DISCLAIMER The following is a staff memorandum or other working document prepared for the members of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments. It should not be construed as representing the final conclusions of fact or interpretation of the issues. All staff memoranda are subject to revision based on further information and analysis. For conclusions and recommendations of the Advisory Committee, readers are advised to consult the Final Report to be published in 1995. TAB H-2 þþþDRAFT þ FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLYþþþ MEMORANDUM TO: Members of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments FROM: Advisory Committee Staff DATE: March 8, 1995 RE: Debates between the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and Department of Defense (DOD); Secrecy Policy Revealed I. THE AEC DEBATES THE DOD ON RADIATION SAFETY AND BIOMEDICAL TESTS Los Alamos served as the AEC's representative in many of the atomic bomb tests conducted during the 1950's. Documents retrieved from Los Alamos shed light on ongoing discussion, indeed debate, between Los Alamos and the Department of Defense regarding safety standards, in general, and the specific risks related to experimentation at bomb tests. In this package we include documents relating to: (1) The debate surrounding the DOD use of human experimentation, and resulting data, to decrease aircraft decontamination measures; (2) The Los Alamos/AEC objection to flashblindness human radiation experiments; (3) Los Alamos' perspective on the failure of the committees set up to screen bomb test biomedical activity. A. The Debate over the Use of Human Radiation Experiment Data and Decontamination The Advisory Committee's staff has recovered several letters on the debate between the AEC and the Air Force over the decontamination of aircraft at nuclear weapons tests. After the military conducted experiments at Operation TEAPOT (1955) where personnel rubbed their hands over the fuselages of contaminated aircraft, the Air Force concluded that decontaminating aircraft was unnecessary. The results of these experiments were notable in many ways. It was determined the "washing down" or decontamination process was unnecessary, because the main sources of the collected radiation were 1 in cracks, crevices, around rivets, and in pitted areas of the aircraft's "skin." Since the decontamination process failed to rid these areas of radiation anyway, little was gained by washing off the contamination on the smoother surfaces. (Office of Information Services Air Force Special Weapons Center, Air Research and Development Command Kirtland Air Force Base New Mexico, Early Cloud Penetration, 01/27/56, Attachment 1) Consequently, the Air Force proposed eliminating decontamination procedures in all but the most extraordinary situations. Col. Kieffer from the Air Force wrote to the AEC's Albuquerque Operations Office: Our experience in nuclear tests in developing knowledge of the psychological effects of radiation on humans, indicates that aircraft decontamination is not required for reasons of personnel safety except in unusual circumstances where radiation intensities are much greater than any we have encountered in our test and sampling aircraft to date. (Kieffer to Hertford, Attachment 2) The suggestion was not warmly received by the AEC. Dr. Thomas Shipman, for example, argued that the position was based on a flawed philosophy: The basic philosophy herein expressed is that there is no biological or moral objection to permitting personnel to receive exposures up to some predetermined level, regardless of the necessity of this exposure and regardless of whether or not it might be avoided. We have always gone on the theory that the only good exposure is zero. (Shipman to Graves, 03/29/57, Attachment 3) Dr. Plank, a Los Alamos researcher who participated in many of the cloud missions, also complained about the Air Force's proposal. He wrote that "Kieffer simply could not understand the philosophy which regards every radiation exposure as injurious but accepts minimum exposures for critical jobs." (Plank to Graves, Col. Kieffer's Proposal for the Decontamination of Sampling Aircraft, 04/24/57, Attachment 4) Kieffer took Plank's concerns seriously, Dr. Plank had read our letter of 21 March to General Herftford and is worried that any changes in our decontamination procedures will lead to situations where personnel may receive beta burns on their hands and faces or otherwise become injured from radiation. Of course we 2 don't want this to happen--and of course also we must somehow persuade all AEC representatives concerned that whatever changes we do make in our decontamination procedures will not in fact result in any significant chance of injuring anyone. (WM. B. Kieffer to Hal Plank, 04/22/57, Attachment 5) Consequently, Kieffer suggested a compromise--treat the procedures at the next test series, Operation PLUMBBOB, as an experiment. Accordingly, please let's use PLUMBBOB as experimental insofar as any changes in our decontamination procedures are concerned. Start out by following the usual procedures for all except one or two aircraft. (WM. B. Kieffer to Hal Plank, 04/22/57, Attachment 5) Plank wasn't impressed, and made his position clear in a hand written note to the leader of the J-Division, Al Graves. As you can see, Kieffer just doesn't understand the problem--radiation injury is only one consideration of the problem. I doubt if proposed exp[erimen]t will demonstrate anything and I tend to regard it as interference.(Hal Plank to Al Graves, routing slip for WM. B. Kieffer to Hal Plank, 04/22/57, Attachment 5) In the end, however, Los Alamos/AEC accepted the compromise. They refused to allow the new decontamination procedures to be used on the normal sampler aircraft for fear of affecting the data collected by the sampler aircraft. They did, however, support the idea of sending additional aircraft into atomic clouds for the purpose of collecting data on the contamination resulting from the experimental procedures. James Reeves, Test Manager for the Nevada Test Organization wrote, In the event you should wish to carry on the program as a DOD project under the Test Director independent of the sampling program for the purpose of establishing operational limits for Air Force training, we feel it would have considerable merit, and we will do everything possible to obtain a waiver of AEC operating radiological safety requirements.(Reeves to Kieffer, 05/14/1957, Attachment 6) The decontamination study, however, found that some decontamination procedures were necessary. Washing down the airplanes, for example, was found to be necessary to prevent overexposures at test sites. It appears the aircraft decontamination results in an appreciable savings 3 in personnel exposure and contamination for routine non-engine maintenance. It is doubtful that B-7 maintenance personnel working on non-decontaminated aircraft could complete a 15 event operation without exceeding the normal operational limits of 3.0 r per quarter and 5.0 r per year. (Aircraft Decontamination Study, prepared by 1st Lt. William J. Jameson, p. 6, Attachment 7) B. The Debate over Flashblindess Studies The AEC also objected to military plans to conduct flashblindness experiments, where personnel would watch the flash from a nuclear explosion. The AEC officially distanced itself from the flashblindness experiments at Operation Buster-Jangle (1951) and Operation Tumbler-Snapper (1953). In a memo from J. C. Clark, the Deputy Test Director from the AEC, to Col Hertford, the Director of the Office of Test Operations, Clark says, Part of this experiment involves the use of human subjects in which there is a possibility that permanent eye damage may result. In Operation Buster-Jangle there was a similar experiment conducted by the Air Force, wherein the observation was made from an airplane and at that time this office requested the military organization involved to furnish by document release of AEC responsibility in the event of permanent eye damage to the individuals. It is my opinion that similar arrangements should be made with the military organization for Project 4.5 Tumbler-Snapper. (J. C. Clark to Col. K. Hertford, Project 4.5, 5 March 1952, Attachment 8). As the Advisory Committee has previously reported, several individuals were injured in these flashblindness experiments and after these injuries the military recognized that the experiments should have been conducted in accordance with the "Nuremburg" policy adopted by the Secretary of Defense. C. The Debate over Biomedical Test Screening We have also received from Los Alamos more documents on the Biomedical Test Planning and Screening Committee. The committee was designed to review proposals for biomedical experiments and prevent ones that were duplicative or unworkable. The AEC, however, complained that the military refused to give the committee any power over the military's experiments. The AEC wanted the Steering Committee to have the power to reject any biomedical experiments that it did not judge worthwhile. Dr. Shipman writes, I also feel that if AEC can not exercise a measure of actual control in this matter, they might better withdraw from the picture completely and 4 permit the military to continue on its own sweet way without the somewhat ludicrous spectacle of an impotent committee's snapping at its heels like a puppy dog. (T. L. Shipman to Shields Warren, 01/10/52, Attachment 9) The Committee appears to have fallen apart but in 1957 the AEC suggested that Los Alamos participate in its resurrection. In response to this suggestion Shipman urged that the committee should, either be given some real responsibility or will at least be able to speak in a loud, strong voice against any proposed program which appears to be poorly or inadequately planned. . .or which appears to be an out and out waste of the taxpayers' money. (Shipman to Dunham, 07/05/56, Attachment 10) Interestingly, committee reviewed all of the biomedical experiments at Operation Knothole and found no problems even with the flashblindness studies. Since this was reported by Dr. Shipman, who was the director of the Health Division, the AEC's resistance to the flashblindness studies seems to have come from somewhere else in the agency. II. THE AEC'S POLICY ON SECRECY The Advisory Committee's staff has also retrieved new documents on the AEC's rules governing secrecy. The "Policy on Control of Information" was issued to explain the AEC's attitude towards secrecy. It is surprising in its progressiveness. The policy includes the provision to apply a balance test to the question of declassification. The AEC's official policy was to weigh the social benefits of declassification with any possible threat to security. These benefits were not limited to the possible gains to society but also included the benefits of political participation. "Another reason for limiting the areas of secrecy is the importance of accountability to the public, so that people may be able to judge the action of their representatives and officials and to participate in public policy decisions. Information about a public enterprise of such consequence as the atomic energy program should be concealed only for reasons soundly based upon the common defense and security." (Atomic Energy Commission, Policy on Control of Information, p. 3, Attachment 11). 5