DOCUMENT 6


K. D. Nichols, General Manager          March 29, 1954

John C. Bugher, M.D., Director
Division of Biology and Medicine

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE
FOR BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE

SYMBOL: BM: JCB

I am pleased to forward herewith the comments and
recommendations of the Advisory Committee for Biology and
Medicine of the Nevada Proving Ground study.  The Commission
had requested that the Committee review this report at its
meeting held on February 17, 1954.

Enclosure
     ltr., 3/26/54 to
     Mr. Murray from Dr. Stakeman




                                   March 25, 1954


Mr. Thomas E. Murray, Acting Chairman
United States Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, 25, 1954

Dear Mr. Murray:

Transmitted herewith are the comments and recommendations of
the Advisory Committee for Biology and Medicine on the "Report
of the Committee to Study the Nevada Proving Ground" as
requested by the Commission in a memorandum dated February 19,
1954 to Dr. John C. Bugher, Director, Division of Biology and
Medicine, from the Division of Military Application.

The Advisory Committee held a special meeting to consider this
report at the Atomic Energy Commission in Washington, D.C., on
Saturday, March 13, 1954.

Paraphrasing General Forrest's famous saying , "Victory goes
to the nation that gits there fustest with the mostest and
bestest weapons."  This is no less true in the atomic age.

It is therefore essential to continue the Nevada Proving
Grounds in order to achieve maximum speed in the development
of weapons.  Speed is essential to national survival.

In emergencies such as this some risks, immediate and long
term, must be accepted.  There risks should be frankly and
publicly acknowledged.  However, the policy of minimizing
these risks must be continued in both the local and national
interest.

Our recommendations relative to the criteria beginning on Page
2 of AEC 141/22 are as follows:

          a.  The number of nuclear shots at the 
     Nevada Proving Grounds in one year should be held
     to a planned maximum of ten.  The number of three
     high yield tower shots should not normally be
     exceeded.

          b. & c.  Each nuclear shot programmed, whether
     for AEC, military or civil defense, should be
     justified individually, evaluated as to probable
     off-site hazard, and should include plans for
     controlling or reducing its fall-out.


Mr. Thomas E. Murray          - 2 -

          d.  No change
          
          e.  Marginal shots should be fired only
     under satisfactory weather conditions that have
     a high degree of predictable stability.  The
     possibility of continuing postponement and
     perhaps of resulting extension of series
     duration should be accepted.  Participating
     organizations and units should be advised that
     they must accept the possibility of postponement
     on such shots.

          f.  Deleted as meaningless

          g.  No change

          h.  Shots should be limited as follows with
     regard to yield and burst altitude, with maximum
     yield to incorporate a reasonable allowance for
     error:

               Surfaces and sub-surfaces, 1 KT
               300-feet tower, 25 KT
               500-feet tower, 50 KT
               Air drop, 80 KT (fireball not to 
                 touch ground)

We suggest that approval of the 50KT yield for a 500-foot
tower be withheld until experimental detonation at a lower kt
level has proved that the safety factor indicated here
actually exists.

In addition to the recommendations on the criteria given
above, there are certain other general comments which we
desire to make:

     (1)  We command the use by the Test Director of an
          advisory panel which has been customary at
          (ILLEGIBLE) and recommend that this practice be
          extended to the operations in the Pacific.

     (2)  The Committee noted that the first announce-
          ment of the recent incident in the Pacific
          came as a result of the letter a Marine
          wrote to his mother.  The Committee considers
          it highly desirable that there should be an
          early official release of authentic 
          information to avoid permitting unreliable
          and inaccurate reports to become controlling
          by default.

     (3)  The Advisory Committee for Biology and 
          Medicine notes with approval the studies
          now being carried out.  It further urges
          that: (a) all feasible emphasis be placed on
          the extension 


Mr. Thomas E. Murray          - 3 -

          and (ILLEGIBLE) of the studies on the 
          distribution and effects of radioactive
          material from tests; (b) the Gabriel and
          Sunshine studies be expanded to include 
          other elements than those now regarded as
          being controlling (Ru, I, Pu, for example)

     (4)  The experimental evidence obtained by the
          staff of the Division of Biology and Medicine
          indicates that the biological food chains
          must be considered broadly and not only
          along conventional agricultural lines.  The
          Committee considers of utmost importance
          the provision of adequate support for 
          extensive and intensive studies on these
          phases of the problem.

As of possible interest to the Commission we are sending you
a complete transcript, classified SECRET, of the discussions
at the recent meeting of the Committee.

                         Respectfully submitted,



                         E. C. Stakman, Chairman
                         Advisory Committee for Biology
                           and Medicine


Enclosure:

     Cy. 2A, Transcript (SECRET)

cc:  Brig. Gen. K. E. Fields
     Dr. Shields Warren


MONTGOMERY/rme

DISTRIBUTION:  (A SERIES)
Cys. #1a & 2a- Addressee
Cy. #3A - Brig. Gen. K. E.Fields
Cy. #4A - Dr. Shields Warren
Cy. #5A - B&M Files 
Cy. #6A - B&M "
Cy. #7A - B&M "
Cy. #8A - Dir. Reading File

DISTRIBUTION:  (B SERIES) 
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Cy. 2B
Cy. 3B - FRM