Attachment 6 T. L. Shipman to Alvin C. Graves re: Summary Report: Rad Safe and Health at Buster-Jangle, 12/27/51 December 27, ILLEGIBLE Alvin C. Graves, J-Division Leader T. L. Shipman, M. D., Health Division Leader SUMMARY REPORT RAD SAFE AND HEALTH ACTIVITIES AT BUSTER-JANGLE SYMBOL : R In accordance with your request of December 12, I am pleased to submit at this time a summary report of the Rad Safe and Health organization activities during the course of Operation Buster-Jangle. In view of the fact that one of the purposes of this report is to supply you and the Test Manager with information useful for the preparation of subsequent test operations, have not hesitated to include a considerable number of suggestions as to how such an operation can be improved. I have not attempted to discuss the cost and types of equipment involved in view of the fact that we used a considerable amount of equipment which had previously been used at Greenhouse, and much that was purchased for Buster- Jangle will be usable at subsequent operations. I have not gone into detail at all as to our operational procedures feeling that this as already quite familiar to you. Our final report will, of course, contain much of this information. ORIGINAL SIGNED BY THOMAS L. SHIPMAN, M.D. T. L. SHIPMAN, M. D. Health Division Leader Attached - Summary Report dtd Dec. 27, 1951 SUMMARY REPORT TO THE TEST DIRECTOR FROM THE RAD SAFE AND HEALTH UNIT OPERATION BUSTER-JANGLE INTRODUCTION For the purpose of this report, Operation Buster-Jangle is regarded as a single operation, in view of the fact that the activities of the Rad Safe and Health Unit were continuous from the beginning of Buster to the end of Jangle. The purpose of this report is to provide a bird's-eye view of the entire operation as viewed from the Rad Safe and Health Unit. Certain comments and criticisms of functions outside of our own organization will be given. It should not be assured that we are ILLEGIBLE of numerous aims of omission and commission within our ow group, some of which will be commended on in this report, while others will be regarded as lessons learned by which rad safe service at future test can be improved. During Operation Buster-Jangle the rad safe work itself was combined, for administrative purposes, with first aid and medical care, safety and fall-out analysis. The advisability of continuing this type of organization will be considered below. RAD SAFE ORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL The following table lists the entire personnel of the Rad Safe and Health Unit and indicates the source of our people in three enterprise -- LASL, Military, and all ILLEGIBLE civilian personnel. In this tabulation I have not ILLEGIBLE also in the middle of the ILLEGIBLE the Laboratory there ILLEGIBLE. 1 RAD SAFE AND HEALTH LASL MILITARY OTHER TOTAL 1. Administration 8 2 10 2. Monitoring 9 52 20 81 3. Fall-out Study 14 1 17 32 4. Dosimetry 10 3 13 5. Supply 3 2 5 6. First Aid 5 1 6 7. Safety 1 1 8. Vehicle Decontamination 18 18 9. Meteorology 3 3 10. Transportation 1 1 11. Instrument Repair 5 4 9 12. Aerial Terrain Survey 2 2 13. Pilots 4 2 6 ____ ____ ____ ____ 61 87 39 187 As can be seen, H-Division contributed approximately one-third of our entire roster, while I would estimate that perhaps 80% of our total effort grow out of requirements of the Military Effects Program. Of the 30 civilian monitors, 5 were drawn from the AESS at Los Alamos, 3 from FCDA, 1 from the Division of Biology and Medicine in Washington, and the others from other ILLEGIBLE installations. I doubt if we could obtain a similar number of ILLEGIBLE from these ILLEGIBLE organizations another time. As it was, they got pretty well fed up with the length of time they were involved. Of the military monitors, most were officers up to and ILLEGIBLE the ILLEGIBLE. In the future I feel we should depend largely on enlisted men. I further feel that the number of H-Division people participating must be held very rigidly to a minimum. There was no aspect o four regular work here in Los Alamos which did not suffer as a result of the expensive participation in the test. Over a third of H-Division was involved to a greater or lesser extent, a situation which I consider extremely questionable. 2 III. FUTURE ORGANIZATION In considering the size and shape of a Rad Safe organization for a future test, I would like to make the following suggestions: A. Administration - H-Division should furnish only what personnel is needed to provide an over-all supervisory and policy-making group. The actual operational work should be placed entirely in the hands of the military, with the understanding that members of our own organization would retain certain supervisory rights. We will also maintain direct supervision of other Los Alamos groups participating in the test. B. As mentioned above, I recommend extensive use of enlisted men, with a limited group of officers to supervise them. C. I feel that the air sampling and fall-out studies as carried out during the recent operation by Harry Schulte's group, must be continued at least for Operation Snapper, as we now understand it. This work, however, can be combined with all of the off-site monitoring. D. I feel that the provision of first aid and medical care is a responsibility of AEC which should best be delegated to the military. One of our own physicians should undoubtedly be at the site during the most active period for the aid and comfort of Laboratory personnel. E. Safety and sanitation must be a continuing and full time responsibilities of AEC. It must be admitted that Operation Ivy present enough unique 3 aspects so that it may be advisable to designate within the Laboratory staff a full time safety representative who would be responsible to Roy Raider, but at all times available to W and J Division and present at all test operations. F. Our supply organization was under-staffed, and I strongly recommend that in the future laundry equipment be installed at the test site, with adequate personnel to operate it on at least a two and preferral a three-shift basis. There should at the same time be available a labor pool of perhaps half a dozen G. I.'s for the ILLEGIBLE jobs requiring brawn more brains. G. Our dosimetry and exposure records group, in spite of being understaffed, I believe did the best job that has ever been done at any test. There is room for improvement, which requires a slight increase in personnel. H. Transportation - The vehicles provided for our use were in many instances unsatisfactory for the work they were called on to perform. Dodge sedans are certainly inadequate for back roads, while jeeps and weapons carriers leave much to be desired during a winter operation. The total number of vehicles available to us was inadequate, owing to the constantly increasing requirements of the operation. I. Instrument Repair. - This work was poorly handled because we did not at all times have a top flight man in charge of it. This same work was much better done at Greenhouse. J. Airplanes. - The use of planes and helicopters seem to become increasingly vital. This subject, however, will not be gone into detail in this report. K. Communications. - It is assumed that the ILLEGIBLE of the telephone 4 system will be rectified before the next operation. Telephone communications between the CP and Camp #3 were unbelievably bad. As for radio, we feel that the Rad Safe Unit should have two channels assigned, one for site monitoring, the other for all off-site work including direct communication with helicopters and other planes assigned to us. IV. RADIATION EXPOSURES In Appendix #1 are given certain tables which will give the essential facts of individual exposures. An exposure limit of 3r was agreed on prior to the test, and our experience at Operation Ranger, Greenhouse, Buster and Jangle indicates that this is a reasonable goal. It should also be pointed out that the Division of Biology and Medicine greed to an exposure of 3.9r. This we did not announce publicly, but used it to give the 3r limited some added flexibility for operations where it was absolutely necessary. Admittedly, we did have overexposures, but none of these were of such magnitude as to cause any concern. They will, of course, be kept in mind at any future test, and certain individuals may be given lower permissible exposures as a result. The average exposure in the monitoring group was kept as low as it was only be the most diligent conservation of manpower. It might have been possible to get by with fewer monitors had we known more definitely in advance what the monitoring requirements would be. To the best of our knowledge, no individual was injured by radiation either within the test program or in the surrounding countryside. V. ACCIDENTS Our pre-test prediction that the motor vehicle would be our greatest ILLEGIBLE was well ILLEGIBLE, as is shown by one fatality and one near fatality. We have, in addition, of one jeep and two pickups which turned over, fortunately without injury to the ILLEGIBLE. There were no other accidents within the test program of any consequence with the exception of one back strain. The necessity for improved first aid facilities, with space for at least a couple of beds at Camp #3, has been clearly demonstrated. 5 VI. RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION In Appendix @3 and Appendix #2 are given maps indicating the level and extent of residual activity at the shot sites, as well as in the surrounding territory. We have, I think established the fact that air drops provide little in the way of problems from the point of view of residual radiation. `Unable' Able certainly appeared at first to present a very unique problem, but this turned out to be only of minor importance. In Operation Jangle, thanks to the kindness of the winds, no significant activity was deposited in any populated localities. It was certainly shown, however, that significant exposures at considerable distances could be acquired by individuals who actually were in the fall-out while it was in progress. In considering Operation Snapper one would do wall to remain respectful of the possibilities and to keep clearly in mind the picture of the cattle at the time of Operation Trinity. Detonations at higher yield can surely drop active material at greater distances. VII. METEOROLOGY Mention should be made of the very significant contribution of Lt. Col. ILLEGIBLE and Major ILLEGIBLE in devising a method of forecasting the time and area of fall- out. These forecasts, of course, can be no more accurate than the weather predictions but with this limitation, the work was of ILLEGIBLE assistance in locating the fall-out study and mobile monitoring ILLEGIBLE in strategic spots. VIII. FALL-OUT STUDY It will be a considerable time before we can get a complete analysis of the data collected in this study. It seems assured, however, that information of great significance and importance has been acquired. The experiment was not cheap either in manpower of dollars. Thirty-two people, 17 of them coming from the U.S.P.M.S. or other civilian organizations, were absorbed in this work, and they had at their disposal an array of dust collecting and air sampling instruments such as had never before been gathered together. Their operations were carried out under extremely difficult conditions and in terrain which was, to put it mildly, unfavorable for such work. The members of this group very properly regarded Operation Buster largely as a training operation for the more important problems of Jangle. Of particularly interest in both of the Jangle shots was the large amount of extremely radioactive airborned due which could pass a given point without leaving any significant deposition on the ground. It is well known that the dust cloud following the second shot went up to the north with a low velocity wind, and seemed to hang in the valleys without getting such of anywhere. What is not so generally known it that in the late afternoon the wind reversal itself, and the same dust came right back to pass directly over the CP. By this time it had a mean particle size of approximately 0.1 ILLEGIBLE, but was sufficiently active in raising the background so that all counting activities had to be given up for the night. Filter papers on which some of this dust was collected were too hot to count even the following day. Quantitative results of this work cannot be given at the present time, but Appendix #4 outlines the qualitative aspects of the work. IX. COMMENTS ON ADMINISTRATION AND ENGINEERING There were numerous factors beyond our control which served to complicate the work of the Rad Safe organization. It might be well at this time briefly to consider some of these factors. I am perfectly certain that 6 many of the points which will be mentioned are understood by others and on the way to being corrected. It also should be obvious that members of the Rad Safe organization were not the only one affected. A. Operations Schedule: It must be kept in mind that over half of the Rad Safe and Health Unit consisted of civilian workers either from Los Alamos or other institutions. The majority of our people arrived at the test site during the last week of September and remained there for the most part until the first week of December. All of these people left their regular jobs to do this work. They arrived at a test site which was not, by the wildest stretch of the imagination, in any condition to receive them. The willingness on the part of the administration to cling to the previously announced schedule, thereby subjecting a large number of people to a period of intense discomfort, with the consequent inefficiencies and expense, is one of the points at which I continue to marvel. The entire area, still under construction as it was, was hazardous to the extreme, and the relatively small number of injuries which resulted must be attributed more to good luck then good management. I fee that the risks which were incurred as a result of jamming people into a camp only partially completed and grossly overcrowded were far more serious and culpable than any of the rinks normally attendant on full scale weapons tests. I cannot regard the fact that the last shot in the serine went off on schedule as anything to be particularly proud of. We can only ILLEGIBLE for a more realistic approach in the future. I would like to recommend the inclusion of a Rad Safe representative at most of the meetings and conferences in the early planning phase of a test. In these early stages many problems arise with rad safe ILLEGIBLE and we were given very little opportunity either to express an opinion or to inform ourselves as to what was in store for us. 7 B. Operations Plan: In the early part of 1951, Operation Buster looked like a reasonably simple affair. It grew alarmingly with the inclusion of a Military Effects Program, and then the entire appearance of the operation was changed by the addition of Jangle. No firm facts were available on which the Rad Safe organization could estimate its requirements; changes and additions appeared and reappeared up to, and in some cases, after the various detonations. Some way must be found of insisting on an early cut-off date, so that one can say 'This is the operation and specifies the requirements; additions or amendments must wait for a future operations'. At the time of Operation Ranger, the dangers and difficulties of having shots too close together were appreciated, and it was agreed at that time that in the future, detonations would be spaced adequately far apart. At Operation Buster this lesson was forgotten or neglected, and shots were squeezed together with what I regard as inadequate time for personnel to function efficiently. I appreciate the desire to complete a program as soon as possible, and yet it seems that a sense of urgency can carry one to extremes. C. Organizations: I am sure that the officers of the Rad Safe Unit were at all times somewhat confused as to whom they were actually responsible. We did not know specifically whether we belonged to the University, the AEC, or ILLEGIBLE. It is hoped that a ILLEGIBLE organization can be worked out in the future. 8 There was a very marked tendency for certain officials to operate more or less by remote control. On innumerable occasions we would need a decision on some point from some person in authority, and find that the person had departed for Las Vegas or for Los Alamos without leaving a responsible alternate. This was particularly true during the pre-test and roll-up periods. many people seemed to forget that many operations, including the work of the Rad Safe Unit, started early and continued well after the last shot was fired. The office handling travel reservations was dissolved just about at the time we needed it most. Establishing the post of duty officer helped considerably, but this post was again abolished only a day or so after the last shot. D. Information Service: There seemed to be no machinery for dissemination of information of all sorts widely to all test personnel. I recommend the use of the daily newsletter which was handed out at ILLEGIBLE. Such a newsletter could carry all sorts of announcements and bulletins of interest and importance to all personnel. E. Drafting of Maps: We must have in the future improved map making facilities, or also we must be prepared to do this work ourselves. F. Roads and Transportation: Careful thought should be given to the provision of adequate by-pass roads, so that all parts of the test area can be reached even though main highways become contaminated. This is regarded as of prime importance for Operation Snapper. I regard the type of highway construction within the site, with the narrow shoulders and deep ditches, as hazardous. It should be obvious by this time that the motor vehicle is potentially 9 our most dangerous instrument. It is also hoped that someone with more experience than a mess officer can be found to run the motor pool, the operation of which left much to be desired during Buster-Jangle. More care should be exercised in providing vehicles suitable for the work which they are to perform, and there should be an adequate number of vehicles suitable for the work which they are to perform, and there should be an adequate number of vehicles for all organizations so that those which go to the contaminated area ordinarily do not go south of the CP. I feel that better transportation between Camp #3 and the CP should be provided, as well as better transportation between Las Vegas and the camp. I also hope that it can be arranged that military shuttle planes operating between Indian Springs and Albuquerque can return to Albuquerque in time to connect with the least scheduled Carco to Los Alamos. G. Meals: The system of feeding people whose work required that they remain at the CP was, in my opinion, deplorable. There was, I think, nothing in the entire operation which produced as many complaints -- complaints which I shared wholeheartedly. Thought should also be given to the lunches provided to work parties obliged to remain at remote points in the Forward Area all day. H. Sleeping Accommodations: It is, I think, the unanimous opinion of the members of our group that sleeping quarters must be provided at the CP to accommodate approximately 20 members of the Rad Safe organization. it is impossible to predict how much of this space will have to be utilized only the night before a shot, an dhow much will be needed almost consecutively. I realize that this a distasteful item, and yet we must face the facts realistically. 10 I. SUMMARY We of the Rad Safe and Health Unit feel that at Operations Buster and Jangle we accomplished our mission successfully. We did this in spite of mistakes, many of them our own, and some beyond our control. We were somewhat undermanned in our supply organization, in the dosimetry and records group, and in the instruments repair group, but in each instance we managed to get by. For a subsequent operation we recommend far smaller participation by the Laboratory, with greater contribution of personnel by the military. We recommend the exclusion from the organization of first aid and medical care and safety, with the inclusion from the organization of first aid and medical care and safety, with the inclusion of laundry facilities and a labor pool. If the group responsible for study of fall-out problems is included, we feel that the Rad Safe Unit, for a test of comparative size and complexity, will be very close to the same size. The expenses would be far less, as so much of the equipment has already been purchased. As the nominal Director of the Rad Safe and Health Unit, and realizing only too well the limitations of my own knowledge, I would like to take this opportunity to express my deepest gratitude and appreciation of the work done by the members of the Unit. Our staff, I believe, was composed of men whom I regard as the most experienced and best qualified available. To every assignment they gave the best of their ability, and lack of neither sleep nor food delayed them from carrying out their assignments. I regard it as a great privilege to have been associated with them and would feel honored to work with them again in the future. I am sure that I, together with all of the others, stand ready to serve the test organization in the future, and if ILLEGIBLE by only , we can accomplish prodigies. It should be pointed out, however, that in the background we still 11 hear the insistent chorus of our respective wives who make no attempt to counsel their collective opinion that these things last too darn long. to this we say `amen'! ORIGINAL SIGNED BY THOMAS L. SHIPMAN, M.D. 27 December 1951 THOMAS L. SHIPMAN, M. D. Director, Rad Safe & Health Unit Distribution: elA & c2A - Al Graves e3A - Shields Warren e4A, e5A & e6A - H-Division Files Attachments: Appendix 1 - Radiation Exposure Summary (3 pages) Appendix 2 - Shot Site Area Survey (1 page w/7 maps) Appendix 3 - Mobile Monitoring for Fall-out (4 pages w/2 maps) Appendix 4 - Fall-out Project (6 pages w/1 map) 12