Washington,
DC, March 21, 2006 - The U.S. Intelligence
Community devoted significant effort to the collection and analysis
of intelligence concerning the French nuclear weapons program
beginning in the early days of the Cold War through the mid-1970s,
according to documents obtained through the Freedom of Information
Act and archival research and posted on the Web today by the National
Security Archive at George Washington University.
Today's posting includes more than 30 documents
-- many originally classified Top Secret -- produced by interagency
groups, the Manhattan Engineer District's Foreign Intelligence
Section, the CIA, the State Department, the U.S. Pacific Command,
and the Strategic Air Command.
The records were obtained by Archive Senior Fellow
Jeffrey T. Richelson while conducting research for his recently
published book, Spying
on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to
Iran and North Korea (W.W. Norton), and by Archive senior
analyst William Burr.
The documents show that French nuclear activities
were of sufficient concern to prompt the Manhattan Engineer District's
intelligence section to produce a series of reports in 1946 --
based on a variety of sources on French nuclear research and development
activities -- on the possibility that French scientists were willing
to sell nuclear know-how to the right bidder and described the
French search for uranium deposits. Documents from the early 1950s
show U.S. intelligence interest in personnel changes in the French
atomic energy organization.
The documents also indicate that new technological
improvements in U.S. nuclear intelligence gathering were used
to closely monitor the French program. The collection effort included
the use of overhead reconnaissance systems (including satellites
and U-2 aircraft), drones, communications intercepts systems,
aircraft to gather debris and signatures from French nuclear tests,
and specially-equipped ships stationed near the French Pacific
test site.
Intelligence analysts used the results of these
collection efforts to produce the classified periodicals, reports
by the Office of Scientific Intelligence, and national and special
national intelligence estimates included in the electronic briefing
book.
U.S.
Intelligence and the French Nuclear Weapons Program
National
Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 184
Edited
by Jeffrey Richelson
During World War II, as the United States and Britain were working
to develop an atomic bomb, their intelligence services tried to
determine what progress Germany had made in developing the ultimate
weapon. With the collapse of the Third Reich, U.S. intelligence
turned part of its attention to Soviet nuclear activities. But
while the Soviet Union was the nation whose nuclear activities
most concerned U.S. intelligence organizations in the decades
after 1945, there were other nations whose nuclear progress was
also monitored by the United States starting in the 1940s. One
of those nations was France.
Initial French interest in developing nuclear weapons goes back
to 1939, when Frédéric Joliot-Curie and other French
scientists met with the French managing director of Union Miniere,
the company that controlled the uranium in the Congo. (Note
1) After Allied forces landed at Normandy in June 1944, a
U.S.-British unit, designated ALSOS, followed the invading troops,
collecting scientists, documents, and equipment pertaining to
the German nuclear program. But the United States also wanted
to prevent France from acquiring nuclear expertise and equipment
and was eager to gain control of personnel and hardware related
to the German program both for intelligence exploitation and to
keep the information from falling into French hands. In April
1945, ALSOS conducted Operation HARBORAGE - seizing key German
scientists (including Werner Heisenberg) and an experimental reactor
in an area of Germany that was soon to come under the control
of French forces. (Note 2)
United States efforts to monitor French nuclear activities are
revealed in declassified reports produced by the Manhattan Engineer
District's foreign intelligence section in 1946. Six reports (Documents
1-6), based on a variety of sources, provided overviews of
French nuclear research and development capabilities, passed on
a rumor that French scientists were willing to sell nuclear know-how
to the right bidder, summarized the key elements of a speech by
Joliot-Curie, France's most prominent nuclear scientist, and described
the French search for uranium deposits.
In the early 1950s, other elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community
- including the State Department's intelligence unit and Army
intelligence - provided information on personnel involved in the
French nuclear program (Document 7, Document
8). At the time, and into the mid-1950s, there had been no
French decision to pursue development of a nuclear weapon. But
after the 1957 defeat of the government of Guy Mollet, which had
promised that it would not seek to develop nuclear weapons, that
would change. As an article in the CIA's Central Intelligence
Bulletin (Document 9) noted in May 1957,
pressures appeared to be mounting in France to develop a nuclear
weapon.
 |
KH-7
satellite reconnaissance image of the Mururoa Atomic
Test Site in French Polynesia, May 26, 1967. (Source:
U.S. National Archives via Tim Brown) Click
to enlarge
|
|
It would not be long before France had established an organization
to develop a nuclear weapon and began its search for a test site.
U.S. intelligence would report in the late 1950s on French progress
toward detonating an atomic device - which involved reporting
on personnel, reactors, enrichment facilities, the test site in
the Sahara, and movements of personnel and equipment. Following
the initial test in February 1960, the U.S. Intelligence Community
would add estimating the timing of future tests, monitoring the
results of those tests, and the research, development and production
of delivery systems, to its tasks. When France was forced by Algerian
independence to find a new test site, it became necessary to also
monitor the construction effort and prepare to monitor tests at
the new site in the Pacific.
The collection and analysis effort involved a variety of U.S.
intelligence organizations. Data was collected from human sources
by the CIA, while the National Security Agency intercepted relevant
communications (Document 28). The CIA and
National Reconnaissance Office (after its creation in September
1961) used aircraft such as the U-2 (Document
18, Document 24) and satellites to obtain
overhead imagery of reactors, enrichment facilities, and test
sites.
In addition, the specific signatures generated by French nuclear
detonations - including seismic signals and, until France terminated
atmospheric testing in 1974, the electromagnetic pulses, x-rays,
infrared radiation and debris generated from atmospheric explosions
- were also collected. Air Force Technical Applications Center
ground stations, AFTAC/Air Force satellites (including the VELA
and Defense Support Program satellites), debris-collecting U-2
aircraft operated by the Strategic Air Command, and U.S. Navy
ships also contributed to the collection effort. In the early
1960s, AFTAC sought to establish ground stations closer to Algeria
to facilitate test monitoring (Document 14,
Document 15).
The data generated by U.S. collection efforts allowed CIA and
other Intelligence Community analysts to produce current intelligence
reports (for example, Document 13) as well
as more in-depth studies and estimates of the French nuclear weapons
program starting in the late 1950s - such as The French Nuclear
Weapons Program of July 1963 (Document 19)
and August 1965's The French Pacific Nuclear Test Center
(Document 25).
The documents included in this briefing book were obtained from
the U.S. National Archives and through Freedom of Information
Act requests (some filed by National Security Archive senior analyst
William Burr) as part of the research conducted by Archive Senior
Fellow Jeffrey T. Richelson for his book, Spying
on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to
Iran and North Korea. (Note 3) They
provide information on both the collection and analysis of data
concerning the French nuclear program and illustrate the extensive
efforts that the United States made, particularly in the 1960s
and early 1970s, to collect and analyze data about French nuclear
weapons activities.
Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe
Acrobat Reader to view.
Document
1: Lt. Col. S.M. Skinner to Col. W.R. Shuler, Subject:
Atomic Experiments in France, February 18, 1946. Top Secret
Source: National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA), RG 226, Entry 210, Box 431, Folder 2
This memorandum, from a member of the War Department's Strategic
Services Unit to a member of the Manhattan Engineer District's
Foreign Intelligence Section, concerns a rumor passed on by a
"reliable source." The rumor involved the alleged willingness
of some French scientists to sell information concerning the "formula
and techniques concerning atomic explosives" to "one
of the smaller nations."
Document
2: Henry Lowenhaupt, Subject: Review of the French Atomic
Energy Development, July 25, 1946. Top Secret
Source: NARA, RG 77, Entry 22, Box 173
This study was authored by a member of the Manhattan Engineer
District's Foreign Intelligence Section. It provides a review
of what was known to the intelligence section about the history
of the French atomic energy program - with regard to organization,
technology, and resources. It also poses fifteen questions for
further investigation and analysis - including questions concerning
French construction of reactors, attempts to acquire uranium through
prospecting and purchase, and personnel.
Document
3: Major Paul O. Langguth to Lt. Col. Richard H. Free, Subject:
Atomic Energy Research in France, August 29, 1946. Top Secret
Source: NARA, RG 77, Entry 22, Box 173
Prepared by a representative of the Manhattan Engineer District
in London, this review of the French atomic energy program covers
the functions, key personnel, and key facilities of the High Commissariat
for Atomic Energy, created in October 1945. It also covers the
functions and activities of other research organizations and institutions
of nineteen other institutions, key personalities, raw materials,
political considerations, and French capabilities.
Document
4: W.R. Shuler, Corps of Engineers to Maj. Gen. S.J. Chamberlain,
Director of Intelligence War Department, Subject: Operation
Crossroad, September 18, 1946. Top Secret
Source:
NARA, RG 77, Entry 22, Box 173
This memo, from a member of the Manhattan Engineer District,
transmits information obtained by the MED from a "reliable
source." That information concerned several of the French
observers who attended the U.S. CROSSROAD nuclear test at Bikini
- Capt. Henri Balande, Bertrand Goldschmidt, Andre Labarthe, and
Frederic Joliot-Curie - as well as France's atomic energy plans.
Document
5: H.S. Lowenhaupt, Subject: France's Atomic Energy Development,
as Extracted From Joliot-Curie's Speech to the Committee on Atomic
Energy, November 14, 1946. Top Secret
Source:
NARA, RG 77, Entry 22, Box 173
This summary and analysis of Joliot-Curie's speech covers a wide
variety of topics - including, the origins of the French Atomic
Energy Commission (High Commissariat for Atomic Energy), French
knowledge of Soviet nuclear developments, Joliot-Curie's vision
of cooperation with the smaller nations of Europe in the atomic
energy field, the existence of uranium deposits in French colonies,
nuclear-related facilities, and the need for secrecy concerning
the nation's atomic energy developments.
Document
6: Lt. Col. Edgar P. Dean, Office of the Military Attache,
American Embassy London, to Col. L.E. Seeman, Subject: Review
of the French Atomic Energy Development, November 18, 1946.
Top Secret
Source:
NARA, RG 77, Entry 22, Box 173
This memo, another prepared by the Manhattan Engineer District's
London office, demonstrates the continued interest in developments
in the French nuclear program. It reports on French geological
survey activities conducted in France and its colonies related
to minerals of interest to the French nuclear program, the High
Commissariat for Atomic Energy's headquarters, and nuclear physics
equipment in France. Attached is a breakdown of nuclear physics
personnel associated with French universities.
Document
7: Division of Biographic Information, Department of State,
to Special Assistant Intelligence, Department of State, Francis
Perrin, French High Commissioner of Atomic Energy, April 24, 1951.
Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This one-page biographic sketch focuses on the Frederic Joliot-Curie's
replacement as chairman of the French atomic energy commission.
It focuses on the reasons for the delay in confirming Perrin,
as well as the new chairman's personal, political, and professional
history.
Document
8: Garrison B. Coverdale, Office of the Assistant Chief of
Staff, Intelligence Memorandum, Memorandum for: Director of Central
Intelligence, Subject: French AEC Personnel Changes and Appointments,
December 23, 1952.Secret, w/att: French AEC Personnel Changes
and Appointments
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
The memo attached to the cover memorandum reports comments from
an unidentified source concerning personnel changes in the French
Atomic Energy Commission - commenting on the political beliefs
of one individual who had been invited to join the AEC, and the
likely role of another individual associated with the commission,
and the replacement of the AEC's secretary-general.
Document
9: Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency,
"French Position on Disarmament May Be Shifting," Current
Intelligence Bulletin, May 29, 1957. Top Secret
Source:
CIA Records Search Tool (CREST) Collection, NARA
The government of Guy Mollet, recently defeated in elections,
had offered assurances that France would not seek to develop nuclear
weapons if any early disarmament agreement. This brief report
notes that pressures appeared to be mounting in France to develop
a nuclear weapon - and notes the political forces pushing for
such a weapon, and the factors behind nationalist pressures for
a French atomic bomb.
Document
10: Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency,
"French Nuclear Weapons Program," Current Intelligence
Weekly, September 18, 1958. Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
In the first years after France had decided to develop a nuclear
weapons capability, U.S. intelligence reported on French progress
toward joining the nuclear club. This article reports on the assessment
of France's capability to explode a nuclear device, possible preparations,
the activities of an unidentified German scientist, and relevant
statements by French officials.
Document
11: Office of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency, The French Nuclear Weapons Program, November
19, 1959. Classification Redacted
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
Despite suggestions a year earlier (Document
10) that France might soon test a nuclear weapon, no test
had yet occurred at the time this scientific intelligence report
was completed. The report's objective was to assess French capability
to produce fissionable material (both highly enriched uranium
and plutonium); to develop, test, and produce nuclear weapons;
and to estimate the likely timing of the first test.
Document
12: Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.
"The French Nuclear Energy Program," Current Intelligence
Weekly Summary, January 28, 1960. Classification Redacted
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This four-page article reviews some of the history of French
atomic energy efforts, the nation's "peaceful uses"
program, the weapons program, weapons testing and plans, the relationship
between the nuclear weapons program and foreign policy, and France's
role in international nuclear activities and agreements. The weapon
testing and plans section discusses the reasons for the then-recent
delay in timing of the first French test and specifics of the
planned test series.
Document
13: Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.
"French Nuclear Test Plans," Current Intelligence
Weekly Summary, February 25, 1960. Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
Published less than two weeks after France's first test on February
13, this article reports on the expectations concerning the specifics
of the three devices that would make up the remainder of the initial
test series, the role of the tests in development of an actual
weapon, the impact of international protests on French plans to
test underground, and France's disarmament plan.
Document
14: Richard St. F. Post to Mr. Witman, Subject: Coverage
of French Underground Tests, August 4, 1961. Secret
Source:
NARA, RG 59, Records of Special Assistant to Secretary for Atomic
Energy and Outer Space, Subject and Country Files, 1950-1962,
Box 5, Folder 1961-France-Testing
This memo reports on a meeting held in the office of the State
Department's Special Assistant for Atomic Energy and Outer Space,
following up on late July inquiry from the head of the Air Force
Technical Applications Center. The subject under discussion was
whether it would be possible to place three Atomic Energy Detection
System (AEDS) stations in areas close to Algeria, in order to
cover French nuclear tests expected to take place from October
1961 through March 1962. The participants discussed the feasibility
of locating stations in Mali, Niger, and Libya.
Document
15: Howard Furnas to General Rodenhauser, August 15, 1961.
Secret
Source:
NARA, RG 59, Records of Special Assistant to Secretary for Atomic
Energy and Outer Space, Subject and Country Files, 1950-1962,
Box 5, Folder 1961-France-Testing
This letter from State Department official Howard Furnas to the
head of AFTAC, General Rodenhauser, reports on the conclusions
reached as a result of considering the feasibility of placing
AEDS stations close to Algeria. It explains why Mail and Niger
are not feasible alternatives, and why Libya is a possibility.
It goes on to note that the State Department was in the process
of evaluating the foreign policy implications of the proposal.
Document
16: Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.
"France May Reassess Nuclear Force," Current Intelligence
Weekly Summary, April 12, 1963. Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
According to this article, technical difficulties and rising
costs might be forcing France to take a harder look at its program
to develop an independent nuclear deterrent. While France remained
committed to having its own force, the article reported that there
were indications that, in order to obtain technological assistance,
it might be looking for ways to reduce its differences with the
Western Alliance.
Document
17: Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.
The French Nuclear Strike Force Program, May 31, 1963.
Secret
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request
Several aspects of France's nuclear strike program are examined
in this report - the program's goals, the Mirage IV aircraft (at
the time France's only means of delivery nuclear warheads), the
program to develop a ballistic missile-launching submarine, warhead
development, and the competition for resources.
Document
18: James A. Cunningham Jr. Memorandum for: Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence, Subject: Proposed Operation of U-2
Aircraft from Aircraft Carrier, July 22, 1963. Secret
Source:
CIA Records Search Tool (CREST) Collection, NARA
In 1963 the CIA initiated an effort to modify some U-2 aircraft
to allow them to take off and land on aircraft carriers - which
would allow some U-2 flights to be conducted without obtaining
foreign basing rights, and could move the planes into position
to conduct overflights of targets that might not be easily reachable
if launched from bases on land, even if basing rights could be
obtained. The only two operational U-2 overflights launched from
a carrier, in 1966, would overfly the new French nuclear test
site on Mururoa.
Document
19: Director of Central Intelligence, SNIE 22-2-63, The
French Nuclear Weapons Program, July 24, 1963. Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This estimate, coordinated among all relevant intelligence community
organizations, focuses on three topics related to the French nuclear
weapons program - current status and future development (with
regard to both nuclear weapons and delivery systems), the cost
and burden to the French economy, and political considerations
(including President Charles de Gaulle's justification for an
independent French program, European support for de Gaulle's program,
and French reaction to a treaty banning atmospheric tests).
Document
20: Office of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency. The French Nuclear Weapon Program, March 27,
1964. Top Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
Produced by the CIA Directorate of Science and Technology's scientific
intelligence component, this study devotes more attention to technical
issues concerning the French nuclear weapons program than the
1963 special national estimate. In assessing the available resources,
production capacity, and testing facilities of the French program,
the study examines the availability of raw materials, research
facilities and their missions, production of fissile ("special")
material, and nuclear weapons tests and test sites.
Document
21: Director of Central Intelligence, Memorandum to Holders
of Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 22-2-63, The
French Nuclear Weapons Program, April 8, 1964. Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
In SNIE 22-2-63 (Document 19) the Intelligence
Community estimated that France was probably not planning to develop
a land-based intermediate range ballistic missile as a nuclear
delivery vehicle. This memorandum was prepared in response to
the acquisition of information that drastically altered that conclusion.
Document
22: Office of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency. French Development of Nuclear Weapons Delivery Systems,
July 14, 1964. Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This study was written to evaluate the "probable nature,
effectiveness, and timing of the various French nuclear weapons
delivery systems." It examines the characteristics and capabilities
of the Mirage IV supersonic bomber, the planned ballistic missile
submarine, and the land-based intermediate range ballistic missile
system. An appendix on ballistic missile research and development
in France discusses the organizations involved, depicts potential
locations for IRBM sites, and technical considerations facing
warhead developers.
Document
23: Director of Central Intelligence, NIE 22-64, The French
Advanced Weapons Program, November 18, 1964. Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
A key conclusion of this estimate was that before the end of
1964, the French would begin a series of underground tests in
the Sahara aimed at developing thermonuclear techniques. Other
key conclusions concerned the Mirage IV, the French submarine
missile force, and the cost of the program. The estimate's discussion
section addresses problems and prospects of the French advanced
weapons program with regard to the production of fissile material,
the construction of new test facilities in the Pacific, and the
development of delivery systems. An appendix examines the costs
of the advanced weapons program.
Document
24: Directorate of Science and Technology, Central Intelligence
Agency, U-2 Aircraft Carrier Operation: project "WHALE
TALE," December 1964. Top Secret
Source:
CREST Collection, NARA
This document describes the early history of the program to operate
U-2 aircraft off carriers - which would be used to overfly the
French Pacific Nuclear Test Center - the approval of the program,
as well as pilot training and suitability tests.
Document
25: Office of Scientific Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency. The French Pacific Nuclear Test Center, August
6, 1965. Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
Political pressure first forced France to moves its Algerian
tests underground. Algerian independence then forced France to
find a new test site. After consideration of a number of sites,
two sites in the Pacific were selected - Mururoa and Fangataufa.
This study reports on the ongoing construction effort, scheduled
to be completed in early 1966, as well as past French nuclear
tests, the decision process to select a new test site, organization
of the French testing program, test schedules, and test operations.
Document
26: U.S. Pacific Command, CINCPAC Command History 1973,
Volume I, n.d. (Extract). Top Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This extract provides details of one element of the U.S. intelligence
collection efforts directed against French nuclear tests in the
Pacific - the one that employed USNS Wheeling (codenamed
POCK MARK).
Document
27: Central Intelligence Agency, "France," Current
Intelligence Bulletin, July 13, 1973. Top Secret
Source:
CREST, NARA
This short item in the CIB tries to provide readers with a preview
of the French nuclear tests for 1973. The portion of the item
that was not redacted specifies the expected number and type of
detonations, the protests that had taken place, and French determination
to proceed irrespective of international pressure.
Document
28: History Division, Strategic Air Command, SAC Reconnaissance
History, January 1968-June 1971, November 7, 1973. (Extract)
Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This extract focuses on one part of the aerial element of the
U.S. collection effort against the French program - operation
BURNING LIGHT. The operation involved use of two KC-135R aircraft,
whose primary sensors measured and recorded the electromagnetic
pulses generated by a nuclear detonation. The extract provides
data on the number of BURNING LIGHT flights in 1968 and 1970.
It also notes the role National Security Agency intercepts played
in providing advance notification of tests - allowing BURNING
LIGHT missions to be in the required area at the time of the tests.
Document
29: Office of the Historian, Strategic Air Command. History
of SAC Reconnaissance Operations, FY 1974, August 28, 1975.
(Extract) Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This extract provides information about BURNING LIGHT monitoring
of French nuclear tests during the 1974 fiscal year. In addition,
it discusses the role played by the USNS Huntsville in
monitoring the same tests.
Document
30: Central Intelligence Agency, French Nuclear Reactor
Fuel Reprocessing Program, September 1984. Classification
Redacted
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This study primarily concerns French reprocessing for commercial
purposes, but does contain a section on the production of plutonium
for weapons use (p.2) and discusses government policy on the proliferation
aspects of reprocessing (p.12).
Document
31: Central Intelligence Agency, French Underground Nuclear
Testing: Environmentally Safe and Likely to Continue, May
1985. Classification Redacted
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
This lightly-redacted, brief study, was produced in the wake
of protests that claimed that French testing in the Pacific had
resulted in Mururoa Atoll breaking apart and leaking large amounts
of radioactive debris into the environment. The conclusion reached
by the CIA, as indicated by the title, was quite different. After
presenting that and other key judgments, the study examines the
geology of Mururoa Atoll, normal containment practice, the current
status of Mururoa Atoll, and the environment status of the Atoll
as documented in two studies - one by French scientists and another
by Pacific Basin Scientists - and considers future prospects.
Document
32: Bureau of Intelligence and Research, State Department,
French Nuclear Strategy and Nuclear Forces: An Update,
June 30, 1987. Secret
Source:
Freedom of Information Act Request
Two portions of this study remain after the removal of classified
information - an overview of how French nuclear doctrine evolved
in response to concerns about different aspects of Soviet military
capabilities, as well as brief discussion of the shift in expenditures
from French conventional forces toward nuclear ones.
Notes
1. Leslie R. Groves, Now It Can Be Told:
The Story of the Manhattan Project (New York: Da Capo, 1983),
pp. 33-34; Bertrand Goldschmidt, Atomic Rivals (New Brunswick,
N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1990), p. 296.
2. Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 234;
Robert S. Norris, Racing for the Bomb: General Leslie R. Groves,
The Manhattan Project's Indispensable Man (South Royalton,
Vt.: Steerforth, 2002),
p. 303.
3. Jeffrey T. Richelson, Spying
on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to
Iran and North Korea (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006).
