DOCUMENT 3 ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION TROOP PARTICIPATION IN OPERATION TUMBLER-SNAPPER Report by the Director of Military Application THE PROBLEM 1. To consider the troop participation program for Operation TUMBLER-SNAPPER. BACKGROUND 2. On November 26, 1951, AFSWP forwarded to the AEC a letter (AEC 494) stating that the Department of the Army had indicated a requirement for participation to the maximum extent possible in all future atomic tests in the continental United States. 3. On December 28, 1951, the AEC replied (AEC 494/1) that the concept of limited troop participation in continental weapons tests had the concurrence of the AEC. We asked, however, that the scope and objectives of such participation be outlined well in advance to the Commission, to facilitate integration of such operations into our weapons development test program. 4. On March 10, 1952, the AEC received the formal AFSWP proposal (AEC 494/2) for troop participation in TUMBLER- SNAPPER. 5. Shots #3, #4, and #8 (see Appendix "E") are sugested for troop participation. Shots #3 and #4, medium-yield air bursts, are comparable to tactical weapons and, therefore, realistic for troop maneuvering. Of the tower shots, #5 and #7 are pre-dawn shots and hence unsuitable for maneuvers. The remaining possibilities are #6 and #8. The test organization agrees that troop participation in these shots will not interfere with the development tests. 6. For troop observer participation, as well as VIP observers, shots #3, #4, #6, #7, and #8 are suggested. The others are not basically suitable because they are either too small (#1 and #2), the first of a series (#5), or not definitely scheduled (#9). Troop observers would be stationed at seven miles distance. 7. The number of troops and observers participating is being limited to approximately the numbers specified in the initial request. The governing consideration appears only to have no more than will permit the Exercise Director, who will be responsible for them in all ways, to comply with the requirements issued by the Test Manager in their regard. Accordingly, the details of actual numbers to be involved are left to be agreed between the Test Manager and the Exercise Director. 8. It is proposed that the AEC allow troops to be stationed as close as 7000 yards (3.9 miles) to ground zero. In each case the DOD believes that the information they will derive from stationing troops at 7000 yards is important. They will prove - 2 - that U.S. troops in combat could survive a detonation of this kind at this distance in field fortifications and emerge immediately thereafter in condition to exploit the enemy's resultant confusion. Their ability to exploit this post-shot confusion, however, is an inverse function of their proximity to ground zero. So strong is the feeling about the importance of being at a tactically realistic distance from ground zero that the Marines have stated they would not participate if the seven mile limitation fixed during Desert Rock were again imposed. 9. Possible hazards at 7000 yards involve injury from: a. Observing shot from unprotected eyes, leading to damaged eyes and possible blindness; b. Radiological exposure due to the dust cloud unexpectedly passing over the troops; c. Thermal burns; d. Sand blasting or secondary missiles; e. Error in burst location due to early or late release of bomb. 10. The first four of these hazards are considered to be minor. The first two will be minimized by the Exercise Director's preparing and executing a safety plan satisfactory to the Test Manager. This will include a positive check to insure that the eyes of all troops are protected at shot time, a rapid evacuation plan, and other similar controls. As to the third, thermal radiation at this distance is not dangerous being less than 2.5 calories per square centimeter, or less than the amount which produces only a slight reddening of the skin. The fourth, danger from sand blasting or secondary missiles, is negligible at this distance. - 3 - 11. The fifth hazard, danger from early or late release of the bomb, is a controversial point since it is clear that the only positive protection is to stay entirely away from the drop zone. To date, however, the maximum radial bombing error at the NFG has been 127 yards and the average error over nine drops has been 67 yards. The SF00 points out that the present AEC policy does not permit manned stations closer than five to six miles to the bomb run and that, for this reason, they cannot concur in the proposal. They believe that, although it is probably safe to permit troops this close to detonation under these conditions, the Commission should disclaim all responsibility for injury which might by some remote chance result from their position. 12. The Division of Military Application believes, on the other hand, that the Commission cannot delegate or avoid responsibility for approving this position. Once concurred in, the decision is a joint responsibility. 13. In summary, if the bomb were released at this point during the nearest bomb run which would detonate it as close as possible to the troops, they would be three miles from the detonation. The danger of injury at this distance is largely limited to eye damage resulting from possible careless exposure on the part of individual soldiers. It is the judgment of the Division of Military Application that the AEC- DOD safety plan, as now conceived, will provide sufficient protection against this possibility of careless exposure, through orientation and supervision by the troop commanders, to warrant Commission concurrence with the proposed troop location (7000 yards from ground zero). - 4 - CONCLUSION 14. It is concluded that: a. Participation by bodies of troops in shots #3, #4, and #8 is justified; b. Participation by troop observers in shots #3, #4, #6, #7, and #8 is justified, at a distance of seven miles from ground zero; c. Determination of precise numbers of troops and observers is a detail best left to the Test Manager and Exercise Director; d. Participation of the troops at a position 7000 yards from ground zero at the above shots is justified in spite of the hazard due to early or late bomb release. Other hazards will be minimized by preparation and execution of a satisfactory safety plan. e. A maneuver by the troops on foot following the shots, through the ground zero area, is justified if done at a time and in a zone of advance prescribed by the Test Manager. STAFF JUDGMENTS 15. The Division of Biology and Medicine does not concur in the recommendation, for reasons set forth in Appendix "F". RECOMMENDATION 16. That the Atomic Energy Commission: a. Approve participation of troops in shots #3, #4, and #8 of Operation TUMBLER-SNAPPER, in positions 7000 yards from ground zero in each case, and following the detonations, a maneuver by troops on foot through the shot area at a time, and in a zone of advance, prescribed by the Test Manager; b. Approve the participation of troop observers in shots #3, #4, #6, #7 and #8 of Operation TUMBLER-SNAPPER, at positions seven miles from ground zero in each case; c. Note that the above approvals are contingent upon preparation by the Exercise Director of a safety plan for the troops in the forward Area which shall be satisfactory to the Test Manager; d. Note that information of the above approvals will be transmitted to the Chief, AFSWP, by means of a letter similar to that in Appendix "D". - 5 -