Attachment 1 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ARMED FORCES MEDICAL POLICY COUNCIL WASHINGTON 25, D.C. 23 February 1951 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD: 1. The Chairman of the Armed Forces Medical Policy Council has been greatly concerned over the lack of medical participation in the recent "A" Bomb tests in Nevada. 2. On 21 February 1951 a meeting was held in Dr. Weiling's office to discuss this problem, Those in attendance were: Dr. Richard B. Weiling, Chairman, Armed Forces Medical Policy Council Brig. Gen. Elbert DeCoursey, USA, Director, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology Captain Arthur W. Eaton, Jr. USN, Deputy Director, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology Major James B. Hartgering, USA, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, (Medical Section) Captain H.H. Haight (MC) USN, Atomic Defense Division, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery Commander Eugene P. Kronkite (MC) USN, Naval Medical Research Institute, Naval Medical Center Mr. David Beckler, Executive Director, Committee on Atomic Energy, RDS Commander J.J. Fee, USN, Navy Secretary, Committee on Atomic Energy, RDS Colonel O.K. Hiess, USAF (MC) Armed Forces Medical Policy Council 3. The group agreed that adequate biomedical coverage was arranged for the next tests (Greenhouse) but that other planned tests should include medical studies if any knowledge could be gained thereby. SECRET SECRET 4. Dr. Weiling forwarded a memo to Research & Development Board recommended medical coverage in future tests (copy attached). 5. On 21 February 1951 the AFSWP Medical Section (Maj. McDonnel and Major Hartgering) learned that Atomic Bomb tests would be held in Nevada four times each year and that a permanent installation was planned. Dr. Shippman (M.D.), Dr. Clark (PhD.), and Dr. Graves (PhD.) were to survey the test site on 23 February for purpose of including medical installations in the plan. 6. Bio-medical studies are to be included in each bomb test as indicated. O.K. Hiess Colonel, USAF (MC) Encl. 23 February 1951 MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT Subject: Department of Defense Biomedical Participation in Atomic Weapons Tests 1. It is considered of great importance that a continuing effort be made by the Department of Defense to obtain needed biomedical information on every occasion of test detonation of atomic weapons. This information is necessary in order that we can adequately inform military field commanders of probable biomedical consequences of exposure of their personnel to the effects of such weapons. 2.I have noted with concern that there was no biomedical participation by the Department of Defense in Operation RA ILLEGIBLE and that there are no approved plans for controlled biomedical investigations in Operation WINDSTORM. 3. It is essential that we all give further consideration to the incorporation of biomedical tests into the plans for Operation WINDSTORM and that a determined effort be made to arrange for necessary and practicable biomedical participation in all other future atomic weapons tests. Richard L. Weiling, M.D. Chairman Armed Forces Medical Policy Council ROB 156/76FEB 28, 1951 MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, JOINT TASK FORCE 131 SUBJECT: Biomedical Investigations in Operation WINDSTORM 1. Some concern has recently been expressed by the Chairman, Armed Forces Medical Policy Council, regarding the lack of controlled biomedical investigations in the research and development plans for Operation WINDSTORM. 2. It is requested that this matter be discussed further with appropriate representatives of the three Military Departments and the Armed Force Special Weapons Project to determine whether any additional biomedical investigations are considered necessary and practicable for inclusion in Operation WINDSTORM. 3. It is further requested that the Research and Development Board be advised as to the results of these discussions together with comments of the Task Force Commander as to the feasibility of accomplishment within the current logistics and operational limitations of the Task Force. WILLIAM WEBSTER Chairman cc: CHO Chief, AFSWP Comdr. J.J. Fee/ma/sc/77059/ 27 February 1951, CAE, RDB RDB 156/76 SECRET SECRET Office of the Secretary of Defense Armed Forces Medical Policy Council Washington 25, D.C. 1 March 1951 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD: Subject: Lack of Medical Participation in Recent "A" Bomb Tests in Nevada A meeting was held this date in the office of Mr. LeBaron', Chairman of the Military Liaison Committee to Atomic Energy Commission. Those present were: Dr. Richard Weiling Mr. Robert LeBaron Colonel O.K. Hiess, USAF (MC) Commander J.J. Fee, USN Mr. David Z. Beckler, R & D Board The lack of medical participation in the recent "A" bomb tests in Nevada was discussed and explained by Mr. LeBaron. Mr. LeBaron offered to write a memorandum to the Chairman, Research and Development Board recommending biomedical participation in future tests. A meeting is scheduled for 1:30 p.m. on Monday, March 5. /s/ O.K. Hiess O.K. Hiess Colonel, USAF (MC) SECRET AFSWP PLAHS GROUP P.O. Box 1805 Washington 13, D.C. 7 March 1951 SD/3 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Biomedical Program 1. A conference was held at 1330, 5 March 1951, as the result of a letter from Mr. William Webster, Chairman RDB, dated 28 February 1951, to reconsider the scope of the biomedical program. 2. Persons present were: B/Gen E. DeCoursey MC,USA Armed Forces Institute of Pathology Capt. C.F. Belvans USN BuMed Capt. C.C. Shaw MC,USN BuMed Capt. H.L. Andrews USPHS N.I.H. Col. O.K. Hiess USAF OSD Col. J.R. Wood MC SGO Army Dr. A.F. Spilhaus Civ. AFSWP Plans Group Dr. Scoville Civ. AFSWP Capt. R.A. Larkin USN AFSWP Plans Group Mr. Hempelmann Civ. RDB Lt. Col. E.A. Martell CE AFSWP Lt. Col. C.M. McHaney GSC Plans Group Cdr. W.W. Walker USN OP 36 Navy Cdr. J.J. Fee USN Staff, CAE, RDB Cdr. J.P. Pollard MC,USN RDB Maj. J.B. Hartgering MC,USA AFSWP Capt. W.H. Kilborn GSC SGO, D.A. 3. Dr. Spilhaus read the letter mentioned in paragraph 1 to the assembled group and asked Dr. Scoville to brief the group on the presently planned biomedical programs. This was done with elaboration from Dr. Andrews. 4. Dr. Spilhaus then described the general nature of Operation Windstorm as regards timing, weather, location, shots, etc. He pointed out the limitations which could be expected because of logistics, climate, etc., and stated that he would like for the service representatives to either SECRET a. Agree that in view of the limitations, the present program is sufficient in scope and content or b. Make positive suggestions regarding necessary additions to its programs to bring it to an acceptable level of sufficiency. 5. General DeCoursey expressed concern over the fact that this was his first notice that such an operation was being planned. Col. Wood agreed. The degree of notice given to the services was described. It was pointed out that the entire operation has been assembled rather hurriedly. 6. Controlled experiments at the site were discussed and in general discouraged because it was felt that these could be conducted with greater confidence limits in laboratories making use of the date obtained by the projects already planned. 7. Dr. Hemplemann, RDB, suggested that it might be worthwhile to consider using the same thermal instruments being used at Greenhouse and attempt to correlate the different Greenhouse shots with those of Windstorm. 8. Col. Wood stated he believed that sufficient date n thermal and nuclear radiation effects was being or had been obtained, and that the presently most important concern is to arrive at reliable conclusions regarding the effects on personnel of the debris thrown about by the blast. 9. Dr. Spilhaus agreed, and described a program to determine missile size, density, velocity and range which was being considered. Col. Wood indicated that such a program would be valuable indeed, and would satisfy the medical requirements therefor. 10. No other suggestions were offered. The conclusions of the group were: a. That the present program is satisfactory b. If possible, projects to correlate thermal effects with other type detonations to determine missile distribution should be added. 11. Action: a. The general conclusions of the conference were reported to JTF Commander. b. A recommended reply to the letter from Mr. Webster was drafted. c. The proposed projects were listed for evaluation and planning for inclusion in the Scientific Program. 12. Conference adjourned 1500, 5 march. G.M. McHaney Lt. Col., GSC Copies furnished: Mr. Gaver SECRET Lt. Little File HEADQUARTERS JOINT TASK FORCE 131 P.O. Box 1805 Washington, 13, D.C. Serial: 0046 19 March 1951 700. MEMORANDUM FOR: The Chairman Research and Development Board Washington, 25, D.C. SUBJECT: Biomedical Investigations in Operation WINDSTORM 1. Your memorandum RDB 156/76 of 28 February 1951 requested that the necessity and feasibility of augmentation of subject investigations be discussed with appropriate Defense Department agencies. Accordingly, the matter has been discussed by representatives of your Board, this Task Force, the Army, Navy, Air Force, Armed Forces Institution of Pathology, and the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project. 2. The consensus of opinion of the above representatives was that in view of financial, logistics, meteorological, and time limitations, augmentation is not practicable, exempt that additional biomedical investigation in the following fields are necessary and may become feasible, i.e. (a) Missile hazard, (size, density, velocity, range etc.) (b) Thermal radiation, (to correlate with GREENHOUSE results). 3. I concur with the above. The additional investigations indicated in paragraph 2 (a) and (b), above, will be incorporated in the WINDSTORM program if practicable. 4. The designation "Joint Task Force 131" and the code word "WINDSTORM" are classified as SECRET. Correspondence to this Headquarters should addressed: Commander, AFSWP, Plans Group P.O. Box 1805 Washington, 13, D.C. T.G.W. SETTLE Rear Admiral, USN Commander Copy furnished: CHO, CHAFSWP OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 25, D.C. 11 July 1951 MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CHAIRMAN, MILITARY LIAISON COMMITTEE TO AEO CHAIRMAN, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD CHIEF, ARMED FORCES SPECIAL WEAPONS PROJECT DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF Reference letter this office, subject: "Military Medical Problems Associated with Military Participation in Atomic Energy Commission Test," dated 27 June 1951, request all copies be downgraded from TOP SECRET, in accordance with the provisions of Classification Guide for the Military Application of Atomic Energy. W. Randolph Lovelace, II, M.D. Chairman Armed Forces Medical Policy Council OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, 25 D.C. Downgraded to "SECRET" Auth: memo from Dr. Lovelace 7/11/51 27 June 1951 MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CHAIRMAN, MILITARY LIAISON COMMITTEE TO AEO CHAIRMAN, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD CHIEF, ARMED FORCES SPECIAL WEAPONS PROJECT DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF SUBJECT: Military Medical Problems Associated with Military Participation in Atomic Energy Commission Tests 1. Fear of radiation is almost universal among the uninitiated and unless it is overcome in the military forces it could present a most serious problem if atomic weapons are used for tactical or strategic purposes. The dispelling of this fear is considered to be of urgent priority in the coordination of military command and medical responsibilities, if maximum effectiveness is to be realized should atomic weapons ever be used. 2. It has been proven repeatedly that persistent ionizing radiation following air bursts does not occur, hence the fear that it present a dangerous hazard to personnel is groundless. It is believed that positive action should be taken at the earliest opportunity to demonstrate this fact in a practical manner. This could be accomplished most conclusively by carrying out a tactical problem with a significantly large and representative group of military personnel in conjunction with the Atomic Energy Commission in one of their scheduled studies of the weapon. Such a study is scheduled for the early Autumn of 1951 within the continental limits of the United States. 3. It is recommended therefore that a Regimental Combat Team with all its attached units be made available for such a demonstration. The Regimental Combat Team should be deployed approximately twelve miles from the designated ground were of an air burst and immediately following the explosion, by means of their organic transportation, they should move into the burst area in fulfillment of a tactical problem. Attached medical units should simulate casualty evacuation under tactical combat conditions with simulated wounded who have been tagged by instructed references. 4. A tactical exercise of this nature would clearly demonstrate that persistent ionizing radiation following an air burst atomic explosion presents no hazards to personnel and equipment and would effectively dispel a fear that is dangerous and demoralizing but entirely groundless. The necessity of destroying this fear is considered to be of great importance and should be accorded the highest priority possible. The Armed Forces Medical Policy Council will cooperate in the development of the proposed tactical application and proved the necessary coordination of the medical services. Richard L. Weiling, M.D. Chairman Armed Forces Medical Policy Council MILITARY LIAISON COMMITTEE TO THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION P.O. BOX 1814 WASHINGTON, D.C. IN REPLY ILLEGIBLE TO: HLC 31.4 MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, ARMED FORCES MEDICAL POLICY COUNCIL SUBJECT: Military Medical Problems Associated with Military Participation in Atomic Energy Commission Tests 1. Reference is made to your memorandum, same subject, dated 27 June 1951 2. The need for indoctrination of a representative group of military personnel in the effects of atomic weapons has been recognized by the service and is being planned substantially in accordance with your recommendations. 3. The Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, which is coordination preliminary plans for military participation in atomic weapons tests, has solicited the views of the services on the subject of troop participation in the fall of 1951 test and has informed this Committee that the Army wished to conduct a training exercise in conjunction with one of the detonations. This would involve a composite Regimental Combat Team of not to exceed 5,000 troops. The maneuver would be essentially an advance over the ground shortly after it had been neutralized by the atomic burst. Effectiveness of radiological defense personnel could be clearly demonstrated. The maneuver is expected to yield valuable information on the psychological implications of use of atomic weapons close to our front lines and to demonstrate the groundlessness of fears concerning persistent radiation from an airburst. 4. In order to disseminate the information gained as widely as possible within the Department of Defense, the military departments have indicated a desire to send observers from many organizations and service schools to witness the tests. From the Army these number approximately 3,000 in addition to the Regimental Combat Team, from the Navy and Air Force 200 each, and 50 from the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project ATOMIC ENERGY ACT 1946 5. A medical problem such as you suggest could undoubtedly be worked into the maneuver. It is suggested that the coordination of medical services which you offer to be accomplished through the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project. 6. The Atomic Energy Commission has been advised that a maneuver in connection with one detonation is being considered, but a definite arrangement for this project have not yet been made. FOR THE COMMITTEE: ILLEGIBLE Col. USA ILLEGIBLE Secretary ATOMIC ENERGY ACT 1946 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD WASHINGTON 25, D.C. Log 39176 MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, ARMED FORCES MEDICAL POLICY COUNCIL SUBJECT: Department of Defense Biomedical Participation in Atomic Weapons Tests 1. In accordance with the tenor of your letter of the same subject dated 23 February 1951, the Commander, Joint Task Force 131, was requested to discuss further with appropriate representatives of the three Military Departments and the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project the necessity and practicability of additional biomedical investigation in Operation WINDSTORM. The requested action was taken by the Task Force Commander and the consensus of the group was that limited additional biomedical investigations in the fields of missile hazard and thermal radiation are necessary and will be incorporated in the WINDSTORM program if practicable. A copy of the reply of the Task Force Commander is attached for your information. 2. A copy of your memorandum of 23 February has also been transmitted to the Chief, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, for his information and consideration in carrying out his assigned responsibility for the preparation of preliminary plans and budgets for the conduct of the military phases of future atomic weapons tests. 3. The Chairman, Military Liaison Committee, has communicated to me the results of his discussion with you on this subject and his opinion concerning wider medical participation in atomic weapons tests, particularly those which take place within the continental United States. It is noted, also, that he intends to keep you posted of pertinent plans relating to future tests. WILLIAM WEBSTER Chairman Enclosure: Memo from JTF-131 for Chm. RDB dtd 19 Mar 51 Log 39083 Sub: Biomedical Investigations in Operation WINDSTORM cc: Mr. Robert LeBaron