TAB F - PART I DISCLAIMER The following is a staff memorandum or other working document prepared for the members of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments. It should not be construed as representing the final conclusions of fact or interpretation of the issues. All staff memoranda are subject to revision based on further information and analysis. For conclusions and recommendations of the Advisory Committee, readers are advised to consult the Final Report to be published in 1995. þþþDRAFTþ FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLYþþþ MEMORANDUM TO: Members of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments FROM: Advisory Committee Staff DATE: September 8, 1994 RE: Human Experimentation in Connection with Atomic Bomb Tests Introduction This memo summarizes documentation indicating that: (l) human experimentation was contemplated in biomedical planning in connection with atomic bomb tests; and (2) that what appears to be research involving human subjects was, in fact, carried out. This supplements earlier presentations to the Committee regarding the Joint Panel on the Medical Aspects of Atomic Warfare ("Joint Panel"). It should be emphasized at the outset that we are trying to reconstruct a story, some of whose key aspects have long been public. Most prominently, it has long been known, even advertised, that troop maneuvers were conducted close to ground zero. What appears to have been less well known (although even this remains to be seen) is the biomedical planning that preceded, and related to, this, and further, instances in which human subjects were used for data gathering. At the June meeting, the Committee discussed a September 1951 Joint Panel draft document entitled "Biomedical Participation in Future Atomic Weapons Tests." The document identified general criteria for bomb test related "experiments" and identified 29 "specific problems" as "legitimate basis for biomedical participation." The presently available documentation, as discussed below, shows that at least 4 of the items listed in this draft planning document (i.e., vision testing, psychological observation of troops, testing of human body fluids for radioisotopes, and human fly-through of atomic clouds) appear to have been conducted. However, the relation between the Joint Panel's plans and these studies is still a puzzle. There is a further piece of the puzzle. The documentation received shows that 1951 biomedical planning was initiated by the Armed Forces Medical Policy Council, another group within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. At the same time, the 1 Council was embarking on a debate which led to the February, 1953 issuance by Secretary of Defense Wilson of the Nuremberg Code policy to govern "the issue of volunteers in research in defense against atomic, biological, and chemical warfare." We do not yet have documentation that shows whether and how these two discussions were connected at the time, or since. I. The Biomedical Planning In 1949, the Defense Department empaneled the "Joint Panel on the Medical Aspects of Atomic Warfare."1 {1 Basic materials on the Joint Panel, including its mandate, appear in Tab O of Briefing Book 4. We have assembled the available Joint Panel materials (e.g., minutes, agenda, Program Guidance documents) in a single volume at the Advisory Committee office.} By charter, the Joint Panel was chaired by a civilian member, and was to include three civilian members and two members from each of the services. Joint Panel documents indicate that associate members included representatives of the National Institutes of Health and the Public Health Service. (The Chairman was associated with Harvard University and Massachusetts General Hospital). The Joint Panel was created by the Committee on Medical Sciences and the Committee on Atomic Energy, which were Committees of the Research and Development Board. According to the initiating Directive, the Joint Panel was administered by the Committee on Medical Science. The reporting structure was: Office of Secretary of Defense | Research and Development Board | Committee on Atomic Energy Committee on Medical Sciences 30 or so other committees Joint Panel on the Medical Aspects of Atomic Warfare A.1951 At its September 1951 meeting, the Panel reported on a request from the Committee on Atomic Energy for (Attachment 1): "a statement of the medical and biomedical information they consider essential for the Department of Defense to obtain through participation in atomic weapons tests. . . ." 2 The agenda for the September meeting contained a draft document2 {2 The agenda noted that while civilians were polled in the creation of the draft, "very few civilians responded." The draft was therefore "offered not as a proposed statement, to be accepted after only minor revisions, but as a general guide to the type of paper which is expected of the Joint Panel." } entitled "Biomedical Participation in Future Atomic Weapons Tests." The draft discussed the basic criteria for experimentation (e.g., "[i]s the experiment itself worthwhile, and does it hold promise of producing significant results?"). The document identified 29 "specific problems for future tests." (Attachment 1, at 4-6.) The list was "designed to show the type of problem which should be considered as a legitimate basis for biomedical participation in future weapons tests." The document stated a concern that even the use of "animals" in "experiments" must be limited.3{3 The document stated, at 3: "it seem unwise to argue that since much remains to be learned there must be animal exposures at every test. Rather, it seems that actual animal exposures should be limited as much as possible and more accurate physical measurements be made. . . ."} Nonetheless, the document identified at least four "specific problems" which (l) expressly or implicitly suggest the need for human subjects, and (2) bear, as discussed below, fair resemblance to activities that were, in fact, undertaken. These include: "11.Effects of exposure of the eye to the atomic flash; (a) Changes in visual acuity; (b) The after-image, description, and duration; (c) Light blindness, description, and duration. . . . 24. Measurements of radioactive isotopes in the body fluids of atomic weapons test personnel. . . . 28. Psychophysiological changes after exposure to nuclear explosions. 29. Orientation flights in the vicinity of nuclear explosions for certain combat air crews." The minutes of the September 1951 meeting record that it was decided to authorize the Chairman to appoint a working group, with responsibility for initiating and reviewing proposals for biomedical participation. 3 The minutes further record that the Joint Panel prepared a Program Guidance Report (identified as "BAW 107/2, Log No. 405- 51"). (The "Program Guidance Reports" were evidently prepared periodically to outline research goals, activities and recommendations.) The Program Guidance Report for the September 1951 meeting (Attachment 2 ) included a section entitled "Biomedical Participation in Future Atomic Weapons Tests." The "Conclusions and Recommendations" of that section stated, in full (page 20, emphasis added): 4.1 "To complete present program and plan for participation in future tests in light of results from Operation GREENHOUSE [a prior test]. These plans should include studies on the effect of atomic weapons detonations on a troop unit operating in normal tactical support." The "Psychological Studies" section included the following "Recommendations" (Attachment 2, at 14): "4.1.3 Continue studies in psychology of panic. 4.1.4 Seek technics [sic] for reducing apprehension and for producing psychologic resistance to fear and panic, especially in presence of radiation hazard (emotional 'vaccination'). 4.1.5 Spread knowledge of radiation tolerance, technics [sic] of avoidance, and possibility of therapy through military and civilian populations and measure their acceptance. 4.1.6 Prepare to make psychologic observations at and after bomb tests. . . ."4 {4 Among "[f]actors interfering with the program," the section notes: "3.6.1 Poor repute of psychological research and general lack of confidence in emotional engineering. . . ."} The Program Guidance Report singled out a number of items for emphasis. The most critical included the initiation of "[t]roop indoctrination at atomic detonations" and "psychological observations on troops at atom bomb tests." (Id., at 23.) B. 1952 In a January 9, 1952 memo to the Chief of Army Field Services, the Executive Officer for the Army Surgeon General addressed the topic of "Psychiatric Research in Connection with Atomic Weapons Tests Involving Troop Participation" (Attachment 3): 4 "l. For your information in connection with planning for future exercises and operations in which atomic weapons tests will be used and troops will participate, this office has a continuing interest in the conduct of psychiatric observations regarding the effects of the weapons on the participating troops. 2. Funds for the conduct of psychiatric observations which may be approved for future atomic weapons tests will be made available through the Surgeon General." The memo bears concurrences from the "Medical Research and Development Board," "Medical Plans and Operations," "Fiscal Division," and "Chief, Psychiatry and Neurology Consultants Division." In February 1952, the Joint Panel's "Working Group on Biomedical Participation" (created at the September, 1951 meeting) held its first meeting, in connection with the Joint Panel's Ninth meeting of the Panel at Oak Ridge (Attachment 4). The recommendations of the Working Group were approved at the Joint Panel's Ninth Meeting. The recommendations do not appear to include any express "human subject" research. Indeed, the references to living subjects routinely refer to "animals," not humans.5{5 For example: "PROBLEM # 5: Hazard from Flying through an Atomic Cloud OBJECTIVE: To obtain definitive information on the hazard of the presence of radioactivity and/or thermal hazards within an atomic cloud. PROCEDURE: Animals will be exposed in drone aircraft passing through the atomic cloud at various times after detonation. Dosimetry and thermometry are procedures which will be included. Data obtained will aid in determining operational procedures related to the problem."} The Joint Panel's Tenth meeting was in September, 1952, at Los Alamos. The minutes record that the Panel "[n]oted the proposed projects of the [bomb test] biomedical program" (Attachment 5). The agenda references the minutes of the February Ad Hoc Group; further documentation is not yet available. The minutes of the Tenth meeting, however, contain several further items that appear to relate to bomb tests. (Attachment 5, Item 10). 5 The program on psychological research was referred to the Committee on Human Resources (evidently another committee of the Research and Development Board). In doing so, the Joint Panel passed a Motion for transmittal to the Committee on Human Resources which reads, in part: "It is possible that inclination to panic in the face of AW [atomic warfare] and RW [radiation warfare] may prove high. It seems advisable, therefore, to increase research efforts in the scientific study of panic and its results, and to seek means for prophylaxis. The panel is enthusiastic for the Disaster Studies project previously initiated. In addition to observations on spontaneous panic in man it would seem promising to seek out techniques for experimental production of panic in animals. . . . The panel supports the point of view that troop participation in tests of atomic weapons is valuable. As many men as possible ought to be exposed to this experience under safe conditions. Psychological evaluation is difficult and results can be expected to appear superficially trivial, but the matter is of such extreme importance that the research should be persisted in, utilizing every opportunity." In referring the psychological component to the Human Resources Committee, the Joint Panel stated that: "the portion of the program guidance report dealing with psycho-physiological affects of radiation in mammals (and when possible man) be transferred to that section of the panel report entitled 'Biological Effects of Radiation.'"6 {6 The "Conclusions and Recommendations" of the September, 1952 Program Guidance for "Biological Effects of Radiation" include (page 15): "4.2 It is still necessary to initiate measurements of the effects of moderate doses of radiation in man. 4.3 Advantage should be taken of any opportunities for the study of the biological effects of radiation particularly in man."} 6 In addition, the Joint Panel recommended the fly through of an atomic cloud. When the recommendation was reported to the Committee on Medical Sciences in October 1952, the following explanation was provided by Colonel Wood, a Joint Panel member: "What they are really asking for is an Arctic trial of an atomic explosion with an operational flying into the cloud to study conditions in the cloud and to see whether such a procedure is safe." The Tenth meeting is the last Joint Panel meeting for which the Committee presently possesses documentation. The minutes note a "Report on Human Experimentation," and briefly refer to a "Report of the AEC Biomedical Program for the Next Atomic Weapons Effects Test." In addition, the minutes indicate that the Joint Panel "[a]greed to table the resolution on the hazards of the atomic cloud." The minutes note that the next meeting was set for June 1953. No further documentation is presently available. The Defense Department is searching for all documentation that may be relevant to the Joint Panel. II. The Armed Forces Medical Policy Council The Committee on Atomic Energy's request that initiated the Joint Panel's planning appears to have, in turn, been stimulated by a February 23, 1951 memo from the chairman of The Armed Forces Medical Policy Council to the chairman of the Research and Development Board (Attachment 6). During the 1951-52 period, the Armed Forces Medical Policy Council was a group within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense's 1953 Nuremberg Code Memorandum was, as the memorandum states, "issued at the recommendation of the Council."7 {7 The 1975 Army Inspector General Report on "The Use of Volunteers in Chemical Research" summarizes (at 33): "The matter of the use of human volunteers was under deliberate consideration by the Armed Forces Medical Policy Council during the first two years of the 1950s. In the fall of 1952, following extensive study, the Council reported to the Secretary of Defense that researchers had reached the point beyond which essential data could not be obtained unless human volunteers were utilized. Thus, they recommended that the Secretary of Defense establish a policy that would authorize the use of humans in medical research. They further recommended that the Nuremberg Code of 1947 be cited as the principal guidance to the services."} The February 23 memo noted with concern that there was no biomedical participation by DOD in prior and planned testing. 7 The memo concluded that biomedical participation was critical in future atomic tests: "information is necessary in order that we can adequately inform military field commanders of probable biomedical consequences of exposure of their personnel to one effects of such weapons." III. Bomb Test Activities At least four of the "specific problems" identified in the September, 1951 Joint Panel draft document ("Biomedical Test Participation") bear a strong relation to data gathering on human subjects that did take place in connection with bomb tests. In some cases it has long been publicly known that these activities took place; indeed, as noted below, they are among the events chronicled in publicly available Defense Department "NTPR" bomb test histories.8 {8 The reference is to the "Bluebook" volumes which were prepared in connection with the "Nuclear Test Personnel Review," (NTPR) and are available in many public libraries. The NTPR is an ongoing activity through which DOD has collected a database of personnel who participated in tests, promoted dose reconstructions, and prepared test histories.} The full extent of these activities, however, may remain to be made public. A. Vision Testing As quoted above, the September 1951 Joint Panel Draft contemplated the possibility of vision tests in connection with bombs. A recently declassified Defense Nuclear Agency ( DNA) history for 1951 records (page 3, 924): "At the request of Lt. Colonel Hartgering, a conference on flash blindness was held in March. . . . It was decided at the conference that research on flash blindness would be initiated in the immediate future and would be incorporated into future weapon tests." The DOD history of the 1951 "Operation Buster Jangle" records that the biomedical program included "flash blindness", testing of 17 volunteers who "orbited in a C-54 aircraft about 15 kilometers from ground zero, at an altitude of 15,000 feet." (Additional materials, also apparently connected to the series, recently declassified by DNA refer to "[h]uman volunteers. . . dark-adapted in a light-tight trailer approximately 10 miles from the detonation.") (Attachment 7). The Joint Panel agenda for a September 1952 meeting records that Lt. Colonel Hartgering reported on the biomedical program at the next atomic weapon test." The February 1952 recommendations for the test, which, as discussed above, the Joint Panel appeared 8 to approve in the September meeting, did not identify any vision experiments. The declassified report of the 1952-53 "Upshot- Knothole" tests, however, identifies as a component of the Biomedical program (Attachment 8). "Subjecting 12 human volunteers and 700 rabbits to the initial light flash from six atomic detonations to investigate its effect on the visual function of the human eyes and to determine the burn injury processes in the dark adapted rabbit eye." B. Measurement of Radioactive Isotopes in Human Body Fluid As quoted above, the September, 1951 draft contemplated the measurement of body fluids in test personnel.9{9 This memo does not address the question of the relation between body fluid testing for "experimental" purposes and testing for health and safety purposes. See the accompanying memo on ethical questions posed by the documentation.} Attachment 9 is a 1955 report on "The Recovery of Radioactive Iodine and Strontium from Human Urine--Operation Teapot." The report was prepared by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, under contract to the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (a predecessor to the Defense Nuclear Agency). The study was designed to provide base line information for the spring 1956 tests in the Pacific in which the yields are expected to be considerably greater." (Id., at 1.) The "collection process included selection of ten individuals" from males at military installations throughout the world, including Camp Mercury (associated with the Nevada Test Site). The DOD history ( "NTPR Bluebook") states that no biomedical program was conducted in connection with TEAPOT. The Walter Reed report refers to three earlier classified reports on "experience at weapons tests with urinary excretion of fission materials by human subjects." In addition, a recently declassified DNA history indicates that Walter Reed Army Institute of Research performed "a study of iodine-131 concentration in the urine of humans during Operation REDWING" (a test series that followed TEAPOT).10 {10 The Walter Reed work was the subject of 1959 Congressional Testimony. See "Fallout From Nuclear Tests," hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, at pages 1314-1319.} C. Psychological Testing and Troop Maneuvers Troop maneuvers and related psychological testing in connection with bomb tests has long been a matter of public record. In 1951-53 a series of troop maneuvers was held at "Desert Rock" in Nevada. 9 In connection with these tests the DOD employed two research organizations, HUMRRO and ORO.11 {11 The Human Resources Research Organization (HUMRRO) was affiliated with George Washington University. The Operations Research Organization (ORO) was affiliated with Johns Hopkins University.} The DOD "NTPR" history of the 1951 Operation "Buster Jangle" ("Shot DOG") records: "An additional study associated with the troop maneuver was performed by the Human Resources Research Office (HUMRRO), a civilian agency under contract to the Department of the Army. At Shot Dog, HUMRRO investigated the psychological reactions of the maneuver troops. The agency was particularly interested in troop behavior during the maneuver and the changes in troop attitudes about nuclear weapons before and after participation in the activity. In addition, the agency assessed factors governing the amount of information on nuclear testing communicated to other troops by participants returning to their bases. The data collected by HUMMRO assisted the Army in determining the probable behavior of troops involved in nuclear warfare." The DOD history of the 1952-53 Upshot-Knothole tests discusses both psychological observations of troops and a special volunteer program. Officer volunteers were asked to take positions quite close to ground zero. Attachment 10 is an example of consent forms, a report prepared by one volunteer, and excerpts from the NTPR history. D. Atomic Cloud Fly Throughs A previously classified Air Force history chronicles the "Cloud Sampling" program (Excerpts at Attachment 11).12 {12 "History of Air Force Cloud Sampling," AFSC Historical Publication Series 61-142-1, January, 1963.} A number of their reports have long been matters of public record (e.g., "Gain in Information in the Desert Rock Abomb Maneuvers," HUMRRO, March, 1954).} The history reports that "Operation Crossroads [the 1946-47 first postwar atomic tests] saw the beginning of Air Force atomic cloud sampling with drones because of the unknown dangers." (Id., at 4) During the early tests drones continued to be employed. 10 The history records that an accidental fly-through of a cloud in 1948 led to the development of the manned cloud sampling program: "The mission was about three hours old when the plane approached the radioactive cloud. . .the WB-29 inadvertently penetrated a small 'finger' projection of the cloud. 'No one keeled over dead and no one got sick,' Colonel Fackler commented. 'In fact, there seemed to be no undue alarm among the crew members.'" (Attachment 11, at 23). "Following the mission [the pilot] discussed the experiment with Colonel Cody, assistant rad-safe officer for the operation. This incident, plus the film-badge experiments he had conducted, gave Colonel Cody the idea that manned sampler aircraft, operating several hours after a nuclear detonation, might possibly obtain samples much more efficiently than measures used heretofore." (Attachment 11, at 23). "Aircraft sampling of atomic clouds became one of the great flying adventures of all time," the Air Force history begins. (Attachment 11, at i.) The public NTPR bluebooks, as well as the Air Force history, show a continuing program involving air and ground crews. The exercises included the measurement of radiation effects on humans, as well as in clouds (and in and on the planes). A recently declassified report on Operation PLUMBBOB, a 1957 Nevada test series, begins (Attachment 12, at 14): "1.1 Objective The objective of this project was to measure the radiation dose, both from neutrons and gamma rays, received by an air crew delivering an MB-1 rocket. 1.2 Background and Theory "Whenever a new weapon becomes available for operational use, its characteristics must be known and available to potential users. Before committing the MB-1 to use, an operational commander must have information on the radiation to be received by the delivery air crew, as well as the blast effect on the delivery aircraft. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the conduct of a test as part of Operation PLUMBBOB in order to obtain the necessary experimental measurements." 11 Ground, as well as air crews, were involved: (Attachment 13, Excerpted from the DOD NTPR Bluebook on TEAPOT ): "Another technique was to have the project personnel rub the base of their hands over the surface of an aircraft with known contamination. An autoradiography of the hand was then made by placing the hand on a large x-ray film packet for a period of time and then developing the film to observe the image created. In this way, changes in the contamination patterns of aircraft and relative amounts of contamination transferred to the hand could be measured. While conducting these studies, none of the survey teamexceeded the AFSWC maximum permissible exposures of 3.9 roentgens for ground personnel." While it appears that personnel were volunteers, the precise method and protocol for the election of pilots and crews is not presently clear. In a section on "Training for Sampler Pilots," the Air Force history records (Attachment 11, at page 66, citing 1952 memos): "The Strategic Air Command pilots picked to fly the F- 84G sampler aircraft were pleased to learn that they were doing something useful,. . .not serving as guinea pigs as they seriously believed when first called upon to do the sampling." Manned sampling was, at least on occasion, publicly advertised. The swallowing of film badges (on a string) was the subject of particular interest: (Attachment 11, at 128): ". . .[T]he film badge experiments fascinated reporters. The Las Vegas Review Journal headlined a long story about the project: 'Gulp Film Badges to Check Radiation.' The newspaper reported that Captain Charles S. Oldfield, Development Directorate, and Colonel Pinson swallowed some film badges and attached others to their clothing while flying through a nuclear cloud." The Air Force history identifies over 200 Air Force "sampling personnel." Other agencies and people, particularly from the AEC's Los Alamos operations, played a key role as well. 12 IV. Questions The available documentation raises many questions about the basic facts of the story. For example: l. Where did the planning engaged in by the Joint Panel fit into the planning done by others, both inside and outside the Defense Department? Was the Joint Panel an initiator of ideas, an echo of plans being made by others, or a check for plans being proposed elsewhere? Or some of each, as might be expected from such a panel? 2. Would access to the complete documentation surrounding the Panel (including Committee on Medical Sciences material) reveal a discussion of the bounds of human experimentation in bomb tests? Would it reveal any discussion of the relation between planned or actual experiments and the Nuremberg code policy set forth by the Secretary of Defense in February, 1953? 3. What was the relation between the Panel and the implementation of activities discussed in Panel meetings? To what extent were the activities preceded by the preparation of data gathering for protocols and succeeded by the preparation of reports? Can these be retrieved? 4. What was the relation between bio-medical offices (e.g., the Army Surgeon General) and biomedical test activities? 5. When DOD was reorganized in 1953, who inherited the planning work of the Joint Panel? 6. What was the relation between DOD biomedical test planners, and the biomedical planners in other agencies?13 {13 Participation in planning for the biomedical components of tests extended beyond DOD. In an Atomic Energy Commission April, 1949 letter to Advisory Committee official Dr. Alan Gregg, AEC Chairman Lilienthal wrote: "Dr. Shields Warren and his staff in the Division of Biology and Medicine are presently engaged in drawing up plans for the biological and medical activities in future tests. A representative of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory is participating. . . discussions have been held by the Los Alamos "J" Division with representatives of the Armed Forces. . . ." A "Biomedical Test Planning and Screening Committee" began to meet in January 1952. AEC documentation indicates the Committee included representatives of the Public Health Service and the Department of Agriculture, as well as AEC affiliated entities. See "Monthly Status and Progress Report for the Division of Biology and Medicine for the month of January, 1952."} Who was responsible for setting basic safety standards? Who could grant waivers? Who was responsible for approving any experiments? Who had to be informed? 13 7. What was the full range of human testing engaged in under the "Biomedical Program" component of bomb tests? What was the full range of human testing engaged in outside of the "Biomedical Programs" component? For example, the Operation TEAPOT "Bluebooks" record that there was no biomedical program in connection with TEAPOT. Where did the urine sampling program, as discussed above, fall? 8. Where experimentation was conducted, what procedures were employed for evaluating risks and benefits? For selecting subjects? Disclosing information to them? Gaining their consent? 9. Was there an understood distinction between the collection of data to monitor safety, and the collection of data for research purposes? Were efforts made to assure that health and safety interests were not compromised by assigning responsibility to organizations with potentially conflicting roles? 14