DISCLAIMER The following is a staff memorandum or other working document prepared for the members of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments. It should not be construed as representing the final conclusions of fact or interpretation of the issues. All staff memoranda are subject to revision based on further information and analysis. For conclusions and recommendations of the Advisory Committee, readers are advised to consult the Final Report to be published in 1995. þþþDRAFTþFOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLYþþþ MEMORANDUM TO: Members of the Santa Fe Small Panel FROM: Advisory Committee Staff DATE: January 24, 1995 RE: Human Experimentation in Connection with Atomic Bomb Tests: Summary and Questions ______________________________________________________________________ Staff Briefing Memoranda (and documents) on experimentation with human subjects in connection with atomic bomb tests appeared in the September and November briefing books (Tabs F in both). Presently, a draft chapter on the topic is being prepared for the final report. This memo (l) briefly summarizes what is known, and some of the basic factual and policy questions that remain to be addressed ; (2) outlines the most current request for information to Los Alamos National Laboratory(LANL)/ Department of Energy (DOE) regarding the tests (Tab A-1); (3) provides sample documents illustrating the kinds of experiments that have been found (Tabs A-2 through A-7). I. THE BOMB TEST BUREAUCRACY AND HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION In 1950 President Truman designated the Nevada Testing Site as a continental proving ground for nuclear weapons tests. In part, the site was chosen because of its proximity to Los Alamos, which had been the staging area for the development and testing of the first atomic bombs during the Manhattan Project. During the 1950's test series took place in Nevada and in the Pacific, with the former being limited to non-thermonuclear weapons, typically (but not always) with a yield of below 50 kilotons. A. Test Organization The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) coordinated the management of the tests, through a series of specially created task forces. In most cases, personnel represented the AEC on day-to-day test management. 1 At their core, the tests were, of course, experiments with new and previously untried nuclear weapons. Around this core, however, the military, the AEC, and other civilian agencies added numerous other programs. In addition to a wide variety of physical data gathering on the bomb, these programs included training programs (such as troop maneuvers near ground zero), and numerous studies of weapons effects (on animals, cars, equipment, clothing, etc.). B. Human Data Gathering and Human Experimentation The many thousands of people who participated in, or observed, bomb tests were, of course, exposed to some degree of risk. In addition, soldiers were exposed in training maneuvers (e.g., troop maneuvers), and in the course of collecting data (e.g., cloud sampling). In many (but not all) of these cases, data on humans was gathered for, at least, safety monitoring purposes. In additional cases, however, people were put at risk with a premeditated intent to gather data on humans for purposes of study. In these cases, as shown by the attached sample documentation (Tabs A-2 through A-7), the term "experiment" could be said to apply, and in many cases, was applied by the investigators/sponsors. These cases include: . Exposure of troops to bomb detonation for purposes of psychological and physiological measurements; . Exposure of troops to detonations for flashblindness measurements; . Measurement of contamination on clothing of troops who crawled over contaminated ground, and measurements related to riding tanks through contaminated areas; . Measurement of radiation in and on aircrews flying through or near atomic clouds; . Use of humans for "decontamination" testing, e.g., hand measurements of radiation on plane fuselages; and . Sampling of radioactive isotopes in body fluids before and after tests. C. The Bureaucracy of Experimentation DOD and DOE have made much information public about bomb tests in recent years. However, there is no easy way to identify experiments in general, and to distinguish them from activities that, while similar, might be deemed occupational. For example, while in some cases the purpose of an atomic cloud mission was to measure radiation in aircrews, in many cases the purpose was to measure radiation in clouds or on the plane. In both cases data on humans would be gathered (for safety monitoring in the latter case). In many tests, the research agenda included "biomedical" programs. A priority, it might be assumed that to identify human experimentation (at least biomedical experimentation), one need only look at the research conducted under this programmatic heading. However, the biomedical programs included numerous animal experiments. Of the experiments identified above, the flashblindness experiments appear to be the only human experiments that took place under the "biomedical" program heading. (The 1954 research on the Marshallese, 2 which was evidently conceived immediately following upon the disastrous irradiation of the islanders, also was pigeonholed under the "biomedical" program category.) In short, there does not appear to have been any routine process for the review and approval of bomb test activities that might be called human experimentation. In most cases activities involving human experimentation were identified by programmatic headings that do not convey the term. In some cases, the experiments may have been "add on" to programs that were already scheduled for other purposes (e.g., flights through atomic clouds). As we have discussed in other contexts, the chicken and egg questions of multiple purpose research are omnipresent in regard to the atomic bomb tests. D. Secretary of Defense Wilson's 1953 Policy and Bomb Test Experimentation For experiments post-dating February 1953, Secretary of Defense Wilson's 1953 "Nuremberg Code" policy should, presumably, have governed bomb test related human experimentation. In early 1954, DOD officials in search of a policy to govern earlier flashblindness experiments recognized that the policy should govern such experiments. (See November Briefing Book, Tab F ). Other than this document, however, there is no indication that the 1953 policy (or any equivalent policy) governed the bomb test experiments. The staff is presently researching the disclosure and consent practices that were employed in the case of each group of experiments. E. Risk Review As noted above, there was no particular bureaucratic mechanism for review of human experimental risks and benefits. Rather, questions of experimental risk were addressed in terms of the ongoing debate about occupational exposures. As indicated in the September briefing book, in the early 1950's DOD and the AEC entered into a lengthy dance regarding the occupational standards to govern at the test site. In essence, the AEC sought to keep standards based on the occupational standard established by the National Council on Radiation Protection (NCRP) (3R/13 weeks). In order to engage in troop maneuvers, and other activities, the DOD argued that planning should proceed on the assumption that the total could be received on a "one-shot" basis by those who were not normally test site workers (e.g., soldiers engaged in troop maneuvers). In 1952-53, the AEC ceded to DOD responsibility for stating the safety levels for troops at maneuvers. However, in subsequent years, exchanges continued regarding waivers for exemptions to NCRP standards, for example, in the case of cloud flythroughs. 3 F. Basic Questions Information that remains outstanding includes: 1. Additional basic documentation (e.g., protocols, reports) on the full panoply of activities that might be considered experimentation in the context of atomic bomb testing. 2. Additional basic documentation of the disclosure to subjects (often called "indoctrination"), the method of subject selection, and the opportunity for potential subjects to opt out of experiments related to atomic bomb testing. 3. Documentation of the use of experimental data obtained during bomb testing. Questions remaining include: l. The division of responsibility between DOD and AEC for experimental activities; 2. The way in which experiments came to be added on to bomb test programs; 3. The logic which led to the bureaucratic location of the experiments outside of the "biomedical" programs; 4. The relation (factually and philosophically) between risky activities that were called experiments and similar activities that were not (e.g., many troops were similarly placed in bomb test maneuvers, but only some were the subjects of psychological experiments; many aviators flew through clouds, but only some were used as measures for radiation). II. DATA SOUGHT FROM LANL/DOE In the late 1970's DOD and DOE engaged in a major effort to retrieve and make public documentation regarding the bomb tests. This documentation resulted in "Blue Book" histories of each test series published by DOD, and the Coordination & Information Center (CIC) collection of documents, operated by a DOE contractor. The Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) and DOE efforts were, and remain, basic research resources in the Committee's study of bomb test related experimentation. In mid-summer Committee staff entered into a series of exchanges with LANL/DOE regarding documents (or other information) located at that site. In November and December LANL/DOE provided some interesting and important information relating to the DOD/AEC "biomedical test screening committees". These documents show LANL/DOE's view that, in about 1952, the DOD refused to permit meaningful review of its biomedical experiments. In addition, LANL/DOE provided some further information on cloud sampling and other experiments. We call to the Committee's attention, in particular, the statement made by LANL/DOE in December, 1995, in transmitting information to the Committee. It states: 4 Radiation effects studies were never conducted on humans. The AEC always opposed the use of volunteers for medical studies, and regarded the operational exposures as occupational. This document is attached to this memorandum. These statements, on the basis of documents summarized above, seem questionable. In anticipation of the Santa Fe meeting, Staff transmitted to LANL/DOE a set of outstanding questions set forth in Tab A-1. We are seeking further explanation from LANL/DOE. 5