LIST OF ATTACHMENTS FOR BRIEFING BOOK VOLUME 6 TAB F Attachment 1: Joint Panel on the Medical Aspects of Atomic Warfare Agenda For 8th Meeting. Attachment 2: Research and Development Board Committee On Medical Sciences and Committee On Atomic Energy, Program Guidance Report, 9/20/51. Attachment 3: Memo from E. G. Prentiss to Chief Army Field Forces regarding: Psychiatric Research in Connection With Atomic Weapons Tests Involving Troop Participation, 1/9/52. Attachment 4: Joint Panel On Medical Aspects of Atomic Warfare Report Of Meeting 2/24/52. Attachment 5: Joint Panel On Medical Aspects of Atomic Warfare Minutes of September 9 - 12, 1952. Attachment 6: Memorandum to the Chairman, Research and Development Board, from Richard L. Meiling, Chairman Armed Forces Medical Policy Council, Regarding Department of Defense Biomedical Participation In Atomic Weapons Tests 2/23/51. Attachment 7: #HRE-80, Regarding Flash Blindness, no date. Attachment 8: #HRE 82, Operation Upshot-Knothole Attachment 9: Recovery of Radioactive Iodine and Strontium From Human Urine -- Operation Teapot, 11/55. Attachment 10: Report of Participation In Selected Volunteer Program Of Desert Rock V-7, 4/25/53. Attachment 11: History of Air force Atomic Cloud Sampling, 1/63 Attachment 12: Operation Plumbbob, 5/57. Attachment 13: Operation Teapot, 1955. ATTACHMENT 1 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD COMMITTEE ON MEDICAL SCIENCES Washington 25, D.C. JOINT PANEL ON THE MEDICAL ASPECTS OF ATOMIC WARFARE BAW 201/2 Agenda, 8th Meeting ITEM 3 - Preparation of Statement on Biomedical Participation in Future Weapons Tests Reference: Memorandum on Chairman, CMS, from the Chairman, CAE, dated 24 Feb. 1951, subject: Department of Defense Biomedical Participation in Future Atomic Weapons Tests ATTACHED: BLT 201/1 (Draft 1) Statement - Biomedical Participation in Future Atomic Weapons Tests 1. The referenced memorandum reads, in part, as follows: "The Committee on Atomic Energy believes that in order to insure that the requirements for biomedical data to be obtained from each atomic weapons test are met, there should be available a statement of the essential information of this type which can be obtained only on the occasion of an atomic weapon detonation. Such information would be of considerable aid in test program planning, and would facilitate the establishment of a continuing program designed to take maximum advantage of actual tests which often are carried out on very short notice. "It is therefore requested that the Joint Panel on Medical Aspects of Atomic Warfare be requested to submit for approval jointly by the Committee Sciences and the Committee on Atomic Energy, a statement of the medical and biomedical information they consider essential for the Department of Defense to contain through participation in atomic weapons tests conducted in the future without regard to a specific type or location of test." 2. A questionnaire, requesting specific recommendations was sent to all members of the Joint Panel and the Committee on Medical Sciences and to certain scientists in AEC and university Laboratories. Response from the military representatives was THIS ITINERARY MAY BE ILLEGIBLE TO RESTRICTED UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT SECRET - 1 - reasonably good, but very few civilians responded, in fact only one from the whole restart of Committee and Panel members. 3. As a result, the attached draft utilizes predominantly the opinions of the military members, outside agencies, and the secretariat. It is offered not as a proposed statement, to be accepted after only minor revisions, but as a general guide to the type of paper which is expected of the Joint Panel. It is hoped that members will read the draft, think about it, and be prepared to offer constructive criticism at the meeting. BAW 201/2 -2- SECRET LOT NO._____ COPY NO. BAW 201/1 (DRAFT 1) BIOMEDICAL PARTICIPATION IN FUTURE ATOMIC WEAPONS TESTS At most atomic weapons tests which have been held in the past, a program of biomedical investigation has been conducted to obtain information vital to both the use of, and defense against, the atomic bomb. In some quarters, however, the need for further investigations, and particularly the need for further extensive programs, has been very seriously questioned. Even among the proponents of vigorous biomedical participation there are frequently differences as to what really needs to be known, i.e., what biomedical information they consider essential for the Department of Defense to obtain through participation in atomic weapons tests conducted in the future without regard to a specific type or location of test. This paper, prepared by the Joint Panel on the Medical Aspects of Atomic Warfare, ILLEGIBLE, is designed to show the general considerations involved in preparing a research program, outline the major unexplored areas in this field, and give some concrete examples of projects worthy of inclusion in future test programs. It seems unnecessary to expound on the general requirement for biomedical information in this field as this is self-evident in either offensive or defensive considerations of atomic weapons. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS It is, of course, obvious that a test of a new and untried atomic bomb is not a place to have an unlimited member of people milling about and operating independently. Every activity must be integrated with extreme care into the overall operation, and close supervision of every individual must be maintained. - 1 - SECRET BAW 201/1 SECRET For ILLEGIBLE, committee was ILLEGIBLE to ILLEGIBLE the various programs and pass judgment on their importance. ILLEGIBLE rather rigid criteria had to be met. Thus at any future tests, is at that test, a proposed program should certainly be considered only if it permits affirmative answers to the following: 1. Is the experiment itself worthwhile, and does it hold promise of producing significant results? 2. Does the experiment have to be done as a bomb detonation; is it impossible or impractical in the laboratory? 3. Can the experiment be adapted to the particular detonations that are contemplated? At most weapons tests, it is obvious that prior to detonation there will be only estimates as to the energy yield, and frequently the actual type of detonation - air drop, tower shot, or ground burst -- may not be decided on until fairly late. Thus, it is essential that the biomedical director maintain a certain amount of flexibility in his planning, but be prepared to confirm his plans just as soon as other basic decisions have been made. This difficulty at weapons tests would, of course, be circumvented at an explosion of a bomb of known yield in what would be essentially a study of weapons effects, such as might be desired and arranged for by the Civil Defense Authority. Any such detonation should be the occasion of a carefully planned biomedical program. To be methodically discourages, however, is the type of thinking which leads to the inclusion of animals at a test surely because there are test structures in which to place them. - 2 - ILLEGIBLE SECRET SECRET One ILLEGIBLE general ILLEGIBLE is that continuity of planning, from one test to another, is absolutely essential to a successful biomedical program. Thus, it seems unwise to argue that since much remains to be learned there must be animal exposures at every test. Rather it seems that actual animal exposures should be limited as much as possible and more accurate physical measurements be made of these quantities so important to the biomedical aspects of the bomb. This last, however, must be tampered with the realization that frequently the physicists' laboratory reproduction of the quantities measured in the field is found to be grossly similar but by no means identical in biological effect. It is obvious that IF the spectral distribution (including time relationships) of the radiant energy from the bomb were adequately known, and IF it could be suitably reproduced in the laboratory, there would be little need for field experimentation. It must be always kept in mind, however, that present laboratory experiments are done with sources of either thermal or ionizing radiation which SIMULATE, but do not DUPLICATE, that from the bomb. Therefore, it should be emphasized that every opportunity should be taken to check in the field against the actual spectrum what has been deduced in the laboratory with an artificial source. But in these areas whose field tests show that laboratory sources give adequate answers, further field testing should be held to a minimum. - 3 - ILLEGIBLE 201/1 SECRET SECRET ILLEGIBLE 201/1 (Draft 1) SPECIFIC PROBLEM FOR FUTURE TESTS It is axiomatic in scientific research that "what needs to be known" is a vague quantity, subject to constant change. Consequently, this section is not intended as a restricted area, beyond which field tests shall not tread. Rather, it is designed to show the type of problem which should be considered as a legitimate basis for biomedical participation in future weapons tests. The following list has been suggested by persons fully cognizant of this field, drawn from both military and civilian life. The order of the problems bears no relation to their relative military importance. (In the final paper, it would be preferable if the problems could be assigned priority ratings.) 1. The types and dimensions of foxholes which are most effective in protecting troops in the field. 2. The effects of combined injury (trauma and radiation, burn and radiation) on mortality in large animals. 3. An analysis of the spectrum of ionizing radiation. 4. The size of radioactive particles likely to be concentrated (a) in the target area and its environs (b) in the more distant "fall-out" areas. 5. Use of head shielding to protect against ionizing radiation. 6. Time relationship of reliance of thermal radiation. 7. Influence of ground irregularities on blast effects. 8. The reaction of large mammals to ILLEGIBLE - ILLEGIBLE within the first few minutes after irradiation. - 4 - ILLEGIBLE 201/1 SECRET SECRET ILLEGIBLE 201/1 (Draft 1) 9. Internal contamination of survivors of a contaminating burst. 10. General burn studied to allow evaluation of laboratory sources. 11. Effects of exposure of the eye to the atomic flash: (a) Changes in visual acuity (b) The after-image, description, and duration (c) Light blindness, description, and duration (d) Pathological effects (e) Other physiological effects 12. Time-intensity data for thermal omissions in high air bursts. 13. The temperature existing inside the atomic bomb cloud, both the puff and the stam, during the first ten minutes of its life. 14. Measurements of gamma and beta ray intensities within the puff of the atomic explosion cloud during the first ten minutes of its life. 15. Measurements of particle size in the atomic cloud puff and stam at various altitudes as a function of time and energy yields. 16. Measurements of the concentration of radioactive particles within pressurized aircraft, during and after flight through radioactively contaminated atmosphere. 17. Shape and dimensions of the atomic explosion cloud as functions of time, altitude, and energy yield. 18. Additional measurements of the rate of rise, disposal, and fragmentation of atomic explosion clouds, and the effects of altitude and temperature inversion layers. - 5 - ILLEGIBLE 201/1 SECRET SECRET ILLEGIBLE 201/1 19. Additional measurements of the energies of gamma and beta radiations from fission products as a function of time and isotopic spectrum. 20. Measurements of atmospheric attenuation of visible, thermal, and long-range ionizing radiation in nuclear explosions. 21. Studies of inhalation and ingestion of radioactive materials in fall-out zones. 22. The retention of inhaled radioactive materials. 23. Quantitative measurements of the contamination of food and drink served in the open in the vicinity of atomic weapons tests. 24. Measurements of radioactive isotopes in the body fluids of atomic weapons test personnel. 25. Optimum design for emergency field-type shelters (slit trenches, etc.). 26. The biological effects of atomic explosion blast in various field-type shelters. 27. The efficiency and suitability of various protective devices and equipment for atomic weapons war: Respiratory filter Goggles Protective clothing Personnel decontamination kits Personnel ILLEGIBLE devices and equipment Treatment kits Diagnostic kits Radiochemical analytical kits 28. Psychophysiological changes after exposure to nuclear explosions. - 6 - ILLEGIBLE 201/1 SECRET SECRET ILLEGIBLE 201/1 29. Orientation flights in the vicinity of nuclear explosions for certain combat air crew. The above problems are of various types. Some require animal exposures; some, only physical measurements. Some have been studied at past tests; other have never been investigated. Some will lend to further field tests; others, such as those confirming laboratory finding, will be an end unto themselves. Some are of major importance, such as the effects of combined injury; others may be less vital. Taken as a whole, they constitute a good picture of what presently needs to be known about the biomedical effects of an atomic explosion. - 7 - ILLEGIBLE 201/1