed by some of the military groups the feeling that they may not necessarily be bound by the same permissible exposure levels as will be used for other workers; they would like to feel that they can go ahead and get higher exposures if they wish. Certainly I on my own responsibility cannot permit this; and as this operation is being staged fundamentally by the AEC, I feel that there should be a specific direction covering this matter from Dr. Warren personally. We can think of a ILLEGIBLE rare individual cases where leniency might be permitted, such as the pilot of a jet plane collecting air samples. John C. Clark - 3 - July 11, 1951 4. Sequence of Detonations At the meeting of Dr. Warren's committee which was held here in May, it was decided that Operation Jangle would open with the deep underground shot. This particular shot was added to the plan of the operation purely as a method to determine the safety of the succeeding shots. It was the major premise of this committee that such a shot would be the safest of the three, in that the radioactive cloud would be contained by surrounding mountains. After considering this matter carefully, we feel that this is a false assumption and that in all probability the deep underground shot could be the most dangerous of the lot. Basing my personal opinion on the calculations made by ILLEGIBLE Felt and on various conversations and discussions with Jerry Suydam, Bill Ogle, members of H-1, and others, I am satisfied that the deep underground shot would probably be the most dangerous of the three, and that it could under proper conditions deposit dangerous amounts of activity in populated areas. I realize perfectly well that such an opinion cannot be proven beyond doubt by any calculations done so far, but I feel strongly that firing the deep underground shot represents a possible risk to surrounding population and livestock; and that should things go wrong, it could jeopardize the entire future of the Nevada Test Site. Personally, I would be willing to accept this risk if I felt that the detonation were essential from a scientific or military point of view. It is my understanding, however, that while the D.O.D. and other have accepted the inclusion cheerfully, this particular detonation was tossed in purely as a radiologic safeguard. For this reason, therefore, it is my personal recommendation that the deep underground shot be eliminated from Operation Jangle, and that the surface detonation be fired first. [Original signed by Thomas L. Shipman, M.D.] T.L. Shipman, M.D. Health Division Leader TLS/cs Distribution: John C. Clark - cy 1A T.N. White - cy 2A H-Div. File - cy 3A P.S. I should not forget to add the opinion which is generally held here, and to which I subscribe, that the exposures permissible for the general population beyond the 40 mile radius, which were proposed by Dr. Failla and incorporated in Dr. Warren's report of the meeting here, simply are not realistic. It would cause me personally very little concern if some of these people should by chance receive as much as 5 or 10 r total dose. I would not anticipate exposure of this magnitude, but if conditions were right, a dose of 2 or 3 might not be surprising. I would consider evacuation if the estimated total dose seemed to be somewhere between 25 and 50 r, provided we could be certain that such evacuation would not serve to increase the exposure rather than decrease it.