ATTACHMENT D Assistant Secretary for Special Security Programs memorandum to Secretary of Defense, April 25, 1952 GRAPHIC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D.C. 25 April 1952 MEMORANDUM THRU THE DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION FOR: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SUBJECT: Chemical and Biological Warfare Readiness 1. A staff study dated 15 December 1951 (Tab E), informed you that the United States was not adequately prepared in the fields of chemical (CW) and biological warfare (BW), and that the then-current programs were not adequate to insure preparedness in the future. As a result, on 21 December 1951 (Tab "A") the three military departments were directed to increase their support of, and participation in, programs to bring to the required state of readiness. 2. Three months later, the military departments were asked (Tab "C") to report on their programs for implementing these instructions, and to set forth the actions taken with respect to selectivity in order to achieve both a CW and BW readiness with at least one good weapons system in the hands of the operating forces and adequately stockpiled. 3. The reports of the three military departments (Tabs "D", "E", and "F"), received this date, outline the progress which has been made, and the programs which are planned. Detailed study and joint evaluation of these reports are necessary to determine the adequacy of the present CW and BW programs to achieve readiness. This evaluation is now being made. Therefore, this memorandum constitutes an interim brief of a few more important actions which have been taken by the military departments as a result of your directive. 4. The Department of the Army has approved and provided funds for the construction of a second production plant for the manufacture of nerve gas (GE). When completed, this facility together with the one presently under construction will provide sufficient GB productive capacity to meet present requirement by 1 July 1954. Army operation plans now include CW and BW annexes. A program is being considered for the strategic location of stocks of available toxic chemical munitions within overseas commands (for use when directed). An Interservice Coordinating Committee of General and Flag Officers has been organized at the request of the Army for the purpose of furnishing Service Chiefs with specific recommendations for corrective action on CW-BW program deficiencies. In addition, Secretary Pace has asked his Scientific Advisory Group (headed by Dr. Killian) to study the adequacy of the Army's efforts to solve the CW-BW problem in the light of your 21 December 1951 directive. 5. The Department of the Navy has prepared a directive outlining naval concepts for offensive and defensive CW and BW. This document directs Commanders afloat to develop and recommend doctrines for CW-BW employment. Existing bombs employing toxic agents are being investigated to determine their suitability for use with naval aircraft. The development of prototype naval projectiles and bombardment type rockets has been initiated to evaluate such munitions for use in amphibious support missions and specialized naval operations. Major developmental efforts are being concentrated on an airborne aerosol generator (Aero 14A) for use with either CW or BW agents, and submarine launched BW mine aerosol generator, Procurement of the Aero 14A is contingent upon further test results, but may be initiated the latter part of 1952. 6. The Department of the Air Force issued a directive dated 15 January 1952, to give guidance to all staff agencies and commands on personnel, training, operations, research and development, defense, and logistics. This directive expresses time-phasing for establishment of CW-BW capabilities for air wings and groups beginning 31 December 1952, and for a sustained Air Force CW-BW capability by the end of 1954. Bomb clusters suitable for the dissemination of GB are now being procured, as are munitions suitable for dissemination of anti-personnel and anti- crop BW agents. A total of $205,000,000 has been programmed for FY 1953 for procurement of these munitions. 7. Insofar as concerns our present day capabilities, there is but little additional to report beyond that set forth in our staff study of 15 December 1951. If the signal to "retaliate" were given tomorrow, or even within the next year, the United States could make little more than a token effort. While there is a greater awareness of the need for CW and BW readiness, the accelerated programs in these fields probably will not place the United States in a position to have significant CW and BW readiness, the accelerated programs in these fields probably will not place the United States in a position to have a significant CW and BW capability much before mid-1954 C.E. HUTCHIN, JR. Lt. Colonel, Infantry Assistant for Special Security Programs Inclosures 6 Taos "A" thru "F" Copies furnished less tabs: Chairman, Research and Development Board Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bronze Team) Deputy Assistant for International Security Affairs - Psychological Policy