DOCUMENT E
				This document consists of 3 page
				Copy     of 5, Series A.

USE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL AS A MILITARY WEAPON

		Summarized from a report written by Doctors James
B. Conant, Chairman, A. H. Compton, and II. C. Urey,
comprising the Subcommittee of the S-1 Executive Committee.

		a.  Availability of Radioactive Material.

		In the near future it should be possible to
produce in the United States quantities of radioactive
material at a rate equivalent in radioactive effect to one
ton of radium every four days.  This material is
approximately one hundred thousand times more active than
radius. Consequently, a four-day production quantity would
weigh about twenty grams in a pure state, or not more than
one hundred pounds when mixed with a suitable chemical
carrier.

		There is no way of estimating definitely what 
the Germans are doing in producing such material.  Very likely
they are further advanced in their production schedule but
probably will not be able to produce in quantities that are
expected to be available in the United States.

		b.  Use of Radioactive Material in Warfare.

	(1)  As a terrain contaminating material, the
radioactive product would be spread on the ground
and would affect personnel by means of intensive
rays similar to those produced by powerful X-ray
machines.  It is estimated that if a four days'
production quantity (the equivalent of one tone of
radium) were evenly spread over two square miles
of average open terrain, one day's exposure to a
human being would result in temporary
incapacitation, and one week's exposure would
result in death.  Effects on a person would not be
immediate, but would be delayed for days or
perhaps weeks.  Five to ten times the above
described concentration would be lethal after one
day's exposure.

	Areas so contaminated by radioactive material
would be dangerous until decay of the material
took place, perhaps for weeks or months.  On a
hard surface some decontamination could be
accomplished by flushing with water, but for
average terrain no decontamination methods are
known.  Further, no effective protective clothing
for personnel has been developed, which would
nullify the effects of the radioactive materials.
	(2)	As a gas warfare instrument the material
would be ground into particles of microscopic size
to form dust and smoke and distributed by a
ground-fired projectile, land vehicles, or aerial
bombs.  In this form it would be inhaled by
personnel.  The amount necessary to cause death to
a person inhaling the material is extremely small. 
It has been estimated that one millionth at a gram
accumulating in a person's body would be fatal. 
There are no known methods of treatment for such a
casualty.

	Two factors appear to increase the
effectiveness of radioactive dust or smoke as a
weapon.  These are:  (1) It cannot be detected by
the senses; (2) It can be distributed in a dust or
smoke form so finely powdered that it will
permeate a standard gas mask filter in quantities
large enough to be extremely damaging.  An
off-setting factor in its effectiveness as a
weapon is that in a dust or smog torn the material
is so finely pulverized than it takes on the
characteristic of a quickly dissipating gas and is
therefore subject to all the factors (such as
wind) working against maintenance of high
concentrations for more than a few minutes over a
given area.

		c.  Possible Use by the Enemy.

		It is felt that radioactive warfare may be 
used by the Germans for the following purposes:

		(1)  To make evacuated areas uninhabitable.

		(2)  To contaminate small critical areas such
as railroad yards and airports.

		(3) As a radioactive poison gas to create
casualties among troops.

		(4)  Against large cities, to promote panic,
and create casualties among civilian populations.

		For use in cities, it is estimated that
concentrations would have to be extremely high to offset the
shielding effect of buildings.

		Doctors Compton and Urey, two members of the
Committee, felt that radioactive material may be used by the
Germans against United Nations in the autumn of 1943.  Dr.
Conant apparently does not concur in this opinion.

		d.  Possible Use by the United States.

 		It is the recommendation of this Subcommittee 
that if military authorities feel that the United States 
should be ready to use radioactive weapons in case the enemy
started it first, studies on the subject should be started
immediately.
		From consideration of the possible effects and
uses of radioactive material in warfare, it is evident that
considerable experimentation with actual field trials would
be necessary to determine the optimum conditions under which
radioactive dusts could be disseminated with lung
contamination or ground contamination.  Such tests could be
very readily carried out by using very small, amounts of
radioactive material (tracer amounts) and studying the
concentrations in the air or on the ground by means of
sensitive physical instruments which are now readily
available.

		These studies could be carried out best by 
a group containing some men who are familiar with the 
particular project which is planning to produce this 
radioactive material, and others drawn from the National 
Defense Research Council, who are working on the developments 
of munitions and dissemination of dust and liquids, and still
others from the NDRC who are familiar with the testing of
chemical warfare agents.

		e.  Defensive Methods Proposed for the United
States.

		The Subcommittee feels that from a defensive 
point of view, one can consider it unlikely (the Chairman of 
the Subcommittee, Dr. Conant, feels that it is extremely
unlikely) that a radioactive weapon will be used against the
Continental United States.  They further believe that if
such a weapon here used against a populated industrial city,
such as London, an automatic alarm would be provided by
virtue of the fact that a concentration of material
sufficient to cause serious damage to any portion of the
population in a few hours, would also fog all photographic
films and give strange effects in various pieces of
equipment in the scientific establishments of the city.  If
the material came down from the air as a cloud of dust, it
would also probably produce strange effects in the radar
equipment.

		The eventuality of enemy use of radioactive
material to render evacuated areas uninhabitable seems to
the Subcommittee sufficiently great to warrant the issuance
of special instructions to at least one officer in each
Division of any Army which might be faced with such an
eventuality.  Such an officer should be familiar with the
ways of detecting and understand the reading of certain
instruments which would give the effective radiation, and
should be prepared to advise on the movement of troops in
such a way as to avoid bore than a passing exposure to high
radiation.  it would also be of great importance to see that
the troops were equipped with the proper type of gas masks
and that these masks were put on immediately so that dust
could be kept out of the lungs.

		It is the recommendation of the Subcommittee 
that a special committee composed of Dr. Stafford Warren and 
Dr. R. S. Stone be asked to prepare a report on both the use 
of detectors in the field and instructions which might be
issued to a divisional officer, explaining under what
conditions troops might be moved through various areas and
what methods of decontamination could be tried under certain
special circumstances.  In short, this special committee
should prepare a manual outlining a doctrine somewhat
similar to that which already exists for the use of gas
officers, and it is suggested that either a divisional gas
officer or some special officer attached to the Corps or
Army Headquarters be charged with the responsibility for
these defensive measures.  Such officer, or officers, would
need to have instruments available and be given authority to
traverse all areas which previously had been occupied by the
enemy.