PUBLIC COMMENT

January 30, 1995
1:45 p.m.
Sweeney Convention Center
201 W. Marcy Street
Santa Fe, New Mexico

REPORTED BY: PENNY E. McALISTER, CCR, NM CCR <z>250
Barbara Harris Court Reporters
201 Twelfth Street Northwest
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87102

DR. TUCKSON: We're going to resume. Those that are at the end of
the line, we're going to continue to go through as expeditiously
as possible. Group 3, we have with us Mr. John Taschner, Mr. Don
Petersen, Mr. George Voelz.

MR. YESLEY: I'm just accompanying them, and I have a brief
announcement at the outset.

DR. TUCKSON: What's your name?

MR. YESLEY: Michael Yesley, Y-e-s-l-e-y.

DR. TUCKSON: After we have this group, we will then be fortunate
to hear from Timothy Benally, Carlos Pacheco, Rosalie Jones,
Bernice Brogan, Barney Bailey, Joe Nardella, and Bob Stapleton in
this group, and my colleague Duncan will be joining us in a
moment. He is delayed doing something, and we want to keep going
on through, because Ruth can't do double duty.

With that, please, sir.

MR. YESLEY: My name is Michael Yesley. I am the project leader of
the Human Studies Project at Los Alamos. It was developed to
generate or identify and release to the public the documents
related to the Bayo Canyon test series of human radiation
experimentation at Los Alamos.

One statement I wish to make is that we have prepared a series of
fact sheets concerning these topics, and my assistant, Chris C De
Baca, who is in the back of the room, will be glad to give a set
of these fact sheets to any member of the audience who requests
one.

DR. TUCKSON: I assume the committee will have one.

MR. YESLEY: I hope so.

DR. TUCKSON: And then, first, Mr. John Taschner.

MR. TASCHNER: My name is John Taschner. I am the Human Study
Projects team leader at Bayo Canyon Radioactive Lanthanum Rala
Effort. I received a master's of science degree in health physics
from the University of Kansas in 1966, and was certified by the
American Board Panel of Physics in 1973.

My purpose here this afternoon is to describe for you the Rala
and the Bayo Canyon Program. Bayo Canyon is located 3 miles east
of Los Alamos. Los Alamos conducted 254 implosion experiments in
Bayo Canyon from September 1944 through March 1962 to test
nuclear weapons implosion designs.

The experiments were pioneer methods to determining uniform
compression implosion of up to 700 pounds of conventional high
explosives surrounding common metals used as (inaudible)
surrogates of plutonium, and up to about 4,000 curies of
radioactive lanthanum at Rala were detonated in each experiment.

The short life of radioactive lanthanum was used as a pioneer
radiographic technique that used gamma radiation from lanthanum
140 and radiation detectors to measure implosion phenomenon.
Radioactive lanthanum used because of its high energy gamma rays
and its relatively short (inaudible) half-life of 40 hours.

The short half-life allowed repeated use of the same firing site
without undue radiation exposure to the experimenters because of
radioactive decay. The Rala source, about the size of a match
head and weighed a few milligrams, was placed in the center of
the implosion test assembly.

The implosion assembly was surrounded by a number of radiation
detectors which measured the decrease of gamma ray transformation
during implosion. Once the source was inserted, the experiment
was detonated for a remote building, where the signals from the
detectors were recorded.

There was no possibility of a nuclear explosion since fission
material was never used. The implosion detonation resulted in the
dispersion of short-life radioactive lanthanum and vaporized
materials in the form of aerosols and solid debris.

Depending on wind conditions, the amount of high explosives, and
the Rala source size, aerosols were dispersed to varying degrees,
both within Bayo Canyon and to the adjacent mesas. Site operating
procedures, at least after 1949, required that experiments not be
conducted unless the winds were blowing towards unpopulated areas
to the north to northeast at the time of the detonation.

These were and are the most common wind directions in the area.
However, on some occasions wind shifts occurred and post-shot
radiation surveys did at times find radioactive contamination in
the vicinity of the Los Alamos main access road and on
(inaudible) to the north and Waje (sic) Mesa to the south.

We found very little radiation monitoring data for the first 126
shots that occurred up to May 1949. Radiation survey measurements
outside the immediate confines of Bayo Canyon appeared to have
been made only when the cloud was expected to move towards Los
Alamos or across the main Los Alamos access road.

The measurements were made much more frequently thereafter. Of
the 117 shots from May 1949 through September 1960, we found
survey data on 73, and these were found in the (inaudible)
physics records. We believe that there may have been more. There
are some gaps in the records, and we have not found those.

These surveys were made at distances out to several miles using
existing passable roads at a parameter surrounding Bayo Canyon
and at another location reachable by automobile. These radiation
surveys provide valuable data from which the overall off-site
impact may be assessed.

The nine shots fired after October 1960 were of a different
design, and although they contained up to 7,000 curies of
radiolanthanum, the sources were placed external to the implosion
test assembly and remained intact after the implosion or the
explosion.

For most of the first 126 shots, records of the wind direction at
the time of the shots were not found in our search. There is
documentation that suggests that wind direction and velocity on
shot days had been requested from the local weather station by
the experimenters, but the data may never have been recorded.

Meteorological support was established in 1949 for the express
purpose of providing weather prediction and cloud observation for
the Bayo Canyon experiments. These records are the source of most
of the cloud behavioral information for the time period 1949 to
1958.

A preliminary analysis of the potential health risks for the
18-year Rala Program shows that the off-site location and maximum
impact would have been the Los Alamos town site. The realistic
assessment of the predicted doses showed the highest doses would
have been a fraction of the annual explosions and background
radiation.

On November 1993, the General Accounting Office report implied
that the Air Force and the Los Alamos Laboratory exploded three
simulated nuclear devices at Los Alamos to produce radioactive
clouds and fallout for the Air Force to track.

In truth, these studies were part of ongoing implosion technology
studies and were not intentional releases of radioactivity for
the express purpose of tracking radioactive clouds. The Air Force
merely piggy-backed on ongoing experiments to test airborne
instruments that were to be used for cloud tracking during
upcoming nuclear weapons tests.

The Rala experiments were terminated in March of 1962. While
these experiments were essential to the development of the
implosion type nuclear weapon, newer and better techniques have
been developed.

In summary, we have completed an extensive search of the records
for information on radiation monitoring data related to the
implosion experiments conducted in Bayo Canyon. We have compiled
these data in a form suitable for an evaluation of the impact on
the populations in the vicinity of Los Alamos and are now in the
process of doing so. We are also preparing a report on the Bayo
Canyon Program.

DR. TUCKSON: Thank you, sir. I think it might be best if we go
ahead and hear the reports, and then we'll come back and ask you
all questions collectively. Thank you for that, and now we will
be hearing from Dr. Don Petersen.

DR. PETERSEN: I'm a Ph.D. pharmocologist/toxicologist. I have
been with the Los Alamos research program for 39 years. Before
that, I was a graduate student and a research associate at the
University of Chicago.

I have been associated with radiation related biomedical research
problems since 1950 and have had the privilege of working with
some of the pioneers in diagnostic medicine. Two of my children
and I have been volunteers in the Los Alamos tracer studies.

Tracer studies at Los Alamos were started to provide information
on the absorption, distribution, retention, and excretion of
tritium, the radioactive isotope of hydrogen, in order to develop
protective standards for workers.

These studies required the development of new detection methods,
and the successful measurements immediately made it clear that
tritium was a powerful tool in studying water physiology in man.
In this case, human volunteers were the investigators themselves,
and the metabolic data they collected over several years in the
early '50s were the basis of the early protection standards.

Today's standards differ very little from the original values.
Other studies on animals and human volunteers established
(inaudible) isotopes that allowed internal dose calculations and
the derivation of protection standards.

Examples are cesium, iodine, zinc, sodium, and rubidium. In
addition to the protection standards, species correlations were
found that permitted the use from the animal data for human
protection standard calculations.

However, it was clear that man could not be removed entirely from
the testing protocols, and normal human volunteers remained a
crucial part of the protection program. From the standpoint of
radiation protection, these studies using the same methods, but
different isotopes, were some of the most productive and valuable
of Los Alamos studies using human subjects.

Another important research program at the time measured how much
radioactive fallout from worldwide nuclear weapons testing was
entering people. The laboratory developed new radiation detectors
sensitive enough to measure the Cesium 137 produced during the
nuclear explosion that was entering people through the food
chain, especially through milk.

Several thousand volunteers from all over the world were counted
as a part of a 10-year effort called Project Sunshine, by AEC,
were by far the (inaudible) single group of human volunteers
studied by Los Alamos. The AEC Project Sunshine using worldwide
fallout data concluded that although radiation levels in people
were not near high enough to cause concern, it was ample evidence
through various (inaudible), and to move nuclear weapons testing
underground.

One of the concerns of testing was the recognized difficulty in
calculating radiation doses from fallout Iodine 131 in children.
Eight young children of the Los Alamos Laboratory -- two of them
were mine -- were given small doses of Iodine 131 and Iodine 125,
simultaneously, to answer questions of retention time and
geometrical corrections.

The study showed that children retained iodine like adults and
provided the permanent correction factor for the future dose
calculations in children. These, our littlest volunteers,
received a lifetime dose of about 15 milligrams, or 4 percent of
the 350 milligrams people who live in this part of the world get
every year.

In addition to the research done to provide radiation protection
data, there was a substantial effort exploiting radionuclides in
diagnostic medicine. A group of investigators at Harvard, Los
Alamos, and University of Chicago, were interested in
cardiovascular disease and especially the metabolic identity of
cholesterol deposits in hardened arteries. (Inaudible) Tritium
labeled cholesterol synthesized at Los Alamos was fed to patients
at the Argonne Cancer Research Hospital to find out whether it
was dietary or (inaudible) synthesized cholesterol appearing in
the arteries. Data showed it was metabolic cholesterol.

Today, we worry about the total fat intake, not just the
cholesterol intake. Chromium 51 (inaudible) red cells were used
to measure how long red cells survive in normal controls and in
Leukemia patients. The measurements allowed doctors caring for
the Leukemia patients to judge the effects of treatments of red
cell survival in the early days of chemotherapy.

I had worked with methotrexate in Chicago and was an enthusiastic
volunteer in the Los Alamos study. Iodine 131, which distributes
the sodium iodine in the thyroid studies, where the use of new
counters reduced doses required for diagnosis between 10 and 104.
(Inaudible) was the basis of an improved liver function test,
where the time for disappearance (inaudible), which was die, from
the circulation was a direct measure of liver function.

I participated in that study, as well, but as a patient. The
volunteers in the Los Alamos studies all followed the same rules,
regardless of the study. These rules were established in 1956 by
the AEC Commission on Biology and Medicine, stating that subjects
must be informed of the diagnostic or research objective.

Doses must be true tracer doses -- the rule of thumb was a
micro-curie or less -- and the study must be supervised by a
licensed physician. The protocols of each study must be described
and approved in writing, and the subjects were informed verbally.

The recruitment process was far less formal than today's,
consisting of a request (inaudible), a referral from a physician,
whether it be a need for diagnosis or a request to a local
service organization. The Los Alamos volunteers were willing,
enthusiastic supporters of the studies and are proud of what they
did.

DR. TUCKSON: Thank you. I know that we'll have a number of
questions to come back to you for. Now, Dr. George Voelz.

DR. VOELZ: I'm a physician specializing in outpatient medicine. I
worked in the Environmental Safety and Health Division at Los
Alamos for 29 years, and from 1970 to 1982, I was a division
leader of the Health Division. As part of my work, I have
published extensively on health studies of plutonium workers.

Plutonium is the element that has been most closely associated
with research activities at the Los Alamos National Laboratory
during the past 50 years. Louis Hempelmann and Wright Langham
were two individuals who carried much of the responsibility for
protecting Los Alamos workers from the excess of plutonium
exposure during the 1940s.

I had the great fortune to work with them when I came to Los
Alamos in 1952. I remember, particularly, one of my first
meetings with them. They were doing a medical follow-up study of
Manhattan Project workers exposed to plutonium during World War
II. This study was originated from the concerns of these two
people for the involved workers.

There was no request by the government to have this study done.
There was no funding for the study. Louis and Wright just wanted
to know the outcome of their efforts to limit worker exposures.
Louis told me many times, he just didn't have enough information
to know if serious exposures were occurring.

In 1944, as you know, he had requested from Dr. Oppenheimer, that
a limited amount of plutonium observed in humans was necessary to
develop internal symmetry methods. This request ultimately led to
some of the plutonium injection studies done in 1944 and 1946 --
1945 and 1946.

Dr. Hempelmann carried his responsibility for the health of the
Manhattan Project plutonium workers with him for the rest of his
life. In May of 1993, about two months before his death, he made
a special call to me to ask if there were any recent medical
findings on the boys, as he affectionately called them. Dr.
Hempelmann was a remarkably conscientious physician.

Wright Langham was a biochemist who came to Los Alamos in the
summer of 1944. He helped develop the first method to measure
plutonium in urine. Wright worked on the plutonium injection
study, because of his experience with the new plutonium
radiochemical procedures.

I know he had personal -- serious personal reservations about the
ethical issues of the plutonium study. That was not his area, nor
his responsibility. He talked about the interpretation and use of
the data, but not often about the study, itself.

I am sure that Wright did not contribute opinions on or about
medical decisions involving the human plutonium injection study.
It was just not in his nature to have done that. In retrospect,
there was a significant urgent purpose for the human plutonium
study.

Plutonium doses for every plutonium exposed worker in the past 50
years are based on the data arrived from that study. Your
investigation should help clarify the enigma of the medical
conduct and medical ethics of this small portion of radiation
research history.

Another source of data used for plutonium exposure comes from
postmortem tissue samples. Measure of the plutonium in tissues
revealed the amount of distribution of plutonium within the body.
A program of tissue analysis gradually became operative at Los
Alamos beginning in 1959.

Initially, tissue samples came from routine autopsies performed
for and by the medical staff at the Los Alamos Medical Center.
Samples were sent for plutonium analyses as an add-on procedure
to the normal autopsy protocol.

A pathologist recognized that these analyses could detect
plutonium exposures that might be occurring by laboratory
employees and people living in Los Alamos. The program was
basically a quality control check on the effectiveness of the
Health, Safety, and Environment procedures at the laboratory.

In 1972, Dr. James McInroy became the principal investigator of
the tissue program. Samples from the general population were now
received from several areas in the United States. The following
hospitals in these areas were told the purpose of the study and
asked if they would like to participate.

The request for autopsy permission was made by the attending
physicians, based on the value of the autopsy to the physicians
and their institutions. Collaborating pathologists sent tissue
samples, usually seven or eight in number, to Los Alamos for the
plutonium study.

Plutonium found in these general population samples during the
1960s and 1970s came principally from the fallout of atmospheric
weapons tests. The data helped to confirm and improve the
atmospheric models that were used to estimate current and future
radiation exposures to the public.

In the 1980s, the tissue program at Los Alamos studied worker
exposures in the nuclear industry. Many of the cases came from
the U.S. Transuranic Registry at Richland in Washington. The
purpose of these studies was to determine the internal
disposition and distribution of radionuclides and transuranics
and uranium from occupational exposures.

The tissue program at Los Alamos terminated in 1994, because a
new radiochemistry laboratory has been set up for the registries.
I appreciate the opportunity to bring these comments to you, and
I hope they will add to your understanding of how we have learned
to monitor and assess plutonium exposure in people.

DR. TUCKSON: Thank you all for that. Let me ask a quick general
question. It's hard for us as a committee to try to go back and
understand the times. One of the issues that we're struggling
with is the notion of retrospective analysis of the ethical
conditions of that time and projecting them forward.

This morning, one of our witnesses -- and I don't know whether
you had a chance to hear the testimony this morning, but one of
our panelists earlier today basically said that a lot of that
doesn't matter -- about what's wrong is wrong, and if something
happens is wrong, it's wrong.

The ethical discussions that characterized this time period in
American life, can you help us to understand what those
discussions were like? You were a willing volunteer for many of
these. You put your own soul into these projects.

You have been involved with methotrexate studies at the
University of Chicago. I don't know whether there was any
differences in the research climate or environment in the
academic center in Midwest America, from being a nuclear facility
here. I don't know whether you noticed or observed any
differences in that discussion.

You mentioned, sir, I think, in your testimony, that there were
some concerns about some of the ethical issues on the part of at
least two scientists, but one was not predisposed to being a
person who was involved in daily conversations about it, and the
other, that wasn't their area of responsibility.

With all of these kinds of comments that you've made today, can
you help us to understand how vigorously these issued were
discussed and what was the climate for these issues at that time
in American history?

DR. PETERSEN: In my own recollection, at the University of
Chicago, there was a stampede to get at these new very, very
interesting materials. The idea of using tracers is not new. It
had been known for 15 years before, but they were hard to come
by. Now all of a sudden, there was this bonanza.

You could ask Oak Ridge, and Oak Ridge would provide you with
information and with a tracer, a radiotracer, and you could
approach your experiment in a way that had never been possible
before. Now, that enthusiasm overshadowed any soul searching
about ethical considerations.

Everybody was very interested in the answers. These were
opportunities for professional advancement. The people that were
participating in the studies were players in this business. They
weren't just taken off the street. They were the people
themselves, and they knew what the risks were in rough terms.

Turns out, they were quite right, and as a consequence of that,
the enthusiasm and the urgency and the feel at the time far
outweighed any agonizing about ethical issues. As a matter of
fact, in all the time that I worked as a graduate student and a
research associate in Chicago, and in the early days here, I
don't think I ever heard a conversation like that in terms that
you could clearly identify as ethical.

On the other hand, nobody was out to hurt anybody, and extreme
measures were taken to protect them, and so unless there were --
in my view, the ethics issues would come into play if somebody
was in harm's way. If they were going to be hurt, then clearly
there are concerns. Since this is all done in fractions of the
amount of natural radiation that you get every year anyway --

DR. TUCKSON: One of the things that we have been trying to
understand is the Nuremberg Codes of that, which were very clear.
Was that -- you mentioned about this business that there were
rules regarding ethical -- regarding, you must inform the
patient, and you didn't mention whether or not the patient was
responsible for signing any consent forms, but in that notion of
the discussion and eagerness and excitement, in the hallways or
in the general air, was there much discussion about the Nuremberg
Codes and those kinds of issues?

DR. PETERSEN: I can't recall a conversation like that in all of
that time.

DR. VOELZ: I would like to comment, that I was going to medical
school from 1946 to 1950, and right after I got out of the
service, and perhaps two or three things in 1991 was, what was
the respect for radiation at the time?

And as a freshman in medical school, we had fluoroscopy machines
in the anatomy lab, and we were encouraged, as students, to look
at each other's joints and innards without any control of how
long we were there or who was there or any log of anything.
Fluoroscopy was just a procedure, and we were encouraged to use
it.

So, there really was a far different environment as far as the
radiation. As a medical student, we did not have -- I don't
believe we had an ethics department in medical school, nor did we
have a lecture, nor was I really aware of the Nuremberg Code,
other than what I read in the newspaper.

So, it really was not discussed with physicians at that time to
any extent, and when I became an intern, we participated -- I
participated in the studies -- this was at the teaching hospital
-- and we put people on certain protocols.

Of course, I was an intern and at the bottom of the ladder of
this whole -- and I had no idea how the studies were set up, but
they were to, as patients, come in, had certain procedures to put
people into a protocol, depending on randomly how they came in,
basically.

I had no idea how those patients -- what was discussed with them.
I don't know who did the discussion. I certainly didn't. But they
were in a research study which controlled what they were being
treated with and what treatment protocol they were on, and I, as
a staff person at that hospital, had no idea what kind of consent
or what had been discussed with the patient.

So, I think the environment was very, very different from what it
is today.

DR. MACKLIN: I have a couple of follow-up questions on the topic
of research practices, but more specifically to the research that
you described. These first questions are to Dr. Petersen. Over
what period of years -- let me just start with both of the named
studies that you mentioned, the tritium studies and the fallout
cesium studies. Over what period of years did those take place?

DR. PETERSEN: The tritium studies started coincident with the
preoccupation of Los Alamos with tritium in the years immediately
following the war, and I would guess that the bulk of the
research was done between 1948 and 1952, possibly 1953.

The landmark paper is actually published in 1957, but the work
had gone on for a number of years earlier. That's the tritium.
The Sunshine -- Project Sunshine was Commissioner Willard Libby's
baby. It was the idea that there needed to be some real hard
measurements made to find out what the circumstances of
atmospheric testing were.

How much radiation was being liberated? Could you measure it? How
much was going into people? This study, probably a decade, from
1954 to 1964, brackets most of the information.

DR. MACKLIN: The reason I'm trying to get at that is a follow-up
to questions about what the research practices were at the time,
since things did begin to revolve quite apart from the question
of the Nuremberg Code, which was known right after World War II.

By the mid-1960s, things had changed a bit. You mentioned that
subjects were informed verbally, and the committee certainly has
heard from many people and known before that, that that was the
standard practice of the time, even though various policies and
statements and other kinds of regulations called for written
consent.

I'm not as concerned about the signing of a piece of paper as I
am about what was told to these people. Since you -- actually,
both of you, worked through this era, and when you were
describing your account, said that subjects were told verbally, I
would like you to elaborate a little, if you will, on, what were
they told?

Were they told that they didn't have to be in this study; that
is, what was the nature, if any, of the voluntariness, even if it
was indeed something in which nothing was being put into their
bodies, but measurements were being taken, and what, if anything,
was disclosed to them afterwards?

What information was given to them about what was found, either
in the aggregate, or in particular individuals about the levels
or the level of the fallout?

DR. PETERSEN: In the cases of tritium, this doesn't come up,
because all of the people were completely informed, but I will --
let me give you an example. Let's talk about Chromium 51 red cell
survival studies, because that was a study where the real
objective of the study was to be able to tell a physician
treating a Leukemia patient whether his procedures with
chemotherapy outside of the protocols for red cell survival were
doing something damaging to this patient's long-term
survivorship.

If you recall in the mid-50s, a Leukemia diagnosis was a death
sentence within a couple of years. So, these patients were all --
although some of them survived a number of months, they were all
essentially people who were dying of Leukemia, and they were told
that this red cell survival protocol was to measure their
specific red cell survival time, and they were all -- or most of
them were on chemotherapy protocols.

Those of us who volunteered were not informed of this sort of
thing, because we were fighting to get into the study anyway. We
were as interested in this and as much a part of it as anybody.

DR. MACKLIN: The Project Sunshine was a different kind of study.
That was a fallout study. They too were subjects --

DR. PETERSEN: That's correct.

DR. MACKLIN: -- which were being measured, and in that, I'm
interested to know what, if anything, were the consent
procedures? What were they informed, both beforehand -- that is,
before they were sought to take their measurements, were they
given the opportunity not to participate? And then what, if
anything, were they told after the information was gathered?

DR. PETERSEN: They were all volunteers who were told that the
procedure they were going to undergo was to estimate the amount
of Cesium 137 they had in their bodies, that they had gotten not
by having been administered, but simply acquiring it as a part of
their environment, mostly eating.

They all volunteered on that basis. We had people from all over
the world being counted in Los Alamos. We all (inaudible) to
Geneva (inaudible) I believe mid to late 50s. I don't remember
the exact date, but they had almost 3,000 people over there that
volunteered to crawl under the counter and be counted.

That one was the one where you didn't have to lay down. You stood
up. But the orientation aside, the data provided by the Geneva
counter and the Los Alamos counter were exactly the same, and the
information was, we want to know how much is in you. This isn't
going to hurt you, and it will help us a lot, and people crawled
in there, a lot of them.

DR. THOMAS: I want to explore the AEC consent policies and their
attitude towards these volunteers. In particular, I think one
example I would like to pursue is the story of the various family
members that were used. You mentioned, I believe, that eight
children had been called, including a couple of your own.

How old were those children at the time, and what were the
children themselves told?

DR. PETERSEN: Well, I can -- let me recount this in personal
terms. The staff members were all either peripherally involved or
at least interested in this dosimetry problem that you have with
kids subjected to fallout iodine.

If you can make the measurement, you have a fairly substantial
geometric correction to make, and we have no basis for making the
correction, but on a one-time experiment, we can get that
information, as well as the survival time of the iodine in kids.

So, in my case, I had three candidates that were in the proper
age range, which was five years to nine years old. My
five-year-old took one look at this, and she said she didn't want
anything to do with it, so she got to stay home.

The six-year-old and the eight-year-old were very interested in
this, and they participated, all told the same thing. You go into
this room. You have to sit very, very still for a substantial
period of time. We didn't say that to them. We said a long time.

We had trouble getting them to sit still. Kids fidget. So, the
solution was to put a television set right on top of the counting
crystal, and they had to lock onto that cartoon (inaudible), but
they were not told anything scientific about the study at all.

They were simply informed in terms of what they would experience
undergoing this procedure.

DR. THOMAS: Presumably, radioactivity would not have been used
for those concepts.

DR. PETERSEN: Sure. We told them that, but that was in one ear
and out the other.

DR. THOMAS: Not a significant part of that process, obviously.

DR. PETERSEN: Especially, a five-year-old doesn't understand.

DR. THOMAS: That goes without saying, I guess.

DR. PETERSEN: But those of us who were involved in talking about
this study and in designing it knew that the amount of material,
the Iodine 131 and 125, the combined lifetime dose was going to
be of the order of 15 millirem. To put this in perspective,
that's like living in Santa Fe for 15 days.

DR. THOMAS: I don't think that's an issue. I think we all
understand that point. It's trying to square that with the 1956
memorandum (inaudible) that you referred to, which, as I recall,
they all had to be bona fide volunteers and fully informed.

I'm not quite sure who this -- exactly what they needed to be
fully informed of. I don't recall whether or not that used the
word "consent." Can you tell me about that?

DR. PETERSEN: No. If says to be informed. If they're playing with
us, they've consented. We're not grabbing people off the streets.
They're either there because they volunteered, or they're there
because they need a diagnosis.

DR. THOMAS: I guess it's a fine line between a child consenting
in full knowledge of all the facts, and being consented by their
parents who are talking them into it. That's what I'm trying to
understand.

DR. PETERSEN: There is no question but what their daddy talked
them into it, but he was only two-thirds successful.

DR. THOMAS: There is also a statement we've received from Los
Alamos. I believe it's from Los Alamos, or at least someone at
DOE. It says that radiation effects studies were never conducted
on humans, and then it goes on to say that the AEC always opposed
the use of volunteers for medical studies.

Now, I'm trying to understand those two sentences a little bit
further. If by radiation effect studies, you mean those harmful
biological effects that might be caused by radiation (inaudible),
and therefore tracer studies would not fall into that heading. Is
that the way we are to read this sentence?

DR. PETERSEN: That's exactly how you should read it, because if
you're looking for an effect, you're either given enough
radiation to cause an effect, or you know there is an effect, and
you're monkeying with the dose to see what the minimum dose is
that causes that particular response, and what we're talking
about in all of the studies that I've alluded to are doses far,
far greater than that, and that goes through voluntaryism, as
well.

DR. THOMAS: Including all of the plutonium injections?

DR. PETERSEN: They were way under effects levels, yes.

DR. MACKLIN: What counts as an effect?

DR. PETERSEN: Something that you can measure -- anything, a rash,
a decrease in blood count.

DR. MACKLIN: So, for example, if something does not produce a
measurable effect at time T, but 10 years later, either from that
dose or through cumulative doses over a period of years, there is
an effect down the road, that would not count under this
definition of effect, because it was not measurable at time T; is
that true?

DR. PETERSEN: I think the litmus test -- the brief answer is yes.

DR. MACKLIN: Suppose someone wanted to do a cruel and unethical
study, which was to inject in very small amounts of substances
into people to see if they got cancer 10 to 15 years down the
line, in which they are explicitly and specifically injecting
something that they believe to be below a measurable effect at
the time it's done, but the purpose of the experiment is then to
see what effect, measurable, it produces in 10 or 15 years. How
would that fit into this?

DR. PETERSEN: The hallmark of a experiment like that is that you
keep track of those people very, very carefully under controlled
conditions for the intervening 10 to 15 years, because you don't
know when they're going to move away, or what you're going to
have to do to keep tabs on them.

By and large, if you look at all of this information that you
have been provided with, you'll find that that kind of follow-up
and concern for these individuals is not there, and the reason
it's not there is because they weren't expected.

They didn't follow these people. They went back and looked at
some of them at a later time, but in addition to the plutonium
injections, there was not a continuous follow-up and continuous
hospitalization or schedule of visits or anything of the kind.

DR. MACKLIN: I'm struggling a little more with the definitional
problem. To say that something isn't expected when we're dealing
with new substances or not previously studied substances -- I
mean, we heard from Dr. Voelz that -- which actually many of us
also experienced as children with fluoroscopes -- how, at that
time, there was not an effect or a believed to be effect. It
wasn't expected, and therefore little was known about what later
became known as a potentially very damaging effect.

So, the fact that at a particular time, an effect was not
expected at a low dose, does not by itself argue that something
should not be considered a study of radiation effects, since if
you knew that it wasn't going to produce any effect, you wouldn't
have to do the research.

DR. PETERSEN: We have only to look at the difference between
human studies and animal studies to answer that question, because
in the case of effects, measurable effects, those experiments
were done all the time, and the effects were known, and they were
measured quantitatively, and they were done in animals, not in
people, and so I stick with my original definition.

If you're going to do that sort of thing, then shame on you if
you don't make remarkable predictions or provisions for keeping
these people under surveillance until such time as you expect
that effect to appear.

DR. THOMAS: I don't want to belabor this point, and to do it
properly, we really need to have the data in front of us. I'm
prepared to admit that the doses that were used in plutonium
experiments were at levels which have not ever been demonstrated
to have caused cancer in humans, and I think probably even based
on the best of (inaudible) combined both the human and the animal
experiments, we could probably still safely say this.

It's different, however, from saying that those doses were safe,
and unless you're advancing a threshold model for cancer
incidence, there is probably some probability that a cancer could
have been caused, and I guess I want to know what your take on
this is.

Was there not some sort of a probability calculation done, which
would say that these doses, although they, in a few instances,
appear high, are nevertheless what we can still call a "tracer
dose" in terms of the minimal (inaudible)?

DR. PETERSEN: The reason the doses of plutonium were given, were
those were the doses that you had some (inaudible) being
measured. The analytical protocol is the driver for those doses,
not any kind of speculative carcinogenic effect or carcinogenic
effect down the line.

It's a simple question of what you can handle.

DR. DUNCAN: That, I can understand, but still, in fair
consideration of the ethics of the experiment, one would
nevertheless -- at least today, one would have to do some sort of
a risk calculation.

MR. VOELZ: Yes, today, we would, and at the time those were done
in '45 and '46, the risk of plutonium really was not -- I mean,
you couldn't have done (inaudible) of probability. There just
wasn't that much information at the time, so -- and I think I
certainly would accept the idea that today's knowledge, we tend
to not accept the threshold theory, and if you get into the
nonthreshold theory, you've got a probability going down to the
last number before zero.

The probability may be exceptionally small, but it does exist,
and that's the way our protection guidelines are formulated
today, except you have to make some sort of a judgment, or
society has to make a judgment as to what the acceptable risks
might be if you are in a nonthreshold situation.

DR. THOMAS: One last question, and coming back to the statement
from whoever it is that I read from before, the second sentence
of this. The AEC has always supported the use of volunteers for
diagnostic studies.

To reconcile this with the experiments we've been talking about,
I assume I have to define the tracer studies (inaudible), instead
of medical studies that we're talking about. Is that the way I'm
to interpret this, that the tracer studies that we've talked
about were not medical sense studies, or how else am I to
interpret the use of the AEC's opposition to use volunteers?

DR. PETERSEN: The question that drove that answer was a bomb
testing question, and the issue under discussion at the time was
the issue of (inaudible), and what the military wanted us to do
was to go out and see (inaudible) in visual acuity that would
hurt them in performing their job, that required visual acuity,
and so you're expanding, essentially, the context in which it was
made, but nonetheless, I think it washes right there, that the
AEC has never felt comfortable with the effects work in humans,
and the documentation for this is the occasional memo going back
and forth.

The letter to Field is the one that is referred to right there,
and that's a clear example. He states, "If you're going to do
this, we want it in writing that you're absolving the AEC of
responsibility for these experiments."

DR. MACKLIN: A quick switch. Because we got so involved with
this, we don't want to overlook Mr. Taschner's comments, and I
had a couple of questions about the Bayo Canyon. I believe what
you said in talking about the implosion experiments, that they
were done only when the winds were blowing toward unpopulated
areas, and although I read some things about this, this isn't my
home, but I don't know much about what the population was like.

So, by unpopulated, does that mean no one was living in those
areas, or were they scattered, few people, perhaps, and how far
away did they have to be for the areas to be considered
unpopulated? I mean, I don't actually know much about wind
theory, but winds are not subject to human change, and we do know
from some material that the committee has gotten, that one cloud
was tracked as far away as 70 miles downwind over the town of
Watrous, New Mexico.

So, this is a cluster of questions. How much was known
specifically about the ability to predict winds, wind changes,
wind velocities, distances, cloud movements, et cetera, and when
that information was used, your claim about unpopulated, how far
are we to understand that that unpopulated area extended?

And then a final point, were people in the area ever informed
about the existence and nature of these tests, and at least the
possibility that winds might change, or that they might go
farther than predicted?

MR. TASCHNER: That's quite a series of questions. During the time
in the Rala experiments, the areas to the north of Los Alamos
were relatively unpopulated for several months. To the northeast,
the closest town was Espanola, about 11 miles away.

The radiation survey measurements were made, and that we have
data for, and all of those showed maximum readings in that
general direction to be 1 to 2 millirem per hour, about a mile or
2 from the shot location.

The measurement that was made by the Air Force at Watrous, we're
not sure what that data means. The instrument was said to have
been (inaudible). We're not sure what the -- we studied their
reports, in trying to figure out whether that has any indication
whether it was ionizing radiation that was being released or
something else.

It's very difficult to see when you take radiation measurements
near the surface at 1 to 2 miles that's only 1 and 2 millirem per
hour, and then try to translate that to 70 miles and come up with
anything that's measurable.

So, we are totally unsure as to what was really being measured at
Watrous. Those measurements -- the highest measurement that we
ever got at any of the surveys that we had was about 5 to 10
millrem per hour, which is located at what we call the Y cut off
coming off the Los Alamos main road, going over to Bandelier, and
that was about a mile or so from Bayo Canyon to the southeast.

If somebody were standing there and tied them to a stake, at 10
millirem per hour, the maximum -- the allowable exposure to the
general population shortly thereafter, depending on the
(inaudible). The AEC published its first regulations in 1957. The
general population number was 5 (inaudible) per year.

So, someone who was there at that location at that particular
time, assuming there was no decay in the radiolanthanum during
that period of time, would have had to stay there for 50 hours to
have received an adequate dose.

So, the exposures that we have seen from all the monitoring data
-- we're going through now, a final period of military
construction of all of that kind of stuff, trying to look at
theory from military construction data and varied actual
radiation measurements that we have, and trying to predict what
the doses might have been in some of those areas, and as I
indicated in my report that -- or my talk, that the Los Alamos
town site, itself, would probably be very close, only about 3
miles, but it was probably most likely the highest exposure that
would occur, and that that would be, then, much lower than the
annual background radiation of around 350 millirem per year.

DR. MACKLIN: Among these areas that you have described now as
relatively unpopulated, would you say there was a high percentage
of Native American communities or pueblos in that area, that
would be relatively unpopulated in terms of numbers, maybe
disproportionate numbers of Native American communities or
pueblos or reservations in that area?

MR. TASCHNER: I'm not too sure I can answer that. Probably there
are some Native Americans all around that area, but what I was
trying to allude to you is that the exposure measurements, the
radiation measurements that were taken, were taken out to a few
miles, and the exposure rates were extremely small.

DR. MACKLIN: The other small point that you didn't answer was
about whether anyone in the area was informed that this was going
on.

MR. TASCHNER: I don't know that they were.

DR. TUCKSON: Again, you weren't here this morning.

MR. TASCHNER: Yes, I was.

DR. TUCKSON: Oh, you were. Do you have a sense -- I mean, there
were a lot of people in the room this morning. You get a sense
from them, and it's not only just this community, but it's been
-- we've had this experience everywhere, that the people who live
in the area feel that they were not a part of the equation, that
folks did things, allowed things to occur, and they were not part
of the conversation.

Nobody seemed to come to them and say, by the way, this and this
and this are going to happen, and you need to know that on the
front end of this. It's one thing to come back on the back end
and say, well, we tested and put measurements out, and we don't
think there is anything wrong, but those folks are living their
lives as if there could have been something wrong, which does
something to them.

What would be helpful -- you're being very forthright. You were
talking to us about those times. How do we come to understand?
Did the people in charge ever stop and think that there was a
need to go to those pueblo communities and say to them, oh, by
the way, this is what's going on, or was it just that in that
time, nobody thought it was a big deal?

Nobody thought -- what we can't do is, we can't get in the minds
of the people who were in charge, and that's what we're trying to
do.

MR. TASCHNER: I don't think anybody would have admitted to
anybody in the world that Los Alamos was there and what it was
doing during that period of time. Even the word "radiation" was
secret up until years after the war. They said they were building
an atomic bomb there.

DR. TUCKSON: Again, it's really appreciated that you're here. It
really is, and we kept you all a long time, and we're making some
people in the audience very nervous about their own time, that
they're supposed to be up here, but we have struggled and
struggled with these issues.

Dr. Petersen, let me just ask you, you said that, in your mind,
if you do things, you've got to at least be able to follow up.
What we don't get a sense of, Mr. Voelz, is that the people in
medical positions inside of those institutions got into any
conversation down the road with the Health Department, the Indian
Health Services.

Nobody, it seems, said, let's make sure that we really do check
out these folks over time. So, I guess, was that just not part of
the equation, either, that there was some sense of, you're not
going to say -- if you're not going to say what's happening
because you're in the middle of secrecy or because of war, or
whatever those justifications may be, even after that, doesn't
something happen down the road?

That's what we're wondering about, without beating you up. We're
just asking. It's a question, not an accusation.

DR. VOELZ: Which people are you talking about? Are you talking
about the off-site people with the Rala?

DR. TUCKSON: That's a good example, yes. Let's just take the
off-site people.

DR. VOELZ: I actually was in Los Alamos during part of the time
that the Rala tests were going on, because I came to Los Alamos
and then left and came back, but my own personal opinion, having
known some of the people, was that the laboratory management
really felt they had a responsibility for protecting the people
who were in the area, and that was part of the planning and part
of the checking in terms of these radiation measurements and
things that were done at the time these tests were being run, and
they were interpreting whether they were creating a problem or
not, and I think they accepted that as part of their
responsibility.

Now, what they didn't do is what you asked earlier. As far as I
know, there was not much communication going on with the people
in the area, and that, in retrospect, was a mistake. It's
something that we learned subsequently, and we now have laws and
regulations and environmental impact statements and all of the
rest that have come on, partly to amend some of these procedures
that we didn't do earlier.

Part of the protection, of course, as these tests went on was
that the quadrant that we just talked about, that the cloud would
go toward unpopulated areas, and so there were Native Americans.
I think kind of the generic term that was used was Espanola, but
there is Santa Clara, San Juan -- San Juan from above, and San
Ildefonso Pueblo to the east, and we likely tried to exclude -- I
say "we," the laboratory. I don't have much party to any of these
decisions -- was to exclude those populated areas the best they
could.

So, I think they were trying to meet their responsibilities, but
they weren't talking about it.

DR. TUCKSON: Let me thank you all very much. There will be an
opportunity for our committee to have further discussions with
you tomorrow. Many of us will be out here tomorrow with you. I
think that you can, first of all, be commended for coming and
really being as honest as you have been with us today and
exploring your own minds and your history of that.

That's very much appreciated. I would hope that -- I really,
really, really, really would say that we are very serious about
creating an environment that allows these issues to be discussed,
and I think that if we have any hope of trying to understand,
we're going to have to create and respect each other in that
environment.

I can appreciate the tensions in this room, but that just is not
acceptable, and I would do anything not to irritate the audience,
but I am absolutely bound and pledged and serious about
preserving the atmosphere for respect for human beings, for
emotions, and for truth, and we're going to work hard at getting
that, but I will tell you, that if we do that, we are never, as a
committee, to be able to have people come in and talk to us and
share.

They're going to lie. They're going to cover up. The windows are
going to be shut forever, and we can't have that. So, I would
hope that we won't do that in here, and I would hope that these
people would be given a chance to say what they have to say, and
we're going to keep asking them questions and asking them some
more, and gentlemen, I'm going to tell you, we're going to keep
on asking you these questions, and you're going to keep sharing
with us, and you have to do that, and I know you understand that
is your responsibility to try to help us understand, and I think
what you're getting from us is, these questions that we're asking
you, detail after detail after detail, if you'll notice, a lot of
those questions that have been focused on are not so much of the
dose reconstruction of megacuries -- a lot of it has to do with
trying to understand the mindset of what really was going on.

So, as we come out tomorrow -- you're going to go back to work
today. You're going to tell them, where are they coming from, and
what are the answers to the exam? The answers to the exam are
much less -- all of the active people on our committee, who
absolutely cannot live unless they're talking about fractions and
megacuries and doses or something (inaudible), but most of us are
really, really, really, trying to understand the content of these
things.

So, the more you can share with us about what was or was not
discussed -- you can see where we're going with this stuff. We're
completely clear. We're transparent. That's what we want to
understand, is why we wouldn't have a conversation with the
pueblo communities and whatnot. What goes on there? What is the
nature of the responsibility?

And there is nothing -- no reason to be defensive at all about
it, and I think you're trying not to be. I think you've said some
things that are important. We thank you for it. We want to make
sure you come back and talk with us every time we ask you. We
want you to be fully disclosing. Let's don't play any games with
each other.

This is too important an issue in American life. I thank you for
your testimony today. You should be able to walk out of this room
and walk out with your heads up. You should be able to come back
to us without fear or anxiety. Thank you very much for being
here.

Apparently, I'm told that Mr. Joe Nardella needs to be the one to
come next to the microphone. Insofar as Mr. Nardella finishes
presenting to us, then we will have the chance to hear from
Timothy Benally, Carlos Pacheco, Rosalie Jones, Bernice Brogan,
Barney Bailey and Bob Stapleton.

MR. NARDELLA: My name is Joseph Nardella. I am representing the
survivors of the medical radiation experiments based in Cameron
Park, California. I am testifying because of our group's concern
regarding the exclusionary language regarding the memo from the
White House to you, dated 1/19/94, in particular, that one
paragraph, to wit: "This category does not include common and
routine clinical practices such as established diagnosis and
treatment methods involving incidental exposure to ionizing
radiation."

Because members of our group, along with some other groups, in
California, in particular, were exposed to radiation as a result
of accepted medical procedures at the time, we have been placed
in the above classification that was excluded from this study.

Members of our group take exception to the term "incidental
exposure." I, as well as many members of our group, have good
reason to believe that we were exposed to approximately 2,000
RADS within a two- to four-month period.

The Atomic Energy Commission states in one of the pamphlets that
human beings should not be exposed to more than 5 RADS per year.
As you can see, 2,000 RADS compared to 5 RADS can hardly be
classified as incidental.

Our group's exposure to radiation as compared to many of the
testimony given today was of a highly localized nature. Those
radium (inaudible) that were placed in our noses came to within a
few centimeters of our pituitary glands, which as you well know
partakes in very important body functions.

We believe that the nasopharyngeal procedures that we were
subjected to were not common and routine. They did not result in
incidental exposure, and they were intentional, and we submit,
experimental in nature. We therefore request that your committee
investigate the issue of nasopharyngeal radiation treatments that
were routinely given in the '40s and in some cases through the
'70s.

DR. TUCKSON: Thank you very much. We had public comment on this
in the past, and it gave us an opportunity -- the staff -- to go
and try and begin to learn about this. We are already looking at
these issues. So that you just know the scenario, it's an active
discussion with us, and I don't know whether any of the staff in
room can tell me now where we are in terms of understanding those
issues better.

DR. THOMAS: In terms of the key word "experimental," which you
referred to, you said that your group contends that these
exposures were not incidental, and furthermore, that they were
experimental in nature.

MR. NARDELLA: That's correct.

DR. THOMAS: So, I think I want to ask you to elaborate a little
bit further on your understanding of the word "experimental."
It's my impression that this was perhaps one example of medical
practice run amuck, but it wasn't in the sense of an organized
clinical trial that we would think of as a medical experiment
today. Have I got that part of the story wrong?

MR. NARDELLA: My scientific education, I have a couple of years
of college chemistry, a little bit of physics. I'm not that
well-versed in the experimental proceedings.

DR. THOMAS: You don't perceive yourself as having been part of a
chemical trial, which alternative --

MR. NARDELLA: No, I do not.

DR. THOMAS: So, the sense in which you're using the word
"experimental" is in terms of unproven, because of the therapy,
whose benefits, and on the other hand, whose risks, were not
well-established at that time?

MR. NARDELLA: Correct.

DR. THOMAS: That's the way in which you use the word
"experimental"?

MR. NARDELLA: That's correct.

DR. THOMAS: And the difficulty, in answer to Reed's question, is
trying to construe this as within our mandate, given specifically
the wording from the charter which you read to us, and this is an
ongoing debate.

DR. TUCKSON: I guess the way we'll have to leave this is -- it's
not satisfactory, I don't think, to you, but where we are is that
we continue to be caught in the web of our mandate that created
us, and we're not sure, and we're still hashing out whether this
fits in with it or not, and we continue to try to understand it
better.

I guess where we'll leave this is that you asked us to look at
it. First, I'll say, it is being looked at. Even as we speak,
we're looking at it, and you'll just have to wait until the final
report to see how we come to deal with it.

We're doing what you said. I can't give you an answer. It's
premature at this point. Thank you very much. We're doing what
you've asked, which is that you asked us to continue looking at
it, and that's exactly what's going on. It's very seriously being
looked at.

MR. NARDELLA: When can we expect the report?

DR. TUCKSON: Theoretically, we're working on a time line of
mid-May. Thank you for taking the time. Our next presenter is Mr.
Timothy Benally.

MR. BENALLY: Human Radiation Committee members, I speak today as
a (inaudible) and as a veteran of the Korean War, as a former
uranium miner, as a resident of Red Valley, and as the employer
of the Navajo Tribal Council, and former miner's widows and their
children.

Over the years, I talked with many uranium miners, mostly
listening to their expression of concerns regarding their work in
the uranium mines. I share these concerns. In one conversation, I
remember a friend referred to uranium miners as the soldiers
serving on the front line in the war zone. Each of these men, I
think, is a war hero.

Soon after World War II, a movement for mass education was
started in the Navajo Nation by the veterans returning from World
War II. Navajo children were sent off the reservation for the
white man's education. At some time, the United States Government
began actually developing the atomic bomb.

Not wishing to lose the superiorities over the countries that the
atomic bomb gave them, the government went looking for more
uranium. They found plenty in the Navajo Nation and the state of
Colorado and Utah. They also found Navajos who needed work in
order to support their families in a changing economy that
increasingly valued cash, and devalued the traditional
subsistence way of life.

But the Navajos were deceived and betrayed by the Federal
government. They were betrayed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs,
who supposedly is responsible for protecting Federally recognized
Indian tribes from such deceits, by the U.S. Public Health
Service, who has the responsibility for the health and well-being
of these recognized Indian tribes, but they instead developed the
studies of the miners and kept quiet about the dangers that they
faced from the radiation and the health by the Atomic Energy
Commission, which decided to totally ignore informing the miners
about the dangers from the uranium mines.

While the uranium was being dug, the United States Government
decided to do research on the effects of radiation on the miners,
not informing the miners of the problems that uranium posed with
their health. Over 700 miners were studied in this manner, as
guinea pigs.

While working in the mines in Colorado in 1960, when my employer
told me and my uncles to go to (inaudible) and get a physical
examination, and we went thinking that our employer was concerned
about our health -- we took the tests, chest X-rays, and other
tests that we took.

I do not remember ever hearing from that group that did the
testing. After working off the reservation, I returned to the
reservation. When I got sick, I went to the PHS Hospital. At the
hospital, they asked me if I worked in the mine, in the uranium
mine, and if I smoked.

The examining physicians never told me why they wanted this
information or what they were going to do with that information.
They never told me that if I smoked I might get cancer, lung
cancer. They never told me that radiation from the mines could
cause cancer.

They never told me that information that I provided them could be
used adversely against any compensation later on. The doctor who
examined me took his time when I go to the hospital. They usually
lasted for about an hour for the examination.

This happened each time I went to the hospital. I only learned
recently that PHS collaborated with NIOSH on the study of uranium
miners, and I was one of the subjects that they studied on. We
were used as guinea pigs for their studies, and they never
informed us about it.

Today, when I go to the PHS Hospital, I spend most of my time
sitting in the waiting room, and when my name gets called to see
the doctor, I'm sent to whoever, whichever doctor is available,
not any specialists, and I see them -- or they see me for maybe
10 minutes or even less, and I'm out of there.

That's the kind of services that we get from the PHS. About 10
years after the mining started on the reservation, people got --
the miners got sick, and the family members didn't know what was
happening with these people that got sick, until they died, and
they were diagnosed with lung cancer.

A long (inaudible) began at that period for compensation. When
the compensation came in 1990, there was a lot of red tape
attached to it, so that a lot of these miners would not be able
to get the compensation.

DR. TUCKSON: Mr. Benally, let me just ask you -- the red light is
going, but I do have one or more questions. Your statement is
well-written, and we can read that. Unless it's something
particularly -- just extremely important that you want to
highlight, we would like to be able to ask you just one question,
but it's your choice.

MR. BENALLY: Ask the question.

DR. TUCKSON: You're one of the few people that we've met that
have been involved in one of these studies. How did you get to
know that you were in the study? How did you know you were a
study subject?

MR. BENALLY: In my work, we were dealing with (inaudible), the
program that you mentioned earlier in one of the testimonies. I
work with that program for the tribe, and when we gathered that
information, we learned that through the PHS and NIOSH, that they
did the studies. That's how we learned about it, and that's how I
learned that we were studied by these two groups.

DR. TUCKSON: Have you seen paperwork that has down your name, or
have you seen your records that say that you were part of that
study done?

MR. BENALLY: Yes.

DR. MACKLIN: I have just a couple of questions. I know you have
to recollect what happened those many years ago, but in your
statement, you mentioned, first, going to the trailer park to get
the physicals, and you never heard anything more about that.

Then you mentioned going to the PHS Hospital. Do you have any
idea who were the doctors at that trailer park? You said the
employers told you to go there. Were the doctors at the trailer
park in any way connected with the Public Health Service, or is
that something you're not aware of?

MR. BENALLY: I didn't know at the time when I was going there for
the examination. Through my work, again, I learned that the
National Institute of Occupational Safety did the studies at
Grand Junction, and they put a trailer out to these mines to do
the testing on the miners.

DR. MACKLIN: The Public Health Service Hospital, was that a
hospital that you regularly went to for health care?

MR. BENALLY: Yes, in Shiprock.

DR. MACKLIN: Were they your usual doctors or different doctors?
For example, if you went there and would normally see some
doctors for your regular health care, were those the ones, or
were there different doctors who asked you these questions about
whether you worked in a uranium mine and whether you smoked?

MR. BENALLY: That was a special doctor that they sent me to. I
believe that most of the uranium workers, uranium miners, were
sent to that same doctor, because when I talked with the uranium
miner, they did mention that doctor's name.

DR. MACKLIN: Were they sent by the employer, or was it their
regular doctor who would normally be seeing them who said, I want
you to see this other doctor -- that is, how did they get to that
doctor? Who referred them or suggested to them?

MR. BENALLY: The usual procedure when they go to the hospital is
to register with the clerk, and then the clerk referred us to
screening for basic screening, temperatures, and blood pressures
and things like that, and that's where they ask -- a nurse asks
you if you smoke or if you're a miner, and then if you say yes,
then they send you to this particular doctor.

DR. TUCKSON: What I would like, sir, because we have to move on,
but we are particularly interested in your testimony. First of
all, let me say, I interrupted you at the end only because the
recommendations that you have made, they were clearly written
here, and I wanted you to know that I see each bullet point, and
they will be introduced into the record, these three bullet
points in your testimony.

So, we clearly have your recommendations. I don't want you to
think you came here and we didn't get the recommendations, but
those questions were interesting to us, and I didn't want to lose
them.

Would you do us a favor and stick around, and if you would see
one of the two staff aides that are right here? They have some
other questions they want to ask you that are fairly detailed and
specific, and if you have a few moments, we would like you to do
that. Could you?

MR. BENALLY: Yes.

DR. TUCKSON: It would help us to understand you a little bit
better and understand some of the issues. Thank you for being
here. The next presenter is Mr. Carlos Pacheco, Santa Fe, New
Mexico. Good to see you.

MR. PACHECO: It's wonderful that we've got such an illustrious
people from Washington D.C. to come over here and listen to our
problems, and I'm here only by the grace of God. I can't talk on
the green, but I'll watch the yellow.

I was sorry when I heard Mr. Tuckson say that you were going to
stop in 1944, but it seems to me like the whole business is the
unknowing of situations which happened to me during World War II.
My name is Carlos Felix Pacheco, also known as Charley Felix
Pacheco, and I have a bit of naval history as to what happened to
me in 1942 to 1948.

I enlisted in the Navy December 12, 1942, for a regular Navy
hitch of six years. By premonition, it seemed to me like the war
would probably last about five years, which it did. My first
disappointment was that after 16 weeks of boot camp at San Diego,
California, and being trained for the Navy, any aspect of Navy
work, we were sent to Port Hueneme, California, and issued all
combat equipment, steal helmets, survival knives, rifles,
(inaudible) and combat clothing.

March of 1943, we boarded an attack transport AKA. We were
surrounded with other Army personnel and got underway to Hawaii.
We were in a six (inaudible) course most of the time for fear of
Japanese submarines.

When we arrived at Hawaii, we were sent to Fort Shaffer for
training in all kinds of communications, (inaudible) systems of
communication for short distances within eight miles. That would
be like eyeball to eyeball in eye tactical maneuverings out to
sea.

We again boarded the attack transport and proceeded to Marshall
Islands to Tarawa and Kwajalein. We landed at Kwajalein, and the
Marines landed at Tarawa. What I mean by "we," that was the Army
special forces and what we were trained for.

After four days of intensive fire of all types, including 16-inch
battleship shells that went over the island, sometimes with
premature firing caps on them that would land on the island and
would not explode -- intensive fire.

We secured the island, set up our tents, which later -- four days
of intensive fire. We set up our tents, which about a month later
was sprayed with DDT for mosquitos and other insects, and you all
know what DDT has come about in your intensive studies.

During our voyage across, we (inaudible) paint and used
(inaudible) red land for priming the ship, which was to be
painted later in gray, battleship gray. Later, we found out that
(inaudible) red land was very toxic and was removed by the Navy
for all purposes and not to be used again.

Now, in 1945, what's called the Crossroads -- that's, in
particular, your area of expertise with radiation and other types
of ionization with the hydrogen. Anyway, most of our military
personnel were being discharged because of their enlistment time
duration of the war being 90 days.

The Navy had converted CDE aircraft carriers to take all military
personnel back to the states. I was on one such carrier. It was
mostly recreation. We did a lot of skeet shooting, basketball,
movies, et cetera, what have you. We were in combat fatigues, but
it was kind of recreation for us coming back in 1945.

1946, I was assigned to U.S.S. Mansfield, a destroyer, and she
was a flag ship of (inaudible), which is a (inaudible). I was on
the Mansfield for six months. The name of the carrier is a
strange name. It was the (inaudible).

She set her course back to the United States towards Enewietok,
where some of the atomic tests were being conducted close to or
near to the island. We were told we would be -- that we could go
swimming. The ship lowered her anchor, and that's (inaudible) for
fear of sharks.

When I got into the water, it seemed extremely hot. The waters of
the Pacific, as you all know, are warm, but this water seemed to
be hotter than I was used to swimming in the Pacific. We swam
that day, got on our way the following day, and went towards
Hawaii, where we replenished and headed toward San Francisco.

About 300 miles from San Francisco, they had a simulated war game
atomic blast (inaudible). This was about the middle of September
1945. This was a drill, and according to the reports, all of the
task force was sunk by that one atomic blast simulated war game.

When we arrived at San Francisco, we were given liberty. Then we
went 72 hours, and we reported back to Treasure Island to be
transferred to San Diego, California. From there, I was assigned
to the destroyer, and during the month of January 1945, we were
conducting many rescues called antisubmarine warfare in the
Central Pacific.

I was assigned -- you know, (inaudible) they were having
intensive drills on carriers, and if a plane would crash, we
would chase it and pick up -- you know, rescue pilots.

DR. TUCKSON: As you prepared that, just know that you really need
to now start focusing on what you really want to make sure we
take home from this. Sorry to interrupt you.

MR. PACHECO: No problem. Because many in the Navy men were being
discharged, I was assigned to the U.S.S. (inaudible) and the
U.S.S. (Inaudible). There is some points here between the U.S.S.
(Inaudible) and U.S.S. (Inaudible). I was being transferred
(inaudible), what it means to move personnel around when you have
a critical raid, and all these men were being discharged. They
would put you where they could use you, or me, or whereever they
could use.

I believe when the second task force, those atomic and hydrogen
atomic blasts were being held, we were dispatched (inaudible),
and other materials (inaudible). The ship we sunk was an old time
New York type battleship. I saw through the binoculars that there
was an airplane (inaudible) washing down the ship with high power
hoses, and all of this -- to make it real short, all of these
were unknown to me, what was happening, except the actual working
of all these experiments on the (inaudible), but much of it was
-- we weren't really -- we really did not know what was going on.

DR. TUCKSON: We do have to break off. Let me just make sure I
understand. When you finished doing the work, did anyone in the
military, in the health team, ever come to you and talk to you
about any risks that you may have been exposed to?

MR. PACHECO: No, because more or less, we were assigned a chief
corpsman to do the health inspections of four or five destroyers.
It was very difficult to find a doctor that would come. So, if
anything would happen to us, a chief corpsman or first class
corpsman would come to us, and we would go to sick bay and given
whatever.

DR. TUCKSON: We would appreciate anything that you have in
writing that you could give us on the record, because that would
be useful to us.

MR. PACHECO: One more thing, PS. Other information as to the
white phosphorous that we used -- the white phosphorous was
enclosed in plastic we used when we would darken the ship, we
used as (inaudible) lines. I used some around my bunk during the
blackouts, and every morning, when I would get up in the morning,
I would get headaches, real heavy headaches.

So, I took it upon myself, something was causing this, so I
removed the white phosphorous encased in plastic from my bunk,
and my headaches seemed to go away, but you know what white
phosphorous is. Dr. White -- well, they told me be patient.

I went to the Veterans in Albuquerque, New Mexico, after 50 years
-- well, more like 48, a couple of years ago, and he told me, why
don't you be patient? And I told him, it's taken me 48 years to
get a little nerve to come amongst the most illustrious people in
the world.

And the other part of what happened -- you know, there are many
things that can contaminate people.

DR. TUCKSON: Again, what I need you to do is, first of all, if
you have it written, we can get that, and if not, please talk
with the staff. I want to thank you.

MR. PACHECO: Dr. White and the Veterans Hospital in Albuquerque,
New Mexico has the other part of all the information that you
might want about what we worked with that's toxic. Thank you very
much.

DR. TUCKSON: Thank you so much. Again, anything in writing. Thank
you.

MR. PACHECO: What did you say?

DR. TUCKSON: Anything you have in writing, even if it's
handwritten.

MR. PACHECO: You want this?

DR. TUCKSON: It would be nice. It would help us out. Next, Ms.
Rosalie Jones.

MS. JONES: In 1961 or 1962, as close as we've been able to pin it
down, I had a husband who was incarcerated at Utah State Prison.
During the time that he was there, they asked for inmates to
volunteer for radiation experiments at the Old County Hospital.

They had 10 men, for which they were paid $10 apiece and given
good time. The 10 men were taken down to the Old County Hospital.
They took blood out of them. They put radiation in them. They
took blood out of the (inaudible) in the right arm.

They put radiation in it and put it back in the left arm, which
they said their reasoning was that this was the closest arm to
the heart. They kept them there for about a week. I think they
took X-rays. I'm sure they took urine specimens, probably blood
tests.

We were allowed to go down and sit on the lawn and take our kids
with us and visit with them there. That was one of the benefits
of this, besides the good time. My oldest son and I went down
there on almost a daily basis and sat and visited with them.

In the next five years, there were four babies born to these 10
men -- as far as we can find, only four. Of the four babies,
three died of birth defects. My baby died of congenital
(inaudible) emphysema. They had to remove the lower lobe of his
left lung when he was five days old.

Many of the men are dead. I have been able to find many of them.
The prison denied this ever happened, and until November of this
year, they insisted that it never took place. If it never took
place, why did they lie? They lied about it. They called us
liars. I talked to the doctors. I talked to the guards.

I could give you the names of the guards that were guarding him
when he was at the Old County Hospital. We're all liars. This
didn't take place. It took a reporter out of Washington D.C. to
come and help us and get them to admit that this did take place.

One of the doctors was a very high profile blood doctor at the
University of Utah Hospital -- had a building named after him, a
Dr. (Inaudible), who died five or six years ago. Another doctor,
the one that finally did admit this happened, was an 80-year-old
man, but sound mind, named Dr. (Inaudible) from the Utah State
Prison. (Inaudible) I think it's a shame that the next generation
--

DR. TUCKSON: Take your time. You just take your time. However
much time you need, you have it. It's all right.

MS. JONES: -- had to pay for their father's crimes. They didn't
do anything. They didn't sign any releases. I have been cheated
of a very beautiful baby boy. Nobody knows the (inaudible) or the
grief I felt. I have been cheated out of watching him grow up and
graduate from high school.

I think it's criminal, first of all, they did it, and second of
all, they denied it. I can't believe that this was allowed to go
on, and that it was hidden and denied. My husband committed a
crime. He paid for that crime, but in the long run, I've paid for
that crime, and so did a little boy who never did anything wrong.

He lived 18 days. I'm lucky. The others only lived 5 and 6 days.
I have the birth certificate. Some of the other mothers can't
even get that. My baby didn't exist at the Primary Children's
Hospital. He does not come up on the computers.

It's really funny. I had him. I was there, but there are no
records. I don't know if the other mothers will be able to get
birth certificates or not, but at this point, we have not been
able to. I brought some letters from some of the other people
with me today.

DR. TUCKSON: Thank you. We know a little bit about this case. I
don't think we know a whole lot about it. What I need to
understand is -- just give me a quick sense of what we now know
about this.

MR. KLAIDMAN: What we know (inaudible) what you've pretty much
summarized for us here today. One of the things that we don't
know and have been wondering about is why this very
experimentation was done. Have you been able to get any sense of
that?

MS. JONES: No.

DR. TUCKSON: I tell you what, first of all, what's important for
us to appreciate in this story is to be able to talk about, as we
go forward in this, the fact that it was denied, and then finally
-- in addition to the facts in the case, is the notion of this
secrecy again.

This is a good case study in some ways, that helps us to better
understand when some of the people in our country are saying
things occurred, and then official people say, no, they didn't. A
lot of times, you tend to stop with the official person, and
folks say, well, those folks must have some other reason why they
are saying (inaudible).

I think what is very important is that where these sorts of
incidents have occurred, we begin to understand that, in fact,
you weren't able to get information, and that you were lax, and
now all of a sudden, you can.

In some ways, that's more important than what the experiment was
about. I really do want to thank you. What I will ask you to do,
and I really hope you will take a few minutes and talk with our
folks -- we must get from you what you have, and while we may not
get to solve everything -- again, there's so many leads to
things, but this one, particularly, and personally, I'm
interested in. I think we have to find out what this is about.

DR. THOMAS: I'm just trying to understand.

MS. JONES: They said there is another one going on in Salt Lake.
They have nine names at the Veterans Hospital, and the veterans
-- they have nine records with no names. The Veterans Hospital
said it didn't have them there, but the Veterans Hospital had the
names.

The University says it didn't happen, because there were no
deaths going on in that period of time, which is right close to
this. That newspaper article that I copied proves that they did
have radiation. They were doing things with it.

DR. TUCKSON: Again, we would like to find out more about this,
and I thank you for being here, and I thank you for the emotional
pain that you had to fight through to get us that story. We're
going to take it seriously. Thank you so much. Ms. Bernice
Brogan.

MS. BROGAN: I'm the other half. My ex-husband was one of the 10
men and had the radiation treatment. They were there five days.
It was before -- shortly before I met him. He was asked to do it
again. He said no, and he was (inaudible) and paid $5 and good
time. We had gotten married. I had a son. My son is the one I
can't find the records to.

He was born at Redlands Community Hospital. He had (inaudible).
He died five days later. It's hard (inaudible). I did everything
right as a mother, carried the child, and to be told, he's dying,
he won't make it through the day. My ex-husband said maybe it was
a part of me that was bad. It probably was the radiation.

So, I'm coming at the emotional part. They did deny it ever
happened, until they finally got pushed to the wall, and they
said it was the Federal government that did it, so pass the buck.
I'm here to say that we're the aftermath of the testing.

I had a little boy. Before he was born, I bought him a cute
little outfit with a hood. It had a stork. It said "Happy
Landing." It had a nice blanket with little yellow ducks. When my
son died, I asked them to please take him, because I turned his
body over to the UCLA Medical Center.

So he was tested. They took part of his brain out. I am trying to
get the records, but I need my birth and death certificates.
They're telling me my son never existed. (Inaudible), but he was
tested on, so there should be records at UCLA of the testing of
the organs of his brain, mainly of his brain, because the doctors
claimed it was (inaudible) cells. Something stopped them from
multiplying and dividing.

We're still trying to trace his records down. They said my
ex-husband signed a release. I'm sorry, I never signed it. My son
never signed it. (Inaudible) I was reading on a statement that he
made. I'm going to read it back, because I have a quotation. My
end of this is emotional, being denied. I'm not a liar. I was
there.

When he wrote, risk and benefits of research, it is inherent in
most research that subjects are put at risk of harm in order to
obtain desired benefit. It is the committee's charge to determine
whether the risk in which subjects were exposed, however low,
were justified. I read it.

The path to hell is paved with good intentions. Us mothers, we
were given the path to hell. So, I leave here with a little
outfit, happy landing, a nice blanket, all wrapped back up, and
put it in my mind, and a part of my heart where you will be.

What they did was unjustified. Yes, they were convicts. They had
done wrong, but to use them (inaudible). When the penitentiary
denied it, that is their attitude. Then back in the early '60s
and in the early '90s, they're throw-away people.

Maybe some are and maybe some aren't, but my child wasn't, and
being denied he never existed, being denied it never happened --
I'm getting frustrated trying to get records.

DR. TUCKSON: This is the same prison?

MS. BROGAN: Same prison. It's University Hospital now. It was a
military hospital. It was a teaching hospital and experimental
hospital.

DR. TUCKSON: Would you please, also, if you could, join your
friend -- and I think they went out in the lobby. Can you also
join that conversation? They should be right out in the back
there. Are they back out there? And again, so that we can get
much more detailed information from you than we can get in this
moment, and so by doing that, just do our job better.

MS. BROGAN: Appreciate it.

DR. TUCKSON: We appreciate you coming. Mr. Barney Bailey. Mr.
Bailey, while you get prepared, let me just mention the next
group. After this is Mr. Bob Stapleton, and then I want Dr.
Louise Able and Sue Dayton to start getting prepared to come up.

I'm being told that they've changed the next -- all right. So,
the people that will come next -- is this Mr. Stapleton who will
come next? So, Mr. Bob Stapleton and then Ms. Linda Terry and Ms.
Sue Dayton and Mr. Earnest Garcia, Mr. Dale Howard -- just start
to become prepared, because you'll be coming up within a few
minutes. Sorry for that interruption. Mr. Bailey.

MR. BAILEY: My name is Barney Bailey, and I am from Lovington,
New Mexico. I was in the Navy in 1946 serving on the Battleship
New York, which was a target ship at Operations Crossroads in the
Marshall Islands in Bikini. This was the first of the military
experiments on the ships, and there was 14,000 men, 100 ships.
The Navy didn't (inaudible) the documents I've done over the
years. Kristin Crotty I think maybe she told me she made copies,
and she gave them to the members. Do you have those? I have one
copy here, and do you want me to just go in and start reading?

DR. TUCKSON: I think what you might want to consider is just to
take us to the points that you really want to make, since we have
the written record.

MR. BAILEY: After the second bomb tests, it did tremendous
damage. (Inaudible) Anyway, we were rushed right back in to
Bikini, and apparently it was discovered the New York, which is
right near ground zero, was sinking, taking water, so they sent
the repair party and rushed over. I would say within two hours
max. It was listing, taking water (inaudible) and damage control,
we knew what to do, seal off the compartments.

Anyway, we were there three days, three days and three nights on
that ship. No warning, nothing, no clothing -- no protective
clothing. We never heard of radiation. We were 17-year-old kids,
most of us. We had no idea. There was plenty of food. It wasn't
any problem.

When we left that battleship, we just left everything aboard. So,
we made out fine as far as food. But after three days, we got the
ship stabilized. We were under the impression we were going to
bring it home. We were proud of ourselves. We patted each other
on the back.

We could see ourselves coming under that Golden Gate Bridge.
There was so many of them that were destroyed. Anyway, three days
later, we had (inaudible) I thought it was the radiation officer
and the Geiger counter, and that's the first one we seen. We went
down to meet him. We thought they were mail calls. (Inaudible) He
asked us, how long you boys been here? Said three days.

DR. TUCKSON: How many days?

MR. BAILEY: Three days. He says this is too much. (Inaudible) He
quarantined --

DR. TUCKSON: He quarantined the whole --

MR. BAILEY: Battleship New York. We were sent back to our old
ship, which was (inaudible), which is, I would say, two miles
down the lagoon, and (inaudible) the doctors and corpsman and all
were waiting on us. They were really alarmed. We were beginning
to get alarmed.

I want to back up just a minute. We were facing forward
(inaudible). Some of us were going up the gang way there, and one
kid fell off in there. He just had a little rope. One of them
fell off into the water.

The doctors and corpsman, and I believe, the captain, they were
all on topside waiting on us, and they were screaming to get him
out. He won't live 10 minutes. And the kids were screaming. It
wasn't fear of drowning. He knew how to swim. In fact, we had
been swimming up there about two miles (inaudible).

DR. TUCKSON: The light is on. You've given us some material that
is very powerful. Do you mind if I ask you a couple of quick
questions -- just a couple of very quick questions, because the
time is up?

MR. BAILEY: Can I make just one point here? We were young kids,
and like I say, we were ignorant. The point is ignorance versus
education. Here it is, we were 20 of us. Here this young kid was
in the water there, and there was screaming, get him out, get him
out, and he was screaming, I'm going to die.

None of us wanted to go in that water. Hell no. We had just been
educated, but we were going to rescue him. So, on the boat, they
took lifesavers, and he would just ignore it. He was paralyzed
with fear. (Inaudible) They had a long oar with a hook on it that
they used to go up to another boat or ship.

Finally, they got it around his neck, and we pulled him out. I've
had people ask me, didn't you know it was dangerous?

DR. TUCKSON: I'm glad you made that point, and clearly, that you
all would not have been perhaps as willing to rush in immediately
after the blasts if you had known the danger, because when
somebody finally got scared --

MR. BAILEY: We didn't volunteer. We were ordered, and if you
lived in the Navy then (inaudible). The point I wanted to make
is, they were alarmed, and we had to go over, and we got top
side. (Inaudible) We were going to take the salt water
(inaudible), and the doctor knew it, and I said, I didn't want
to. (Inaudible).

DR. TUCKSON: Did they do that?

MR. BAILEY: No, sir.

DR. TUCKSON: They did not.

MR. BAILEY: Three days later, we were told it was a mistake,
forget it, out of here. I guess I can understand the first
mistake, but I can't understand (inaudible). We were scattered
throughout the fleet and never were we interviewed. Now, I
understand this was the first -- this was the very issue of the
Crossroads tests, and I understand -- they moved us. Later on,
they take your clothes.

DR. TUCKSON: Let me just thank you. For the audience's sake, you
don't have a copy, but just so you will -- to be frank, it is a
very powerful article that he has given us that describes the
return of the Battleship New York to port, and that everybody who
was terrified or anywhere near it -- the people that handled the
ropes to dock the boat had on special gloves and special
everything, so it is a little hard to understand why there was no
follow-up, and maybe we'll begin to understand this a little
better.

MR. BAILEY: I was there when that ship came in.

DR. TUCKSON: Thank you so much. I'm sorry that we have to cut you
off, but this is powerful testimony.

MR. BAILEY: I want to thank all of the committee, and I want to
thank Kris. I was a little apprehensive, and she talked to me and
reassured me, and I want to thank President Clinton for making it
possible.

DR. TUCKSON: Thank you for saying that. I'm glad that Kris was
able to get you to do it. We need to hear from you. Mr.
Stapleton, welcome.

MR. STAPLETON: My name is Robert Stapleton. I live in Ventura,
California. I am the Senior Vice President of the National
Association of Radiation Survivors. In 1956, I was assigned to
the carrier 310th military squadron at Pope Air Force Base.

I was a helicopter pilot in the Air Force. In January of 1956, a
squadron was alerted to participate in Operation Red Wing in the
Marshall Islands. About 12 days later, we were operational and
ready with 10 aircraft and about 60 men (inaudible).

At some point during the first week there, we were called
together for a briefing involving a highly placed official in the
Atomic Energy Commission, and I remember his words very well. You
probably heard about radiation, but don't worry one thing about
it. You would get no more than you would get in an X-ray.

I have no idea who that man was, but it was an Army colonel. That
statement has remained in the back of my mind for a number of
years. A typical shot day began with rising about 0400 and going
to the mess hall, then on to the fight line.

About an hour before the shot, which is always very early in the
morning, one pilot would be sent to pick up the MP guards, who
are out at ground zero -- as if someone was going to steal that
bomb. They spent the previous night there.

The Army, through the circular island chain (inaudible) told us,
keep one eye on the (inaudible), stay over the shallow water on
the reef. In this case, we flew directly across the deep water
(inaudible). I asked the senior controller, who was an AEC man at
the time, what do we do if we're going out to pick someone up and
that weapon goes off?

He thought a few minutes, and he said, don't look at it, and that
was my final instruction that day. During the countdown, we
dressed in white coveralls, white canvas booties and gloves. We
were always given (inaudible) to wear under our helmets. We wore
Air Force flying helmets, football helmets.

The fly in the coverall and the leg holes were all sealed up with
masking tape. Radiation badges and dosimeters were fastened in
the front of the coveralls. Following a day of flying, the badges
were turned in (inaudible).

On more than one occasion, the (inaudible) man looked through the
dosimeter, at the time, banged it on the table, looked at it
again, and threw it away in the trash, saying, half these damn
things are not working. The badges, they were all thrown into a
big bucket. (Inaudible).

After each series of flights or flights into the hot area,
following (inaudible) by men dressed as we were. These men
entered the aircraft with hand-held radiation detectors. They did
the same to us, and then sent us to the showers. We showered
(inaudible) and returned to be reexamined.

On one of these flights, I had to take five showers before I was
declared cleared to get dressed and go back to the barracks. Our
coveralls, gloves, and booties were thrown into containers near
the showers. At the time, I gave no thought to those items,
assuming they were being burned or destroyed.

Many years later at a convention, I met another participant.
During a conversation, he revealed to me that he laundered those
items while working at the base laundry. He added he was now
suffering from cancer.

Returning to the subject (inaudible), we were generally airborne
toward the shot area within 30 to 40 minutes from the shot. Some
flights were made to take scientists to the concrete bunkers to
recover instruments and related equipment.

One such mission, I was transporting a Rad safety man. He was
dressed as I was, and he had passed a large Geiger counter that
he had in his hand. It was near the shot area. He began reading
the dials to me over the intercom. He began with 100 MR, 200 MR,
500 MR, and then it became 200 MR, 500 MR -- get the hell out of
here. Get out. He said 800 MR, get out.

I banked very deeply, and I dropped a couple of hundred feet and
stayed right over the water all the way back to the base. About
an hour later, we tried it again, and there was less radiation,
and we made it to the bunker. He did not read off any of the
radiation to me.

When we made it to the bunker, he got out, ran inside. I took
off, circled out over the room, and then picked him up again.
That was the mission when I took five showers. While we were
taking showers, an aircraft was being hosed down about a hundred
feet away by ground crews that were wearing only khaki short and
GI shoes and socks, and getting very wet.

All of the contaminated water (inaudible) every afternoon after
duty. Our showers and drinking water came from the lagoon going
through a desalt. For us, the tests ended after 17 shots over 16
months, and our unit returned to North Carolina.

There was no debriefing at any departure. No one said anything.
At one time, I asked the (inaudible) man, when are you going to
read these things? He said, I don't know. Well, are you going to
tell us? No, it's classified. And that's their favorite word.

The following year I was transferred to (inaudible) Johnson Air
Force Base, Greensboro, North Carolina. From here, some of us
went teamwide to the test site at Nevada for Operation Plumbob.
Commissions were much the same as (inaudible) and energy
variations.

One is recovering spent objects from around the desert, which we
learned much later had been shot through the (inaudible) after
detonation. We were sent out to find them, but we really didn't
realize that they had gone through the (inaudible).

We were told nothing about it, other than pick up the thing and
locate it. We were supposed to sweep the sling. We had to pick it
up, put it in the sling underneath the aircraft. Well, on one
occasion, the sling didn't work. We didn't know what this thing
was. We threw it in the cabin with us and threw a tarp over it.

Anyway, about 28 shots were fired (inaudible) including the first
Airdale rocket. I witnessed about half of them. As you know, it's
between '46 and '63 when the test ban was imposed. The United
States disposed (inaudible) 330 weapons in the atmosphere.

DR. TUCKSON: We know that. Let me just ask you one question.
First of all, your testimony confirms other's testimony, referred
to now several times in several cities, and so this is very
powerful to add to that story.

One quick question. That is, how do you deal with the question of
whether or not, as a soldier, that this was part of the your
occupation? There are some that would want us to try and
understand what happened to you as being a part and parcel of the
life and responsibility of the soldier.

You are put in harm's way. You are asked to do things that are
unusual, because that's what a soldier does. This was not so much
an experiment as much as it was a part of your job. Help us to
understand how to think about it.

MR. STAPLETON: That's very difficult, but in war time, people
around you are mostly enemies, and in peace time, they're all
friends. One thing in Nevada, in the test site, I used to fly
over those trenches every day, where they had those men, and that
was pure experimentation, really.

I have the document on it that was, Welcome to Desert Rock Camp
(inaudible) and in it, it tells how on such and such date, you
will go to those trenches. You will get out. You will get down on
your hands and knees (inaudible). After the shot, the loud
speaker will tell you to advance, and you do it.

You will leave your badge in the trench, and that's documented.

DR. TUCKSON: What is your title, again, with the association?

MR. STAPLETON: Senior vice president.

DR. TUCKSON: I just wanted to make sure. I would just say to you,
if you're so inclined, it might be useful to jot down some
thoughts and send them along to us about this notion.

MR. STAPLETON: You have an expanded copy of this.

DR. TUCKSON: I guess what I'm specifically saying is, since we
don't have time to fully explore it, if you have an interest in
helping us to think through the difference between being exposed
to issues as a part of the job and what your expectations are
there, versus experiment and how we should think it through.
We're struggling with that question, and any help you can give us
--

MR. STAPLETON: I'm going to have difficulty trying to define
that.

DR. TUCKSON: If you can put that down for us.

MR. STAPLETON: I'll try. You asked him what he thought might come
out of this.

DR. TUCKSON: What did he expect.

MR. STAPLETON: Well, you ask me the same question.

DR. TUCKSON: Sir, what do you expect to come out of this?

MR. STAPLETON: Damn little, damn little.

DR. TUCKSON: Reason?

MR. STAPLETON: I don't trust the government.

DR. TUCKSON: Fair enough. Thank you, sir.

MR. STAPLETON: Famous words of Henry Kissinger when asked about
testing in Marshall Islands, there is only 90,000 people out
there. Who gives a damn, and that's quoted.

DR. TUCKSON: Thank you. Ms. Linda Terry.

MS. TERRY: My father Mac E. Bradley committed suicide on April 6,
1952, four and a half months before I was born. The military went
to great lengths to lay the blame on my mother. You see, my
mother had postpartum depression after her fourth child, so the
military decided to conclude, because she was pregnant again, my
father decided to leave this world.

He had on him, at the time of his death, a letter of commendation
for his part in Operation Buster-Jangle. For over 40 years, my
family felt this, actually, did not seem plausible. Whatever my
father was involved in at Indian Springs, Nevada, from August
1951 to February 1952 greatly affected his well-being, so much
that he became a totally different person.

He had only been home five weeks before he committed suicide.
First, let me explain, although my father was an orphan at an
early age, there has never been any signs of emotional problems
in his life or his siblings.

Secondly, that change in him was so marked that my mother twice
went to his commanding officer upon his return, asking what had
happened to Mac, only to be told everything was fine and he was
just doing his job.

Several months after my father's death, my mother went to the
base commander to try to find out additional information
regarding the circumstances surrounding this whole affair, only
to be told it would be best served if she and our family were to
forget there was ever a Mac A. Bradley. She tried again in the
1980s, only to be stonewalled again.

Third, after 42 years, the family was able, with the help of
Congressman Steve Schiff, to obtain father's military records.
This is where we discovered the findings of the military
investigations into my father's death, laying the blame at my
mother's feet.

My mother took this information with her to her grave. Still, in
all those pages and pages of service records, there was no
mention of Operation Buster-Jangle. In May of 1994, Congressman
Schiff asked the Air Force for additional information,
specifically regarding Buster-Jangle, only to be told that there
was no information available on this particular operation.

It was shortly after this that we read the story in the
Albuquerque Tribune regarding Buster-Jangle. What we did to find
out from the record that we received from the military was there
were people who saw changes in my father.

The Air Force claimed he was a hard-working officer, once
friendly and outgoing before going to Indian Springs, but when
returning, being very withdrawn. There were comments in the
testimony as to how he appeared ill and his skin was flushed.

When asked if he was having problems, he would quickly change the
subject. Unfortunately, I cannot show what Operation
Buster-Jangle did to my father, but not having him with us
changed our lives. All that I ask for are whole truths, no more
half truths, no more lies, so that my sister and brother can
understand why we grew up without a father.

Basically, what I'm asking is that the government start giving
full disclosure the first time it's asked, so families don't have
to live in darkness, in just wondering, speculations, things of
that nature.

I think it's time the government started really opening up.

DR. TUCKSON: The documents that you've given us to review make it
pretty clear that from sworn testimony in front of notary
publics, et cetera, that your father was an exemplary and
conscientious worker, who was sent to Indian Springs, came back,
and didn't even know who this guy was. He was completely
different. It was dramatic.

Have you been able to find out much about Operation
Buster-Jangle?

MS. TERRY: No. One of the reasons why we came to this is we had
high hopes that we would meet men who were part of Buster-Jangle,
and that has happened, so we're learning a little bit more about
the operation.

We haven't met anybody who knew my father yet. We don't know if
he was actually involved in any actual radiation exposure or if
he helped plan it and felt so guilty about it. All we are doing
is looking for information for the truth, so we can --

DR. TUCKSON: Let me just quickly --

MR. KLAIDMAN: I just wanted to say that we have some information
on the Buster-Jangle. We'll send you copies of what we have.

DR. THOMAS: I find quite extraordinary this letter from the
Department of the Air Force saying that we don't even know what
Buster-Jangle is.

MS. TERRY: We always thought it was a little strange that my
father would commit suicide, but have on him like no letters of
why he's doing it, but he did have this letter, the actual letter
of commendation on him. It was like a clue for my mother to
follow up on later on.

DR. MACKLIN: Just one question. In a couple of places, there are
references in letters that were sent to the family to some
photographs. One, they apologized that the photographs were not
in good condition, and the one I'm looking at now, from a Marvin
(inaudible) Captain of the U.S. Air Force, that attributes your
father's -- surrounding his death to the depression, and your
mother, et cetera, says, "The photographs which are included in
this investigation need no comment whatever, as they graphically
depict what took place."

If it's not too painful, could you tell us what was in those
photographs?

MS. TERRY: One picture was the car. The other picture, here was a
man who supposedly killed himself by carbon monoxide by attaching
his hose to the car, but on the seat next to his body is a
whiskey bottle and rat poison and a cup with it all mixed up, and
there is no mention of rat poison or alcohol in the autopsy.

It wasn't very good quality, and luckily because I received it 42
-- or 41 years after his death, I wanted everything -- anything
that they would send me. There was supposed to be photographs of
my dead father, but they won't tell me what he did with the
military -- such a strange operation.

DR. TUCKSON: For all of us, I think that so much of what we've
heard today continues to reinforce the human dimensions of
secrecy. The inability to get information, it seems to me, has
its own consequences, which we are really starting to hear,
whether it is a Utah prison, whether it is a Marshall Island,
whether it is your father.

It's just this consistent pattern of human suffering that results
from the inability to get information from people not just being
open. It becomes a mantra, that our report is going to have to,
in some terms, deal with it.

This is one person's impact. I have no power. I'm just one of a
group of colleagues, but anyway, thank you very much. We can at
least do something to help you, and that is to give you what we
know, and we will go ahead and give them your name and get that
to you. Sue Dayton.

MS. DAYTON: My name is Sue Dayton, and first of all, I would like
to thank you for allowing me to speak to you all today. I'm here
today because I'm concerned with the continued suffering of
Navajo uranium miners.

Actually, this is for all Native uranium miners, but specifically
for Navajo uranium miners and their families who apply for
compensation under the Radiation Employee Compensation Act. Today
I want to suggest to you four amendments to the RECA amendments
that will aid the act in fulfilling its mission to this group.

The amendments are: Number 1, the institution of accurate medical
testing procedures; Number 2, utilizations --

DR. TUCKSON: Excuse me, institution of?

MS. DAYTON: Accurate medical testing procedures; Number 2, the
utilization of CT scans in the event of conflicting chest X-ray
readings; Number 3, additional epidemiological studies; Number 4,
the elimination of the current required documentation pertaining
to working level months of radiation.

In addition to these amendments, I would like to suggest three
additional programs that would serve to satisfy the spirit of
this act. The three programs are: Number 1, the establishment of
uranium miners medical fund; Number 2, the establishment of the
uranium location fund; Number 3, the administrative restructuring
of the RECA.

Native American uranium miners were working for the best of the
country, and in the end, they were deceived by their own
government, which voted to withhold from them information
regarding the health hazards associated with uranium mining.

The RECA is a compensation program which refers to itself as
compassionate payment. In truth, it is culturally biased. It is a
program that does not offer its victims, who are Navajo, fair and
equal consideration.

The U.S. Government has a moral obligation to provide
compensation to those who it's harmed. The RECA is the big first
step, but it falls short. I submit to you the following
amendments to this act:

Accurate testing procedures. In order to qualify for
compensation, uranium miners must be diagnosed with abnormal lung
function. Lung function tests are currently based on Caucasian
norms. There is evidence that lung capacities of Native Americans
may exceed that of Caucasian people; therefore, the very accuracy
of these tests are suspect. I recommend research to establish
Native American norms for these tests.

Number 2, Optional CT scanning. Under the RECA, in order for a
uranium miner to receive compensation for a lung disease, the
miner must submit to chest X-rays read by two (inaudible)
readers. These readings are very subjective. If there is a
conflict in these readings, the miners seek out additional
readers. I recommend that funds be made available to obtain a CT
scan in these cases, since a CT span is 20 times more sensitive
than a simple chest X-ray. This should clarify if a lung disease
is present.

Number 3, Additional Epidemiological Studies. Preliminary
findings have shown uranium miners have extremely high mortality
rates for prostate cancer, pancreatic cancer, liver cancer, and
bladder cancer, in the order of 45 to 263 times the norm.
However, none of these diseases have been considered as
work-related compensable diseases under the RECA.

Additional epidemiological studies need to be conducted on miners
and other groups at risk, such as open pit miners, mill workers,
and those who lived, and presently live, downwind from uranium
mining activities, in order to establish the cause of the link
between these diseases and radiation. If this link is found, then
these diseases should be compensated, as well.

The final amendment to the RECA that I would like to suggest is
the elimination of the current required working level month --
working level month levels of radiation for miners. To qualify
for compensation, a miner must prove he has been subjected to the
required minimum level of radiation.

This is an almost impossible requirement for Navajo miners to
fulfill because of several reasons. Some because of culture
differences. Many mines, for one thing, did not take accurate
readings of the radiation levels, nor did they keep records of
this information.

Additionally, what miner, regardless of his cultural heritage,
would have retained his working level month records over a period
of almost 50 years? How many of you kept your grocery receipts
from last week? Whether he is sick with pneumoconiosis or lying
on his death bed with cancer, without the required working level
documentation, a uranium miner will not be considered for
compensation under the RECA.

Beyond the implementation of these recommended RECA amendments,
the institution of three additional programs will help to make
right the United States Government's responsibility to its
citizens.

The programs are: Number 1, the establishment of a uranium miners
medical fund. The purpose of this Federally-funded program would
be designed to provide funding for all required and optional
medical testing, to provide funding to assist the uranium miner
and their family with travel expenses to and from testing
centers.

Many Navajo miners live in isolated areas, are elderly, and do
not have the economic means to travel to the area testing center
of Raton, New Mexico. Under a miners medical fund, all miners who
file a claim through the RECA would receive equal access to
screening and testing without hardship, to determine the presence
of a compensable disease.

The establishment of a uranium relocation fund. The uranium
relocation fund would work with the existing reclamation programs
in locating structures built with radioactive materials. This
program would provide funding to rebuild any structure on a
reservation constructed with contaminated materials.

Native American miners and their families who are presently
living in or near contaminated structures on reservations would
be eligible for assistance under this program.

The third and last is restructuring of the RECA. I will demand
the Justice Department coordinate a joint program with the Native
Advisory Committee representing a cross section of Native
American uranium miners affected by RECA.

The Native Advisory Committee would work hand to hand with the
Justice Department, which is presently responsible for claims.
The Native Advisory Committee would assist in evaluating program
efficacy and any problems associated with medical or legal
criteria.

Most importantly, however, the Native Advisory Committee would
place some control in the hands of those affected. Finally, I
just want to say that in terms of the compassionate payment, the
RECA will only be that when we are (inaudible).

DR. TUCKSON: Let me say right off the bat, your presentation
could not have been better timed or more thoughtful. We are, as a
full committee, going to spend almost the bulk of our next
meeting in February on this issue of compensation.

The insights that you've given us into this area from your point
of view are just tremendous. What I need to understand first,
simply given that the red light is on, is, how do you come by
such a precise analysis? Are you associated with a particular
group that we should be aware of?

MS. DAYTON: Actually, I'm a student at the University of New
Mexico. I became involved with these issues about two years ago
when my husband and I moved to the state, and since then, I have
been kind of following what's being going on and doing my own
research in it.

DR. TUCKSON: I would very, very much hope that you will be --
that we'll be able to find you, that we'll have your phone
number, and that we can connect with you. This is such a
thoughtful document, just tremendously useful.

MS. DAYTON: I've written a paper on the problems with the RECA,
and actually, I submitted to Faith Weiss.

MR. KLAIDMAN: We have the paper.

DR. THOMAS: (Inaudible) data which I was not aware before of the
prostate cancers and the other cancers you mentioned.

MS. DAYTON: I'm sorry, which data?

DR. THOMAS: It's in your paragraph on additional epidemiological
studies. You refer to data research on prostate, pancreas, liver,
and bladder cancer. The figure is far in excess of the very high
base of lung cancer, so is the citation for that this paper by
Sammon (sic) and Archer?

MS. DAYTON: No, it's not, and actually, I don't have that
information with me, but I would be glad to forward that to you.

DR. THOMAS: I would appreciate that, and Faith is the person you
need to send that to.

DR. TUCKSON: Let's do a couple of things on this one. I would
like to inspect this document in its entirety with its little
cover of how it came to us in this conversation here, which would
go out to the committee after Duncan has seen this stuff.

I think it needs to be in the briefing packet for February's
meeting.

DR. THOMAS: The picture you circulated to the subcommittee.

DR. TUCKSON: This is very, very useful. Thank you very, very
much.

MS. DAYTON: Thank you for coming.

DR. TUCKSON: Mr. Garcia.

MR. GARCIA: My name is Ernest Garcia. Welcome to New Mexico.
Thank you very much for being here in Albuquerque. I am an
original veteran of 1946. I became a group of 100 -- or 1,000
highly elite secret soldiers, and I was put in CIA offices. We
became a group of experimental subjects, unknowing to us, that
would last for four years.

We participated in many, many historical events of the time. I am
a member serving in the Nuremberg Trial of 1947. While I was
talking, I found it very difficult to talk about this subject. As
I was looking at you from back there, I could actually smell the
stench of the human flesh that was burning.

It is difficult for me to talk about these things. As we arrived
in Nuremberg, I went to this (inaudible), and I could still see
the children moving, and I couldn't conceive this. I am one of 13
children and became an orphan at the age of 7, raised by a very,
very strict father.

I, as a little boy, showed extraordinary talents in school, but I
was, in their definition, extraordinarily intelligent. I find
that very, very difficult to accept, because I don't consider
myself that.

As I went into the service, I went into the service with the
intent to become a member of an artillery battalion, but very
quickly, they noticed the difference, and at that time, I just
entered at the time when the CIA was looking for a specific group
of people, targeting on people that would qualify both
psychological and intellectual and physical, not knowing what I
was about to go into.

The first experience that I had was to become one of the subjects
that was used for the gas chamber environment, which many, many
drugs was used on me. After surviving that, under an
extraordinarily horrifying experience, seeing some of my
colleagues fall dead there.

They just didn't have the resilience I had, obviously -- falling
dead, and me having to walk out of there vomiting. My body was
already blistered, and as you can see those pictures right there,
and it has haunted me for the rest of my life.

I have never been compensated for that, because it seems the
Federal government has targeted something against me, only
because I became so aggressive and assertive in trying to make
things right.

I became one of the most valuable, valuable resources for the
writing of the book Veterans At Risk, compiled by Dr. Burshura
(sic) and her staff of scientists. They would call me
periodically to justify some of the allegations that was there,
and when the book was completed, she sent me a letter, and she
said, I can't believe the accuracy you have mentioned.

That was a short summation of the biochemical experimentation,
which was many, not only mustard gas. Let me bring something over
here in regard what these gentlemen were saying from Los Alamos,
that every -- as you notice, if you were listening, that these
men said that they had a 15-year time to follow up all these
experiments.

Well, the truth of the matter is that that was true with all
experiments, that all experiments were tainted with radiology,
and in order to be able to trace them. So, we ingested humongous
amounts of radiation in many ways. I, personally, was one of
those people.

I participated in the operations in the United States, operated
covert operations outside of the United States. The CIA, as I
understand, when the Federal government asked for information,
they said that it had shredded or destroyed all of the files.

If the CIA or any representative of the CIA is here, I want to
make it very clear that they didn't destroy my records, because I
trained and I worked with the CIA. It became -- it's very
difficult for me to talk about these things.

I participated in many, many radiology experimentations outside
the United States. One thing that keeps on bothering me
tremendously is the enormous guilt that goes with it, because I
became the initiator of these horrible, horrible experimentations
that were done without any human -- I can't even say the word. I
can't find the word to say it -- where we, as democratic
Americans, were responsible for annihilating a complete, complete
race of Indians in South America.

Now I can talk about it as of December 3, 1943, because that's
when they released me from the Secrecy Act. I, before then,
couldn't even tell my doctors. Not even my wife knew about that.
Let me tell you what the residual was in my family.

We had eight children. Of the eight children, six of them have
been born full nine months, severely deformed. I have two
children that survived, all very intelligent, but very, very
tainted by their own problems. They both are disabled.

DR. TUCKSON: Listen, I hate to interrupt you, but we're several
minutes over the red light. I'm at a quandary here. First of all,
it's hard to not be able to respond emotionally to your
presentation. Clearly, this is a matter of importance to you.

The issues don't fit quite well with our charge, and that's
difficult for me because you are clearly concerned, you're
clearly upset, and I'm not in a position to do much about that,
which is a terrible position to be in.

I don't want to mislead you. There is no way that this committee
can be particularly or specifically -- or maybe my colleagues --

DR. THOMAS: I'm having a little difficulty understanding exactly
what you're telling us, but correct me if I haven't got the story
right. Part of your history concerns your exposure to mustard gas
and subsequent medical workup to understand what the consequences
of that would have been, which included some radiation exposures.
That's part of what you're telling us, is it not?

MR. GARCIA: Let me say this in response to that, that that was
the beginning of my experimental. Because this is 40 years of
time, I can't really relay to you or really convey to you the
extent of the experiments, because I was a secret subject of the
times, and I was used with the (inaudible) that I was totally
expendable. As a matter of fact --

DR. THOMAS: Let me interrupt a second. It's that latter piece
that I'm more interested, because in this part, as you say,
through your involvement with the CIA, you became an experimental
subject in radiation experiments, and that would, in principle,
fit into our charter.

The difficulty I'm having is that the CIA persists in telling us
that, in fact, they never sponsored any radiation experiments.
So, if what you're telling us is true, it calls into question the
things which we're hearing directly from the CIA. I want to make
sure that we understand, and we need to have some way of getting
this information.

DR. TUCKSON: I guess what we need to then, is -- I think Duncan
is right. If you have the ability to give us information that
says that the CIA was involved in some radiation experimentation
testing and so forth, and that information will be useful to us,
given that one of the agencies that is under our sphere of
control is radiation testing by the CIA, and the notion would be
that they have been saying that they really have not been
involved, and if you can help shed some light on that, I would
ask you to talk with our folks here, so they can try to get that
from you, and that's probably the best way to proceed.

If you can, in a few minutes, go over there and talk about that,
that might be a way we can get involved and help you. Otherwise,
to be frank, it's just that our charter is fairly rigid, and I
apologize for that.

MR. GARCIA: I'm sorry if I might have distorted you, but because
of the diversity of the extent of my experiments here, I was
trying to define to you that everything, every experiment that
was used there, contained -- was tainted with radioactivity, and
that I -- and every experiment -- there was many of them -- was
that of radiation.

DR. TUCKSON: Again, the one thing we don't want to do is mislead
people, but on the other hand, if we can find a way to get at it
better -- if you can go ahead and have a conversation with staff,
maybe we can understand your story a little better and find some
ways in which this fits in.

I sincerely hope in your conversation we can learn some more from
your story. Let's go ahead and get that worked out. Thank you a
lot for sharing that.

Mr. Dale Howard. Mr. Howard, we have a handout from you, as well.
Welcome.

MR. HOWARD: Since you do have that handout, would you like for me
just to move right to the points I would like to make and skip
most of it?

DR. TUCKSON: That might be good. That would give us some time to
have a conversation with you.

MR. HOWARD: Really, the point I wanted to make was that I believe
that about anyone who was in the Marshall Islands during the
hydrogen tests, and especially, the Mike Shot, I believe we were
part of an experiment, because they really didn't know what was
going to happen with Mike, but since you do have a copy of all of
this, the point I would like to make is, really, not all of us
blame our government for putting us at risk, because they were
desperate times.

We were at war in Korea. China and the USSR were taking big bites
out of the world and threatening our very existence, but we do
think that denying for 40 or 50 years that we were harmed is too
much. Our government recognizes and compensates cancers and
conditions at Marshall Island that they denied US veterans.

Did our uniforms make us immune in some way? Public Law 97-7-2
passed in 1981 was the first law that was of much use to atomic
veterans, in my opinion, and it only gave medical treatment for
certain cancers. Public Law 98-5-42, in 1984, recognized a lot of
cancers and conditions, but required dose estimates that were
impossible, except in rare cases.

The Defense Nuclear Agency -- those estimates would be laughable
if they were not so tragic for claimants. Public Law 100-3-21 was
the first of the presumptive laws, and it named some of the
cancers, but not the most common ones caused by radiation, and
since then, a few more have been added piecemeal.

Our government knows that all cancers and conditions named in the
Marshall Island Agreement and Public Law 98-5-42 are caused by
radiation. We want them all to be presumptive now, and that is
the point I would like to make, and thank you for your time.

DR. TUCKSON: Let me, first of all, thank you, and say that this
statement reads very clearly. In your recommendations about
presumptiveness, it is extremely timely. We are going into this
discussion about remedies as a full committee in a couple of
weeks, and so we will have this, and again, this will be
included, and we have to find a way to make sure that this advice
gets included in that discussion immediately.

The question that I would ask you is a different one than the
point you were making. If you could turn this clock back to that
time again, and you were in charge, you were a leader, what would
be different? What would you expect to be different?

Would it be that they should never have done the testing? Do you
think they were wrong for doing any of it, or is the wrong that
they didn't talk about it? Where is the wrong? What is it you
would do differently if you could turn this clock back?

MR. HOWARD: I don't feel, really, that it was that wrong at that
time. I feel like it was -- we were very desperate at that time.
The USSR was making threats. It went on and on with the Cold War,
even as far as trouble with Cuba. It all built and built and
built.

So, I don't truly blame our government for putting us at risk at
the time. I blame our government more today for denying that
anything happened, and they have been denying it, and outright
lies, and also records, missing records.

I deal with veterans so much. I belong to several organizations.
I have offices in state offices in some of the organizations. I
find this same thing, on atomic veterans especially, claiming too
much is missing from the records.

DR. TUCKSON: Is your experience with the atomic matters, do they
have a different experience than other veterans, or are these
kinds of issues common to veterans across the board?

MR. HOWARD: No, they're not common. There is some with that, but
no, I find it more and more with atomic veterans, records missing
and parts of records missing, and I would say selectively
missing.

DR. TUCKSON: Each of these points is powerful. I am moving
rapidly, but what is the reaction of other veterans when you are
having a conversation about these issues? And the atomic veterans
are angry, and they're concerned, and they're talking about
issues of compensation and so forth.

Do other veterans say -- do you ever hear them saying, that was
your job? Stop all that moaning and whining. You did your job. I
was in the place where they had bombs going off, and my people
were blown up, or could have been blown up. Do you get any of
that? How are you perceived by other veterans?

MR. HOWARD: I haven't run into anything like that. If you were
hit with a bullet or a piece of shrapnel, it shows. If you were
exposed to radiation, then it takes 20 years to show up, and it
doesn't show until 20 years later. Therefore, it is denied. That
is the problem that I see.

I'm concerned with all veterans issues, not just atomic veterans,
but this specifically.

DR. TUCKSON: Very helpful, and I think that we understand this
presumptiveness, and the critical part on that statement is,
before you die, in other words, you are looking for criteria that
would be established without -- by the time you argue this thing
out another 40 years, it doesn't much matter, and that's what you
seem to be saying.

MR. HOWARD: That is my point.

DR. TUCKSON: Thank you very, very, very much. You've been great.
We have a duo, Mr. Coy Overstreet and Ms. Denise Nichols.

DR. TUCKSON: What's your name, sir?

MR. KANE: Paul Kane.

DR. TUCKSON: Paul Kane is accompanying them at the table.

MR. OVERSTREET: I am Coy Overstreet. I represent the National
Association of Atomic Veterans. I participated in Operation
Dominic in 1962, the last of the atmospheric tests. I want to
thank the panel today for giving us this opportunity to address
you.

I also represent the Desert Storm veterans, and one thing I would
like to do is point out, we have bid an extensive study on the
effects of using depleted uranium as penetrater shells in the
Desert Storm fiasco. We're adding many illnesses there, and we're
having cancer deaths occur at a rapid rate.

Other than that, you have my material from Desert Storm, so I
will only mention one other thing. I've had many health problems.
The fact is I have a rating from the Veterans Administration of
nonservice connected or residuals of radiation exposure.

This is repulsive coming from my government to somebody that
offered to give their life, and I am an all time tour veteran. I
retired from the Marine Corps, and it was hard for me to do,
because in the last five or six years, having participated in the
tests in 1962, I was beginning to feel the effects.

My records, and where they have lost my biopsies of skin cancers,
misdiagnosed things, are at your disposal here, and I will offer
any more information that the panel might require or might be
interested in.

I will leave a study here of the Desert Storm situation. We had
some scientific people. I only have one copy of this book, and I
might mention, our best buyer was Los Alamos. We sold them 50
copies at $15 a throw. That made us real happy.

I participated with (inaudible) the experimentation death. I can
bring up one other thing here. Also, we're told, Senator Reigle,
furnishing information to him, and of course, I think he may have
seen this GAO report, which states, Operation Desert Storm, Army
not adequately prepared to deal with depleted uranium
contamination.

Members of the panel, I think that's been happening for 50 years.
We have not been ready and prepared for what has happened to the
veterans, and I feel that if the present course of action
continues, it's going to harm our national security more than it
would to finally recognize the people, the very patriotic people
that defended our government in a time when we were called on.

We offered our lives, and now then, we call for recognition. I
would like to introduce Major Denise Nichols, and let her take
this over. As slow as I talk, I can't see here. I don't know
whether I went over five minutes or not.

Mr. Chairman, one other thing I would like to say, I was very
impressed in the way that you handled the chair today, and most
certainly, one of the things that arose. Major Nichols.

MS. NICHOLS: Good afternoon. I appreciate being added to the
agenda today. You don't have a statement from me because I have
been working very hard with the Desert Storm veterans. I will be
providing one, mail it to you within the week.

I am a nurse. I have a master's degree. A lot of what I have to
tell you is not hard data. I wish I had access to the hard data,
but I have been working very hard trying to educate our vets and
get them out of their denial, which, as a nurse that has worked
with patients for 20 some years, I know the first thing a person
does when they have problems, healthwise, is they try to deny it.

It's a natural response, and then when the government is denying
it, and I saw it on TV when the troops came forward, that they
were told, you're just having a stress adjustment. You're just
having posttraumatic stress.

No, sir. If we're going to have posttraumatic stress, it is being
caused by our government since we came home from war, with having
to deal with the government and having to go through the hurt and
pain that each victim in here today has talked about, much less
the pain that a veteran that has committed to lay his life on the
line, or her life in my case, goes through.

It is a very painful, emotional situation. To tie in the past
veterans that have commented, you kind of briefly met with Ed
Garcia, and I wanted to make a comment about that. I think the
man has information and data, and it's very hard for us to come
forward as individuals, but we can tell you things, and I think
it's your job to take back the information that the vets are
telling you to the powers that can't get to the information.

I'm one person. That individual that has served with the CIA
before is one person. We can give you clues and guides, and we
can do some of our homework too, which we're out here trying to
do, and suffering as we are with our illnesses, but the
government's history has not been very good dealing with the
situation.

We are no mystery in radiogenic diseases as I see. I see immune
system disorders. From physically watching these people and
listening to the patient, I see immune system problems. I see
neurological problems. I see cancers being diagnosed. I see birth
defects happening.

I see it happening awfully fast, and I go along with those
studies that have been done from the senators with veterinary
assistance and scientific people that were involved in the
Rockefeller studies. We were subject to some questionable
practices of whether this is experimentation or not.

You be the judge. A waiver was granted (inaudible). Do you know
back -- I mentioned this to the staff, and it's included in the
Rockefeller report. I was part of a study by Air Force reserves
out of Kelly Air Force Base in Texas, and it's a research,
experimental study.

I was a reservist, sir. I was home between my weekend duty, got
little white pills in the mail, and told, with a little note in
it, take these every so many hours and get in contact with your
flight surgeon if you have any problems.

No further information on the drug. No identification of the
drug. I wish I had saved that. I'm digging through everything I
have trying to pull that up in checking with other flight nurses
that were involved out of Kelly Air Force Base, Texas.

They've mentioned a lot of people called in about that. That's
experimentation when you don't give informed consent, when you
don't give information to the subject. My gosh, and some of these
people did get sick, and they were not covered because they were
reservists. We only get coverage if we were on duty when we got
sick.

So, there is a lot of experimentation going on, and as far as
this situation here, listening to the radioactivity, it was just
given to you material put together by Damacio Lopez that you'll
be hearing from in a while, friendly fire.

I have a lot of questions as I look through some of the quotes
that he's pulled from other sources, that if this is not
experimentation, I don't know what it is. It's done with
camouflage. You don't see it until you start investigating.

Now, the veterans of Desert Storm -- and I'll try to make it
quick -- were having problems with the same symptoms showing up
in our families, our loved ones, and it's not just the ones that
we make love to, and I am very concerned.

I'm watching my daughter complain of things -- my daughter. She
didn't take the oath to serve. Now, how far is this going to go
to the public health of this country? So, please, get the data,
and I've mentioned some things that need to be looked into and
taken back to Washington.

DR. TUCKSON: Thank you, and I hope, again, that you feel that in
terms of Mr. Garcia, sitting down and talking with the staff to
take that back, so we don't just let that just fall off the edge
of the earth, and Mr. Overstreet, I can't help but notice that
you thoughtfully included in your package of things for us a
little note from the Wall Street Journal that documents that the
United States Government offered $2 million to clean up nuclear
test sites in Estonia, and so I guess you were telling us that
somebody has some money somewhere to do something. Thank you very
much.

MS. NICHOLS: Sir, can I mention one thing? The NAS just came out
with their study and said to look at lead, because our lead
levels were showing high, and they were looking at problems with
the (inaudible) that the lead also can come from DU, and DU is
being hidden.

DR. TUCKSON: We have to close out, and again, I want to be very
clear, again, that you really need to go back and look at our
charter. I do not want you to be angry at us if you don't see us
adequately deal with some of the things you presented, only
because it's very precise in what we have jurisdiction to look
into.

I understand how important that is. I don't want you to feel that
because you mention it to us, that we didn't deal with it, that
we did not deal with you honestly. I want to be very up-front
about that. We can only do that which our charter says we can do.
That's just what we can do.

MS. NICHOLS: Are you interested in the harassment that was
occurring in the desert?

DR. TUCKSON: What I don't want to do is to make anybody angry.

MS. NICHOLS: I'm not going to get angry.

DR. TUCKSON: I don't want to lie. That's what this whole thing is
about. It would be useful if you go back on that table in the
back and get a copy of our charter, so you can see what your
expectations are of us. Understand what I'm saying. I'm not
saying that it's not important. I'm not saying it shouldn't dealt
with. I'm not saying any of that.

I'm saying we have a limitation to our charter, which really
focuses on some issues of human radiation, and those issues
should be presented. As legitimate as they are, this cannot be
added --

MS. NICHOLS: Human radiation DU continues to be not dealt with
completely and honestly.

DR. TUCKSON: Thank you very much, and you have been helpful to
us, and I hope we'll be helpful to you.

MR. OVERSTREET: I want to thank the panel. I will present one
copy.

DR. TUCKSON: We understand that you and your organization are
very important to this committee, and I want to thank you for
staying with us.

MR. OVERSTREET: I appreciate that, and anytime I can be of
assistance in any of your endeavors, please notify me.

DR. TUCKSON: Mr. Langdon Harrison.

MR. HARRISON: I'm Colonel Harrison, retired United States Air
Force. I had many jobs in the Air Force, but the one we're
concerned with is the cloud sampling (inaudible). I was mission
director of Red Wing Operation in Nevada.

The first thing and most important thing I would like to present
you with is the simple fact that the records of radiation are so
erroneous it's a laughing matter. This Nuclear Defense
organization that we have is putting out that this is the amount
of radiation we received on our tests. I'll give you a striking
example.

When I was directing the missions at Enewietok, I kept track of
each crew member of the amount of radiation that had been turned
in by the radiation man, who was monitoring radiation monitor,
and so I could keep the crews getting the same amount of
radiation.

In other words, one had 10 rems of radiation. Another had 10 and
15 and 12. I would move the Number 7 and Number 8 radiation up
for the next mission, and try to keep it uniform. I was given a
directive at that time not to exceed 15 rems of radiation during
this test series under any circumstance.

This Red Wing consisted of 16 shots starting out on the 6th of
June -- starting out on the 1st of June. By the 6th of June, my
crews and the entire group had 15 rems of radiation reported, and
I told the commander, we have exceeded the limitation that was
placed upon us when we arrived for the mission, and he said,
stand by, I'll see what they want to do about it.

So, he wired back to Kirtland, and Kirtland wired back and said,
up it to 30 rems of radiation per man. That was on the 6th of
June. On the 21st of June, all my crew members had only 30 rems
of radiation. (Inaudible) Colonel Samuels that we were exceeding
the second degree of limitation on radiation per man at that
time.

Again, he says, let me see what they want to do at Kirtland. Next
morning he said, up it to 45 per crew member. This was on the
21st of June. By the 10th of July, we had 45 rems of radiation
per crewman, and we still had two more shots left, and I
approached him again and said, we are vastly exceeding what we
started out with. We were exceeding tertiary limits that they
gave us.

We finished up and had almost 50 rems of radiations per crew
member. They called them RADS, same thing. I had 50. Defense
Nuclear Agency that turned over the Veterans Department said that
I had 8 rems of radiation from both sets of tests.

This has got to be so erroneous it's a laughing matter, and they
keep saying they'll correct it, they're going to reevaluate it,
but nothing ever happens. Now, it doesn't matter to me. I mean,
I'm retired. I get paid in any event. I'm not looking for
compensation.

I am disabled because I have cancer in the bladder and prostate,
and they have both been removed. I have disability of $1700 a
month, tax free. I was getting $1,780, but it is beneficial to
have it tax free. We entered into the aircraft with dosimeters.

We carried personal dosimeters, and as we flew through the cloud
-- as we flew in the cloud, we circled in the cloud, we could see
our instruments going up, sometimes as high as 150 rems of
radiation. When we got on the ground, we looked at our
dosimeters, which has a long needle about the size of a tube of
lipstick, and it had a needle that went up, and it would be
pegged out, so we knew our radiation level was even higher than
the film badges were producing.

The film badges is a very, very erroneous judge of the amount of
gamma radiation you're getting. Of course, alpha radiation, we
didn't keep track of the contaminates. Gamma is the one that
penetrates and remains with you for thousands of years, et
cetera, et cetera.

The corrective action for my friends and fellow officers and
enlisted men for the government is to go back and redo the law,
presumptive law. I think it's hard for anyone to be ordered to be
on a set of missions like this, and who has certified radiation
and gets cancer. There should be no more question about it, that
it caused the cancer.

The VA, for eight years, told me, yes, you have cancer, and you
have radiation, you have the whole thing, but prove to us that
the cancer caused -- the radiation caused the cancer, and I
suggested, why don't you prove to me that it didn't? He said,
you're the one who is asking me for something.

DR. TUCKSON: Thank you. The reason I want to make sure is, people
have questions.

DR. MACKLIN: I'm particularly interested in the discrepancy in
the records, that is, the Defense Nuclear Agency claiming that
the doses were much lower than your experience and your own
records show. Now, I know so little about how records are kept or
how they might be kept or who keeps them or who enters numbers.

What are the possible hypotheses, and what is your best guess
about whether the records were altered, whether the correct
numbers were never put in the first place, whether the records
that you and your colleagues have were not even looked at, but
instead, someone just made up the doses to fall within the
acceptable limits?

Do you have any information about that? At some point or other,
the discrepancy that you point out means that someone either
altered records, didn't look at information that should have been
looked at. So, how are we to understand this discrepancy?

MR. HARRISON: I'm going to state that there is a great deal of
carelessness in keeping these records, first off. The film badges
were badly handled, thrown into boxes later on with radiation in
them from the sand, and they were contaminated.

However, they come back and say, they should have been higher in
that case. These badges are sent -- I don't know what company. I
don't remember now who had a contract with the Air Force and
military to reevaluate these badges -- and sent their final
calculations in.

Somewhere between badges being turned over to them and the
information disseminated to the Defense Nuclear Agency, this vast
area occurred, and I repeat again, film badges are an awful bad
system of judging radiation.

DR. MACKLIN: There are really two aspects, two sorts of
discrepancies that you're telling us about. One is the
discrepancy in the records from what the film badges themselves
would have shown, and what eventually was put out by the Defense
Nuclear Agency; that is, whether or not the film badges are
accurate or not, there has been a discrepancy.

The second thing you're telling us is, what I take your example
-- I mean, that is that the film badges are unreliable, and as
your evidence, among other things, you could probably say that
your evidence for that, where you saw those needles when you were
engaged in the cloud fly-through in comparison with what the film
badges eventually showed. Is my question clear?

MR. HARRISON: I understand your question. As pilots, we had the
(inaudible) in the aircraft so we could breathe when you're in
the hottest part of the cloud. We were charged with sampling the
cloud at the hottest point as we circled through, and then our
dosimeter was worn on our person.

So, we turned the film badge in, and we took the records off the
dosimeters to get the crews amount of radiation posted on our
operation board and keep track.

DR. MACKLIN: You answered the question. I'm just wondering if
there ever could be any way to go back and look at records if
they still exist.

MR. HARRISON: I know what I wanted to say that was very
important. We evaluated these film badges, and if you have them
-- I'm sure you have the report, what they say about the film
badges, and they wanted to go eight times what the film badges
said, in some instances, to arrive at a logical amount.

I feel if we did multiply it by eight, it would be fairly
accurate.

DR. THOMAS: Operation Red Wing, which addresses this discrepancy
between -- one discrepancy, specifically speaking, the
discrepancy between the film badges and this report, which is
(inaudible).

MR. HARRISON: I'm sorry?

DR. THOMAS: There is a report which we have reviewed on Operation
Red Wing, which talks about the discrepancy between the P meter
(sic) and the film badges.

MR. HARRISON: The P meter (sic) is out on the tanks, normally
where it would be very hot, and there is a discrepancy between
the P meter (sic). In fact, I think in this regard, P meter (sic)
is used completely.

DR. THOMAS: That seemed to be the conclusion of this report. Is
that what you were talking about, which you said you thought the
(inaudible) than the film badge?

MR. HARRISON: No. The (inaudible) in the aircraft is a large
Geiger counter, if I might say. It runs up and drops off as it
goes through the clouds. Let me just briefly describe where we
got so much radiation. I think it's a criminal act to cause this
much radiation.

I don't have time to go through the history. If we went through
the cloud and got the particulate samples, the tank samples, all
the cheese cloth samples, this would serve well, Los Alamos and
Livermore, for information they're seeking.

What they're seeking is a weapon (inaudible). We circled in this
cloud until you get this tank, pressure tank, up to 75 percent.
Here we are and the damn cloud emanating 100 rems of radiation,
circling in this cloud, for no other reason than to pump up these
damn tanks, and sometimes the pump worked very slow, and after a
while, I said, hell with it, I'm getting out of here.

I don't care what they want. I'm not going to sit there and float
around in that thing another half-hour. But this requirement
alone caused problems, greatly.

DR. TUCKSON: Thank you very much. I wanted to ask you my favorite
question, again, which is, as a leader, commander, in terms of
the occupational issues here -- but maybe I can catch you another
time on that one. Thanks a lot.

MR. HARRISON: I wish you asked me the same question you did the
second man.

DR. TUCKSON: What was that?

MR. HARRISON: I agreed with him. I can elaborate a little bit
more. I have an address I gave to a group concerning all that,
which I will turn over to you, and you can read it. It's the same
thing.

DR. TUCKSON: I would appreciate that. Also, again, if you want,
we're more than open for you to send us the paragraph that helps
us to understand your position on that, because I really would
like to know. Thank you a lot.

Mr. Ray Koonuk. How do you want to use your time, all together?
What's your name, ma'am?

MS. CANNON: Carolyn Cannon.

DR. TUCKSON: And a third person is with you?

MR. SCHAEFER: Jack Schaefer, President of the Native Release Fund
(inaudible).

MR. KOONUK: My name is Ray Koonuk. I am a native of Point Hope,
Alaska. I am also a captain and subsistence hunter. I would like
to thank the task force for inviting us to testify on behalf of
our Inupiat people.

Back in 1950s, the Atomic Energy Commission tried to blast the
harbor with nuclear bombs, in which would be about 10 to 20 times
bigger than the Hiroshima blast. This program is called
Plowshare, which was directed by Edward Teller.

Mr. Teller did not succeed in detonating the atomic bombs. The
Inupiat people stopped the detonation that would destroy our
land, animals, in which come from the sea and the land. With the
time I have, I would like to bring up a couple of things,
although there is a lot to discuss in regards to the Atomic
Energy Commission.

Back in 1950s, the AEC, Atomic Energy Commission, had done some
experiments with some tracer material that was brought from
Nevada, and the Atomic Energy Commission took the contaminated
soil and dumped this experiment and how it would affect the
environment, the animals, on the Inupiat people.

Before this had happened, we had talked with the State Health
Department, the (inaudible) Health Department and various other
organizations in regards to the higher rate of cancer,
miscarriages, birth defects, and other health-related problems,
in which could not be answered.

The only answer that was given to us was a change of diet and
smoking cigarettes, but we did not believe them, and we continued
to try and find out what was really causing the problems we are
still facing today.

That's when we found out that the Atomic Energy Commission had
dumped 50 pounds of tracer material, which they decided to do
experiments on the food chain and the Inupiat people. We hunt our
food.

We hunt and feed our families, in which we still do, as our
traditional hunting way of life. What I'm trying to get at is,
that the Public Health Service knew about this project and had
denied -- I repeat, had denied to the Inupiat people that they
had any involvement in any of the experiments, and also denied
having any documents.

Well, they lied, and we have documents of the involvement of the
Public Health Service, and I will give you the copies of what I
have here. So, in closing, I would like to thank you, once again,
task force, for the invitation to testify on behalf of our
Inupiat people from Point Hope.

The time I have left, I would like to give the rest of the time
to Mr. Schaefer, because he has a lot to discuss, and I would
like to give him some of my time.

MS. CANNON: Good afternoon, Mr. Chairperson, members of the
committee. First of all, my name is Caroline Cannon, project area
coordinator for Point Hope in the state of Alaska. I would like
to thank the committee today for giving me the opportunity to
speak on behalf of the Inupiat people. I come before you today in
high hopes that my testimony will be recognized and effective,
and that a stronger message will be brought forth to this
critical committee on human radiation experiment done on my
people during the 1950s and 1960s, as well as radioisotopes that
occurred in our area, dependant on subsistence purposes.

In the Arctic, for generations, we Inupiat people, with all
respect, welcomed visitors to our community, and to this matter,
we were taken advantage of, our warm welcome. Military research
exposed the Inupiat people from the Arctic region to radioactive
isotopes. They experimented.

They decided to measure the ability of U. S. Soldiers from the
lower 48 states to survive in the Arctic climate. You must keep
in mind, there was a language barrier, limited information, and
doing little to overcome known language barrier.

A communication gap was a big problem when the United States
Atomic Energy Commission performed experiments by the
distribution of radioisotopes in the Arctic soil and water.

The experiment occurred in Cape Thompson, Alaska at the project
site, which is 34 miles from our village in Point Hope. Today, we
total approximately 700 people, and the majority of our Inupiat
people still rely on our subsistence hunting in the same Cape
Thompson area, which was untouched before the United States
Atomic Energy Commission disrespectfully invaded that land.

The area did and still does provide much for our needs. The water
that we drink and give our children our future, caribou meat,
berries, (inaudible) seals, and walrus, which has been used by
our forefathers for generations by the Inupiat people of Point
Hope. Inupiat, a people who were able to survive the harsh kind
of preliminary subsistence.

In reality, our village, consisting of 700 people, we have 54
recorded cases of cancer. I find -- we find this high compared to
the United States statistics. The Federal government has tried to
convince the community this was all due to our lifestyle.

In 1988, we had eight individuals that died of cancer, and
diagnosed our respected leaders, friends, and family members, a
loss so severe to cause chaos to our community, where the pain
and grief are suffered by the entire network of people felt for
many years, mentally and physically, and still are here today.

I lost both of my grandparents to cancer. My grandparents had 11
children. I wrote 10, but there is 11 children, and 4 out of the
10 -- of the 11 siblings died of cancer. My mother, last year,
was diagnosed with cancer.

I had to take her to Seattle, Washington, for medical attention.
My grandparents used Cape Thompson area as a subsistence area,
along with their children, as did many other hunters for our
community of Point Hope.

There have been many testimonies regarding miscarriages and
sterilization for both men and women. It has also been stated
that children were born deformed, and without explanation, in
early years, that children were shipped away, taken from their
parents.

Several years ago, I had my first cousin, who traced his family
tree back to Point Hope, and came back to visit his family. He
had been born with a disability. He was one of those children who
had been shipped out and was adopted by another family. He was
one of many.

There has also been testimonies about some hunters noticing some
differences or deformations on the animals, some being sickly and
inedible. In 1988, an entire whale that was landed by the
successful whale hunter (inaudible) was so terribly ill that it
couldn't be eaten.

Through tests, there was a diagnosis of diseases that could have
made people sick if they ate that whale. As far as history goes,
whalers and elders can't recall or find any recorded information
about a whale being that sick.

The spring and summer of 1956, and continued in 1957, the United
States Army Air Medical Laboratory conducted a series of medical
experiments on approximately 102 Eskimos and Indians from the
Point Hope area and outlying areas.

That experiment was designed to study whether the Alaska natives
had physiology differences that enabled them to withstand cold
temperatures better than other people. One experiment involved
the administration of Radioisotope (inaudible) in pill form to
test.

Point Hope area had six males that were in the experiment, and to
this day, the names of these people have never been revealed, and
this makes us sick that we haven't been provided with all of the
information related to these tests.

In conclusion, I would like to ask yourselves some serious
questions. See if you can put yourself in my shoes. I am in the
position of understanding what an invasion of a personal freedom
of choice was inflicted on my ancestors, who did not realize the
truth of what the United States Government was capable of doing.

I have lived in Point Hope all my life and eaten the food from
the sea and the land and drank the water of Cape Thompson, along
with others. I have to wonder about my health, what impact the
poison on the earth will have all through my lifetime,
emotionally, physically, and most of all for my children and my
grandchildren.

My people want to be assured there is some kind of justice for
these betrayals they suffered, some responsibility taken by
someone. The Inupiat people are still waiting for answers
(inaudible). Thank you very much for your time.

DR. TUCKSON: Thank you very much. Mr. Schaefer.

MR. SCHAEFER: Thank you. I do not know how to operate this
microphone, so I don't know if I'm too close or too far.

DR. TUCKSON: You're perfect right now.

MR. SCHAEFER: It's very difficult for me to go ahead and indicate
what all has taken place to us. I do know that some of the
material that was given to your committee -- I don't know whether
or not you have read that material, but it was considerable in
reference to the Public Health Services.

In there is a very interesting scenario in dealing with the
Public Health Service in reference to the -- (inaudible) they
said they were not doing their analysis, and also the
surveillance of renewable resources, such as caribou,
specifically.

In 1964, they went ahead and did a radiological survey of the
caribou and also the radium. When they realized there was a
considerable amount of accumulation of radiation, they decided we
better do something about it and involve our Congress in dealing
with this.

When they did that, they analyzed every single herd of caribou
endangered throughout the state of Alaska. When they were done,
they found none that were edible, in reference to their own
viewpoints in dealing with safety standards.

So, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Indian Health Service, the
Fish and Wildlife Service, and also a couple of other Federal
agencies got together in November of 1964. They sat down. They
looked at each other. They saw the results, and they
contemplated, and they were trying to decide, what are we going
to do? We couldn't find any supplemental food for these people.
These caribou are too contaminated. How are we going to deal with
this?

(Inaudible) for which they can survive on. It's going to create
Federal dependency. Therefore, we are making a decision to
collect additional data, and that's all we're going to do, and so
they did it, and so the initial data is right here.

This is done by Dr. Wayne Hansen and a few of his other
colleagues in reference to the testing of caribou over the years
from 1956 through 1986. He also did an analysis of all of our
people, every single Inupiat in the Arctic slope, and his results
were considerably interesting.

His results do conflict with the Public Health Service records of
correspondents. That is why I do not have a written statement for
you, because I'm still analyzing the differences between them.
The publications that were done by Wayne Hansen were along the
lines of dealing with one interior group of Eskimos, the Inupiat
people.

They had indicated they had the highest rate of accumulation of
radiation. One correspondent dealing with Public Health Service
had indicated that there were a couple of closer villages that
had a higher intake, and that was very interesting to them. There
was only one document that said that. That, in itself, does
indicate a conflict (inaudible). There is a major concern about
the Inupiat people. The Inupiat people are now aware of it, not
only in the Arctic slope, but in the area (inaudible) around the
Fairbanks area in the interior of Alaska, also have recently
received this information from myself, for which I had obtained
from you, and so they are now analyzing it. They are beginning to
realize it.

I spoke to the people in that area last summer, and the response
that I got from them was a blank stare in the air, and then I
asked one of my cousins what was going on. I couldn't understand
why he was acting that way. He responded (inaudible). It didn't
really need to happen, but it did.

As far as Cape Thompson, there was a telegram here that indicates
that there was a desire, or actually, there was a shipment of
foreign devices, 20 boxes (inaudible) and one of radioactive
materials.

There was also a reference to the stockpiling of retired nuclear,
nonnuclear weapons for Cape Thompson, specifically. The
Department of the Navy had indicated that it wanted to retain
that area for long-term biological studies equal to that of
Hanford and Savannah River (inaudible) reservations.

So, that gives you an idea of (inaudible). 12 square miles
(inaudible) that Department of Energy had indicated that that was
all natural. They also indicated in our last meeting with them
recently that the amount of Plutonium 210 and Lead 210 in
caribou, and also in ourselves, were naturally occurring.

Later on -- I recently received a document that had indicated
interpretation of a 1984 cancer study. That interpretation was
reviewed and indicated by a woman by the name of Rosalie Bertell
(sic) of Canada.

She had indicated that the amount of Lead 210 and Plutonium 210
was 200 times higher than the average United States citizen in
your urine. She also indicated computations in reference to the
differences between the studies that were done in the past and
1984 and relating that to the BEIR III and BEIR V reports. So,
she gave those indications. So, it gives you a little bit of
understanding in reference to Caroline's statement in reference
to how much cancer we do have.

The differences between the soil samples that were taken and the
vegetation samples that were taken prior, by the Federal
government and also by ourselves, there was considerable
discrepancy between both, and their values were considerably
lower than our values, which was somewhat alarming.

It's very difficult for us to provide that information to you,
because they provided it to us in a light form, which was barely
readable. So, there was a wide range of discrepancy, and so
you'll be provided with an indication from the North Slope in
reference to their instances dealing with cancer, and also
Rosalie Bertell's (sic) interpretation of that cancer study.

(Inaudible) So, in 1971, EPA was contracted to do a citing
reference to the amount of radiation in the people around
Amchitka area. When they went ahead and did that, their results
were the people of Inupiat had higher amounts of radiation than
the people in the Nevada test site.

However, they had lower amounts of radiation than the people of
the (inaudible) of the North Slope. In 1982, there was a couple
of our leaders who were the governing body of the Inupiat
community of the Arctic slope. They indicated and came up with a
formula dealing with the interpretation of cancer and how to
derive from, and so the person who had done this, which was by
the name of William (inaudible).

He had provided a written document on that, and he had indicated
his concern. Soon thereafter, in 1982, after he had done that,
BIA stepped in. They went ahead and misspent their funds, turned
around and said, hey, you misspent their funds. You better
document that for us.

Just last month, the Inupiat was reading the article, so it was
able to contact, just recently, all those years, because of the
concerns dealing with cancer and all of those years (inaudible)
from 1982 to present.

DR. TUCKSON: We're going to have to close up.

MR. SCHAEFER: I have one more thing. Are you familiar with the
harp? It is an instrument that is used, which was perfected as a
result of the United States and the Russian government getting
together and determining and using radioactivity through the
nuclear bomb testing.

It was a partnership type of deal that lasted from 1958 through
present. In 1958 through 1962, they had filled the whole
atmosphere with radiation. They called that the Van Allen Belt.
It just so happens we were victims of circumstances, so the beta
radiation had gone through the magnetic lines through the earth.

You know how Mother Earth cleans herself. So, we were victims of
that (inaudible) accumulation. In 1987, (inaudible) received a
patent for this device. It is a device that alters the earth's
atmosphere and creates weather changes.

So, that will be provided to you, and in there will indicate the
partnership that the Soviet Union and United States had in
reference to its nuclear research in dealing with electromagnetic
radiation.

DR. TUCKSON: Thank you, all three. We're completely out of time
here, but what I think is important is that we really are going
to be very interested in getting these records, so we can
understand this matter.

We are going to be very interested in getting the records that
you have, and I would urge you -- we're going to take a short
break. I would urge to please see our staff and make sure that
they know how to reach you.

MR. SCHAEFER: Let me mention one book.

DR. TUCKSON: Go ahead. Please mention the book.

MR. SCHAEFER: This is done by Tomlin (sic) and Kaufman (sic),
Population Control Through Nuclear Pollution. It was written in
1970.

MR. KOONUK: I have one request I would like to make in regards to
inviting the task force to come down to Alaska and listen to the
people of Alaska and their concerns of experimentation that has
been going on in Alaska.

There are various other nuclear sites, reactors, and also
concerns about the Russians that had dumped a lot of nuclear
wastes, and we're talking about in one area, a million curies
that have been dumped in the Arctic Ocean, where our animals
migrate up north and migrate south.

I would like to make a request for the task force to come down
and listen to the people of Alaska.

DR. TUCKSON: We really have to stop. If you could make sure you
can sit with our folks, then we can get that from you. Thank you
for your invitation to come to Alaska and to do that.

(A recess was taken.)

DR. TUCKSON: To all of the audience that's still here, thank you.
I want to say to those who will going to be coming before us,
that we really do have enough energy to do this, and we have
enough time to be able to give you appropriate time.

We're going to be sticking pretty rigidly to the red light, but
we don't have to race through this like race horses, either.
We'll be able to give you the appropriate attention that you
deserve. We thank you for staying so late. We're happy to welcome
Dr. Chellis Glendinning.

DR. GLENDINNING: Thank you. I am the tail end of the Laguna/Acoma
delegation to the World Uranium Hearing. I was in San Francisco
this morning when they were on, so I flew in and came right here.
I am a psychologist, and my area of expertise is the psychology
of disaster and impending disaster, and I've written a number of
books, three books, two of them are relevant.

One of them I am going to give you, which is called When
Technology Wounds. The Human Consequences Of Progress, and it's
based on a study of people who become sick from their exposure to
dangerous technologies. It's not limited to radiation, but it
includes people who have been contaminated by radiation.
(Inaudible).

The first thing I wanted to say is that I really feel for what
you are experiencing by being on this committee, because I was on
the board of listeners at the World Uranium Hearing in 1992 in
Salzburg, Austria, and it was a meeting of people from all over
the world who were gathering to express, and have witnessed their
experiences of nuclear development and the impact on their
cultures and their psychology and their health, and I know that
the job requires a tremendous amount of compassion and
mindfulness, and I want to tell you one aspect of it that was
very important to me, which was that we were given the mission on
the board of listeners of responding with equal amount of energy
to what it was that we heard, and that changed my life, and I
know it will take my entire life to respond to what I sat and
listened to for one week there, and as a result of that, I'm
working with the Laguna/Acoma delegation and have worked with the
people from the Navajo nation, and I sincerely hope that this
mission is taken on by this committee, and I know that it will be
an immense -- it's an immense task that you face.

One way that the psychological community conceptualizes the
experience of radiation contamination is by using the concept of
posttraumatic stress disorder, and in the diagnostic and
statistical manual, which is the manual that psychiatrists and
psychologists turn to, trauma is defined as any event that's
outside the range of usual human experience and would be markedly
distressing to almost anyone.

So, when we think of trauma, actually that definition which is
meant to describe something very extreme, it seems tame compared
to what we have heard. It certainly seems tame to me, knowing
what goes on at Jack Pile Mine (inaudible) and now goes on in the
community at Laguna/Acoma and surrounding Spanish communities.

We usually think of trauma as a very sudden experience and a very
traumatic experience, as what was experienced by, for instance,
the American (inaudible) or the atomic veterans who had to
witness tests, but trauma can also be slow and insidious, and the
sociologist Kyle Erickson has described it this way:

"A chronic disaster is one that gathers force slowly and
insidiously, creeping around one's defenses rather than smashing
through them." And so in my brief time today, what I want to do
is lay out the concept of the Jack Pile Mine as a chronic
disaster, which is causing the chronic problems to the community
and to the individuals.

Posttraumatic stress disorder is characterized by a shattering of
the psyche, or in a community experience, a shattering of the
community, a fragmentation of the experience, and then a
consequent repression or denial of the pain that that shattering
causes.

So what does it look like? I'm just going to name a few things.
There is more in the book. There is a fragmentation of the
future. There is an experience that you don't know when you're
going to get sick, or if you are sick, you don't know when the
next shoe is going to drop.

You don't know if you get pregnant if there are going to be birth
defects. You don't know if this is going to be a miscarriage. You
don't know if you're going to die, you don't know how, and you
don't know when, but you have this kind of impending disaster,
and there is a fragmentation of the future of the community.

For instance, the General Accounting Office has done a study of
the water table of the Grant's mineral belt and found it to be
very high in radium and in heavy metals, and so all the wells at
Laguna and Acoma and the surrounding Spanish communities go into
that, and they know.

When I go to visit, I know the tea I'm drinking is contaminated,
that some of the buildings are built with radioactive tailings.
The roads are paved -- that we know which roads are paved with
radioactive tailings.

We know that the animals and plants surround them, and when
people go hunting and when they go gathering, and when they
plant, these are also being affected. There is this shattering of
belief in institutions that takes place, a sense of betrayal, and
I know you've seen that again and again -- and anger, a sense of
cynicism that rises up, and in Native communities, in particular,
this breakage of the continuity of the community that is so
important, that has in many ways not yet been affected by the
alienation of mass society.

It happens between those who know what happened and are
expressing it, and those who don't know what happened or don't
want to know what happened. So, there is a split in an already
split community, that is already split by colonization.

So, this kind of -- another kind of breakage in the community is
hard on tribal peoples who are already suffering. There is
ongoing grief, and I know you've seen that again and again. The
ongoing losses, the loss of, for some people, the ability to have
a family, the loss of health, the loss of the ability to work,
the loss of the ability to participate in tribal ceremonies and
customs because of health loss, and for the community, the loss
of cohesion of the community, and if you ever go out to the Jack
Pile Mine, it will break your heart. It is a seven-mile by
four-mile gash in the earth.

It is enormous, and it will just make you want to cry just to
look at it. So, the results of all of this is either an
incredible sense of helplessness and hopelessness, or it's a
heroic arising into some kind of struggle for dignity and
justice, some kind of desire and means to move towards some kind
of healing, and so my hope, as a psychologist and as a member of
Laguna/Acoma delegation, is that you will take bold actions, and
it boggles my mind to think of what those bold actions might be
to help the survivor communities, and in this case, it's Acoma,
Laguna, and the surrounding Spanish communities of the Jack Pile
Mine.

And of course, the first step is to listen, and to me, having
been involved in the struggle for some time, it's absolutely
unprecedented that you are here listening, and that you are
listening with this amount of quality, but, of course, the
listening is only the first step, and the experience with the
government has been so often that even if there is listening,
that there is going to be no action, and so I look forward and
wish that we would have more time to brainstorm, perhaps, but we
don't, but I look forward to an equal response from the
President's Advisory Committee to what you have heard.

DR. TUCKSON: Thank you very much. We are in the time, but let me
just say that I'm glad you gave us a copy of the book. I would
also think that we would greatly appreciate having a copy of that
analysis that you gave, in terms of, here are some of the primary
consequences.

I think that's useful, and I think because -- again, I don't know
if you were here when we talked earlier, that our next full
committee meeting is dealing with the social remedy and trying to
understand those issues, and I think that having such a precise
diagnosis certainly starts to lead us into some kind of -- to be
frank, you've advanced my thinking a great deal in terms of how
wide we must start to range, that sometimes when people think of
remedies, they have to do with money.

It isn't always about money. This is about some other things.
These are very broad, but they are clearly diagnostically
specific. So, the implications of that, I think, are important.
You must be a busy person, but I would urge you to, if you could
focus in on that part of it and give us your best thinking in
writing, I guarantee that we'll use it. There are folks here.

DR. GLENDINNING: I know that the delegation is planning to put
together a packet. Should I include it with that?

DR. TUCKSON: Perhaps that is the answer, but I've heard enough to
know that it's better to make a personal relationship with one of
these people. Then they know what to do. Thank you very much.

DR. GLENDINNING: Do I have a moment to tell you one of the
exciting things we're doing?

DR. TUCKSON: Please.

DR. GLENDINNING: In addressing this issue of healing in a tribal
community, in some ways it's easier, because it's a limited group
with some cohesion, and one of the things we're doing right now
that is both going to answer the need for people to be listened
to, the miner particularly, and also the fact that in some ways
the culture was very truncated when the mine came -- this
morning, Dr. Pino may have spoken about it, how the loss of
tradition goes hand in hand with the coming of the cash economy,
which came in with the mine, and so in many ways the culture was
truncated at that time, so we are doing training to train the
miners in traditional story telling, and then we're going to do a
presentation, and I've shown you our flyer (inaudible) for the
tribal people.

It's open to the public, but it is for the tribe, and it's
purpose is healing within the tribe. It will have the purpose of
both the miners being heard and being able to tell their story,
the people listening, and also to do it in the traditional way.

DR. TUCKSON: I think that if you could, you might want to include
in our material that goes to the committee for the full
committee, this piece of paper. It won't make sense without a
little narrative. The point is that, what it does -- again, I
don't want to say -- just to open up our thinking about the range
of things that might be recommended. It just forces us to think
in a way we might not have thought before, so that might be
something.

DR. GLENDINNING: Thank you very much.

DR. TUCKSON: Mr. John Sheahan.

MR. SHEAHAN: If I may, just a short preface. I enlisted in the
United States Army Air Corps nine months prior to Pearl Harbor. I
enlisted in World War II, in Vietnam, no scratches, very pleased
with my service career, and I have one small, if you will,
request of the committee.

I thank the advisory commission members, in particular Kristin
Crotty, for providing the opportunity to present a problem that
has existed, in my case, for some 44 years. I and countless
thousands like me were not subject to human radiation
experiments, per se.

We were exposed to ionizing radiation while performing our
routine and some not routine duties as members of the armed
services, while in the discharge of our assigned tasks. I can
only relate my experiences that resulted in exposure to
radiation.

I know the facts, because I was there. It is said that ignorance
is bliss. Upon my arrival at Enewietok in November of 1950, my
ignorance and bliss soon vanished. I was assigned to the chief of
aircraft maintenance, a colonel, as his (inaudible) in providing
necessary suggestions for solutions.

My duties were quite varied, and as I was one of 10 senior
noncommissioned officers in the Air Force (inaudible), our
principal mission, usually 18-hour days, was to prepare the Air
Force facility for occupation and to ensure the equipment tools,
et cetera, were in place to the main body.

My Air Force specialties were flight engineering and air craft
engine mechanics. My principal duties were in the areas of
quality control inspection for aircraft maintenance and for
runway crash removal team.

I participated in four nuclear device detonations, the 8th and
21st of April 1951, the 9th and 25th of May 1951. After the
shots, my task duties took me into the (inaudible) attach D
contamination wash area on several occasions.

Film badges were only issued to slightly over 30 percent of the
Air Force personnel. I was not one. A fact sheet published by the
Defense Nuclear Agency lists fallout from only one of the last
four shots. (Inaudible) personnel remaining Enewietok two weeks
after the shot received over 2.8 rem.

My fallout shelters for seven months was a standard eight-man
tent. I departed Enewietok several weeks after the last shot when
the hotel was used for VIP visiting the test area. Prior to being
allowed to the dock in Honolulu, the ship received a
decontamination wash down.

In February of 1984, the Air Force mailed to me, by my request, a
report by Science Advocation, Incorporated, a DNA contractor,
who, and I quote, has scientifically reconstructed radiation
doses from personnel at Enewietok on a day-to-day basis.

Based on an SAI memorandum, dated February of 1982, calculated
radiation doses of personnel on the residency island of Enewietok
during Operation Greenhouse, a calculated radiation dose of 4.23
rem has been assigned.

Over 31 years later, they come up with this. How did they do
that? Advancing the clock to February of 1953, I received the
recognition as an aircraft maintenance officer. In April of 1954,
I received orders to attend atomic energy school.

In June 1955, I graduated as an atomic weapons officer. I
remained in the weapons program until October 1964, serving in
various locations in and outside the US. I worked on a continuing
basis with active material, in most cases, daily, except for
short furloughs.

I became familiar with Uranium 235, Plutonium 239, and tritium,
and in addition, alpha, beta, and gamma particle emissions --
nine years, four months, ten days in the weapons field, four
above ground shots, and I ask why my exposure records do not
exist, or so I have been led to believe.

I am not unique in my individuality, and there are, as I
mentioned a few minutes ago, literally thousands of individuals
who have no idea of the amounts of radiation they have been
exposed to. I wore a DT60, a radiation recording device,
religiously, and turned it in every month to read while I was in
the weapons program.

The Air Force denies knowledge of any exposure records. Again, I
ask, why? Thank you.

DR. TUCKSON: Thank you. One brief question, one we've kind of
asked a couple of times. The notion of this being occupational
versus experimental.

MR. SHEAHAN: I enjoyed every minute of it. I would do it again
tomorrow, but I'm too old to get back.

DR. TUCKSON: That's important to hear. Your main upsetness is
what?

MR. SHEAHAN: It's not an obsession, sir.

DR. TUCKSON: No, you're upsetness.

MR. SHEAHAN: Upset, okay.

DR. TUCKSON: Not obsession, no.

MR. SHEAHAN: I would presume that the Air Force, the DOE, et
cetera, et cetera, et cetera, would have kept decent records. I
went to work in 1980 at the Nevada test site, and one of the
requirements was that if I had a radiation history, provide it. I
provided it to our safety officer, who, in turn, wired the Air
Force, answered me back, no radiation history.

When I was on Enewietok, I was not privileged, for whatever
reason, to readings from the film badge. My duties carried me
into a very highly contaminated area.

DR. TUCKSON: You were progressively promoted into a discipline of
radiation worker?

MR. SHEAHAN: The appointment to the atomic energy school, sir,
was not my choice; however, Uncle Sam says go and do. I go and do
the best I can, and I enjoyed it -- as I said before, I enjoyed a
25-year career.

DR. TUCKSON: In that regard, somebody that was graduated up into
this and had schooling and experience, you were part of that
culture of people there.

MR. SHEAHAN: Absolutely.

DR. TUCKSON: What was the relationship between you and the
medical units that you have been associated with? Given that
you're in this world protecting them, my impression would be,
then, that somehow or another you have -- that the physicians and
the health professionals there absolutely knew about you, and
they were monitoring you, and every time you went for your annual
physicals, they would document where you were working and what
you were doing and any changes -- that they were really there to
take care of you.

MR. SHEAHAN: All my physicals were flying physicals, sir. I took
one once a year, and at no time did anybody question any
radiation history. I have an awful lot of friends that were in
the medical groups.

DR. TUCKSON: The medical group that was there for you in this
area, were they people that had any special expertise or interest
in the area of radiation?

MR. SHEAHAN: Not special interests, no.

DR. TUCKSON: The physicals that you got, that you received, were
they different from the physicals that maybe others would have
received?

MR. SHEAHAN: No. They were identical to the ones that I started
to take when I first started flying in 1942, and as I said, I
didn't get into the weapons program until 1954.

DR. TUCKSON: Thank you so much. Really appreciate it. Mr. Damacio
Lopez.

MR. LOPEZ: Yes, sir. I'm here today to talk about my personal
experience. I live in little town just about 150 miles from here
called Socorro, New Mexico. In Socorro, depleted uranium, a test
fire, right next to my house by U.S. Eagle Institute of Mining
and Technology.

They have defense contractors come there and batch test depleting
uranium projectiles to see if they're working, and then companies
turn around and send them to other countries, Europe, to sell
them there or to the U.S. Army.

I no longer live in Socorro, because I found out that those
clouds of smoke that those projectiles make when they hit hard
targets are filled with radiation. That radiation is uranium, and
it's enriched Uranium 238. That is what depleted uranium is.

These explosions were quite a concern to me when I first got back
to my home town in 1985, and I used to live there before, but I
was gone for a while, and so I started looking into it and tried
to find out what was in those clouds of smoke.

The people told us that it was conventional munitions, and when I
found it was radiation in those clouds that hovered over my
house, I decided that maybe I should try and find out what they
were, since the president of New Mexico Tech and government
agencies would say they were just simply smoke, and these were
conventional munitions.

Since then -- that was 10 years ago. Since then, I've done a lot
of research that actually changed my life. I have been a coauthor
of a book called Uranium Battlefields at Home and Abroad. The use
of Depleted Uranium by the U.S. Department of Defense, which is
this report here. You already have a copy of it.

Another one that is a more recent one is called Friendly Fire.
The association between depleted Uranium emissions and Human
Health Risks. I'm not here today to talk about these reports. I'm
here to talk about my personal experience. I have trouble
breathing. I have a lot of breathing problems.

My father died last year from a GI tract illness associated with
cancer, several different kinds of cancers, and I'm very
concerned about the studies that, according to the Army and the
Department of Energy and the Department of Defense and everybody
else in the government that deals with depleting uranium, they
say there are no health studies of the people that have been
exposed to depleted uranium.

Depleted uranium is something that's been used in Socorro since
1972, since the inception of this particular kind of weapon. They
use it for bullets and armor. It's the same stuff they used in
the Persian Gulf War.

So, my question here is and the reason I'm here today is, I would
like to know if people like myself, and communities around these
testing sites where smoke goes over people's communities -- we're
right next to it. My property borders this facility, and I'm
wondering, and I have been for a long time, if maybe we're not
just guinea pigs out there, and the government is testing and
seeing what it does to us.

I've asked them many times if there is any health surveys, not
only just in Socorro, but other places across the country. There
is ammunition ranges, bombing ranges throughout the United States
that are being used for this purpose. NATO countries are now
doing the same thing.

After the Persian Gulf War, depleted uranium projectiles became
very popular. Now there is a proliferation of these weapons
throughout the world by the United States, United States
contractors and the government itself.

I'm here today to ask you if there is such studies that are being
done on people. I would certainly like to know, and if it's being
done in Socorro, I would like to know, and I would also like to
know if it's possible that we can be tested.

I understand there is machines called in vitro monitoring systems
that will check people's bodies out to see if they have any U238
in their bodies. I request that that be done for me and other
people in Socorro. That's basically what I have to say today.

DR. TUCKSON: Let me ask you one quick one. Let me turn the
question around to you for a minute. What if you found that there
was no testing on you at all, that this was in no way
experimental to you, but what it was, was simply some contractors
blowing up stuff and putting things in the air, would you react
any differently?

Is there any difference to you between whether you were just
living near a business enterprise that was putting stuff in air,
versus people putting stuff in the area and testing you as part
of an experiment -- any difference?

MR. LOPEZ: Absolutely.

DR. TUCKSON: What would that be?

MR. LOPEZ: Deceit, deceit by our government of me and the people
around me in Socorro. I've asked many times if the studies have
been done on people that have been exposed to depleted uranium.
They say none were. I find that very difficult to believe.

I think that is an outright lie, and I feel insulted by that. I'm
a former veteran. I used to be in the United States Air Force,
and I was really disappointed when I would ask people who were in
charge of these things, and they would deny these things, and
later on, I find out they were doing this testing, and now they
turn around and look at me and the people in Socorro and say,
well, don't worry about it. Uranium has never been known to cause
cancer in anybody. Everything is fine.

DR. MACKLIN: You asked a perfectly reasonable and important
question, and in order to get at the answer, I mean, whether --
you phrase it in terms of, are we being used as guinea pigs, or
are they experimenting on us?

We have to have some sense of, what is the mechanism for
gathering information; that is, in all the testimony that the
committee has heard from very many people throughout this country
and different parts of this country, either it's a doctor, a
Public Health Service person, a work site data gathering -- there
has to be some way, if it's going to be experiments or being used
a guinea pigs, that someone, whoever it is, is trying to find out
this information.

So, what, if anything, can you tell us that might help us get at
the answer to that question, that is -- I mean, research or
experiments have to have an accompaniment to gathering of data.
(Inaudible) they've got to find something out, what's it doing to
these people. So, what would be the mechanism or the means that
you can think of by which the information would be gathered?

MR. LOPEZ: The information that has already been used, or future
information?

DR. MACKLIN: Just information being gathered. In other words,
you're questioning, and you're asking the committee to help you
find out whether or not these clouds that are flying over
adjacent to where you and your neighbors and community live,
whether or not these are being released for the purpose of some
kind of experiment, and my question is, if it were some kind of
experiment, the people doing it, whether it's a government or the
company or whoever, has to have some way of collecting
information about the effects of this cloud on people.

So, do you have any information about people being asked
questions about surveys, about doctors at regular doctor visits,
about hospital information, anything that could indicate to us
that someone is trying to find out information about you and your
neighbors and the community who live in this region?

MR. LOPEZ: What I do know is that the employees that work at New
Mexico Tech from my community, which is mostly people of color,
mostly Hispanic people, they're hired to go there to New Mexico
Tech, and they are temporary employees. They are the people who
go out and pick up the scrap and put it into barrels and things
like this, but they were only temporary employees.

They don't have health benefits and so forth, but I do know that
they are carrying dosimeters, and it's my understanding that
urine analysis are performed on these individuals that work
there. Quite possibly, those records would indicate if anything
is happening to these workers there at New Mexico Tech.

As far as the community is concerned, I don't know -- maybe the
state can keep records on cancer rates that are taking place
there in Socorro, and if they're elevated, whoever would make
those kinds of surveys.

DR. TUCKSON: All right. If the people in your community are
experiencing folks coming and drawing blood and asking for
various samples of this or that, or observing them in certain
sorts of ways -- if not, it's hard for us to imagine.

We're not giving you an answer today. We can't possibly, but it's
hard to imagine how that could occur, but I think what's very
important is our conversation about those issues of
responsibility on the part of those who may put you or your
community in harm's way.

Whether or not you're being experimented on or not, there are
implications to all of those things, which certainly the
committee has to think about. Thank you very much for coming.

MR. LOPEZ: Okay. I did not provide you with a written statement.
I can provide you with one based on this testimony. I've recorded
it. And I also have a copy of Friendly Fire, second edition.

DR. TUCKSON: I would like to have that. Your regular job -- you
mentioned how you were employed.

MR. LOPEZ: I'm the Research Director for Revision New Mexico.
It's a public interest research institute here in New Mexico.

DR. TUCKSON: How were you educated?

MR. LOPEZ: Well, prior to this incident in 1985, when I came back
to New Mexico and found out what was happening, I was a
professional golfer for 18 years, and I left the golf business,
and since then, my research has taken me to the University.

I graduated cum laude from the University of New Mexico, using
Uranium Battlefields I as my thesis, and I've also gone to
graduate school, and my work has been centered around nuclear
issues, and particularly, depleted uranium, and I continue to do
that kind of research.

DR. TUCKSON: I was kind of hoping for an answer like that. It's
fascinating to me of how people, when they get empowered to take
control over their own lives, have fantastic outcomes as
individuals. Mr. Glen Stuckey.

MR. STUCKEY: Thanks for letting me come here. I really want to
try to get some help from the VA, not only for me, but for a lot
of the other veterans. I came here to Kirtland Air Force Base
back in March 1, 1946, and I can tell you -- you probably know
all the big shots.

Buster-Jangle was the big one we had, and before that, Crossroads
and all those. I will skip some of that and go right to the heart
of this thing. We need to get some VA action. We need to get more
doctors here at Kirtland. How do we that? I don't know.

I've talked to senators, Steve Schiff and all them, but it's
really hard. I was hoping maybe the panel can do it. After I got
discharged, I was doing pretty good until about 1962 -- or 1985,
when I was 62, I should say, and I was diagnosed with cancer
there, and went for an operation and everything, and since I have
been out from the operation in 1985, while I have been monitored
real closely and everything, chiefly by the Air Force personnel,
the doctors there, and they're very shorthanded.

I also have a hearing problem that I've tried to get taken care
of. Only the Air Force will help me with it. To get any help
there, I have to go someplace like San Antonio, Texas, to get
help, and then (inaudible) then you got to pay for it.
(Inaudible).

What I'm trying to do, gentlemen, is try to get this thing going,
and that we need help, and also from -- our doctors at the
hospital put in about 22 years in the military, Air Force, and
this is what I'm trying to do is just let you all know that we
need some help here.

A lot of people don't want to say anything. They don't want to
take the time or are bashful or something, and I hope I have made
some type of impression on the board.

DR. TUCKSON: Yes, because you did take the time. It sounds like
one of the things that you're suggesting that this committee
needs to do is, there are a number of people who are veterans who
can and should be hospitalized in the VA, and you're saying there
are not enough resources now to be able to take care of them.

MR. STUCKEY: That's true. We had one doctor and hundreds of us
needed him for cancer and different things of that nature.

DR. TUCKSON: Let me ask you specifically, then, what is the
general feeling that you and others in your community have if we
were to recommend that people who need treatment should get it at
the VA? Is there a confidence in the VA, and would that
recommendation be well received by you and others?

MR. STUCKEY: I think so. I think the general feeling, the
hearsay, that the VA don't want to do anything for us. We've done
all this now for the country. Now we've done all that by
ourselves. We just need a gathering of forces, I guess, to get
some things done. We need a little outside help -- I should maybe
say a lot of outside help.

DR. TUCKSON: Thank you very much. That was very helpful and very
specific.

MR. STUCKEY: Thank you all very much for letting me come up here.

DR. TUCKSON: Mr. Phil Harrison, Mr. John Fowler, Mr. George
Nelson, Mr. Bill Tsosie. Are any of them still here? Mr. Fowler's
statement will be read by his daughter Renda Fowler. Mr. Phil
Harrison; is that right?

MR. HARRISON: Good evening and yah-ta-hey, members of the
advisory committee, panel, audience, and friends who are all here
for a very special reason. We appreciate the opportunity to
express our concerns as victims and survivors of the Cold War and
our government.

My name is Phil Harrison, and I'm currently chairing the
organization called Radiation Victims Committee based in
Shiprock, New Mexico, which is about a five-hour drive from here
from Santa Fe. Our town is sometimes referred to as the valley of
death.

Our group has been the voice of many Navajo families who have
dealt with uranium mining during the 1940s through the 1970s. It
was during these years that companies mined uranium in the Four
Corners region. The Navajo miners were never warned of the
hazards involved in the uranium mines.

As of today, hundreds of miners have died from contracting lung
cancers and other debilitating respiratory illnesses. It is sad
to say that many more miners are losing their battle with various
kinds of cancers.

In the last 15 years, we have worked so hard for justice and to
ease the hardships, regardless of the many obstacles we face
today. As a result of our work and with Mr. Udall's assistance, a
piece of legislation was signed into law October of 1990 to
compensate uranium miners.

Through the law, compassionate payments were to be made, but
several years later, it is clear that the intent of the law is
not working, due to the very strict eligibility requirements. My
people comprehend this law as a slap in the face because of the
stringent criteria set by the Justice Department.

I mention this because I feel there was much more devastation and
harm done to our native people, and we are still totally
neglected. There are hundreds of abandoned mines, open pit mines,
and radioactive waste piles that have been left behind by past
mining.

Contamination still exists. For so many years, the Navajo miners
have been intentionally used as guinea pigs, as were their
families. The miners went home in their contaminated work
clothes, and so exposed their families and their homes.

The mining companies and the U.S. Government failed to warn the
workers and the families that have lived so many years above the
mining camps. I have witnessed miner's spouses who have died from
the same disease their husbands did.

The Navajo uranium millers, who have been left out of the Public
Law 11-4-26, the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, are also
radiation victims, and many have also died from their exposures.
These members were severely exposed.

Today, we'll hear from former members who have worked in these
mills. Compensation and restitution are a necessity. In
conclusion, from the past mining and milling, the Navajo people
and other Native Americans in the Southwest were truly the
victims and used in experiments in the scientific world.

Our recommendation to the advisory committee here today is, we
seek restitution for all human radiation victims, and we need
independent studies designed and (inaudible) our people. Only
then will we participate and allow the studies to be done on us.
So, to help and assist the Native people to find the truth, to
find the medical justice we have needed for so long. Thank you.

DR. TUCKSON: We'll come back and ask questions. Let's go now to
Mr. John Fowler.

MS. FOWLER: Good evening to the members of the committee. My name
is Renda Fowler, and I'll be testifying on behalf of my father,
John Fowler, who is a former uranium mill worker for 4 years and
4 months, and the former uranium millers and the miners, Uranium
and Radiation Exposure Committee of Western Navajo Agency, of
which my father is the president or chairperson.

We reside in Tuba City, Arizona. A committee organized in the
late 1980s advocated the health problems and anguish of the
miners from the effects of uranium radiation, and seek
reformation for being inhumanely subjected to harmful radiation.

The committee presently comprises of former uranium mill workers,
miners, residents of nearby uranium tailings, and their families.
We approximate about 70 mill workers who worked at Rare Metals.
That was about 100 miles northwest of Flagstaff, and
approximately the same number at the Mexican Hat and Mill site.

Today, there are surviving mill workers, and some are presently
deceased. Milling plants established in the Navajo reservation
provided employment for many Navajo men and women. Considering
their remoteness of the locations, there was a high demand for
jobs on the Navajo reservation for young Navajo families.

Sadly, today, we become aware of the harmful effects of the
uranium radiation and are presently left only to regret and
realize how we were inhumanely exposed to radiation by recounting
the poor safety precautions taken on the job at the milling
plants.

There was no mention of the toxicity of the effects of radiation
and the dangerous chemicals. In addition, little or no protective
clothing, devices, apparatus, were stressed by the company or
other affiliates like the Atomic Energy Department, who were
involved in setting up these mill sites on the reservation, as
well as the Department of Interior.

In addition to this, there was poor ventilation in the plant.
They could see visible airborne uranium particulates, that, upon
departing from work, these particles were in their mouth, nose,
eyes, and on their skin.

When they cleared their nose or mouth, they only saw yellow
particles of uranium. Lunch was also consumed at the job site
with uranium particle laden clothes and hands. There was no
designated site to consume their lunch, and no sinks to wash
their hands properly.

Also there was no showers to remove the particles from their skin
at the end of the work day. The air contained chemical vapors
that the metal roofing and ceilings and the walls of the plant
showed corrosion and deterioration.

And this statement lists some of the chemicals that were used
there, and again, these chemicals were handled with no safety
devices. Several families also reside at nearby mill sites with
their children in tents or other temporary structures.

Children of the mill workers recall that they used to play around
in the uranium tailings and stockpiles. Also, reports that yellow
uranium formed in jars, or uranium ores were brought home for
display inside their home.

Innocent lives have been played with, considering the reports
given by women who conceived during their employment at the
plant, which almost always resulted in miscarriage. Also, we
realized through testimony, that children born to mill workers
prior to their employment are born normal, and children, after
their employment, were born with usually some kind of a
disability or handicap.

Also exposed to radiation were the families residing nearby the
uranium tailings and livestock raised in these unprotected
tailings. Mr. Harrison has gone over some of the recurrence of
our health problems, which included lung disease, renal toxicity,
(inaudible) skin problems, respiratory problems, thyroid problems
and psychological problems.

My father expresses often in front of me of how he thinks about
how long he has to live and always feels guilty for exposing his
family to the effects of uranium radiation, and says that if he
were informed of the dangers of the uranium radiation, he would
have chose not to work at the plant, or maybe practiced the full
extent of safety precautions.

In conclusion, the Federal government tried the mill workers to
be exposed to harmful effects of uranium radiation, which this
advisory committee is chartered to advise. We request that our
tribe be no longer neglected, and receive restitution for the
neglect of our safety for past, present, and future physical,
mental, psychological traumas, which highly affect our future,
and in respects to our -- to take consideration in respects to
our contribution to our nation's defense.

Again, in this instance, the lack of education of the Navajo
people has been taken for granted, being viewed as an inferior
group minority, and their desperate financial status, and we want
the committee to consider these traumas, and we hope that we're
not neglected anymore, and something comes of this hearing for
our testimonies.

DR. TUCKSON: Thank you very much, both of you. Mr. George Nelson.

MR. NELSON: First, I have to thank the panel to let me testify,
best as I can, because I'm not a really educated man. My name is
George Frazier Nelson, Sr. What I want to say here is, my work
history at the plant, I worked there about 13 years as a miller,
and the mill work already started back in 1956 -- I think we
started about 1954, in that area, because I just got out of the
service.

So, I left for about one year, and I was first hired to work as a
laborer outside and inside, just to clean up all the mud out of
the sump, and later on, they put me in the package area, the
uranium package area, and that's the dirtiest place a person
could work.

First, that area, to dry uranium, they got the tray with the fire
underneath, and we got the roller about two sizes of this here to
roll over to get it dry, and all the dust is just flying up
towards the ceiling, and after it's dry, then you put it in the
drums, 55-gallon drums.

After we filled one up, (inaudible) pack down, and then we seal
it up. I'm doing it for about -- at least about four years, four
or five years, and it began to improve, that they built two
furnaces, the drier they called it. It's about 12 foot around and
about 20 feet high.

They got a fire on each side, and they got a vibrator underneath.
You got little boot under the furnace to -- so the uranium goes
in, and still have the dust. We still have a lot of dust to
package that uranium, pure uranium. They call it yellow cake,
just like that cloth behind you, and we don't package them to
(inaudible) 98. something -- about 98.5 percent before we
package.

If it's lower than that, you have to rerun it, and they add
something to it to make it a little higher percentage. That's how
we packaged it. To protect your clothes, there is no protective
clothes. When we first hired, we had rubber gloves only about
this big, and the rubber boots were only 8-inch high, and then a
lot of times, the sump was full, and sometimes you fall in there.

So, just had to wash our feet, and then wash out our boots, and
start using it again. So, I have been working almost -- I'll say
about 7 years out of the 13 years in the package area. After they
had the furnace built and the drier, they started precipitating,
(inaudible), alongside of us, so they build another furnace to
fuse the uranium. This is not very far, about 100 feet or 150
feet from that yellow cake furnace or drier. We called it drier.
The other one is the furnace.

That (inaudible), it had to be precipitated, and the other was
precipitated above the package area, so it's pretty dusty. We
still have that -- a little bit improvement on that drier. So, I
worked both places. When you first started, we had to stand by --
the respirator we had, half the time would be all choked up, so
we had to go without.

So, toward -- about five years later, we run out of those
respirators, and half the time, we had to order that and wait for
it. We keep patching without the respirator. (Inaudible) I think
-- contaminated we breathe. We just exposed to radiation.
(Inaudible).

I said about five years later, they give us a film badge. That's
the only time they give us a film badge. We wear it for a month,
and we turn it in. They furnish another one, until about 1969.
The plant went down in 1969, little before 1969.

So, nobody informed us about the dangers with this stuff, the
yellow cake and all the ores, everything, and then the film
badge, no one informed us how much was on there, and we just turn
it in. That's all. We didn't see it again.

DR. TUCKSON: Better try to bring it to a close.

MR. NELSON: One more. A lot of members died. When I first --
plant started, about 20 something. (Inaudible) compensated in
some way. See what you people can do.

DR. TUCKSON: Thank you. Mr. Bill Tsosie.

MR. TSOSIE: My name is William Tsosie, known as Bill Tsosie, and
I started to work for Kerr McGee down at the Shiprock mill. At
that time that I was hired, I never been told what that stuff can
do to you in later years. Nobody ever been told.

We just hired and work like a slave. We don't ask questions. We
just get down to business. The people have been hired, fired,
just right and left. Kerr McGee is some company to work for like
that, just like that, prisoners.

At this time, I worked there seven and a half years. Before I
work, just as we are, the clothes we're wearing, and eight hours
time to change shifts. We go home just as we are. Then we handle
our kids, our food, without a change, because we never been told
that that is a dangerous material.

I used to take some high grade ore, to take home. I live in a
small trailer. I put it by the window, and I slept underneath it.
This is unbelievable. And then morning breeze, in the morning
time, you can smell all the chemicals from the plant from the
mill.

When the wind blows, they're covered up. I live just outside the
plant, quarter of a mile, for more than three years. I just walk
to work. That's when my first boy was born. Now this man, he got
a rash on his forehead and all over his hair. Don't know what it
is.

My second boy was born, the second, and this boy was born with a
cleft palate. I think that's what they call it, all the way open
in the mouth, and this boy almost died. We take him to El Paso to
have it repaired, plastic surgery, and he had an operation two
times, one in Albuquerque.

Then after three years, we move away from that plant, about three
miles. When I went to work there, we don't have no running water,
no electricity. My wife washed my clothes in the tub. This is --
cross my heart, I'm the witness to this. What I'm telling you is
the truth.

We never been told what it is until later on, and it's too late.
We're already contaminated. We're already exposed. Right now,
about 25 mill uranium workers have died. The latest died about
two months ago, an old man. His name -- what was it -- Clarence
Hudson, his name.

The last minute of his life, he had said at the hospital, don't
give up, get something from the company -- I mean, the
government. The people have hoped to get something from the
government of Kerr McGee or whatever before they died, but they
never see nothing yet. The people are dying.

We're survivors. We're still living. We know we're the next in
line, and I want to talk about it. Right now, I'm sick. I don't
feel good. I don't sleep at night. I fight my pain in my chest. I
have been fighting a rash for 20 years on my legs.

I went to see the doctor. All she does is give me shot to go away
and come back later on. I feel like we should be getting some
money from Uncle Sam or Kerr McGee, so we can buy what we always
wanted in our lifetime. Then we go with a smile on our face.

Japanese bombed the Pearl Harbor December 27, 1941. They asked
for trouble. We gave it to them with the uranium. We bombed
Japan, and later, a consent paid these people back millions of
dollars. That's what I understand. Why not us?

DR. TUCKSON: Thank you very much. Panelists, any questions?

DR. MACKLIN: My question is for all of the panelists, and you
told us stories that you were told nothing and subjected to great
risks. Was there anytime at which people in the mills, or doctors
in hospitals came and wanted samples, urine samples or blood
samples?

Was there anytime at which people took a medical history? Was
there anytime, in your recollection, when people wanted to find
out what the effects were on your health of working for all those
years in the mills?

MR. NELSON: As I said a while ago, about five years later when
they give us those badges, and only one time they give us a
little bottle to spit in to take those samples. What happened to
it? No results. We never get informed.

DR. MACKLIN: This is important. You had told us about the badges,
and I remember that now, but now they wanted to test your sputum.
They asked you to spit in the bottle. Was this done at the plant,
or was it when you went to a doctor, and who was it who asked you
to do this?

MR. NELSON: It was at the plant, some of those workers, their
samples, but we never did anything.

DR. MACKLIN: Was it a public health nurse who worked at the
plant?

MR. NELSON: No.

DR. MACKLIN: Who asked you to do this?

MR. NELSON: I think earlier, Mr. Tim Benally say something about
that they do some testing on the miners. I think -- I'm not sure,
but I think it is the same people that took those samples. It's
not from the plant.

DR. MACKLIN: I'm sorry.

MR. FOWLER: I used to work in Tuba City at Environmental. Nothing
has been done there. He's talking about the (inaudible) New
Mexico. (Inaudible) is in Arizona. I used to work in (inaudible)
I used to work at Mexican Hat as a pressure plant operator.
Nothing has been done.

DR. MACKLIN: But you did describe when you had these bad health
defects, you went to doctors and were treated. For example, you
talked, Mr. Tsosie, about the dermatologists. Did any of the
doctors that you visited take a history or try to find out more
of the cause of these ailments that you came to them with?

MR. NELSON: No.

DR. TUCKSON: Mr. Harrison, can you help me to understand if there
has been any epidemiological, any statistical analysis that has
been done to record the cases of cancer or other such illnesses
in your community? Are you aware of any effort to document this
from -- excuse the stupid language, but from a "scientifically
objective" manner -- any agency of government, any agency
anywhere?

MR. HARRISON: The only one that I'm aware of right now is -- as
of today, the miners or people that are working with these miners
and others were aware of the NIOSH records that exist and PHS
studies. (Inaudible) We know that they have some kind of data
that the government is studying.

That's the only thing that we resort to. As far as any kind of
epidemiological studies and things likes that, there isn't any
studies that have been made on the reservation yet, but those are
some things we would like to request.

DR. THOMAS: I want to check up on this point when I get back to
my office. I have a recollection of having seen one
epidemiological study of uranium. At this point, I can't recall
the details. I think it was quite old. It's certainly something
to look into.

At this point, there isn't radon (inaudible) in open pit mining
or milling, that there is in underground mining, but it's also
clear from the testimony we've heard today, that there is this
exposure to uranium dust, which presumably has its own health
hazards associated with it, and I think it's something we ought
to look into.

DR. TUCKSON: One last question. Excuse my naivete, I mean, my
innocence in this question, but again, it would seem that you
have been struggling with these issues for a number of years.
You're saying that people are dying.

We're not the first people to hear this, and I guess what's hard
to understand is why there is no investigation, why is it that
you do not have in your hands a full report by some bodies who
would have done this work.

Dr. Duncan thinks he may have seen one study. First of all, why
don't you have that? Why is no one listening? It seems as if no
one is listening or taking this seriously. Do I have the wrong
impression, and if I have the right impression, no one is taking
it seriously, why not?

MR. HARRISON: The word "struggling" is correct, and along with
that, the anger and frustration, the pain and suffering that I
see in the eyes of these people that were exposed to radiation --
I see this every day. I have been doing this work advocating for
miners and millers for 14 years now.

My father was a miner, and he died 24 years ago this month, and I
actually did three months of mining, and what has been expressed
here today has -- I think we have made a big impact, but the
people that are dying, I often wondered, and I asked myself this,
too, who is going to notice this? Who is going to bring help to
us and assistance?

And our own tribal government is not prioritizing what we have
been struggling with. As of now, the last miner that died was
five days ago, and we have been working on his paper, and he was
looking for compensation money, and the criteria had set him back
to get him any kind of compensation on this.

So, in the meantime, it seems like we're the only ones that are
really bringing forth the concerns that we have in our
communities.

DR. TUCKSON: We better stop. I would ask you, if you can before
our next meeting, which is February 16th, if you would have an
opportunity to send us some more detailed thought on why you
believe that the current law is too restrictive.

I think that's just useful for us to know, because, again, we may
-- someone may come up in our discussion in Washington and
suggest that, well, we have models of legislation, and we need to
be able to be prepared to understand why you feel that law is so
terribly inadequate and too limited, and that will help us, I
think. If you get a chance, send that in.

MR. NELSON: Half a minute?

DR. TUCKSON: You can have half a minute, sir.

MR. NELSON: Like I said, I'm a miller, and I formed this -- with
the help of Phil, here, I formed a miller's association. We
didn't get anything back about 15 years. They're always kind of
denying us, or I don't know what happened, but about three years
ago -- about four years ago, I registered for this compensation,
or just the registering with the uranium office, and they told me
the miller is not entitled to this compensation.

So, we formed a miller's association, and it's kind of
independent, so the millers registered with us, and we went to
the proper doctors. We didn't go to PHS doctors, because they
don't give us the evidence, whatever is wrong with us.

So, I have been examined in Denver, Colorado, and I got the file,
so I just -- I will give you some statement. I'll send it to you.
I don't know where to send it to.

DR. TUCKSON: Duncan wants to get one more question in. What you
do, so there is no chance of losing it or being unclear, go over
there, and they will tell you what to do.

DR. THOMAS: I'm just puzzling over something in one of our
earlier staff memoranda, which was discussed at -- I think it was
the November meeting -- the October or November meeting, where we
first began to address this issue of remedies, and in particular,
this section of the staff memorandum where it talks about the
Radiation Exposure and Compensation Act.

I just want to read one sentence from here. "RECA contains no
causation requirements. Claimants do not have to establish the
dose to which they were exposed or that such exposure caused
their illness. Rather, the law requires only that the individual
must have been physically present at the specified location
during the specified period of time" and so on.

We have heard testimony from quite a large number of people today
to the fact that there has to be a specific dose given
(inaudible). Can someone straighten me out about this issue?

DR. TUCKSON: What we're saying is that our staff has given us a
report that interprets the RECA law as being very, very friendly,
saying that we don't have to approve doses, and you don't have to
do thus, which is very much different from what you're saying.

So, what we're trying to do now is find out from our experts why
there is a difference in our memo from what you've testified.

MR. HARRISON: May I address that?

DR. THOMAS: We have some legal advice on this. (Inaudible) There
is a mistake in the draft that I have in front of me. The piece
that I was reading from apparently refers only to the
downwinders, and not to the miners. There is a 200 requirement
(inaudible).

DR. TUCKSON: By the way, now I understand what you just said a
minute ago, because you are a miller, you don't fall under that.
That makes more sense.

MR. HARRISON: I want to comment on working level months. The item
on the work level months has prevented a lot of miners from
getting their compensation. A lot of them are falling short of
the 200 work level months. If they're smokers, they're 300 to
500.

DR. TUCKSON: Say that last statement again.

MR. HARRISON: If the miner has 200 work level months for a
nonsmoker, and if they're 45 and under, they will have to have
300, and if they're 45 years old and over, we got to have 500
work level months.

DR. TUCKSON: A previous witness, I remember, said that if he had
known about the nature of these laws at some point, he would
never have admitted that he was a cigarette smoker, because to
voluntarily admit that almost made it impossible for him to get
the claim handled. I think I understand that.

DR. THOMAS: (Inaudible) A number of people would argue that that
figure is unreasonably high in terms of (inaudible). It's one of
the things which really ought to be corrected.

DR. TUCKSON: I've got to stop, because of the people behind you.

MS. FOWLER: Your question, why there was nothing being done this
far, we have worked with Bill Harrison and (inaudible) Charley in
reference to getting (inaudible) on the RECA, but we weren't
successful with that, and after that, we met with several law
firms trying to do cases going against the companies, but they
found that the costs were too great for them to handle the case,
and they just left us there again.

DR. TUCKSON: We went a long time on this panel, but you advanced
our understanding. Thank you, thank you, thank you.

DR. TUCKSON: We'll go then with Mr. Robert McConaghy. You have
absolutely everybody's attention.

MR. McCONAGHY: I would like say that listening to the other
people here and the ones that immediately preceded this group, I
suddenly heard the word Kerr McGee, and I have photographed that
mine and some of the material went to the U.S. Government, and
some of it went to the Kerr McGee, which was operating the mine,
and when they mentioned some of the additions, one of the things
that I was photographing was a loading dock, and here were signs
saying how you would conduct -- how you would handle certain --
like the yellow cake barrels, and they were doing things that
were completely out of line with what the sign said.

I said, I'm not going to photograph it if you want me to
photograph something where you're deliberately disobeying what
the rules are, and I gave them some time to get it all
straightened out before I went back to do some more photography,
but it was interesting to listen to these people that were
talking about how they worked and their experiences, and my
photography, which recorded a lot of that.

And I want to make one mention. Somebody said something about the
Nuremberg Trials. Dick Kent, a photographer here in Albuquerque,
who died a number of years ago, was the initial photographer for
the United States Government for the Nuremberg Trials, and he
became internationally famous because of it.

Now, there is an article that was in the Albuquerque Journal
about 9 or 10 months ago, and we were hoping that this article,
with a picture of my wife -- these photographs are just copies of
newspaper, and they're not very good photographs, but we hoped it
would generate some correspondence and some knowledge, and we
would get feedback, and this article -- you have copies of this
article here, I believe. Do you have copies of that?

DR. TUCKSON: Yes, we do.

MR. McCONAGHY: The picture to the right is a picture of my wife,
who had 12 years photograph experience before she went into the
Waves, and was given basic training under Collins and the other
Waves. They were in classes before going through there, and the
class she went through, was sent to the Indian -- the Naval War
Center at Indian Head, Maryland, and their first job was to do
X-rays of bags of powder.

These were the bags of powder that went behind the 16-inch
galleys. The bags weighed 110 pounds. One of the girls would grab
the loose material on one side, and the other on the other side,
lift it up onto a table or bench of some type where it would be
X-rayed.

They were given no protection. My wife died of breast cancer
about 10 years ago. She had been on chemotherapy for six years.
The last year was quite tragic. We thought that this article
would get a certain amount of attention, and we have not heard
from one single person.

The question now is, did these other girls who were mainly out of
high school, just out of high school, did they all die before she
did, because they had more exposure? After doing this X-ray,
those girls' blood counts would go down. They were tested every
week.

When it got down so far, they would take them off the job, give
them medicine and a diet, which would bring their blood level
back up to normal, and they put them back on the job.

My wife with her 12 years' experience had more ability than any
man on that base, and she never went back to the X-rays. The
other girls, without any evidence, (inaudible) sweeping the
floors or something. They on, off, on, off, on, off. Are any of
those girls alive today? We can't find a single one that's alive.

Did they all die of breast cancer just within a few months or
years after they were given that type of an exposure? And that's
what -- to me, that's the primary thing I'm trying to find out.
If we could find one girl that would say, I was there, this is
the work we did, how we did it, and here are five people I worked
for or worked with.

So far, we haven't found a single one, and are they all dead? And
this is a form of radiation now.

DR. TUCKSON: Sir?

MR. McCONAGHY: But it's not what you have been talking about,
because it's a very specialized situation.

DR. TUCKSON: Let's take a few questions. Thank you.

DR. THOMAS: It's not implausible that there could be a connection
between your wife's radiation exposure and the subsequent breast
cancer. It sounds to me from reading this article that you have
actually been doing some digging to find the other girls that
were working with your wife.

Can you tell us a little bit about how you went about doing that?
I gather you were trying to find other girls who might also have
developed breast cancer, but so far have been unsuccessful.

MR. McCONAGHY: That article mentions one girl that -- the only
one that I had ever met. She married a Randall, and we went out
-- we were going to graduate school at the University of Denver.
We made two trips up to their ranch in Colorado.

We tried to find someone that -- she married Randall Yeats (sic),
and we wanted to make a connection, but we cannot find a Randall
Yeats (sic) or a Margaret Hill. Margaret Hill was her married
name, and we can't find them.

There are a couple of others. If I can find somebody, an
investigator or something, a man that has been put in that same
type of work, because he evidently was not (inaudible), and there
may have been some others, but this (inaudible) Dewey (sic) they
called him was one who came from Boston, South Boston.

There was a girl whose father had a Greek restaurant in Nevada,
and it might be possible to find her. I don't think there is that
many Greek restaurants in that area, but that would be one that I
can remember her mentioning.

DR. THOMAS: This is now quite a few years later. I presume you
didn't start this search until after your wife's breast cancer.

MR. McCONAGHY: I never thought of a connection there until after
we got those articles in the Albuquerque Tribune every week, and
then I got to thinking about the possibility of my wife being --

DR. THOMAS: Trying to find people 50 years later is quite a
challenge.

DR. TUCKSON: Maybe we can just make one call to Indian Head,
Maryland.

MR. McCONAGHY: I have some friends that live near Washington D.C.
I don't have any connections that would allow me from here.

DR. TUCKSON: Maybe -- I don't want to overpromise, but maybe we
can make a call. We have representatives from the Navy who come
in and out of our meetings. Maybe we can ask them. I doubt that
the Indian Head Naval War Center still exists.

I would be shocked if it did, but it seems we ought to be able to
see if there was a record, and maybe we can do that. I know you
don't have a phone, but is there a way we can get your address?

MR. McCONAGHY: Yes, you have the address.

DR. TUCKSON: First of all, would you take the time and come and
share with us?

DR. MACKLIN: One little question. You did mention that the blood
was sampled regularly. Blood was taken from the women workers,
and then they were taken off the job, et cetera, until the blood
count went back up. Who took that blood?

MR. McCONAGHY: I wasn't there. What I am repeating is something
that would come up, and, oh, that reminds me of. Sometimes it was
a funny incident, and like the two girls that came from the
ranch, I think in Iowa, or one of those mid-western states, they
were adjoining ranches.

They were both 5 foot 10 inches tall. They had gone to school
together. They enlisted in the Waves together, and the girls had
taken these bags of powder, one on each side, so each girl was
lifted 55 pounds.

These girls came in there in a later class, and they were used to
seeing bags of grain that weighed about 100 pounds, men putting
them on their shoulder, and that's what they were used to seeing,
and that's the way they picked up the 110-pounds bags of powder,
just like this and walk off with that. It made the men about so
big.

My last point is that I think it wouldn't be too hard to trace
some people that were so unusual, two girls 5 foot 10 inches
tall.

DR. TUCKSON: Sir, we will get your address, and let me just say
that I thank you. We have to closeout to get to the airport, but
I want to thank you. We have at least one way we can make a call
to where they worked to see if there are any records that exist
there, and we'll try to contact the Navy and get them to do that
search for us.

So, know that we need to get your address so we can follow up
with you.

MR. McCONAGHY: And you're going to be back here in February; is
that right?

DR. TUCKSON: No, sir, our meeting in February is in Washington
D.C. Good luck to you, and thank you.

MR. McCONAGHY: There is one other thing that I wanted to mention
that was referred to just remotely. I believe that the explosion
on the Battleship Iowa, from what my wife told me, I think I know
how it happened. I would like to talk to somebody from the Navy
before they explode again. That's something I can -- just a clue
to work on.

DR. TUCKSON: Sir, you ought to put that in writing and get that
to somebody, and you think you've got some clues, we'll pass it
on to the Navy. Would somebody come and gavel us away? The
meeting is now adjourned.

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded at 7:50 p.m.)

CERTIFICATE

I, Penny McAlister, a Certified Court Reporter, do hereby certify
that the Proceedings of the above-entitled cause were reported by
me stenographically on January 30, 1995, and that the within
transcript is a true and accurate transcription of my shorthand
notes.

I further certify that I am neither an attorney nor counsel for,
nor related to or employed by any of the parties to the action,
and that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or
counsel employed by the parties hereto, or financially interested
in the action.

Penny McAlister, CCR
Certified Court Reporter #250
License Expires: December 31, 1995