Washington D.C., 5 March 2004 - The recent turnaround in
Libya's nuclear policies and the many disclosures of Pakistan's role
as a super-proliferator of nuclear weapons technology produced another
extraordinary revelation: the discovery by U.S. and British intelligence
of Chinese language material among the nuclear weapons design documents
that Pakistan had supplied the Libyans. (Note 1)
The exact subject matter of the documents remains secret, but the
discovery was no surprise to students of nuclear proliferation or
to China and Pakistan watchers. China's nuclear relationship with
Pakistan was a matter of great concern to U.S. government officials
over the course of four presidential administrations. Since the early
1980s, at least, allegations abounded that the Chinese government
provided the Pakistanis with nuclear weapons technology, including
design information. (Note 2) This assistance may
have continued through the mid-1990s, or even later, though much remains
conjectural.
Until the revelations from the Libyan files, no evidence had surfaced
that conclusively linked China with Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.
But the revelation on the Chinese documents is only one piece of the
puzzle; questions remain about the nature of the China-Pakistan nuclear
relationship--its origins and its extent--that may not be settled
for many years. How and why this nuclear relationship emerged can
only be a matter of speculation. Certainly, for many years, Beijing's
official position was that it would not help other countries acquire
nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, during the years after China's first
nuclear test in October 1964, its nuclear weapons policy was complex
and ambivalent. On the one hand, even as it developed its small nuclear
arsenal, Beijing supported a complete ban of nuclear weapons and their
ultimate elimination. On the other hand, Beijing railed against the
superpower's nuclear monopoly, declaring that non-nuclear states had
the right to develop nuclear weapons on their own, just as it had.
Moreover, after the signing of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (1968),
China treated it as another unequal treaty, allowing the great powers
to keep their arsenals while prohibiting sovereign nations from taking
self-defense measures. (Note 3)
China's professed opposition to sharing nuclear weapons technology
with non-nuclear states may have led to compromise of principle when
security and economic interests were at stake. Well before the question
of nuclear sharing emerged, China and Pakistan, each having an adversarial
relationship with India, had developed a close understanding involving
significant military cooperation. When the U.S. cut off sales of weapons
to both India and Pakistan because of their 1965 border conflict,
China became Pakistan's main supplier of weapons. The close relationship
with China became one of the pillars of Pakistani foreign policy.
When India held its first nuclear test in 1974, and Pakistan made
decisions to acquire its own capability to build nuclear weapons,
it may have seemed a matter of course for elements in the Chinese
military, which had a powerful voice in Beijing's nuclear establishment,
eventually to decide to lend Pakistan a hand. (Note 4)
The interests that propelled Beijing to assist Pakistan's nuclear
program became competitive, during the 1980s and 1990s, with other
sets of interests pushing for a stronger Chinese role in global nuclear
nonproliferation efforts. While reports of Beijing's transfer of nuclear
weapons designs and sensitive technologies circulated, the two governments
signed a nuclear cooperation agreement and conducted negotiations
over the sale of Chinese nuclear reactors. At the same time, Beijing
became a full member of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, joining
the International Atomic Energy Authority in 1984 and signing the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1992 and the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty in 1995. Moreover, China began to work closely with Washington
and other powers in trying to curb the North Korean nuclear program
and in restricting trade in sensitive nuclear technology. As China's
market economy developed greater complexity, central authorities could
not always control events, which is what may happened when a Chinese
firm sold ring magnets used for the production of highly enriched
uranium to Pakistan in 1995. (Note 5)
Exactly what the United States government knew (or believed it knew)
about Chinese nuclear sharing with Pakistan and when it knew it, remains
highly secret. So far no intelligence reports on the issues have been
declassified, although during the Clinton years Washington Times
correspondent Bill Gertz published highly damaging communications
intercepts on Chinese-Pakistan nuclear transactions in 1996. (Note
6) In light of the sensitivities involved--U.S. relations with
two highly important partners, Pakistan and China--the relevant details
may not be declassified for many years. Moreover, the presidential
records that would shed light on how consecutive administrations tried
to reconcile the larger goal of engagement with Beijing with specific
concerns about nuclear proliferation issues remain secret. Within
the limits imposed by the secrecy system, this briefing book sheds
light on how U.S. government officials looked at the China-Pakistan
nuclear relationship, their persistent efforts to discourage it, the
repeated denials by Chinese diplomats, and the evolution of China's
nuclear nonproliferation policy. Among the disclosures are:
- U.S. unease over secret China-Pakistan security and military cooperation
during the late 1960s
- Chinese assistance to Pakistani nuclear-weapons related projects
in 1977
- the refusal by Chinese diplomats in 1982 to give an "unequivocal
answer" to queries about nuclear weapons aid to Pakistan
- the conclusion reached by State Department analysts in 1983 that
China was assisting with the production of fissile materials and
possibly with the design of weapons
- the George H. W. Bush administration's concern in 1989 over "reports
of Chinese assistance to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program"
- denials by Chinese diplomats that same year of reports of Chinese
nuclear aid to Pakistan
- U.S. pressure on China in 1992 to impose full-scope safeguards
on the sale of a nuclear reactor to Pakistan because of proliferation
concerns
- more disquiet (late 1992) over China's "continuing activities
with Pakistan's nuclear weapons programs"
- the Clinton administration's 1997 certification of improvements
in Beijing's nuclear proliferation policies
The revelations about the China-Pakistan nuclear connection coincided
with Beijing's recent application to join the 30 member Nuclear Suppliers
Group that tries to regulate international trade in nuclear materials
and technologies in order to check weapons proliferation. (Note
7) It is possible that tensions between nonproliferation, foreign
policy, and commercial goals will continue to complicate Beijing's
policies as it has that of other nuclear states. Nevertheless, Beijing's
decision to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group suggests that it is moving
much closer toward full participation in the global nonproliferation
regime and away from the narrowly nationalistic approach that characterized
its nuclear relationship with Pakistan. To the extent that Chinese
government agencies actually transmitted nuclear weapons design information
to Pakistan, one can only hope that the spin-off from Pakistan never
leaked into private hands.
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Document
1: Thomas Hughes, Director of Intelligence and Research, U.S.
Department of State, to Director of Central Intelligence, W.F. Raborn,
21 July 1965, enclosing paper on U.S.-Pakistan policy problems, Secret
Source: U.S. National Archives, CIA Research Tool (CREST)
Well before Washington was concerned about Chinese nuclear sharing
with Pakistan, U.S. government officials worried about the close China-Pakistan
relationship. During the mid-1960s, when the Johnson administration
was escalating the Vietnam War and U.S.-China relations remained tense,
top policymakers defined Pakistan as a problem. Not only were the
Pakistanis loosening security ties with the United States and keeping
their distance from U.S. Vietnam policy, the White House and the State
Department believed that they were getting too close to China, even
to the point of allegedly signing a secret security understanding
with Beijing. (Note 8) That the two neighboring countries
had highly tense relations with India was central to their close cooperation,
but that did not make the Johnson administration any more sympathetic.
Significantly, a Pakistani effort to convey a message from Beijing
warning Washington about the Vietnam War failed when President Johnson
canceled Ayub Khan's visit. Not long before Hughes sent this paper
to CIA, President Johnson decided to cut signal displeasure over Pakistan's
tilt to Beijing by postponing a meeting of the aid consortium, which
had provided a forum for U.S. pledges of economic aid. Tensions would
grow during the following months as an India-Pakistan crisis over
Kashmir broke out, which threatened to bring in the Chinese. (Note
9)
Document
2: George C. Denney, Deputy Director of Intelligence and Research,
U.S. Department of State, to Secretary Rusk, "Pakistan and Communist
China Strengthen Cooperation," 4 December 1968, Secret
Source: U.S. National Archives, Record Group 59, Records of the Department
of State, Subject-Numeric Files, 1967-1969, POL 1 Chicom-Pak
The Johnson administration would continue to be troubled by signs
of close and highly secret cooperation between China and Pakistan.
Not only were border and military cooperation growing, apparently
the Pakistani military had given the Chinese access to U.S. F-104
supersonic fighter aircraft, in violation of the acceptance agreement
with the Pentagon. This generosity made the Chinese just as obliging
in providing substantial interest free loans. No doubt, realpolitik
accounted for this neighborliness. As INR noted, China was willing
to "overlook ideological factors in dealing with Pakistan."
As this document was written, the Nixon administration was coming
to power. Ironically, it was the close China-Pakistan relationship
that would serve the Nixon administration so well when it began its
search for secret back channels to convey its strong interest in rapprochement
with Beijing. Indeed, suspicions of Pakistan dissolved as the Nixon
administration tilted policy toward Pakistan, for example, during
the 1971 South Asian war. (Note 10)
Document
3: " Proposed Cable to Tehran on Pakistani Nuclear Processing,"
12 May 1976, Secret
Source: National Archives, Records of the State Department, Record
Group 59, Office of the Counselor, 1955-1977, box 3, Chron-Official
April-June 1976
During the mid-1970s, in the wake of India's "peaceful"
nuclear explosion, nuclear proliferation concerns grew as governments
in Asia (Taiwan, South Korea and Pakistan) and Latin America (Argentina
and Brazil) showed interest in acquiring weapons capabilities. Moreover,
growing competition among national nuclear power industries and increased
interest in nuclear energy raised intense concerns about "safeguarding"
nuclear reactor exports so they were not used for military purposes.
One issue that emerged during 1976 was Pakistan's quest for nuclear
reprocessing facilities as part of a program to acquire nuclear weapons
fuel. During this meeting, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and
State Department advisers discussed the difficult problems raised
by Pakistan's nuclear weapons ambitions. One interesting sidelight
was the brief mention of intelligence reporting on Pakistan-Libyan
discussions of nuclear cooperation. Another subject of discussion
was the negotiations between Iran and the United States on nuclear
cooperation and the newly proposed "Symington Amendment"
which aimed at cutting off U.S. military aid to countries that engaged
in unsafeguarded nuclear activities.
Document
4: Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to National Security Assistant
Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Nuclear Safeguards - Pakistan, South Africa,
China," 14 July 1977, Secret
Source: State Department Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Release
By the time that the Jimmy Carter administration had come to power
in early 1977, the U.S. had working relations with China and full
diplomatic relations would go into effect later in 1978. One of the
major issues that President Carter had campaigned on was the problem
of nuclear proliferation. After he came to power, the Pakistani nuclear
program remained worrisome, as indicated by Secretary of State Vance,
who supported initiatives to constrain Pakistan's access to nuclear
fuel fabrication services. In this way, Vance hoped to encourage Pakistan
to cancel or postpone its reprocessing project. As he noted, one problem
was a pending deal with the French for a reprocessing plant at Chashma;
the French wanted to disengage from the contract and were already
dragging their feet on it. Another complicating factor was China,
which was starting to offer fuel services and technical assistance
to Pakistan's KANUPP heavy water reactor (whose fuel would later be
a source of plutonium). China's assistance made it important, Vance
observed, to share U.S. disquiet about nuclear proliferation with
the Chinese. In any event, when it was evident that the Pakistanis
were pushing the French to make good on the reprocessing contract,
Carter and his advisers had decided that Islamabad was going too far.
In September 1977, without invoking the Symington amendment, the administration
cut off military and economic aid to Pakistan. (Note
11)
Document
5: State Department cable to U.S. Embassy, Austria, "Pakistan
Nuclear Issue: Briefing of IAEA Director General Eklund", 9 July
1979, Secret
Source: State Department FOIA Release
Later in 1978, when the French drastically slowed down work on the
Chashma plant, the Carter administration restored aid to Pakistan.
Nevertheless, the Pakistanis pursued alternative strategies for acquiring
nuclear fuels leading Carter to formally invoke the Symington amendment
in the spring of 1979 and cut off economic and military aid for the
second time. In June 1979, Carter's top diplomatic representative
on nuclear proliferation issues, Ambassador-at-Large Gerard C. Smith
(who had negotiated the SALT I agreement),briefed the director general
of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Sigvard Eklund, on the
latest evidence on Pakistan's efforts to develop reprocessing facilities
and acquire technology for centrifuge machines (for producing highly
enriched uranium). (Robert Galluci, then with the State Department
Policy Planning Staff, provided the detailed briefing, not included
in the text of this document). In a later meeting, Smith expressed
some optimism that there was "some time" to stop the Pakistani
program but Eklund was not so sanguine. Plainly a believer in peaceful
nuclear power, Eklund was most worried that "a Pakistani explosive
capability [was] a serious threat to nuclear power programs of the
future."
Document
6: Friday Morning Session, September 14, 1979, General Advisory
Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, Secret, Excised Copy, Excerpt
Source: State Department FOIA Release
The General Advisory Committee (GAC) on Arms Control and Disarmament
was a high-level presidentially-appointed body of former officials
and scientific experts that offered policy advice to the White House,
the State Department, and the former Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency (ACDA). Created during the 1960s, its first chairman was the
quintessential establishment figure John J. McCloy. During the Carter
years Thomas Watson (Nixon's second ambassador to France) chaired
the GAC; other members were McGeorge Bundy, Brent Scowcroft, Wolfgang
Panofsky, and Paul Doty. When the committee met on 14 September 1979,
nuclear proliferation was high on the agenda, with the assistant director
of ACDA's Non-Proliferation Bureau, Charles Van Doren, providing a
detailed briefing on the "immediate tough cases." Pakistan
headed the list--the "makings ….of another Indian disaster"--and
Van Doren reviewed efforts at "slowing down the process",
the impact of the Symington amendment, the implications for global
nuclear commerce, and apparent Israeli consideration of military action
against Pakistan. The United States itself had not discussed "preemption
plans." Van Doren also reviewed China's ambivalence: on the one
hand, he did not believe they were doing anything to "help"
with Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, but on the other hand, Beijing
was advising the United States to help Pakistan against the "Soviet
peril" and refrain from punitive action: "cutting off your
nose to spite your face." When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan
in December the Carter administration would decide that Beijing's
advice was correct. In the light of the invasion, Pakistan looked
more like an ally than a wayward client and the administration approved
an indefinite waiver of Symington amendment sanctions so long as Pakistan
did not actually test a nuclear weapon. (Note 12)
Document
7: "Secretary's Talking Points: U.S.-China Relations,"
June 1981, Secret
Source: State Department FOIA release
The Reagan administration intensified cooperation with Pakistan against
the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and, like its predecessor, gave
a pass on suspect nuclear activities so that it could funnel support
for Afghan rebels through Pakistan. Yet, it also sustained some quiet
and not very successful attempts to tighten up controls of third party
exports to slow down Pakistan's nuclear progress. In keeping with
this, the Reagan administration sought to discourage Chinese nuclear
sharing with Pakistan. When Secretary of State Alexander Haig met
with Deng Xiaoping and other top officials in June 1981, one item
on his agenda was nuclear proliferation. While the briefing paper
does not directly mention Chinese aid to Pakistan in that connection,
it does specify concerns about China's exports to Argentina and South
Africa of unsafeguarded uranium and heavy water. "These and similar
exports elsewhere could contribute to the spread of nuclear explosives,
undermining regional stability." Then the paper mentioned the
political damage that a Pakistani nuclear test could cause. That may
have been a veiled way of cautioning the Chinese not to assist Pakistan's
nuclear program.
Document
8: U.S. embassy China cable 17090 to State Department, "Arms
Control and Disarmament," 17 December 1982, Secret
Source: State Department FOIA release
By late 1982, and probably earlier, the Reagan administration had
asked Chinese diplomats if Beijing was aiding Pakistan's nuclear program
but it was not getting any answers. Haig's successor, George Shultz,
was gearing up for a trip to Beijing and nuclear proliferation was
on his agenda for the discussion. This cable, prepared for briefing
Shultz, shows that concern about unsafeguarded exports of uranium
and heavy water persisted even though the Chinese were privately arguing
that they had not, and would not, "assist any country in developing
nuclear weapons." According to Ambassador Arthur Hummel, Chinese
officials were unresponsive to U.S. pleas for "adequate safeguard"
or other specific cooperation on nuclear exports. Moreover, "The
Chinese have also refused to give us an unequivocal answer that they
are not assisting Pakistan's reported efforts to manufacture a nuclear
explosive device."
Document
9: U.S. embassy China cable 17168 to State Department, "U.S.-PRC
Nuclear Cooperation -- Or the Lack of It," 18 December 1982,
Secret
Source: State Department FOIA Release
A cable sent by Hummel the next day gave some of the broad context
for U.S. concerns about China's policy on nuclear proliferation. On
the one hand, the Embassy was aware that Chinese economic development
plans required huge inputs of electrical energy and that Beijing was
banking on nuclear power to make development possible. In this connection,
the Embassy observed that there were billions of dollars in possible
U.S. contracts for the Chinese reactor market, for which U.S. companies
like Westinghouse were competing. On the other hand, the Chinese were
themselves getting involved in the nuclear export business as a way
to earn needed foreign currencies that could underwrite imports. As
indicated earlier, the U.S. government suspected Chinese nuclear sales
to Argentina and South Africa and held "suspicions" that
Beijing was providing "weapons-related know-how" to Pakistan.
To get control of this problem as well as meet the U.S.'s own nuclear
export goals, the Embassy recommended greater nuclear cooperation:
"a U.S. nuclear policy … that will encourage China to keep
in close touch with us on nuclear issues, through channels established
by cooperation and understanding." This was part of the thinking
that led to the eventual U.S.-China negotiations on nuclear cooperation
that was formalized by a 1985 agreement. To ensure that Beijing's
and Washington's thinking on nuclear proliferation was compatible,
this was a major subject of discussion in the negotiations on nuclear
cooperation that began in July 1983.
Document
10: State Department cable 348835 to U.S. Embassy Pakistan,
"Newsweek Article on Chinese Nuclear Cooperation with Pakistan,"
18 December 1982, Confidential
Source: State Department FOIA Release
Just as Hummel was signing off on cables indicating doubts about
China's assistance to Pakistan's nuclear weapons project, Newsweek
was running a story highlighting the problem. Pakistani authorities
denied the story, which included a reference to an alleged theft by
a Pakistani scientist of "information on uranium enrichment technology
from a nuclear installation in the Netherlands." It is now well
known that the Pakistani scientist was none other than Abdul Qadeer
Khan. (Note 13)
Document
11: U.S. State Department, "The Pakistani Nuclear Program,"
22 June 1983, Secret, excised copy
Source: State Department FOIA release (Note 14)
As if someone at high levels needed convincing about Pakistan's nuclear
activities, six months later a State Department briefing paper opened
with this emphatic language: "There is unambiguous evidence that
Pakistan is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons development program."
After detailing the elements of the weapons program, the report expressed
confidence that China had played a significant role in Pakistan's
effort to build a bomb. While Pakistan had far to go before it possessed
nuclear weapons, China had provided assistance with the production
of fissile materials and possibly in "nuclear device design."
Document
12: Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs Paul Wolfowitz to Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth
Dam, "The Secretary's Meeting with Premier Zhao - Nuclear Cooperation,"
10 January 1984, with attachments, Secret
Source: State Department FOIA release
In January 1984, Beijing and Washington tried to put the Pakistan
problem behind them. As a sign that it was paying more attention to
nuclear proliferation concerns, that month China joined the IAEA.
In addition, Premier Zhao Ziyang traveled to Washington for talks
touching upon nuclear proliferation and the proposed U.S.-China nuclear
cooperation agreement. Because Beijing sought access to U.S. reactor
technology and Washington wanted to expedite sales as well as receive
assurances that China would not facilitate weapons proliferation,
the Chinese agreed to make a public statement that spoke to U.S. concerns.
As Wolfowitz observed, the statement was designed to "resolve
the concern which arose from past Chinese assistance to Pakistan."
The next problem was to ensure that an agreement was consistent with
the Atomic Energy Act which insisted that Washington have "consent
rights" concerning the disposition of nuclear materials.
Document
13: U.S. Embassy China cable 00644 to State Department, "Premier
Zhao's Statement on Non-Proliferation Published in Beijing,"
12 January 1984, Confidential
Source: State Department FOIA Release
As promised, during the White House banquet premier Zhao's toast
included a statement that "we do not engage in nuclear proliferation
ourselves, or do we help other countries develop nuclear weapons."
The embassy gave a positive spin to Zhao's statement, suggesting that
the "Premier's statement that China will [emphasis added] neither
engage in nuclear proliferation nor assist any other nation to obtain
nuclear weapons" was an important step forward from previous
"less-definite" language. But as the marginal comment indicated,
Zhao's statement did not cover future activities. Apparently, however,
when U.S. officials made an attempt to get private clarification of
this point, the Chinese agreed that it did apply to the future. The
Reagan administration, however, never got such a statement in writing.
(Note 15)
Document
14: U.S. Embassy India cable 14048 to State Department, "News
Reports of Pakistan Nuclear Capabilities," 22 June 1984, Unclassified
Source: State Department FOIA release
As this cable indicates, Zhao's declaration hardly reduced skepticism
of Bejing's nuclear policies and influential members of Congress kept
allegations of Chinese-Pakistan nuclear cooperation in the news. Moreover,
the Reagan administration wanted assurances that Beijing and Washington
meant the same thing by "assist." Clarification of that
and related issues made it possible for the two parties to wrap up
the negotiation of the nuclear cooperation agreement. But Congressional
reservations would have a significant impact on the prospects for
U.S.-China nuclear cooperation. The 1985 agreement included language
prohibiting the diversion to military uses of material produced by
U.S.-supplied reactors, but there was no broader policy commitment
on nuclear proliferation. That was exactly what Congress wanted and
the joint approval resolution on the agreement made implementation
dependent on presidential certification. Before any reactors could
be sold, China would have to provide information on its nuclear nonproliferation
policies confirming that it was doing nothing "violation of section
129 of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, which requires termination of US
nuclear exports to countries that help non-nuclear weapons states
acquire nuclear weapons capabilities." No president, however,
was able to certify that Chinese policies were compatible with the
Atomic Energy Act until 1997. (Note 16)
Document
15: U.S. Embassy China cable 24244 to State Department, "Pakistan
Foreign Minister Visits PRC: Nuclear Cooperation and Afghanistan,"
29 September 1986, Confidential, excised copy
Source: State Department FOIA release
That the Chinese were sensitive to Congressional criticism of their
nuclear policy is evident in this discussion of the 1986 signing of
a China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation agreement. Thus, the Chinese
saw the agreement as important to "underline the peaceful nature
of Sino-Pakistani nuclear cooperation", to dispel "irresponsible
rumors," and provide an occasion for reiterating the PRC's non-proliferation
policy. At the same time, however, Beijing remained publicly critical
of the NPT because it was "discriminatory" against non-nuclear
states. In the meantime, Congress tried to find ways to express concerns
about Pakistan's nuclear status without jeopardizing U.S. Afghanistan
policy. The result was the Pressler amendment (1985), a far less stringent
version of the Symington amendment. Under Pressler, economic aid and
government military sales would continue as long as the President
could certify that Pakistan had not assembled a nuclear device. (Note
17)
Document
16: U.S. State Department Briefing Papers, "The President's
Meeting with President Yang Shangkun," 8 February 1989, Secret
Source: State Department FOIA release
Lingering suspicions over the degree of China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation
encouraged the State Department's China Desk to raise the problem
in material prepared for President George H.W. Bush's visit to China,
where he would meet China's president, Yang Shangkun, among other
senior officials. Yang, an influential military man (who would soon
help orchestrate the crackdown at Tiananmen Square) played an important
role in military sales policy. (Note 18) For the
State Department, a discussion with Yang provided an opportunity to
emphasize the U.S. interest in the military dimension of U.S.-China
relations but also to convey "concerns over the global dangers
of nuclear, missile, and chemical weapons proliferation." By
then Washington was also worried about Chinese missile sales, for
example, to Saudi Arabia, and working to influence Beijing to comply
with the nascent Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). With respect
to Pakistan, "our concern focuses on reports over a number of
years of Chinese assistance to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program."
Whether or how Bush or his Secretary of State dealt with those issues
in his talks with Yang is yet to be disclosed.
Document
17: U.S. Embassy China Cable 14868 to State Department, "Ranking
MFA Official on PRC Nuclear Matters: No Proliferation or Subs for
Pakistan; Zip for Pyongyang," 30 May 1989, Secret, excised copy
Source: State Department FOIA release
If Bush or Secretary of State Baker raised questions about China's
stance on nuclear proliferation, they may have rankled Foreign Ministry
officials. At a meeting held days before the Tiananmen Square events,
an unidentified Chinese diplomat denied the rumors that China had
helped Pakistan develop nuclear weapons and observed that since Beijing's
accession to the IAEA, any country with which China was engaging in
nuclear cooperation had to accept safeguards on fuels and technology.
He also denied another rumor--Chinese cooperation with Pakistan on
nuclear submarine technology--this was most unlikely, he claimed,
because the "PRC is certainly the most backward in those technologies."
(Note 19) The diplomat restated the Zhao declaration
adding that "one could even say that China opposes nuclear proliferation,"
despite the PRC's opposition to the NPT.
Document
18: U.S. Department of State, Office of Non-Proliferation and
Export Technology, "U.S. Interaction with the PRC Concerning
the PRC's Nuclear Relationship with Pakistan," 28 November 1989,
Secret, excised copy
Source: State Department FOIA release
This heavily excised paper provides some background on the negotiation
of the nuclear cooperation agreement although the material relating
to its implementation and any specifics on Pakistan is withheld. Whatever
this paper may have concluded, the Bush administration would determine
the following year that it could not certify that Pakistan was in
compliance with Pressler amendment requirements. In the light of Pakistani
decisions to assemble several nuclear cores and an intelligence establishment
consensus that this had indeed happened, President Bush withheld the
necessary certification, thus triggering a suspension of military
and economic aid. Facilitating this decision was the Soviet withdrawal
from Afghanistan, which seemingly reduced Pakistan's strategic importance.
This action produced an angry reaction in Pakistan where authorities
continued the drive toward a nuclear capability. (Note
20)
Document
19: U.S. Embassy China Cable 1884, "Proliferation Issues:
The View from Beijing Looks Grim," 16 April 1991, Confidential,
excised copy
Source: State Department FOIA release
In this update, the Embassy summarized China's official position
on nuclear proliferation and nuclear exports including Beijing's routine
demurrals that it had given any assistance to Pakistan's weapons program
or that it was anything less than aboveboard in applying IAAEA safeguards
on nuclear projects with Pakistan and Algeria. (Note
21) While the Chinese professed concern about a South Asian nuclear
arms race, they argued that Pakistan's nuclear program was basically
"defensive" and a "check" against Indian "hegemonism"
in the region, which China also opposed. Beijing also rejected New
Delhi's arguments that it was the PRC nuclear arsenal that had motivated
the Indian program. The Chinese were not about to put their nuclear
arsenal on the table and believed that only the superpowers--the United
States and the (soon to be former) Soviet Union--could broker a deal.
Thus, Beijing was "unresponsive to our attempts to engage them
on South Asian nuclear proliferation."
Document
20: Department of State cable 09394 to U.S. Embassy China, "China's
Nuclear Reactor Deal with Pakistan; Chinese Steps Toward Joining NPT,"
10 January 1992, Confidential
Source: State Department FOIA release
The news that a major nuclear export from China to Pakistan--a 388
megawatt nuclear power plant--was in the works produced concerns that
the Chinese safeguards were not tough enough to prevent diversion
of nuclear resources to the Pakistani weapons program. Thus, the Department
instructed Embassy officials to express regret that the Chinese were
not treating "full-scope safeguards"--ensuring non-diversion
of resources from the Pakistani nuclear power program to the non-safeguarded
weapons program--as a condition for the sale. Such safeguards had
become a standard for the Nuclear Suppliers Group which tried to provide
international regulation for nuclear exports. On a more positive note,
the Department asked the Embassy to preface those concerns by expressing
satisfaction that China's National Peoples Congress had made a decision
that China would adhere to the NPT, which became official in March
1992. With this move, China was starting to join the world in a critically
important area although Beijing's adherence to new standards of nonproliferation
policy would not occur overnight.
Document
21: U.S. Embassy China cable 01109 to State Department, "China's
Nuclear Deal with Pakistan -- Demarche Delivered," 14 January
1992, Confidential
Source: State Department FOIA release
Several days later, an Embassy representative presented the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs with the demarche on the reactor deal with Pakistan.
Wu Chengjiang, the Foreign Ministry expert on nuclear proliferation
matters, observed that Beijing would apply IAEA safeguards to the
reactor sale and that the NPT did not require full-scope safeguards.
Further, Wu argued, Beijing needed to make the sale, which would benefit
Pakistan's economic development. The embassy official nevertheless
maintained that full-scope safeguards were necessary for reactor sales
to Pakistan because of the "proliferation concern." Washington
would continue to press Beijing on this issue.
Document
22: U.S. Embassy China cable 02139 to State Department, "Recent
Nuclear Developments in China," 24 January 1992 [incomplete document],
Confidential
Source: State Department FOIA release
Other countries took a parallel position to Washington's on the reactor
sale to Pakistan; paragraph 5 of the cable reports on a recent Chinese
discussion with a German company of the possible sale of cooling equipment
for the Pakistan reactor. The Germans would not quote a price and
informed the Chinese that the West German government would not provide
an export license without adequate safeguards. The German businessmen
agreed to quote a price, however, when the Chinese representative
said that he wanted to get the same item for a Chinese reactor to
be built later in the decade. That some Chinese officials recognized
they had been playing outside of the nonproliferation rules is evident
in the reported reaction to a French demarche about Chinese nuclear
activities in Algeria: "We got caught this time in Algeria, but
this will not happen again"--a double entendre that did not reassure
the French.
Document
23: U.S. Embassy China cable 025699, "ACDA Director Lehman's
Beijing Consultations: Non-CWC Topics," 19 August 1992, Secret,
excised copy
Source: State Department FOIA release
The Bush administration saw 1992 as a year of progress in cooperation
with China on nuclear proliferation and regional security issues.
A visit to China by ACDA director Ronald Lehman would involve more
talk on full-scope safeguards, but also expressions of appreciation
for Beijing's decision to join the NPT, its helpfulness on the festering
North Korean nuclear issue, and the decision to participate in talks
on South Asia. Nevertheless, Lehman reported that Washington was "still
concerned about reports of Chinese involvement in Pakistan's nuclear
weapons program." Plainly, that was an issue that time had not
settled.
Document
24: U.S. Embassy China cable 037741, "Chinese Views on NPT
Extension," 25 November 1992, Confidential
Source: State Department FOIA Release
Not long after Beijing signed the NPT, the problem of treaty extension
was on the international agenda, with plans for a 1995 conference
under way. In November the Chinese hosted a conference on arms control
where relatively frank Chinese assessments of the NPT shed some light
on older internal debates, motivations for signing the treaty, and
reactions to U.S. pressure on the China-Pakistan nuclear connection.
Unfortunately, this cable was transmitted in somewhat garbled form
(see paragraph 6, first sentence), but the discussion in that paragraph
suggests why some Chinese officials may have thought it legitimate
for Pakistan to develop nuclear weapons. Some of the Chinese argued
that the U.S.-Soviet nuclear standoff had produced "a de facto
political stability that prevented direct conflict." If that
was good enough for Moscow and Washington should not "other rival
states", such as India and Pakistan, have the "same chance
to prevent conflict." This was a minority view at the conference
but it may have been close to the thinking of those elements in the
government that had supported nuclear assistance to Pakistan.
Document
25: U.S. State Department Briefing Paper, "China," circa
December 1992, Secret, excised copy
Source: State Department FOIA Release
China policy would be a significant issue for the incoming Clinton
administration which, like its predecessors, would have to balance
nuclear proliferation concerns with trade, human rights, missile proliferation,
and other issues. This briefing paper, prepared for incoming Secretary
of State Warren Christopher, provides an overview of China's evolving
approach to nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation. China's uneven
commitment to nuclear nonproliferation was plainly troubling, as evidenced
by the discussion of Beijing's aid to Algerian and Iranian nuclear
programs. The China-Pakistan nuclear relationship remained a top concern;
not only the problem of full-scope safeguards on reactor sales, but
also "continuing activities with Pakistan's nuclear weapons program."
The briefing paper included recommendations on "tools",
"starting minimally and then increasing in severity," that
could be used to ensure Chinese compliance with "minimum standards"
of nonproliferation policy. The recommendations are heavily excised
in this version and it is obscure how the Clinton administration conducted
itself in the behind-the-scenes diplomacy of nuclear nonproliferation
policy. Nevertheless, as the following documents suggests, by 1997
the administration was confident that the problem of Chinese cooperation
with Pakistan's nuclear weapons activity had been resolved.
Document
26: "Classified Report to Congress on the Non-Proliferation
and Practices of the People's Republic of China," 1997, Secret,
excised copy
Source: State Department FOIA Release
Twelve years after the U.S. and China signed the nuclear cooperation
agreement, a U.S. president certified that Beijing's nuclear policies
complied with Congressional nonproliferation requirements. Pressure
from the U.S. nuclear energy complex was an important element in the
decision but the Clinton administration argued that changes in Chinese
conduct justified the finding. An important section in this heavily
excised report (only one and a half secret paragraphs were declassified)
was a discussion of the China-Pakistan relationship. While the Chinese
would never publicly declare that they had aided Pakistan, new charges
of illicit sales--of ring magnets and a special industrial furnace--were
surfacing, (Note 22) and further U.S. demarches
produced a May 1996 public declaration that China would not assist
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Nevertheless, intelligence intercepts
unwisely published by Washington Times reporter Bill Gertz
suggest that only months after that declaration the Chinese, through
the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation, were still making deals
with the Pakistanis although it remains unclear whether the transactions
were completed. (Note 23) Whether the White House
used this discovery to stimulate stronger nonproliferation commitments
from the Chinese is unclear. In any event, the Clinton administration
soon become that Chinese policies had changed for the better and the
following year reported so to Congress. According to the 1997 certification,
"we have no direct evidence that China has transferred equipment
or material to Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear program since that
time, and we have no basis for concluding that China is not honoring
its pledge." Although some Republican critics would argue that
China remained in defiance of the NPT, the Clinton White House rested
its case; the Republicans could not overturn the certification. Thus,
the huge Chinese market for U.S. nuclear reactor technology was officially
open. (Note 24)
President Clinton's decision did not mean that the China-Pakistan
nuclear issue had simply gone away. Months later, the Christian
Science Monitor reported that U.S. intelligence had picked up
signs that Chinese companies were trying to sell equipment for Iran's
and Pakistan's nuclear programs. Apparently, the U.S. government reported
the information to Beijing, which took steps to halt the transactions.
(Note 25) Yet the certification of Beijing's nonproliferation
policy by no means dispelled the nuclear problem in U.S.-China relations.
During 1998, accusations of Chinese espionage would fill front pages
as would a flap over the U.S. satellite technology to China. In more
recent years, DCI Tenet's semi-annual unclassified reports to Congress
on weapons of mass destruction proliferation show continuing wariness
about the China. (Note 26)
That China's aid to Pakistan had the most negative consequences became
evident in May 1998, when both India and Pakistan held nuclear weapons
tests and more recently with more and more disclosures on Pakistan's
role as a super-proliferator. China expressed "deep regret"
over the former and the Foreign Ministry is now investigating the
latter. To what degree Beijing will disclose the background of its
nuclear relationship with Pakistan remains to be seen.
Notes
*The FOIA requests and appeals that made this collection possible
were supported by the W. Alton Jones Foundation, whose untimely and
regrettable disbanding created a significant void in support for research
on nuclear nonproliferation policy.
1. See "Libyan Arms Designs Traced Back to
China," Washington Post, 15 February 2004.
2. For a summary of the charges, see Ming Zhang,
China's Changing Nuclear Posture: Reactions to the South Asian
Nuclear Tests (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 1999), p. 7, and Monterey Institute of International Studies,
"China's Nuclear Exports and Assistance to Pakistan," at
<http://cns.miis.edu/research/india/china/npakpos.htm>.
3. Robert S. Sutter, China's Nuclear Weapons
and Arms Control Policies: Implications for the United States
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1988), pp. 22,
27-28.
4. Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan
1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies (Baltimore/Washington,D.C: Johns
Hopkins University Press/Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001), pp. 172
and 224 (for "pillars" of Pakistan diplomacy).
5. Kux, The United States and Pakistan,
pp. 332-333.
6. Bill Gertz, Betrayal: How the Clinton Administration
Undermined American Security (Washington, DC : Regnery Pub.,
1999), pp. 206-207.
7. "Come Clean," South China Morning
Post, 20 February 2004. For background on the Nuclear Suppliers
Group, see <http://fas.org/nuke/control/nsg>
and <http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org>.
8. The Johnson administration first learned of this
understanding in late 1964 but it is unclear whether U.S. intelligence
ever found out what it was about. See U.S. Department of State, Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXV, South Asia
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2000), p. 167.
9. For developments in 1965, see Robert J. McMahon,
The Cold War on the Periphery: the United States, China, and Pakistan
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 304-336, and Kux, The
United States and Pakistan 1947-2000, pp. 153-168. For the Chinese
signaling over Vietnam, see Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold
War (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001),
p. 217.
10. For U.S.-Pakistan relations during the Nixon
years, see F. S. Aijazzudin, ed., The White House and Pakistan:
Secret Declassified Documents, 1969-1974 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002).
11. For China as a military supplier and the Pakistani
nuclear decision in 1974, see Kux, The United States and Pakistan,
p. 223; Leonard Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today (New
York: Vintage Books, 1984), pp. 80 and 212.
12. Ibid, pp. 85-86; Kux, The United States
and Pakistan, p. 239.
13. See "A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation,"
New York Times, 12 February 2004.
14. This document appeared in a National Security
Archive briefing book edited by South Asia/Near East specialist Joyce
Battle. See "India and Pakistan--On the Nuclear Threshold,"
at <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB6/index.html>
15. Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today,
p. 324.
16. For details on the nuclear cooperation agreement
and implementation issues, see <http://www.nti.org/db/china/ncaorg.htm>,
on the Nuclear Threat Initiative web site.
17. Kux, The United States and Pakistan,
pp. 275-278.
18. For background on Yang, see "Yang Shangkun,
a President Who Would be King, Dies," Reuters, 14 September
1998.
19. Readers can decide for themselves how "backward"
the Chinese nuclear submarine program was by consulting China's
Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear
War, by John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1994), especially pp. 176-208.
20. Kux, The United States and Pakistan,
pp. 309-311.
21. For the Algeria-China nuclear connection, see
David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Algeria: Big Deal in the
Desert?" The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 57 (May-June
2001): 45-52.
22. Zhang, China's Changing Nuclear Posture,
p. 7.
23. Gertz, Betrayal, pp. 266-267.
24. "U.S. Says China Isn't Helping Others
Build Bombs," New York Times, 11 December 1997. For
former Rep. Lee Hamilton's case for the certification and discussion
of the criticisms, see "We Mustn't Move the Bar on China Now,"
Washington Post, 12 November 1997.
25. "China Foils the Spread of Nukes …
Probably," Christian Science Monitor, 13 March 1998.
26 . The whole series of CIA Non-Proliferation Center
semi-annual (since 1999) "Unclassified Reports to Congress on
the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction
and Advanced Conventional Munitions," can be found at <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/wmd.htm>.
Each report has a separate section on China as a nuclear supplier.
See also Congressional Research Service, "China and Proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues,"
8 August 2003, at <http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/RL31555.pdf>.