Jangle NEVADA PROVING GROUNDS OCTOBER - NOVEMBER 1951 FOR REFERENCE SEE (3pm15.GIF) 1 UNCLASSIFIED FORMER "ILLEGIBLE" DATA Handle As "illegible" in Foreign Dissemination Section 1.4B. Atomic Energy Act. 1954. RESTRICTED DATA This document contains restricted data as defined n the Atomic energy Act of 1946. its transmittal of the disclosure of its contents in any part to an unauthorized person is prohibited. This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United state within the meaning of the Espionage Laws. Title 19 U.S.C. Sections 793 and 794. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. UNCLASSIFIED WT-376 This document consists of 229 plus 4 page (counting all preliminary page in all reports and all unnumbered blanks) Copy of 232 copies. B TESTS OF SERVICE EQUIPMENT AND OPERATION Project 6.3-1 Evaluation of Military Individual and Collective Protection Devices and Clothing (WT-401) Project 6.3-2 Evaluation of Potential respiratory Hazards Associated with Vehicular Operations in a Radioactively Contaminated Area (WT-402) Project 6.7 Clothing Decontamination and Evaluation of Laundry Methods (WT-347) Project 6.8 Evaluation of U.S. Army Field Water Supply Equipment and Operations (WT-340) UNCLASSIFIED OPERATION JANGLE PROJECT 6.3.1 EVALUATION OF MILITARY INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE PROTECTION DEVICES AND CLOTHING by JOHN R. HENDRICKSON July 1952 CHEMICAL CORPS AND RADIOLOGICAL LABORATORIES ARMY CHEMICAL CENTER, MARYLAND ii UNCLASSIFIED PROJECT 6.3-1 PREFACE The purpose of Project 6.3-1 was to determine the adequacy of items of protective equipment for use in radioactively contaminated areas. The work at the test site was performed under the direction of the author, who was Project Officer. The report is a compilation of four individual reports covering separate items of equipment. iii PROJECT 6.3-1 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The assistance of Lt. Col. Charles Robbins and Lt. Robert L. Hanzel in the planning and conduct of this project is gratefully acknowledged. The cooperation of Major Alfred H. Partham, Jr., Office of the Quartermaster General, in providing the test clothing; Mr. Norman Arnold and Captain David W. Armstrong, Aberdeen Proving Ground, and Lt. Col. John S. Sandiland, Army Field Forces, in operation of the armored vehicles was material to the conduct of the project. Pvt. John Sweeney, an assistant to the project officer, was of invaluable aid during the test phase of the project. The volunteer enlisted men, too numerous to mention by name, who participated in the evaluation of protective clothing were of great assistance which is gratefully acknowledged. PRECEDING PAGE BLANK - NOT FILED -v- PROJECT 6.3-1 CONTENTS PREFACE iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS v ILLUSTRATIONS viii TABLES ix ABSTRACT xi CHAPTER 1 PROTECTIVE CLOTHING 1 1.1 Introduction 1 1.1.1 Objective 11.1.2 Historical 1 1.1.3 Properties of Protective Clothing 1 1.2 Experimental Procedure 2 1.2.1 Clothing on Racks 2 1.2.2 Clothing on M26 Tanks 2 1.2.3 CMC Controlled Contaminator 5 1.2.4 Clothing Worn by Men 5 1.3 Test Results 5 1.3.1 Clothing on Racks 5 1.3.2 Clothing in M26 Tanks 12 1.3.3 Clothing from QMC Contaminator 12 1.3.4 Clothing Worn by Men 19 1.4 Discussions of Results 19 1.5 Conclusions 19 CHAPTER 2 EFFICIENCIES AND RADIATION HAZARDS OF M9A1 INDIVIDUAL PROTECTIVE MASKS 20 2.1 Introduction 20 2.1.1 Objective 20 2.1.2 Historical 20 2.2 Experimental Procedure 20 2.3 Test Results 20 2.4 Discussion of Results 22 2.5 Conclusions 22 2.6 Recommendations 22 - v - PROJECT 6.3-1 CHAPTER 3 EFFICIENCIES AND RADIATION HAZARDS OF TANK COLLECTIVE PROTECTORS E26 AND E22 24 3.1 Introduction 24 3.1.1 Objective 24 3.1.2 Historical 24 3.2 Experimental Procedure 25 3.2.1 Tank Collective Protectors E26 in Armored Vehicles 25 3.2.2 Tank Collective Protector E22 25 3.3 Test Results 30 3.3.1 Tank Collective Protectors E26 in Armored Vehicles 30 3.3.2 Tank Collective Protector E22 31 3.4 Discussion of Results 31 3.5 Conclusions 31 CHAPTER 4 CONTAMINATION OF M5 INDIVIDUAL PROTECTIVE OINTMENT 33 4.1 Introduction 33 4.1.1 Objective 33 4.1.2 Historical 33 4.2 Experimental Procedure 33 4.3 Test Results 33 4.4 Discussion of Results 33 4.5 Conclusions 34 4.6 Recommendations 34 APPENDIX A TABLES 35 APPENDIX B TABLES 52 BIBLIOGRAPHY 59 vii PROJECT 6.3-1 CHAPTER 1 PROTECTIVE CLOTHING 1.1 Individual Protective Cover 3 1.2 Clothing Racks 4 1.3 QMC Controlled Contaminator with Rag Filter 6 1.4 Chemical Corps Clothing Uniform 7 1.5 Walking and M26 Tank Operations, Surface Detonation 8 1.6 Walking and M26 Tank Operations, Underground Detonation 9 1.7 Decay Factors 15 CHAPTER II EFFICIENCIES AND RADIATION HAZARDS OF M941 INDIVIDUAL PROTECTIVE MASKS 2.1 Nosepiece and Filter 21 CHAPTER III EFFICIENCIES AND RADIATION HAZARDS OF TANK COLLECTIVE PROTECTORS E26 AND E22 3.1 Three Man, E26 Tank Collective Protector 26 3.2 Tank Crew Hearing Tank Masks 27 3.3 E22 Tank Collective Protector Integrating Test Unit 28 3.4 Diagram of E22 Electronic Test Unit 29 viii PROJECT 6.3-1 TABLES CHAPTER 1 PROTECTIVE CLOTHING 1.1 Contamination of Clothing on Racks, 2000 Feet NE of Ground Zero, Surface Detonation 10 1.2 Contamination of Clothing on Racks, 3000 Feet NE of Ground Zero, Surface Detonation 11 1.3 Contamination of Coveralls in Two Stationary M26 Tanks 13 1.4 Contamination of Clothing in Two Mobile M26 Tanks 14 1.5 Contamination of Coveralls in QMC Contaminator 16 1.6 Walking Areas, Surface Detonation 17 1.7 Protective Clothing on Walking Men after Surface Detonation 18 1.8 Protective Clothing on Walking Men after Underground Detonation 18 A.1 Laundering Data Sheet, Impregnated Clothing 35 A.2 Laundering Data Sheet, Unimpregnated Clothing 36 A.3 Contamination of Clothing Worn by Men after Surface Detonation 37 1.4 Contamination of Clothing Worn by Men after Underground Detonation 48 CHAPTER EFFICIENCIES AND RADIATION HAZARDS OF M9A1 INDIVIDUAL PROTECTIVE MASKS 2.1 Radioactivity in M11 Canisters of M9A1 Protective Masks 23 CHAPTER 3 EFFICIENCIES AND RADIATION HAZARDS OF TANK COLLECTIVE PROTECTORS E26 AND E22 3.1 Calculation of Filter Efficiency of E26 Tank Collective Protector 32 B.1 Filter Efficiencies of E26 Tank Collective Protectors 52 ix PROJECT 6.3-1 B.2 Activities of Particulate Filters from E26 Tank Collective Protectors 53 B.3 Activities of M10 Canisters (Effluent from E26 Tank Collective Protectors 54 B.4 Radiation Hazard of E26 Tank Collective Protectors in Tank 13 55 B.5 Radiation Hazard of E26 Tank Collective Protectors in Tank 24 56 B.6 Radiation Hazard of E26 Tank Collective Protectors in T18E1 Personnel Carrier 57 B.7 Filter Efficiencies of E22 Tank Collective Protectors 58 B.4 Radiometric Effluent Readings of E22 Link Collective Protectors 58 x PROJECT 6.3.-1 ABSTRACT Under conditions resulting from surface and underground detonations of atomic bombs, tests were conducted on Chemical Corps impregnated and unimpregnated protective clothing. Individual Protective Mask M9A1 with M11 Canister, Tank Collective Protector E26 and E22, and Protective Ointment M5. Both impregnated and unimpregnated clothing were capable of preventing contact between the skin and radioactive dusts. Unimpregnated clothing demonstrated better contamination-decontamination characteristics, but the secondary radiation free all clothing was negligible. The protective cover was effective in preventing contamination of clothing. The M9A1 mask with M11 canister furnished complete protection against inhalation of radioactive dust. The filtering efficiencies of the E26 tank collective protectors were found to be very high, and no efficiencies of the E22 tank collective protectors were also high. Panels coated with M5 ointment were found to be much more highly contaminated than bare panels. -xi- CHAPTER 1 PROTECTIVE CLOTHING9 1.1 INTRODUCTION 1.1.1 Objective The object of this phase of Project 6.3 was to determine the adequacy of Chemical Corps protective clothing to prevent radioactive dust produced by atomic bomb detonations (surface and underground) from contacting the skin of the wearer. 1.1.2 Historical During the period between World War I and World War II, Chemical and Radiological Laboratories developed an impregnation process for clothing to protect the wearer against war gases. A mixture of nine parts of N, 'bis (2,4,6 Trichlorophenyl) dichlororuea and one part of zinc oxide was developed to neutralize mustard gas. This compound, known to produce 3Chemical Corps protective clothing. The class I protective uniform consists of standard helmet and gas mask and the following items impregnated with XXCC31 underclothing, socks, boots, gloves and coveralls. Class II protective uniform is the same as Class I except as unimpregnated undershirt may be worn. Class III uniform of composed of the same items, but none are impregnated. The individual protective cover, Fig. 1.1, was designed to provide protection against chemical warfare agents sprayed from aircraft. it is constructed of .002 inch flame and moisture resistant cellophane. For cold climate use, the cover is lined with serum to increase resistance to cracking. The soldier is instructed to dispose of the cover after it becomes contaminated. The cellophane cover was recently de-standardized in favor of a cover, now under development, which is more easily donned. 1.1.3 Properties of Protective Clothing The protective uniform should prevent radioactive dust from contacting the skin, should be difficult to contaminate and easy to decontaminate by simple laundering procedures. Another desirable property in the protective clothing, not tested under this project, is protection against the thermal effects of atomic bomb detonations. It is obvious -1- PROJECT 6.3-1 that one protective uniform be used in chemical, bacteriological, and radiological. 1.2 EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES 1.2.1 Clothing on Racks (Fig. 1.2) At 2,000 feet downward (40o north of east) from Ground Zero, ten racks were set up for exposure of protective clothing to the surface detonation. The following items of clothing were mounted on the racks: 1. Individual protective cover 2. Individual protective cover 3. Impregnated herringbone twill coverall 4. Impregnated herringbone twill coverall 5. Impregnated cotton sateen coverall 6. Impregnated cotton sateen coverall 7. Unimpregnated herringbone twill coverall 8. Impregnated herringbone twill coverall encased in an individual protective cover 9. Impregnated cotton sateen coverall All impregnated clothing contained 7 to 15% by weight of XXCC3. Six hours after the detonation, the clothing was collected and removed to the Control Point at the test site, where each item was monitored with a side-window PR-3 Beta-Gamma survey meter from a distance of six inches, as the level of activity was above the range of Chemical Corps clothing monitor. 1.2.2 Clothing in M26 Tanks During the surface detonation, clothing was exposed at the five crewman's positions within each of the two M26 tanks. The tanks were located 2,000 feet downwind, 15o east of south, from Ground Zero. The -2- FOR REFERENCE SEE (3pm16.gif) -3- FOR REFERENCE SEE (3pm17.gif) -4- PROJECT 1.3-1 front of one tank and the side of the other faced the blast. All crew hatches were open. Six hours after the detonation, the clothing was collected and monitored according to the procedure used on the clothing from the racks. 1.2.3 CMC Controlled Contaminator12 (Fig. 1.3) Five types of coveralls (see Table 1.5) were contaminated uniformly in the CMC controlled contaminator, using dust collected near the surface crater. Each batch was run for 10 minutes with 14 pound radioactive dirt. The "shake-off" dirt was removed by an air blast and collected in a bag filter. The laundering and drying of the coveralls was accomplished in the CMC portable laundry unit, employing the standard laundering procedure was used for each batch. Monitoring of the coveralls was done before and after laundering at nine points. 1.2.4 Clothing Worn by Men (Fig. 1.4) Men walking, crawling, and riding in armored vehicles passed through the contaminated areas produced by both the surface and underground detonations. The clothing worn included coveralls, drawers, undershirts, socks, gloves and boots; either impregnated or plain. Four hours after the surface detonation, eight teams of men worked for a period of one hour in the contaminated areas (Fig. 1.5). Five days after the underground detonation, one team walked and one team walked and crawled through the 10 to 500 milliroentgen per hour area (Fig. 1.6), downwind from Ground Zero. The walking team traveled approximately 1/2 mile in 1/2 hour. The walking and crawling team crawled ten years in the 300 milliroentgen per hour zone. At 25-1/2 hours after the surface detonation, crewmen wearing Class I protective clothing entered the two M26 tanks and drove through the contaminated area. 1.3 TEST RESULTS 1.3.1 Clothing on Racks (Tables 1.1 and 1.2) The results of the contamination of rack-counted protective clothing 2,000 feet from the surface detonation were as follows: The average contamination, measured at six inches approximately eight hours after the detonation, was 0.025 mr/hr. The range of readings on clothing items was 0.01 to 0.04 mr/hr. The average permissible level of contamination for clothing, presupposing use throughout lifetime of wearer and a large safety factor, is 7 mr/hr8. - 5 - FOR REFERENCE SEE (3pm18.gif) - 6 - FOR REFERENCE SEE (3pm19.gif) - 7 - FOR REFERENCE SEE (3pm20.gif) - 8 - FOR REFERENCE SEE (3pm21.gif) - 9 - FOR REFERENCE SEE (3pm22.gif) - 10 - FOR REFERENCE SEE (3pm23.gif) - 11 - PROJECT 6.3-1 below which no contamination is required even when presupposing a continuing lifetime exposure and a large safety factor, is 7 mr/hr. The results of contamination at 3,000 feet downwind from Ground Zero show that the average contamination measured at six inches eight hours after the detonation, was 0.06 mr/hr, or slightly higher than the average at 2,000 feet. The range of activities was 0.03 to 0.10 mr/hr on clothing. Again the helmet was the most highly contaminated giving a reading of 4.7 mr/hr. The protective cover proved very effective but became brittle from the heat. However, the fact that the covers were manufactured in 1942 may have been responsible for the brittleness. 1.3.2 Clothing in M26 Tanks (Tables 1.3 and 1.4) The activities on the clothing in the two M26 stationary tanks were lower than the activities of clothing exposed on racks. The average contamination was 0.01 mr/hr at six inches eight hours after the detonation. Contamination of clothing on men in mobile tanks was greater than on coveralls in same unmanned stationary tanks. 1.3.3 Clothing from CMC Container (Tables A.1 and A.2) The correction curve, Fig. 1.7, was used to correct the activities of the clothing from the contaminator to one hour after the detonation. The resulting contamination levels are shown in Table 1.5. The impregnated clothing was more highly contaminated than the corresponding unimpregnated. The laundering efficiency for unimpregnated clothing was higher than for impregnated. 1.3.4 Clothing Worn by Men (Tables 1.6, 1.7, 1.8, A.3, A.4) Of protective clothing worn by men after the surface detonation, gloves and boots worn into areas near Ground Zero were the most highly contaminated, giving readings ranging from .01 to 9 mr/hr at six inches when monitored 26 hours after the detonation. Contamination of underclothing was negligible. Of the clothing worn into the contaminated area produced by the underground detonation, the maximum reading was 3.7 mr/hr. The men who crawled received only 2 to 4 mr from their clothing while receiving a total dosage of 1 to 2 roentgens, as measured by film badges which recorded radiation from both the clothing and the ground. The contamination of clothing worn by men riding through the area contaminated by the surface shot was also negligible. -12- FOR REFERENCE SEE (3pm24.gif) - 13 - FOR REFERENCE SEE (3pm25.gif) - 14 - FOR REFERENCE SEE (3pm26.gif) - 15 - FOR REFERENCE SEE (3pm27.gif) - 16 - PROJECT 6.3-1 Table 1.6 Contaminated Areas in Which Various Teams Walked for One Hour While Wearing Protective Clothing after Surface Detonation (See Fig. 1.5) Team No. Distance Downwind from Ground Zero Direction 1 2-11,000 ft N 2 11-20,000 ft NW 3 2- 9,000 ft NE 4 14-50,000 ft N 5 2-14,000 ft E & SE 6 14-15,000 ft NE 7 2- 8,000 ft NW & SW 8 20-50,000 ft NNE - 17 - PROJECT 6.3-1 TABLE 1.7 Protective Clothing Worn After Surface Detonation by Men Walking in Contaminated Areas (See Fig. 1.5 and Table 1.6) Total Number Coveralls* Team Numbers Suits 7 Laundered HBT 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 & 8 8 Impregnated HBT 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 & 8 7 Laundered and Impregnated HBT 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 & 8 3 Cotton-Sateen 1, 3 & 6 * Underneath the coveralls, drawers and undershirts were worn. The underclothing was either impregnated or unimpregnated to match the corresponding coveralls. In addition, uniforms with impregnated clothing included impregnated socks, boots and gloves. Uniforms with unimpregnated clothing were matched with unimpregnated socks, boots and gloves. TABLE 1.8 Protective Clothing Worn After Underground Detonation (See Fig. 1.6) Number Coveralls Team ** 2 Laundered Herringbone Twill 1 6 Laundered Herringbone twill 1 and 2 2 Laundered, Impregnated HBT 1 2 Cotton Sateen 1 and 2 8 Cotton Sateen, Impregnated 1 and 2 * Team 1 crawled and walked ** Team 2 walked only - 18 - PROJECT 6.3-1 1.4 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS The level of contamination of the clothing under the test conditions was very low, indicating no hazard to the wearer. The fact that underclothing worn by the men crawling after the underground detonation was still uncontaminated indicates that the clothing is adequate to prevent contact between radioactive dust and the skin of the wearer. The impregnated clothing, in general, retained more radioactive dust than did the unimpregnated items. It is significant, however, that the level of radiation due to dust on clothing throughout the tests was negligible. 1.5 CONCLUSIONS 1. Impregnated herringbone twill clothing is more easily contaminated than impregnated cotton sateen clothing. However, the difference is slight. 2. Class I and Class III protective clothing furnish adequate protection against the penetration of radioactive dust under the soil conditions encountered in the test. 3. Cotton-sateen clothing has contamination-decontamination characteristics superior to those of herringbone twill. 4. Under the soil and weather conditions encountered at the Nevada Test Site, contamination of clothing worn by personnel in the area contaminated by an atomic detonation would not constitute a military hazard. - 19 - CHAPTER 2 EVALUATION OF M9A1 PROTECTIVE MASKS4 2.1 INTRODUCTION 2.1.1 Objective The objective of this phase of Project 6.3 was to determine the adequacy of the Chemical Corps individual protective Mask M9A1 to protect the wearer from inhalation of radioactive dust resulting from an atomic bomb detonation. 2.1.2 Historical The M9A1 Protective Mask, Fig. 1.4, developed by Chemical and Radiological Laboratories during the latter part of World War II, was designed to protect the wearer against all known war gases and toxic aerosols. As standardized in May 1951, the mask consists of a medium weight rubber face-form with M11 canister5 attached to the face-piece. The M11 canister contains a paper particulate filter and an activated charcoal (ASC) filter in series. The mask is held tightly against the face by a head harness. Previous to this test, the M9A1 mask had been found suitable for protection against chemical and bacteriological agents. 2.2 EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE The apparatus for determining the overall radiometric efficiency of the mask consisted of a molded rubber nose-piece with a cotton wad filter (Fig. 2.1). The periphery of the nose-piece was sealed to the volunteer wearer's face with adhesive tape. The mask was worn in the usual manner over the nose-piece. The volunteers who wore the mask test units were members of the teams walking and riding through the contaminated area after the surface detonation for the clothing tests described in Chapter 1. After the wearers returned from the tests, the cotton wads were counted to determine their radioactivity. 2.3 TEST RESULTS No radioactivity was found on the cotton wads returned from the surface shot when counted 25 hours after the detonation. Five M11 canisters from masks worn by personnel who entered the contaminated area for a period of 1/2 hour approximately 3-1/2 hours after the underground -20- FOR REFERENCE SEE (3pm28.gif) -21- PROJECT 6.3-1 detonation, were disassembled and counted for evaluation of the radiation hazard. The activities, corrected to one hour after the detonation, ranged from 1.12 mc to 5.20 mc. 2.4 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS Since no measurable amount of radioactivity reached the cotton wad of the test nose-piece, it may be assumed that the filtering efficiency of the mask unit approached 100% under the low-contamination conditions of the surface shot. The radiation from the M11 canisters (Table 2.1), used by men working in the contaminated area after the underground detonation, was not dangerous and would not constitute a hazard (1 to 5 mc at H + 1 hr). 2.5 CONCLUSIONS 1. The M9A1 Protective Mask was adequate to prevent inhalation of radioactive particles under the conditions of the test. 2. The accumulation of radioactivity in the M11 Canister, under the test conditions, was not sufficient to produce a radiation hazard. 2.6 RECOMMENDATIONS None, as work is continuing on the development of individual protective devices. -22- FOR REFERENCE SEE (3pm29.gif) -23-