ATTACHMENT E (TAB H)

CIA Documents on Atomic Energy Intelligence.

56.  [ORE], Intelligence Memorandum 225, "Estimate of Status
     of Atomic Warfare in the USSR," 20 September 1949
     (Excerpted photocopy)

                 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

20 September 1949

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 225

SUBJECT:  ESTIMATE OF STATUS OF ATOMIC WARFARE IN THE USSR  
     (Category No. 5)

ILLEGIBLE as a whole:

     The USSR has an atomic energy program which started in
late 1945 and which is being vigorously ILLEGIBLE under a top
priority. The current estimate of the Joint Nuclear Energy
Intelligence Committee is that the earliest possible date by
which the USSR might be expected to produce an atomic bomb is
mid-1050 and the most probable date is mid-1953. (Secret)

              ESTIMATE BY TECHNICAL OBJECTIVES

AX-1

     No foreign country is known to be developing a large-
scale uranium isotope-separation program, although a number of
countries are planning to develop plutonium production
facilities.  It is believed, that excluding Britain, the USSR,
and possibly Canada, no foreign country has the capability of
producing sufficient fissionable material to make an atomic
bomb within the next ten years. (Secret)

     Pursuant information indicates that a plutonium project
for the production of fissionable materials is being
developed.  It is reasonable to suppose that the Soviets have
had at least one low-energy pole (probable graphite) operating
for a year or more although no ILLEGIBLE evidence exists.  It
is probable that production piles are now in the
process of design and/or construction, but their exact status
is unknown.  There is no evidence of a large-scale uranium
isotope separation project. (Secret)

				 1

AX-Z

     There is no information indicating that any foreign
country is engaged in a project dealing with radiological
warfare agents. (Secret)

AX-3

     As the production of radiological warfare agents requires
operating production piles, it is apparent that no foreign
country can have done very much in this field. (Secret)

AX-4

     No information is available.

AX-5

     Defensive measures against radiological warfare agents
have not been apparent within the USSR.  The single possible
exception is a report that a large portion of the counters
being manufactured by one German plant for the USSR is
reported to be for distribution to the Red Army down to
ILLEGIBLE level.  Large production of field counters for the
Soviets had been reported in Germany and elsewhere; but, as
far as can be determined, these are primarily for use in the
uranium mining operations.  Although protective measures for
the general public may be in the planning stage, it is
difficult to believe that widespread ILLEGIBLE programs would
escape ILLEGIBLE. (Secret)

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Leahy to the President, 21 August 1946 (Photocopy)



21 August 1946

From:     Admiral Leahy

TO:       The President

NO:       White #26

     The National Intelligence Authority today approved the
following quoted directive to be issued by the Authority to
General Vandenberg, General Groves approved.

     Secretaries Patterson and Forrestal consider it very
important that the directive be issued without delay. 
Secretary Acheson stated that your approval should be
obtained.

     The members of the Authority recommend your approval with
an understanding that any action taken by the Authority will
be without prejudice to future change that may be desired by
the Atomic Energy Committee.  I recommend approval.

     "Pursuant to the President's letter of 22 January 1946,
designating this Authority as responsible for planning,
developing, and coordinating all Federal foreign intelligence
activities so as to assure the most effective accomplishment
of the intelligence mission related to the national security,
the following policies and procedures relating to Federal
intelligence activities in the field of foreign atomic energy
developments and potentialities affecting the national
security are announced:

     1. The Director of Central Intelligence, subject to the
direction and control of this Authority, is hereby authorized
and directed to coordinate the collection by agencies subject
to coordination by N.I.A. of all intelligence information
related to foreign atomic energy developments and

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potentialities which may affect the national security, and to
accomplish the correlation, evaluation, and appropriate 
dissemination within the Government of the resulting intelligence.  
The Director of Central Intelligence is further authorized to 
arrange with other intelligence agencies of the Government to 
utilize their collection facilities in this field.

     2. To accomplish the function assigned in paragraph 1,
the Secretary of War and the Commanding General of the
Manhattan Engineer District have authorized the transfer to
the Central Intelligence Group of the personnel and working
files of the Foreign Intelligence Branch operated by the
Commanding General of the Manhattan Engineer District,
effective at the earliest practicable date." 



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE

SOVIET POTENTIALITIES TO CONDUCT RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE

WP-10-50
23 FEBRUARY 1950

THIS REPORT IS A WORKING PAPER AND AS SUCH DOES NOT REQUIRE
CONCURRENCE OF THE IAC AGENCIES.  IT WAS PREPARED BY THE
OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY EXPRESSLY FOR THE USE OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON CEBAR
OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.  THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN
SHOULD NOT BE FURTHER DISSEMINATED WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE
DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
SOVIET POTENTIALITIES TO CONDUCT RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE

INTRODUCTION:

     IT MUST BE EMPHASIZED AT THE OUTSET THAT THERE IS VERY
LITTLE POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE ON EITHER SOVIET INTENTIONS OR
CAPABILITIES TO CHANGE IN THE PRODUCTION OF OR TO EMPLOY
RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE MATERIALS.

PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES:

     YOU ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF
LAST SEPTEMBER 23RD WHICH STATED THAT WITHIN RECENT WEEKS AN
ATOMIC EXPLOSION HAD TAKEN PLACE WITHIN THE USSR.  IT IS
REASONABLY CERTAIN THAT THE FISSIONABLE MATERIAL USED WAS
PLUTONIUM, AND THESE FACTS IMPLY THE CAPABILITY TO PRODUCE
PLUTONIUM IN SOME QUANTITY, E.G. FROM ONE OR MORE PRODUCTION
FILES.  THEREFORE, WE MUST NOW PRESUME THAT THE USSR HAS THE
BASIC FACILITIES FOR PRODUCING SMALL QUANTITIES OF
RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS, WHICH MAY TAKE THE FORM OF RAW OR
SEPARATED FISSION PRODUCTS, ESPECIALLY IRRADIATED MATERIALS,
OR PLUTONIUM ITSELF.  THERE IS FAIRLY GOOD INFORMATION THAT
THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM IS STILL IN THE CONSTRUCTION
PHASE, AND DEPENDING ON THE EMPHASIS WHICH IS PLACED ON THE
CONSTRUCTION OF FACILITIES IN THE NEAR FUTURE, THE USSR MAY
HAVE THE CAPABILITY FOR PRODUCTION OF LARGE QUANTITIES (TENS
OF ILLEGIBLE) OF RW AGENTS, WITHIN TWO OR THREE YEARS.  IT IS
IMPOSSIBLE AT PRESENT TO DRAW MORE PRECISE CONCLUSIONS FROM
THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE.

POLICY AND PROPAGANDA:

     THERE IS NO INFORMATION ON SOVIET NATIONAL POLICY WITH
RESPECT TO THE EMPLOYMENT OF RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE MATERIALS
EITHER OPENLY OR SUBVERSIVELY,HOWEVER, IT IS CONSIDERED THAT

				 1
 
THE USSR WOULD NOT HESITATE TO USE THESE MATERIALS IF SUCH USE
WOULD ASSIST THEM IN ATTAINING THEIR OBJECTIVES.  THERE IS NO 
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION SPECIFICALLY RESTRICTING THE USE OR 
EMPLOYMENT OF RE.

     SO FAR AS IS KNOWN, THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT DIRECTLY
EMPLOYED THE TEAM "RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE" EITHER IN DISCUSSIONS
AT THE UNITED NATIONS, OTHER CONVENTIONS AND CONFERENCES, OR
IN ANY OF THEIR PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGNS.  IT MUST THEREFORE BE
ASSUMED THAT "RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE" IS INCLUDED IN THE
CATEGORY OF EITHER "ATOMIC WEAPONS" OR "OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION," BOTH OF WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE PROPOSED SHOULD
BE OUTLAWED BY INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION.  THE LINE TAKEN BY
SOVIET PROPAGANDA FOR HOME CONSUMPTION HAS BEEN TO MINIMIZE
THE EFFECTS OF THE ATOMIC BOMB, INCLUDING RADIATION, AND IT
SEEMS REASONABLE TO EXPECT THAT THE EFFECTS OF THE USE OF
RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE MATERIALS WOULD BE SIMILARLY MINIMIZED.

DEFENSIVE MEASURES:

     PRACTICAL DEFENSIVE MEASURES AGAINST RADIOACTIVE
MATERIALS, OTHER THAN IN CONNECTION WITH ATOMIC BOMB ATTACKS,
HAVE RECEIVED NO MENTION BY THE SOVIET PRESS AND RADIO.  THERE
IS SOME EVIDENCE THAT THE VOLUNTEER DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
(OSOAVIAKHIM) WAS CONDUCTING SOME TRAINING ON THE EFFECTS OF
ATOMIC BOMB ATTACKS PRIOR TO MAY 1948.  SOME INSTRUCTION IN
THE DETECTION OF RADIOACTIVITY WAS OFFERED, AND ATOMIC AIR
RAIDS WERE SAID TO HAVE BEEN SIMULATED TO DRILL THE POPULATION
OF STRATEGIC AREAS FOR RAPID MASS MOVEMENTS TO SHELTERS, OR
OUT OF THE AREAS.  SOME SPECIFIC REPORTSAPPLICABLE TO THE 
PROBLEM OF DEFENSE AGAINST RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE ARE:

				2

     (1) AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT IN THE SPRING OF 1949 STATED
THAT A LARGE PORTION OF THE COUNTERS BEING MANUFACTURED BY ONE
GERMAN PLANT FOR THE USSR WAS RUMORED TO BE FOR DISTRIBUTION
TO THE RED ARMY DOWN TO THE COMPANY LEVEL.

     (2) A SOVIET SCIENTIFIC JOURNAL REPORTED IN MID-1949 THAT
A METHOD HAD BEEN DEVELOPED FOR PREPARING VITAMIN-FORTIFIED
BLOOD WHICH COULD BE STORED WITHOUT LOSING POTENCY.  THE USE
OF WHOLE BLOOD TRANSFUSIONS IS STANDARD TREATMENT FOR
COUNTERACTING RADIATION EFFECTS.

     (3) A NORTH AMERICAN NEWSPAPER ALLIANCE ARTICLE FROM
BERLIN DATED 8 FEBRUARY 1950 STATED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD
PERFECTED AN INJECTION CONTAINING INSULIN, CERTAIN HORMONES,
AND OTHER COMPOUNDS, WHICH WILL IMMUNIZE A HUMAN BEING AGAINST
RADIATION SICKNESS FOR 3 DAYS.  AN INJECTION IS STATED TO
RELIEVE NAUSEA, VOMITING AND CERTAIN TOXIC EFFECTS OF
RADIATION SICKNESS IF APPLIED BEFORE TISSUE DECOMPOSITION SETS
IN.  FURTHER, IT WAS CLAIMED IN THE ARTICLE THAT SEVERAL
"CLINICAL PHYSICISTS" SPECIALIZING IN RADIOLOGY, BELIEVE THIS
DEVELOPMENT TO BE FEASIBLE, AND THAT AMERICAN INVESTIGATIONS
HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT ALONG SIMILAR LINES WITH SOME SUCCESS.

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CONCLUSIONS:

     IN CONCLUSION, IT IS CONSIDERED THAT THE USSR DOES NOT
HAVE AVAILABLE AT THE PRESENT TIME A SUFFICIENT QUANTITY OF
RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE MATERIALS TO BE USEFUL IN A MILITARY
SENSE, BUT THEY DO HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF DISSEMINATING SMALL
QUANTITIES OF RADIOACTIVE POISONS WITHIN THE U.S. THROUGH THE
EMPLOYMENT OF SUBVERSIVE INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS, IF
THEY SHOULD SO DESIRE.

     IT IS OUR OPINION, HOWEVER, THAT FROM A PRACTICAL
STANDPOINT, AS COMPARED TO RW AND CW, THE PRODUCTION OF A
SIGNIFICANT QUANTITY OF RE MATERIALS REQUIRES AN EXTENSIVE
PLANT INSTALLATION, AND WOULD INTERFERE WITH ATOMIC BOMB
PRODUCTION.  IN ADDITION RW MATERIALS ARE DIFFICULT TO HANDLE
AND DISSEMINATE, AND THEIR USE IS RELATIVELY INEFFECTIVE.  FOR
THESE REASONS THEIR EMPOWERMENT BY THE USSR IS CONSIDERED TO
BE UNLIKELY.


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HAND WRITTEN

NOTE: Inserts in red made after presentation to committee on
24 Feb. '50

List of Attachments
For Briefing Book Volume 6