DISCLAIMER The following is a staff memorandum or other working document prepared for the members of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments. It should not be construed as representing the final conclusions of fact or interpretation of the issues. All staff memoranda are subject to revision based on further information and analysis. For conclusions and recommendations of the Advisory Committee, readers are advised to consult the Final Report to be published in 1995. TAB F MEMORANDUM TO: Members of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments FROM: Advisory Committee Staff DATE: November 8, 1994 RE: Documentary Update on Human Experimentation/Data Gathering in Connection with Atomic Bomb Tests As discussed previously, the Department of Energy (DOE) and Department of Defense (DOD) are engaged in a search for documentation related to possible human experimentation in connection with bomb tests. This includes documentation of planning and coordinating groups, documentation of disclosure and consent policies and practices, and documentation of data gathering protocols and research results. This memorandum references some materials (attached) that have been obtained since the September staff report to the Committee on this topic. The September staff memoranda referenced below can be found in the September Staff Memoranda, Tab F. I. FURTHER DOCUMENTATION OF 1951 ARMED FORCES MEDICAL POLICY COUNCIL (AFMPC) PROPOSALS As discussed in the September Staff Memoranda, the AFMPC (located within the Office of the Secretary of Defense) appears to have initiated discussions that led to (a) the Joint Panel on the Medical Aspects of Atomic Warfare's discussion of biomedical participation in tests; and (b) the 1953 DOD Nuremberg Code policy (also referred to as the "Wilson Memo"). Attachment 1, located by staff in the National Archives, contains further AFMPC materials relating to the AFMPC's consideration of the presence of troops at atomic bomb tests. As discussed in the September Staff Memoranda, in February 1951 the AFMPC recommended that there be concerted study of biomedical participation in atomic weapons tests; this recommendation evidently resulted in the development of biomedical test participation planning documents by the Joint Panel on the Medical Aspects of Atomic Warfare. In a June 27, 1951 memorandum to high military officials, AFMPC Chairman Richard L. Meilling, M.D. addressed "Military Medical Problems Associated with Military Participation in Atomic Energy Commission Tests." The AFMPC counseled that troops be participants in forthcoming tests to be conducted at the Nevada test site. In doing so, the memorandum indicates that the AFMPC's view was that the fear of harm (at least on the terms for participation stated) was groundless, and that the exercise was needed to demonstrate to the troops that this was the case. The June 27 memorandum, on its face, does not clearly constitute a proposal for an experiment (at least an experiment in the sense that questions of the physical risk of radiation exposure were presented); however, as part of a series of exchanges which led to at least some bomb test related experimentation, the memorandum provides an idea of the view of risk and benefit shared by some of the medical personnel who were involved in bomb test related human data gathering/experimentation. The materials include a June 27, 1951 memo from AFMPC Chairman Richard L. Meilling, M.D. to high DOD officials regarding "Military Medical Problems Associated with Military Participation in Atomic Energy Commission Tests." The memorandum states, in part: 1. Fear of radiation is almost universal among the uninitiated and unless it is overcome in the military forces it could present a most serious problem if atomic weapons are used. . . . 2. It has been proven repeatedly that persistent ionizing radiation following air bursts does not occur, hence the fear that it presents a dangerous hazard to personnel is groundless. It is believed that positive action should be taken at the earliest opportunity to demonstrate this fact in a practical manner. This could be accomplished most conclusively by carrying out a tactical problem with a significantly large and representative group of military personnel in conjunction with the Atomic Energy Commission in one of their scheduled studies of the weapon. Such a study is scheduled for the early Autumn of 1951 within the continental limits of the United States. 3. It is recommended that a Regimental Combat Team with all its attached units be made available for such a demonstration. The Regimental Combat Team should be deployed approximately twelve miles from the designated ground zero of an air blast and immediately following the explosion. . .they should move into the burst area in fulfillment of a tactical problem. Attached medical units should simulate casualty evacuation. . . . 4. A tactical exercise of this nature would clearly demonstrate that persistent ionizing radiation following an air burst atomic explosion presents no hazards to personnel and would effectively dispel a fear that is dangerous and demoralizing but entirely groundless. . . . As quoted, the memorandum appears to indicate that, at least on the terms stated in the memo (i.e., an "air burst" and the initial location of troops at twelve miles from ground zero), the participation of troops in tests was not said to pose a risk. As shown in documents contained in the September memorandum, troop maneuvers did, in fact, subsequently take place at the Nevada tests. The initial location of the troops was significantly closer than 12 miles from ground zero. II. DOCUMENTATION REGARDING TROOP PARTICIPATION AT DESERT ROCK As discussed in the September Staff Memoranda, troop maneuvers were conducted in the early 1950s at the Nevada test site. Attachment 2 consists of documents obtained from the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) and by staff at the National Archives. These documents show analyses that were made in relation to the decision to place troops within a few miles of ground zero, and selected volunteers particularly close to ground zero. A June 5, 1952 memorandum called for "a study to be made to determine the minimum distance from ground zero that should be permitted in a peacetime maneuver. . . ." The memorandum states that: (See Attachment 2-A) under conditions of a tower explosion, such as currently being used at the Nevada test site, it may be possible to place troops in deep fox holes as close as 800 yards from ground zero without those troops suffering serious injury. A December 12, 1952 document, contains a report on the study requested in June. The report states, among other things: (See Attachment 2-B) There is no known tolerance for nuclear radiation, that is, there is no definite proof that even small doses of nuclear radiations may not, in some way, be harmful to the human body. On the other hand, within certain limits, nuclear radiation has injured personnel who have been exposed to it. Accordingly, permissible radiation dosages have been established on the basis of knowledge and experience accumulated to date. The memorandum recommends that dosages for Army personnel be above the 3r/test limit set by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) for its personnel. The request is justified because, it is said, Army personnel will be exposed, by comparison with AEC personnel, "very infrequently." In a February 3, 1953 memorandum to Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Major General Nichols recommended that, while the body of the troops be kept at a greater distance, "we should give the maneuver commander discretionary authority to use a small group of selected individuals to more definitely prove our doctrine. Accordingly, it was agreed that the selected group (on tower shots only) should be permitted to be exposed to 10 pounds per square inch over-pressure (which means 8 PSI at ground surface), nuclear radiation up to 10 roentgens per test. . . .The Surgeon General has agreed that it is highly improbable that such exposure will result in any injury to these selected individuals." (See Attachment 2-C) In a February 11, 1953 letter to Congressman Carl T. Durham, L.L. Lemnitzer, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research describes the need for the volunteer arrangement. (See Attachment 2-D) A February 20, 1953 document contains "Instructions for Positioning DA [Dept. of Army] Personnel at Continental Atomic Tests." (See Attachment 2-E) The document provides, at page 2, for the positioning of "selected volunteers" at particularly close distances to ground zero (but not closer than 1500 yards). The memorandum provides that the selected individuals "should be familiar in detail with the nature of the experimental explosion involved and be capable of making a personal assessment of the probability of significant variations in yield." The memorandum states that: [i]t is not intended that these exposures result in any injury to the selected individuals, but rather that their reactions to the experiments be gained for use as a basis for development of later troop exposure programs and for confirming safety doctrine. . . . III. DOCUMENTATION SHEDDING LIGHT ON THE RELATION BETWEEN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION PERFORMED IN CONNECTION WITH BOMB TESTS AND THE 1953 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE NUREMBERG CODE POLICY ("WILSON MEMO") In the September Staff Memoranda, it was noted that the relationship between the planning and conduct of bomb test experimentation and the simultaneous planning and issuance of the Secretary of Defense Nuremberg Code policy was a puzzle. Attachment 3, provided by the DNA, is a set of memos which appear to have been written in 1954. They appear to concern a review by DNA's predecessor of the report of a flashblindness experiment conducted at a test in which injuries resulted. The reviewers of the report asked whether any protocol governed such experiments. An attached memorandum shows their discovery that a "T/S" (Top Secret) 1953 Secretary of Defense directive had been issued, but, it appears, "no serious attempt had been made to disseminate the information to those experimenters who had a definite need-to-know." IV. DOCUMENTATION RELATING TO THE MANDATE OF HUMMRO, WHICH PERFORMED PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING OF SOLDIERS IN CONNECTION WITH ATOMIC BOMB TESTS As discussed in the September Staff Memoranda, DOD employed HUMMRO, a university-affiliated research organization in connection with psychological studies at the bomb tests. Attachment 4 is a transcript of a discussion of the mission for HUMMRO, which includes psychological testing, from a meeting of the Human Resources Committee of the DOD Research and Development Board. V. DOCUMENTATION INDICATING ATTEMPT TO CAST FALLOUT DATA COLLECTION AS "NUTRITION" RESEARCH As discussed in the September Staff Memoranda, in 1955 the Army conducted urine sampling of humans in connection with the TEAPOT series bomb tests in order to check for fallout products. Attachment 5, also provided by the DNA, is a set of December, 1954 documents relating to the planning for animal milk and tissue and human urine sampling. The December 16, 1954 memorandum from the Chief of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (DNA's predecessor) states, at least in regard to the animal sampling: The actual data obtained are SECRET and the sample collection should be discreetly handled. It is suggested that a statement be included in the instructions to the effect that these samples are being collected for nutritional studies. The memorandum further states that "[d]ata from studies of these [animal and human] samples is classified SECRET." VI. DOCUMENTATION OF MAINTENANCE OF FILES ON RADIATION EXPOSURE IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH POTENTIAL LIABILITY CLAIMS At the onset of the Committee's work, the Department of Veteran's Affairs (VA) provided two documents which indicated the 1947 creation within the VA of a "confidential" Atomic Medicine Division. The documents indicated that the Division was evidently created to respond to potential disability claims which might stem from the exposure of soldiers and sailors at weapons tests. (The timing of the creation of the Division followed the Operation Crossroads Tests in the Bikini islands, which resulted in severe contamination of ships that were the subjects of testing, and the subsequent exposure of sailors who manned them following the tests.) The key memo was a 1952 document authored by Dr. George Lyon, who served as a safety advisor at Operation Crossroads, and subsequently as a VA atomic medicine official. (Briefing Book Vol. 3, Tab I, Attachment A). The Committee, in coordination with DOD and VA, is following the trail of the Atomic Medicine Division in an effort to understand what it did, and whether there were secret records related to exposures of troops or others at atomic tests. Attachment 6, received from the Defense Nuclear Agency, includes 1952 memoranda and letters relating to the maintenance of files, perhaps secret, on exposures of military personnel. An August 8, 1952 letter, stamped "Confidential," from Major General Loper to Dr. Lyon, which states, in part: (See Attachment 6-A) This activity [DNA's predecessor AFSWP] has received information that the Army Field Forces is proposing to eliminate the requirement for maintaining detailed statistical records of radiological exposures received by Army personnel. This requirement was originally conceived as being necessary to protect the government's interest in case any large number of veterans should attempt to bring suit against the government based on a real or imagined exposure to nuclear radiation during an atomic war. Although the Army Field Forces is the only organization which is now preparing to eliminate this requirement, it is possible that the Navy and Air Force may propose similar action in the future. A note to the letter states that, "[i]t is requested that the Security Div determine whether the addressee has proper clearance." In an evidently responsive December 2 letter (stamped "Confidential Security Information"), Carl Gray, VA Administrator, stated: (See Attachment 6-B) It is the present policy of the Administrator of Veterans Affairs to urge that no change in present policies and practices within the Armed Forces be made. . .it is proposed that a careful study of this matter be undertaken within the coming year in order to arrive at a policy which will be consistent with practical accomplishments. In this study the cooperation of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project and the Veterans Administration would be indicated and they should consult with the Division of Medicine and Biology of the Atomic Energy Commission, and of the Joint Panel on the Medical Aspects of Atomic Warfare, Research and Development Board. We have asked DOD and VA to assist in locating any information which might shed light on the origins, nature, and whereabouts of the files referred to. (As noted in the Committee's Interim Report, VA has called on its Inspector General to assist in the search for information on the Atomic Medicine Division.) VII. CONTEMPORANEOUS SCIENTIFIC/MEDICAL UNDERSTANDING AND STANDARDS Attachment 7 is an excerpt from a 1957 manual, evidently recently declassified, and provided by DNA, which summarizes the state of understanding regarding nuclear weapons effects. The attached excerpt concerns biological effects. It may be noted that the bibliography for the section includes classified and non-classified materials. The only classified human studies appear to be those relating to Marshall Islanders and what appears to be the urine sampling study discussed in "V" above.