DISCLAIMER The following is a staff memorandum or other working document prepared for the members of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments. It should not be construed as representing the final conclusions of fact or interpretation of the issues. All staff memoranda are subject to revision based on further information and analysis. For conclusions and recommendations of the Advisory Committee, readers are advised to consult the Final Report to be published in 1995. STAFF MEMORANDUM TO: Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments FROM: Advisory Committee Staff DATE: June 28, 1994 RE: Historical Background on Radiological Warfare and Human Experiments Military research in the area of Radiological Warfare was one possible motive behind human radiation experiments. Many, if not most of the human experiments being studied by the staff had more than one purpose, as so-called dual-use experiments. It is possible, though not yet proven, that some of the human experiments were primarily inspired by military interest in RW. It is certain that the majority of the intentional releases described in the November 1993 GAO report were directly related to RW research. The purpose of this memorandum is to provide some brief historical background on RW and its possible relation to human radiation experiments. Interest in RW began with the Manhattan Project also known as "Manhattan Engineer District" or "MED" in 1942. That year, when the National Academy of Sciences assessed the potential military value of atomic energy, RW was ranked first in importance, above the less-certain prospect of a fission bomb. When the Medical Division of the MED was established in spring 1943, research on the offensive and defensive uses of radiological agents was included in its charter. One early result of this interest was the so-called Compton Report of summer 1943, "Radiation as a War Weapon," a version of which was included in the previous Briefing Book. The idea at that time was to spread fission products from a nuclear reactor upon the ground as a crude "area denial" weapon. Another idea, entertained briefly in 1943 by Robert Oppenheimer and Berkeley physicians Joseph Hamilton and Robert Stone, two of those subsequently involved in the plutonium injection story, was to put a radiological agent like strontium in the enemy's food and water supply. (See Hamilton's report to Groves of May 1943, "Review of Possible Applications of Fission Products in Offensive Warfare." ) By early 1944, when it was believed likely that the atomic bomb would work, Army interest in RW shifted to a defensive program, code named "Operation Peppermint, " which centered upon the possible threat of German use of RW agents against the Allied invasion of Europe. After June 1944, when it became clear that the German atomic program posed no threat, interest in RW began to decline. However, interest revived in summer 1946, when results of the "Baker" test at Bikini, a 20-kiloton atomic bomb set off underwater as part of "Operation Crossroads," alarmed and excited those interested in RW, as related in a recent book by Jonathan Weisgal. Unexpectedly, "Baker" proved to be a radiological nightmare: the contamination problem was much worse than the Navy had anticipated, both for ships and for people. Shortly after "Baker," the Joint Chiefs completed a secret study pointing out the offensive potential of an atomic bomb set off underwater in a port city. The study emphasized that, in addition to the highly-radioactive "base surge" from the weapon, the radioactive mist from the explosion would travel far inland and kill many people. Accordingly, after "Baker," RW experienced a renaissance; the interest this time, however, was in radioactive aerosols. Joseph Hamilton's December 1946 report on RW, which urged Nichols to establish a civilian advisory board on RW "of men trained in the medical and biological sciences," is attached as Document #1. In December 1947, Hamilton and Stafford Warren drew up a proposed list of civilian scientists to serve on such an RW panel. Hamilton's list included many of those who had been involved in earlier human radiation experiments, and is attached as Document #2. In March 1948, an RW Study Group in Biology and Medicine, the "McLean Panel," was created under the auspices of the AEC's Division of Biology and Medicine, with several of those on Hamilton's list as members. Two months later, a joint DOD-AEC civilian advisory group on RW, the "Noyes Panel," was also established. The Noyes Panel met six times during the next two years and ultimately concluded that RW faced the same problems as gas warfare--RW agents were dispersed unpredictably by the wind; RW was too expensive for the results obtained, etc. Nonetheless, the Army Chemical Corps between 1948 and 1952 conducted a total of six aerosol RW experiments in the Utah desert near Dugway. Two additional small-scale RW tests, involving radio-lanthanum, were carried out at Oak Ridge in 1948. Documents concerning the Oak Ridge tests are included in the "intentional releases" section of the current Briefing Book. The Dugway and Oak Ridge intentional releases are detailed in the November 1993 GAO report, which was included in the first Briefing Book. The Dugway RW tests involved the aerial release of more than 100,000 curies of two radiological agents--tantalum and protoactinium--in aerosol munitions. Hamilton headed the Army panel that had responsibility for overseeing the safety of the Dugway tests. There is no evidence to date that human subjects were involved in the Dugway tests. In June 1950, with the outbreak of the Korean war, there was a sudden resurgence of interest in RW. Following the Chinese entry into the war, in December 1950, the Army considered using chemical, biological, or RW weapons against the enemy. One idea reportedly discussed by General MacArthur at this time was sowing a band of radioactive cesium across Manchuria as a kind of "cordon sanitaire" against the Chinese advance. In April 1951, Truman instead authorized the use of nine nuclear weapons against targets in Manchuria in the belief that the Chinese, and possibly the Russians, were planning a new offensive. With the exception of a brief revival of interest in RW in spring 1952, interest in RW once again dwindled as the fortunes of war improved in Korea. The war ended in July 1953; the same month funding for the Army's RW program was essentially cut off. Since the mid-1950s, it appears that the military's interest in RW has been almost exclusively upon understanding radiation's effect upon the body, and defensive measures.