Attachment 3

       T. L. Shipman to Alvin C. Graves, Decontamination of
                    Aircraft at Tests, 3/29/57

Al Graves, J-Division Leader                       March 29, 1957

T. L. Shipman, M.D., Health Division Leader

DECONTAMINATION OF AIRCRAFT AT TESTS

K-257


The following are my comments on the letter signed by Col.
Kieffer, dated March 21, and addressed to Mr. Hertford.  In
essence, this is a proposal that decontamination procedures on
aircraft during a test operation be virtually eliminated unless
there is a specific operational requirement which requires
decontamination.  Under ideal circumstances, I have very little
objection to such a procedure but I would like to point out that
there seems to be creeping in here a philosophy which is quite
contrary to everything which we have held to be right and proper
in the past.  I should make it clear that my remarks here are not
directed at normal USAF operations; I am concerned solely with
what happens when Air Force planes participate in tests.

The basic philosophy herein expressed is that there is no
biological or moral objection to permitting personnel to receive
exposures up to some predetermined level, regardless of the
necessity of this exposure and regardless of whether or not it
might be avoided.  We have always gone on the theory that the
only good exposure is more.  We accept the fact that certain
operations which must be performed in laboratories or at tests
simply cannot be done without accepting some exposure.  In
performing these operations, however, we have always made every
effort to keep the exposure at the lowest possible level.  This
sometimes necessitates fairly elaborate and expensive safeguards,
and sometimes delay.

In Par. 1 of Col. Kieffer's letter is stated that past experience
in tests indicates that decontamination of planes is not required
"for reasons of personal safety except in unusual circumstances
....."  I would accept this phrase if it were reworded to say
that decontamination has not been necessary to prevent
overexposures.

In the second paragraph it is stated that the elaborate
promotions followed in past tests are inconsistent with the point
of view they are trying to establish within the Air Force and
that they are not practicing what they preach.  If this means
that the Air Force is trying to indoctrinate its personnel with
the belief that moderate exposures may be received with
impugnity, I could not disagree more violently.  Perhaps this
means that the Air Force is so superior that exposures which
might hurt other people do not damage them and that rules
necessary for other people do not apply to Air Force personnel. 
In any event, I feel that this was a most unfortunate statement.

The final paragraph of Col. Kieffer's letter states that while
some exposures to ground crews might exceed the test limit, the
Air Force will keep its own records and take care of anyone who
gets hurt.  In other words, this means 

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Al Graves, J-DO                                    March 29, 1957

that Air Force personnel participating in tests are no longer to
be bound by standards and procedures which have been developed
for other less fortunate (or should I say more fortunate)
individuals.

Attached to Col. Kieffer's letter is a page having to do with
rad-safe experience in past tests.  The final paragraph of this
enclosure states:  "If a reduced decontamination effort doubled
this average dosage (less than 1 r per test), the 300 mr per week
or 3.0 r test limit would still be met."  I can think of no finer
argument to justify the decontamination procedures which have
been used in the past.  This sentence, in effect, says that we
may be able to permit sloppy methods and still sneak by.  To this
philosophy I take strong exception.

There are a number of arguments on the side of routine
decontamination of aircraft which have, in my opinion, been
overlooked.

     1.   Without decontamination there will be inevitable
migration of contamination carrying activity to other areas where
it may be very undesirable.  This letter has completely
overlooked the fact that people working at test invariably have
neighbors with special requirements.

     2.   Failure to decontaminate will produce a buildup of
long-lived beta-gamma contamination and the same would probably
be true of alpha contamination under certain circumstances.

     3.   The trucks and other equipment for decontamination
already exist; the detergent materials used have been furnished
by LASL for the reason that these materials were superior to
those furnished by the Air Force.

     4.   A 3-day separation between shots in the contemplated
tests cannot be counted on.  While there may be a 3-day period
between shots, aircraft and crews may have to be in a state of
readiness more frequently.

     5.   The current system of routine decontamination was
originally instituted by Karl Boughton and Hal Plank on the basis
of SANDSTONE reports that the exceedingly high contamination on
the planes used in that operation resulted from the dirty, greasy
condition of the planes.

It is my recommendation that the philosophy expressed in this
letter should be firmly rejected as it applies to test operations
in ILLEGIBLE and Eniwstok, and must particularly as it applies to
sampling planes.  What the Air Force wishes to do at their own
bases and in their own tactical operations is, of course, no
concern of ours.


                         ORIGINAL SIGNED BY THOMAS L. SHIPMAN,
M.D.
                              T. L. SHIPMAN, M.D.,
c1A - A. Graves               Health Division Leader
c2A - Wm. Ogle, J-Do
c3A - G. Jacks, J-Do
c4A - W. Kennedy, K-6
c5A - H. Plank, J-11
c6A - H-Div. Files
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