Attachment 11 Atomic Energy Commission, Policy on Control of Information, 5/2/49 OFFICIAL USE ONLY AEC 111/8 May 2, 1949 COPY NO. 18 ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION POLICY ON CONTROL OF INFORMATION Note by the Secretary 1. At Meeting 262 on April 28, 1949, the commission considered AEC 111/5, a report by the Executive Officer of the Program Council, together with comments from the Senior Responsible Reviewers and the Director of Security (AEC 111/6) and a revised version of Appendix "A" (AEC 111/7). After discussion, the Commission: a. Approved, with revisions directed at the meeting, the "Draft Tentative Statement by the Atomic Energy Commission on Policy for Control of Information"; b. Noted that copies of the policy statement, with the revisions directed at the meeting, will be forwarded to the MLC for information and further comment prior to promulgation or release; c. Noted that the General Manager will promulgate the revised policy statement within the AEC: DISTRIBUTION COPY NO. Secretary 1 Commissioners 2 - 6 General Manager 7 Deputy General Manager 8 General Counsel 9, 10 Biology & Medicine 11 Finance 12-14 Information 15-25 Intelligence 26 Military Application 27 Organization & Personnel 28 Production 29 Program Council 30-109 Raw Materials 110 Reactor Development 111-113 Research 114 Security 115 Secretariat 116-130 1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY d. Noted that upon promulgation of the revised policy statement within the Commission, a letter such as that in Appendix "B" to AEC 111/5 will be sent to the Joint Committee; e. Noted that upon promulgation of the revised policy statement within the Commission, a letter such as that in Appendix "C" to AEC 111/5 will be sent to the appropriate representatives of the United Kingdom and Canada; f. Noted that further consideration will be given to the possible public release of the revised policy statement; g. Requested the General Manager to recommend an individual to be made responsible for putting into effect the approved policy on control of information within the Commission. 2. Attached for the information of the Commission is the "Atomic Energy Commission Policy for Control of Information", revised in accordance with discussion at the meeting. ROY B. SNAPP Secretary 2 OFFICIAL USE ONLY ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION POLICY FOR CONTROL OF INFORMATION INTRODUCTION 1. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 contains a number of provisions governing the control of information, which have led to a large body of regulations and practices concerning the classification and declassification of documents. The operation of the system for classification and declassification of documents, which was established before the act became effective, has been subsequently formalized through such documents as the revised Declassification Guide, the Joint NME-AEC Classification Guide, and GM 93 providing for unclassified topics of research. Modifications have been made from time to time, and as a result of experience, a set of principles has been evolved governing the application of and release from secrecy of technical information. The present statement of policy defines and affirms these principles and promulgates them for use. The statement contains little that is new to those who have been concerned previously with declassification matters. The purpose in issuing it are to promote uniformity of understanding, to provide standards for judgment for use by those who carry out Commission policy, and to explain the Commission's attitude toward secrecy problems to those unfamiliar with the subject. More experience and changing conditions can be expected to lead to further evaluation of the policy in the course of time. 2. Essential provisions of the law are that the Commission shall control the dissemination of information so as to assure the common defense and security, and that dissemination of scientific and technical data should be encouraged so as to provide that free interchange of ideas and criticisms which is essential to scientific progress. - 1 - OFFICIAL USE ONLY COMMISSION POLICY IN CARRYING OUT THE LAW 3. In fulfillment of the law the Commission has determined that information should be controlled so as to promote the common defense and security in two ways: a. by withholding from those whose objectives may be inimical to the interests of the U.S., information which could be used by them to the detriment of our own security. b. by providing adequate information for a vigorous and efficient pursuit of the goals of this nation's atomic energy and other related programs, in a manner consistent with democratic traditions. 4. The secrecy classification to be applied to any item of information therefore depending upon a balance between the value of the information to inimical interests and the value expected to accrue to the U.S. either through distribution of the information under secrecy classification in official channels, or dissemination by public release. The result of such a balance of values should be appropriately modified according to the status of knowledge of the information in the part of interests inimical to the U.S. The manner of appraising and balancing these factors is discussed further below. 5. It is the policy of the Commission to maintain secrecy classification upon all information which, according to the proper balance of these factors, should be kept secret, but only upon such information. A conscious effort should be made not to overclassify, or unnecessarily classify documents. Classification should depend upon the specific merits of the individual case, not upon mere association with atomic energy, which does not in itself justify concealment. 6. The essential long-time assets of the U.S. in atomic energy, as in other fields, are the ability and experience of - 2 - OFFICIAL USE ONLY industry, the knowledge and enthusiasm of scientists, and the maintenance of momentum in all technical fields. Many of these long-term national assets lie outside the Commission's organization, and depend to an essential degree upon free access to adequate information. Another reason for limiting the areas of secrecy is the importance of accountability to the public, so that people may be able to judge the action of their representatives and officials and to participate in public policy decisions. Information about a public enterprise of such consequence as the atomic energy program should be concealed only for reasons soundly based upon the common defense and security. 7. A natural result of the accumulation of documents is that a considerable fraction of those now bearing secrecy classifications are unnecessarily or too highly classified. Careful definition of the areas of secrecy contribute to the administration of security and strengthen the security of the more vital information. A substantial reduction in volume and degree of classification of classified material without damage to security is probably possible. To the extent that it is possible, it is considered desirable. FORMULATION OF JUDGMENT UNDER THE POLICY 8. Successful control of information will require constant exercise of judgment in the last analysis by every individual concerned with classified information. It is clearly impossible to write hard and fast rules for all circumstances and all fields of information. Rather it is intended that specific rules and guides will be developed, and changed when necessary, to meet the needs of the many specialized groups and sets of conditions which exist. Such guides in the past have been, and will continue to be prepared by responsible groups of individuals as fully informed - 3 - OFFICIAL USE ONLY as possible on all ramifications of the problems, who should base their judgments upon the considerations described herein. 9. There are two general respects in which information provided to foreign countries may impair our common defense and security: a. The information may be part of the fund of scientific and technological knowledge which supports an atomic energy program; in other words, a rival atomic energy program could be conducted more effectively with knowledge of such information than in ignorance of it. b. The information might be used by inimical interests to reduce the effectiveness of our own atomic energy operations (for example, through sabotage or other means) to increase our vulnerability to attack, or to limit the effectiveness of our armed forces (for example, by devising counter-measures or by other means), or otherwise to damage the U.S. 10. The essential factor in appraising values under paragraph 9 a, is an understanding of the pertinence of particular information to the objectives of the over-all program. The Commission looks to key technical personnel associated with its activities for the essential technical judgement involved in such an understanding, which clearly requires specialized knowledge as well as familiarity with broader aspects of the program. Due attention should be paid to differences in conditions which might cause the significant obstacles confronting rival atomic energy programs to be different from those which gave most difficulty in the U.S. The appraised value of the information should depend upon the obstacles to which it pertains, and should be in proportion to the importance to the rival program of overcoming the pertinent obstacles, and also to the degree of assistance which knowledge of the information would provide in overcoming the particular obstacles involved. 11. Values of the type referred to in paragraph 9 b will often depend upon many factors of a non-technical nature, such as, for example, matters related to military operations, civil defense, or - 4 - OFFICIAL USE ONLY international relations. In seeking competent advice on such subjects effort should be made to determine the relationship of information to the specific ways in which it might be used to the detriment of this nation. 12. The benefits to the U.S. resulting from controlled distribution of classified information and from declassification and publication of other information should be appraised from a broad viewpoint. Much more may be involved than accelerated progress on specific technical problems. Direct benefits to AEC might include, for example, acceleration of construction and development programs, attracting a greater number of able scientists and engineers to the project, improving administrative efficiency, saving costs, and others. Some of the most important benefits may accrue outside of the AEC; for example, stimulation of technological development in industry, education of the public concerning atomic defense and other matters, increased effectiveness of the armed services in planning, training, or operations. Stimulation and encouragement of scientific research anywhere in the nation is considered an important benefit of publication of technical information. These values will usually be more difficult to define and estimate than the value to a rival. Particular attention should therefore be paid to fields of activity where difficulties are encountered which might be lessened through increased dissemination of information, either through distribution on a classified basis within the Commission's organization, or through publication. Both technical and non-technical judgments are clearly required. 13. Information which is fully known to rival programs should ordinarily be declassified, but caution in proportion to the value of the information should be applied in appraising the - 5 - OFFICIAL USE ONLY status of rival knowledge. Partial or presumed knowledge on the part of others shall not be considered as justification for declassification. The value of confirmation of certain types of knowledge, and the probable inefficiencies of dissemination in other countries of scientific knowledge should be borne in mind in evaluating the effects of known compromise of information. Information concerning the status of foreign knowledge should be used when available. Due weight may also be given to competent technical judgments concerning the probable progress of foreign programs beyond the generally known state of atomic energy development as indicated in AEC declassified reports. GENERAL RULES FOR BALANCING VALUES 14. The final assignment of classification will depend upon a common-sense appraisal of all the factors mentioned in paragraphs 9 to 13. It is to be emphasized again that no all- inclusive rules can be laid down in advance as a substitute for informed judgment in such decisions. The Commission expects to rely largely upon the people responsible for conducting its program to obtain judgments which are founded upon the most complete information available and which are adequately supported by competent technical advice. 15. As a general guide for such judgments, the following objectives are stated: (careful analysis and monitoring will clearly be required in judging the relevance of information to these objectives): a. With Respect to Fissionable Materials and Weapons: The prime objective of secrecy should be to delay the date when interests inimical to the U.S. possess atomic weapons and thereafter to try to keep to a minimum the number and effectiveness of weapons in their stockpiles. The production of fissionable material, and the techniques of weapon development, production and use are equally relevant to this prime objective. Insofar as control of information may affect - 6 - OFFICIAL USE ONLY progress, retarding interests inimical to the U.S. in these activities is to be regarded as generally more important than advancing our own progress. In other words, benefits to ourselves of disseminating information in these fields are to be given reduced weight, as compared to the value of information to rivals, and the status of rival knowledge should be estimated most conservatively. b. With Respect to the Development of Nuclear Power: A second objective of secrecy is to avoid giving information which would accelerate the application of atomic power for industrial or military purposes by inimical interests. Much information pertinent to the use of power is also of importance in connection with weapons or the production of fissionable materials, and in such cases the prime objective mentioned above is clearly dominant. Other fields of information exist, and more will doubtless develop, which will be of only peripheral interest to weapons or to the production of fissionable materials and will pertain primarily to the utilization of power. Such information will generally be more closely related than information about weapons and production of fissionable materials to normal industrial processes, and its availability outside Commission installations is likely to be of high value both to industry and to the accomplishment of the atomic energy program. The threat to the security of the U.S. resulting from the use of atomic power by inimical interests is less immediate than that arising from the ability of such interests to produce atomic weapons. These factors should be taken into account in determining the secrecy of information pertaining to the use of atomic power. In the field of atomic power as contrasted with that of weapons or production of fissionable material, the value of dissemination of information to ourselves acquires an increased weight as compared to the risk of disclosure to rivals. c. With Respect to Nuclear and Allied Sciences: In order to promote the free interchange of ideas and criticisms which is essential to scientific progress, scientific information should not be classified unless it pertains in a useful way to a foreseeable practical application in the production of fissionable material or in the fields of atomic weapons or power. It should also be borne in mind that certain information will require classification because of considerations such as those of paragraphs 9 b, and 11. DISTRIBUTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 16. It is the policy of the Commission that properly cleared employees of the Commission or its contractors should be provided with all information which they need for the performance of their duties. Responsible supervisory officials should - 7 - OFFICIAL USE ONLY determine how much of the information available to them should be disclosed to those under them. It is also the policy of the Commission generally to segregate the work on weapons from other activities and thus to minimize the need for dissemination of weapon information. 17. Grades of Classification. Grades of classification (such as "Official Use Only", "Restricted", "Confidential", "Secret", "Top Secret") should be so administered as to permit decreasing access to information and decreasing risk of leak or improper disclosure as the grade varies upward to "Top Secret". Definitions of grades should be consistent with official definitions of the National Military Establishment, but may be amplified and developed so as to assist in carrying out efficient control of information. Administrative matters should be graded no higher than "Official Use Only" unless they reveal information pertaining to programs or operations which bears a higher grade of classification. CONSULTATION WITH THE NATIONAL MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, AND WITH THE U.K. AND CANADA 18. Prior notice should be given to the NME, the U.K., and Canada of any actions involving changes in the Declassification Guide. Close liaison with the armed forces should be maintained with respect to information which may require military classification even though it need not be classified under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946; and such military information will not be downgraded without the approval of the appropriate representatives of the National Military Establishment. 19. This statement of policy for the control of information is intended as a guide to personnel charged with the responsibility for proper distribution within the atomic energy project of - 8 - OFFICIAL USE ONLY classified information, and to personnel responsible for the classification and declassification of information, and for the clearance of AEC material proposed for public release. The existing Declassification Guide, as adopted by the Commission and as amended from time to time, currently embodies this policy and serves as a basic standard for determining whether technical information is declassifiable. The organization and administration of the declassification system shall be so designed and carried out as to insure the continuing development of adequate standards for the uniform application of these policies. PROVISIONS OF THE LAW 20. Extracts from the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 which pertain directly to the control of information are: DECLARATION OF POLICY Section 1(a) ........ it is hereby declared to be the policy of the people of the United States that, subject at all times to the paramount objective of assuring the common defense and security, the development and utilization of atomic energy shall, so far as practicable, be directed toward improving the public welfare, increasing the standard of living, strengthening free competition in private enterprise, and promoting world peace. Section 1(b) Purpose of Act. - It is the purpose of this Act to effectuate the policies set out in section 1 (a) by providing, among others, for the following major programs relating to atomic energy: ******** (2) A program for the control of scientific and technical information which will permit the dissemination of such information to encourage scientific progress, and for the sharing on a reciprocal basis of information concerning the practical industrial application of atomic energy as soon as effective and enforceable safeguards against its use for destructive purposes can be devised.......... Section 3(a) Research Assistance. - ....... the Commission is authorized and directed to make arrangements ...... for the conduct of research and development activities..... Such arrangements.....shall not contain any provisions or conditions which prevent the dissemination of scientific or technical information, except to the extent such dissemination is prohibited by law......... - 9 - OFFICIAL USE ONLY CONTROL OF INFORMATION Section 10 (a) Policy. - It shall be the policy of the Commission to control the dissemination of restricted data in such a manner as to assure the common defense and security. Consistent with such policy, the Commission shall be guided by the following principles: (1) That until Congress declares by joint resolution that effective and enforceable international safeguards against the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes have been established there shall be no exchange of information with other nations with respect to the use of atomic energy for industrial purposes; and (2) That the dissemination of scientific and technical information relating to atomic energy should be permitted and encouraged so as to provide that free interchange of ideas and criticisms which is essential to scientific progress. (b) Restrictions. - (1) The term "restricted data" as used in this section means all data concerning the manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons, the production of fissionable material, or the use of fissionable material in the production of power, but shall not include any data which the Commission from time to time determines may be published without adversely affecting the common defense and security ....... (Various penalties are prescribed for unlawful handling of restricted data.) - 10 - OFFICIAL USE ONLY INFORMAL NOTES OF THE DISCUSSION BY THE AEC ON JANUARY 19, 1949, OF AEC 111/3 AND 111/4, CONTROL OF INFORMATION UNDER ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1946 Mr. Pike commented that establishment of elaborate and specific procedures would tend to give a false appearance of exactitude to processes of classification and declassification which by their nature could be reduced to mathematical precision. Mr. Lilienthal agreed that any illusion of certainty was dangerous, but observed that the alternative to methodical procedures was judgment based primarily on emotion and that the effort to inject reasonable procedures for reaching judgment was salutary. He suggested that the analysis of classification with relation to technical information in which the Commission at the present time had no declassification machinery. He pointed out that the classification of administrative matters under the categories used for restricted data as defined by the Atomic Energy was usually not justified and caused confusion as to the importance of classification and as to procedures for declassifying. Mr. Bacher observed that over-specific analysis was perhaps useful in such a nebulous area, and he expressed the opinion that the policy summation in AEC 111/3 was sound and represented a major step toward an improved system for control of information. He said that the choice between Paragraphs 10 a and 10 b presented to the Commission in Appendix "A" was not a valid alternative. A further possibility would be a policy of not making anything classified which did not need to be classified: overclassification tended to make the system of classification ridiculous, and avoidance of overclassification was thus an advantage to security itself. He commended also that the proposal to allot a higher grade of classification to weapons information appeared sound, both as security and as part of the transition which must be made from the present extent of classification toward greater declassification. After further discussion, the Commission NOTED that AEC 111/3 would be revised in the light of the discussion and resubmitted at a later meeting. - 11 - OFFICIAL USE ONLY VERIFIED UNCLASSIFIED PUBLICLY RELEASABLE LANL Classification Group