Related
article
"Robert
Gates: A Look at the Record"
By Tom Blanton and Peter Kornbluh
The New York Times
May 27, 1991
Praise
for Safe for Democracy
"John
Prados has written the first really comprehensive history of the
CIA, thereby illluminating a basic fact of American intelligence--if
you want to know what the CIA is doing, listen to what the president
is saying; and if you want to know what the president really wants,
watch what the CIA is doing. Safe for Democracy is history
for adults--not White House spin but what really happened and why.
For more than half a century the CIA, with marching orders from
the president, has been trying to make the world safe for democracy.
As Prados describes it, the result of these adventures--little safety,
less democracy--tells us what to expect from the latest crusade
in Iraq."
--
THOMAS POWERS, Pulitzer Prize-winner for national reporting
and author of Intelligence Wars: American Secret History from
Hitler to Al-Qeada
"A
masterful account of the CIA's covert and not-so-covert activities
around the globe. Drawing on thousands of newly declassified documents,
Prados brings together in one colorful narrative a sweeping history
of America's covert wars from the high plains of Tibet to the back
alleys of Cairo. The result is an authoritative book that demythologizes
the agency and poses hard questions about the true costs of secrecy
to democracies everywhere."
--
KAI BIRD, co-author of American Prometheus: The Triumph
and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer, winner of the 2006 Pulitzer
Prize for biography
"John
Prados is one of the most prolific and respected authors on national
security issues today. In his troubling new book, Safe for Democracy,
he draws on his many years of research to show that while the CIA
wields the dagger, its aim is directed by the White House, often
with disastrous results over the decades. At a time when the CIA
is swallowed up in preemptive wars overseas and bureaucratic battles
at home, this definitive history of covert action is both timely
and necessary."
--
JAMES BAMFORD, author of The Puzzle Palace, Body
of Secrets, and A Pretext for War
"John
Prados has put it all together here in one great panorama of the
CIA's covert actions. The chapters on Eisenhower make clear that
he was the key president in promoting the schemes, setting the pattern
for the Cold War. Highly readable, this is intelligence history,
and intelligent history, at its best."
--
LLOYD GARDNER, author of Approaching Vietnam,
Spheres of Influence, and Pay Any Price
"John Prados has again demonstrated his excellence as a researcher
and writer--coupled with his in-depth understanding of intelligence
issues--to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date account of the
CIA's 'secret wars.' Safe for Democracy will be carefully
read by those in and out of the intelligence community--in many
countries."
-- NORMAN
POLMAR, co-author, Spy Book: The Encyclopedia of Espionage
|
Washington
D.C., November 10, 2006 - Bush administration
nominee for Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates had a long
career in government which showed a notable combination of ambition
and caution, according to a new book by Archive senior analyst
John Prados [Safe
for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA
(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006)] which deals with Gates among its
much wider coverage of the agency since its inception.
As Director of Central Intelligence in the immediate aftermath
of the Cold War, Gates faced criticism for moving slowly with
reforming the agency for the new era, and thus missing a moment
of extraordinary opportunity that occurred at that time. In
earlier posts at top levels of the CIA, Gates figured in the
Iran-Contra affair, in which he engaged in sins of omission
if not commission, hesitating to make inquiries and pass warnings
that might have headed off this abuse of power. As the CIA's
top manager for intelligence analysis in the early 1980s he
was accused of slanting intelligence to suit the predilections
of the Reagan administration and his boss, Director William
J. Casey.
Excerpts from Safe
for Democracy related to Mr. Gates are here
posted by the Archive. They are accompanied by the full three
volumes of the extraordinary confirmation
hearings of Gates for CIA director which took place
in 1991, and which at the time constituted the most detailed
examination of U.S. intelligence practices carried out since
the Church and Pike investigations of the 1970s. Also posted
is the portion of the report by Iran-Contra
special prosecutor Lawrence Walsh which concerns Mr. Gates,
along with his response to those findings.
Six
Presidents Served
A career intelligence officer, Robert M. Gates has emphasized
the number of presidents he served and the long sweep of history
he witnessed. The sixty-three year old Gates indeed worked under
every U.S. president from Richard M. Nixon to George Herbert
Walker Bush, and has now been nominated by the second President
Bush as secretary of defense. His resume includes some key periods
in contemporary history, serving in a White House role as Deputy
National Security Adviser during the first Gulf War, leading
the U.S. intelligence community in the wake of the fall of the
Soviet Union, being implicated in the Iran-Contra affair, taking
an active role in directing CIA intelligence analysis during
the Reagan administration, fulfilling assignment as a staff
aide to National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski during
the Carter administration, working on U.S. national intelligence
estimates on the Soviet Union, and playing a peripheral role
in nuclear arms limitation talks during their early years. Gates
holds a PhD from Georgetown University, graduated from the University
of Indiana, and was born and raised in Wichita, Kansas. His
only direct military experience was as a young officer in the
United States Air Force, where he worked primarily as an intelligence
analyst, including for the Minuteman ICBM missile wing stationed
at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri.
The record suggests that Gates combines caution and ambition.
As Director of Central Intelligence, leading the CIA after the
Cold War, Gates promised many reforms but went slowly in implementing
them, carefully marshaling agency support before embarking on
those reforms. In Iran-Contra, the record of the special prosecutor's
investigation shows that Gates learned of a number of the key
developments at a time when he could have intervened, but remained
hesitant to do so. That caution cost him the first two times
he was nominated for Senate confirmation-in both cases, to head
the CIA-in 1987 and 1991. In the first instance, he was forced
to withdraw from consideration. Gates' second nomination, in
1991, led to the contentious hearings posted here.
As a manager of intelligence analysis under CIA Director Casey,
Gates again demonstrated his two most recognizable traits. Knowing
that Casey wanted to see certain kinds of analyses, for instance
that painted the Soviet threat in bleak terms, Gates, according
to former intelligence officers, demanded that his staff comply
and encouraged reporting that some insisted was blatantly slanted,
to a degree that led a variety of intelligence analysts to oppose
his nomination as director. Such opposition was and remains
unprecedented in the history of the CIA. On the other hand,
on the Nicaragua covert operation of the mid-1980s, Gates showed
caution in advising Casey near the end of 1984, when Congress
was on the verge of cutting off all aid to the U.S.-backed Contra
rebels to hand off the project to some other U.S. agency, which
would protect CIA from charges that resulted from questionable
activities. In the Carter White House and as an aide to CIA
Director Stansfield Turner, Gates also displayed his guardedness.
Until 1986, when he emerged as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence,
Gates functioned in a quintessentially staff role.
Given his narrow background in military affairs, Robert Gates
may be expected to go slowly in innovating new policy or strategy
as Secretary of Defense, to devote considerable effort to reestablishing
rapport between the Secretary's office and the military service
chiefs, and to work loyally in support of White House objectives.
On Iraq, that may mean shifts in nuance but not direction. On
the other hand, the Gates appointment may be a moderating influence
on U.S. Iran policy, since he has dealt with this issue and
has knowledge of the players going back more than two decades,
was burned by policy missteps on Iran during the Reagan administration,
and has in the past favored an opening to the Teheran government.
Excerpts
from Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Chicago:
Ivan R. Dee, 2006)
By John Prados
Pages
572-574:
AN
UNCOMFORTABLE INTERREGNUM followed Bill Casey's collapse [on
December 15,1986]. With Casey in and out of the hospital,
Robert M. Gates served as acting DCI. On February 2, 1987,
Casey resigned. The White House faced the sudden need to find
a new director of central intelligence. Years before, at the
outset of Ronald Reagan's presidency, Gates had told colleagues
he wanted the top job. Now he came close to getting it. So
close. The day Casey resigned, President Reagan nominated
Gates as DCI in his own right. Perhaps the Reagan White House,
beset by Iran-Contra, had not the energy or vision to seek
out a new candidate for DCI. Or possibly Reagan saw Gates
as a loyalist. Perhaps the call was for a professional but
not someone with roots in the clandestine service. Gates fit
that bill too. In any event, for a time it looked like Bob
Gates would be moving into the director's office.
The
Senate would have to approve the Gates nomination, but the
White House had clearly felt out the ground there. In the
1986 off-year elections the Democrats regained control of
Congress, making Oklahoma Senator David L. Boren chairman
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Boren and
a number of others reacted positively to the Gates nomination.
Even Vermont's Pat Leahy saw the Gates appointment as a wise
move. Opinion held that Gates would be asked tough questions
on Iran-Contra but then confirmed.
Bob
Gates put his best foot forward. There could be no denying
his background as a superbly qualified intelligence officer.
He had done that work for the air force and the CIA, beginning
with Soviet nuclear weapons. He had seen diplomacy on the
U.S. delegation to arms control talks. Gates had crafted the
NIEs as an assistant national intelligence officer, as national
intelligence officer, and later as ex officio chairman of
the National Intelligence Council. He had done management
as an assistant to a CIA director, an executive staff director,
and as deputy director. Gates had headed one of the agency's
tribes as deputy director for intelligence. He knew the White
House, serving there under Jimmy Carter. As DDCI he had gotten
a taste of covert operations and the clandestine service.
In twenty-one years, in other words, Robert Gates had acquired
wide agency experience. He had made some enemies, in particular
as he handled intelligence reporting during the Reagan years,
but in 1987 those people did not contest his nomination, which
seemed unstoppable.
Except
for Iran-Contra. Gates gave that his best shot too. Not coincidentally
it became known that when he took over as acting director,
Gates had recorded a classified video affirming that the CIA
would act only under legal authorities and would never again
do anything like the Iran arms shipments without a proper
presidential finding. When hearings opened on February 17
[1987], Gates quickly made it known that he felt Iran-Contra
had broken all the rules. He would resign if ordered to do
something like that. Gates regretted not following up on the
scattered indications of illegality he had perceived, But
the nominee's assurances foundered on the rocks of the Iran-Contra
investigations. A number of questions had yet to be answered
then, including whether Gates had helped mislead Congress,
the extent of his participation in concocting false chronologies,
his role in efforts to have the CIA take over the Secord "Enterprise,"
when Gates learned of the diversion of funds to the contras,
and what he had done once he knew it.
The
more questions, the more Bob Gates's chances disappeared into
the maw of assorted illegalities. Had Gates known of violations
o the Arms Export Control Act? Had he known of the "retrospective"
finding? What had he done? Again and again. At this point
Congress created a joint committee to investigate Iran-Contra,
and it did not expect answers for months. Then, on February
22, the public learned that in 1985 Gates had sent the White
House a memorandum from one of his national intelligence officers
advocating the improvement of relations with Iran through
arms sales, a view at variance with existing estimates. Two
days later the Joint committee asked that Gates s nomination
be put on hold. Senator Boren posed the alternatives of a
vote or a withdrawal of the nomination while senior congressional
leaders warned the White House that a fight over Gates would
concentrate yet more attention on Iran Contra. Reagan who
had just released a presidential commission report in an effort
to put the scandal behind him did not care to hear that.
Robert
Gates decided to withdraw. The next day the administration
took back the nomination. Gates issued a statement defending
his actions during the Iran-Contra affair denying he had covered
up evidence or suppressed improprieties. Eventually the joint
committee cleared Gates of illegal actions, and the Iran Contra
special prosecutor affirmed that conclusion, but there had
been failings. Gates cites mitigating circumstances in his
memoirs, where he writes:
I
would go over those points in my mind a thousand times in
the months and years to come, but the criticisms still hit
home. A thousand times I would go over the "might-have-beens"
if I had raised more hell than I did with Casey about nonnotification
of Congress, if I had demanded that the NSC get out of covert
action, if I had insisted that CIA not play by NSC rules,
if I had been more aggressive with the DO in my first months
as DDCI, if I had gone to the Attorney General.
It
became Robert Gates's misfortune to be swept up in a web of
illegality so immense it brought dangers of the impeachment
of a president, which made Gates small fry indeed and virtually
overnight neutered Ronald Reagan.
In
withdrawing the Gates nomination, President Reagan simultaneously
announced his appointment of William B. Webster to lead the
agency. Webster liked to be called "Judge"-he had
been a jurist on the federal bench, eventually on the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Where CIA denizens begrudged Stansfield
Turner his preferred title of admiral, no one held back with
Judge Webster. Dedication to the law and to his native St.
Louis, at least as deep as Turner's to the navy, had seen
Webster through law school at Washington University, then
a decade as a St. Louis attorney, another as a U.S. district
attorney, and then the bench. In 1978 President Carter named
Webster to head the FBI, the post he held when Reagan asked
him to move to Langley. Three days shy of his fifty-third
birthday, Judge Webster came with stellar reviews-squeaky
clean, exactly what Reagan then needed. The Senate intelligence
committee approved his nomination in early May, and the full
Senate consented to it shortly thereafter. Judge Webster was
sworn in immediately.
Bob
Gates felt the weight of Iran-Contra lifted from his shoulders,
only to hear from his brother that their father had just died.
As Gates dealt with personal tragedy, Webster established
himself at Langley. Again like Admiral Turner, Judge Webster
brought in a coterie as his inner circle-this time of former
FBI aides. That move scarcely endeared Webster to CIA staff,
though he took some of the sting away by announcing Gates
would remain DDCI.
The
new CIA director had a background in government and even in
the security field, where his 'time at the FBI had included
notable investigations of corruption among congressmen, the
Korean CIA, and, of course, Iran-Contra. In Webster's last
months at the FBI the Bureau had looked into Southern Air
Transport, the agency's quasi-proprietary. But Webster's knowledge
of intelligence, mostly peripheral, resulted from participation
in the National Foreign Intelligence Board, the DCI's committee
of the directors of all the U.S. intelligence agencies. His
background in foreign affairs, even thinner, did not help
in the corridors at Langley.
Webster's
tenure has received mixed reviews. Melissa Boyle Mahle, an
officer with the DO's Near East Division, saw the Judge as
isolating himself, managing rather than leading CIA, passing
Olympian judgments, treating the agency as something dirty
or infectious. "He did not lead the troops, or ever really
try to get to know them," she writes. The chief of station
in Brussels, Richard Holm, felt Webster never really fit in
but nevertheless had been a good choice, and Holm was sorry
when he left. Floyd Paseman, by 1987 a branch chief in the
East Asia Division soon elevated to the management staff,
believes Webster "did a terrific job of restoring the
CIA's image." Dewey Clarridge asserts that Webster "didn't
have the stomach for bold moves of any sort." Robert
Gates acknowledges the criticisms but calls Webster a "godsend"
to the CIA, observing that none of the complaints "amounted
to a hill of beans compared to what he brought to CIA that
May: leadership, the respect of Congress, and a sterling character."
Pages
582-585:
Judge
Webster may have been the most prominent casualty of the Gulf
War. During the long interregnum between Saddam Hussein's
invasion of Kuwait and the beginning of the coalition military
campaign came a period of diplomacy and economic sanctions.
In Capitol Hill debates and the struggle for public opinion,
Webster was called upon to render opinions on the effectiveness
of sanctions, Iraqi intent, and the balance of forces. Others
seized on Webster's words as ammunition. This did not please
Bush. Never that comfortable at Langley, Judge Webster decided
he had had enough. He let a few weeks go by after the Gulf
triumph, then stepped down. The DO shed few tears.
The
White House announced the resignation on May 8, 1991. Appearing
briefly with Webster, President Bush said he had yet to think
of a successor but praised Robert Gates. That same day Bush
summoned Gates to his cabin aboard Air Force One and asked
if the former spook would accept the CIA nomination. Gates
immediately agreed. He expected a painful confirmation process,
and he got one. Iran-Contra investigations continued, and
Bob Gates would not be definitively cleared until the special
prosecutor's final report, still two years in the future.
When Alan Fiers pleaded guilty in July 1991, Gates feared
that Fiers would implicate him in some way. "The lowest
point in my life came the day before the plea bargain was
announced," Gates recalls. Acutely conscious of the fact
that civil servants rarely rise to head their departments,
Gates realized it had been a generation since Bill Colby had
been confirmed. Gates had been close to some quite controversial
people, from Kissinger to Casey. Then the summer of 1991 brought
the final collapse of the Soviet Union, kicking off the debate
as to whether the CIA had failed to predict it. Of course
Gates had had a dominant role in CIA analysis of Russia for
years. But this time, unlike 1987, Gates resolved to proceed
with the confirmation process no matter what.
Charges
that Robert Gates had politicized intelligence took center
stage when confirmation hearings opened in September [1991].
At first an extended examination of the nominee was not planned.
Marvin C. Ott, deputy director of the SSCI staff at the time,
recalls that the predisposition to let Gates sail through
created a staff presumption that there was nothing to look
into. Committee staff and members were flummoxed by the appearance
of a succession of analysts who gave chapter and verse on
many Gates interventions in intelligence analysis. Reports
on Afghanistan and Nicaragua were among those cited. Evidence
emerged that current employees, reluctant to criticize openly,
also saw Gates as an interventionist. Far from pro forma nomination
hearings, those on Gates morphed into a major CIA inquiry.
The
nominee presented a preemptive defense, attempting to disarm
critics with examples of how he had simply tried to push analysts
to back up their assertions, picturing some alleged interventions
as his effort to tease out better reporting. Then a number
of former analysts went before the committee to dispute that
rendering, most notably Mel Goodman, who had been a colleague
for years; Jennifer L. Glaudemans, a former Soviet analyst;
and Harold P. Ford, one of the CIA's grand old men. Alan Fiers
appeared as part of the committee's fairly extensive coverage
of Iran-Contra, but his testimony did Gates no harm. Others
supported the nomination. Gates himself returned for "something
fairly dramatic," a round of follow-up testimony refuting
critics. The hearings became the most extensive examination
of U.S. intelligence since the Church and Pike investigations.
Work at Langley ground to a halt as CIA officers watched every
minute on television, much like Americans riveted by the 0.
J. Simpson murder trial.
The
intelligence committee wrestled with its quandary. President
Bush intervened, invoking party discipline to ensure that
members backed the nominee. Ott believes Gates appealed to
the White House for this measure. Committee chairman David
Boren staged his own covert operation, acting impartially
in the camera's eye while laboring in secret to build support
for the nominee. Boren agreed to one of the most extensive
committee reports on a nomination ever, in which his committee
attempted to reconcile Gates's testimony with the charges
against him. In Ott's view, this episode became the first
time in a decade where partisanship reigned on the SSCI. Finally
the committee approved Bush's appointee. Gates was confirmed
early in November.
For
all the drama of the hearings, the sequel did not live up
to the fears of opponents. Director Gates strove to preserve
flexibility as Langley marched into the post-Cold War era.
He showed a healthy appreciation for the need to change, forming
a whole range of task forces, fourteen in all, each to recommend
changes in some aspect of CIA activity. A group on openness
figured among them, advising that a swath of records be made
public. In 1992 Gates spoke before a conference of diplomatic
historians and promised that the agency would open up, even
in regard to covert operations. As an earnest of its intentions,
the CIA declassified large portions of the body of NIEs on
the Soviet Union and that December sponsored a conference
reflecting on the period. Stansfield Turner gave the keynote
address.
One
of the Gates study groups considered politicization. Although
its instructions were drawn so narrowly it could conclude
there had been none, Gates gathered a large contingent of
officers in The Bubble in March 1992 to ventilate the issue.
Directly confronting the matter that had clouded his confirmation,
Gates squared the circle by acknowledging that whether or
not there had been politicization in the past, it was a danger
to be guarded against. The director declared his determination
to find better ways to prevent policy driven analysis.
Another
task force focused on covert action. Among the novelties there,
a delegation of senior clandestine services officers met with
scholars at the Institute of Policy Studies, a leftist think
tank, to solicit their views on directions the agency might
take. They did not flinch when told the DCI ought to abolish
the Directorate for Operations. Of course no such advice made
its way into the final report, but DDO Thomas Twetten was
placed on notice that the old days were gone. Twetten, one
of the anointed, who thought nothing of rejecting a Freedom
of Information Act request for Mongoose documents whose substance
was already in the Church Committee report, was forced to
retrench. The directorate consolidated operations in several
African countries closing a number of stations-a move that
soon came back to haunt the agency.
A
national center to target human intelligence assets flowed
from Gates's concern for more spies. But DO officers in the
field met with silence when they proposed new operations or
recruitments. Iran Contra showed that Langley would not back
its officers in trouble, and now morale became difficult to
sustain. One Latin American division field man told his mates,
"Pay attention this is the end of an era." Clandestine
officer Melissa Mahle pictures the atmosphere well: "We
were not listening. Operations officers felt they had been
made the scapegoat of a failed White House policy… We
did not hear the call to do …business in a new way,
in a way that would be more attuned to the attitudes of the
post-Cold War 1990s. In a climate in which the agency's goal
seemed to have been achieved, Robert Gates could not stem
the retirements and resignations that began about then. The
clandestine service denigrated him as a mere analyst who did
not understand operations.
As
far as covert action is concerned, Mahle makes the apt point
that part of the CIA's problem was rooted in Reagan-era practice,
in which covert operations were conducted openly and made
the subject of political debate and partisan accusation, all
to avoid explanations when projects did not go as advertised.
She writes: "The CIA entered into a new phase of 'overt
covert action,' a marvelous oxymoron that should join the
ranks of 'jumbo shrimp' and 'military intelligence."
The consequences of acting overtly included constant demands
for specifics-from Congress, the press, the public, foreign
governments-that meant secrecy headaches. Operational details
could be exposed. Political tumult could terminate actions
in midstream, magnifying the fear of abandonment of CIA's
proxies. And overt action amplified tensions between CIA and
the Pentagon too, as the special warfare community pressed
for greater control. Worse, the CIA's role became that of
bag man, hiring the proxies, whether foreign security services
or local factions, as spearpoints for U.S. action. Paramilitary
capabilities atrophied with cutbacks in the Special Activities
Division. Operations also became less controllable as CIA
steadily reduced its direct role.
The
growing importance of proxies had implications for the use
of covert action to implant democracy. To the old dilemma
of shady means in service of lofty goals was added the spoiler
of agents who acted in America's name with their own agendas,
or those who took the CIA cash and wouldn't stay "bought."
These problems were, and are, intractable.
As
director, Robert Gates's vision involved gradual, planned
change. He put teeth into the idea of support for military
operations. One of the task forces worked on that alone. He
tried to turn the agency toward the challenges of proliferation
and transnational threats. Director Gates wanted more and
better training for analysts, use of open source information,
and techniques like competitive analysis. He ordered the revamping
of CIA file systems. He opposed restructuring, including talk
of a national agency for mapping and photographic interpretation,
but agreed with the Pentagon on reforms at the National Reconnaissance
Office. When Gates came to Langley, 6o percent of the CIA
budget aimed at Russia; when he left that figure had dropped
to 13 percent. But Gates never completed his mission. George
H. W. Bush lost the 1992 election to William J. Clinton. A
few days later, on November 7, Gates announced his retirement.
He stayed only long enough for Clinton to choose his own director. |
Documents
Note:
The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe
Acrobat Reader to view.
Chapter
16, "Robert M. Gates" - Excerpt from
the Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra
Matters, Volume I: Investigations and Prosecutions, August
4, 1993
Robert
M. Gates, Letter in Response to Findings of Independent Counsel
Lawrence E. Walsh, September 22, 1993 - Excerpt
from Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra
Matters, Volume III: Comments and Materials Submitted by Individuals
and Their Attorneys Responding to Volume I of the Final Report,
December 3, 1993
"Nomination
of Robert M. Gates," Hearings Before the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, Volume I, September 16, 17,
19, 20, 1991 - Part
1 of 2 (16MB) - Part
2 of 2 (16MB)
"Nomination
of Robert M. Gates," Hearings Before the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, Volume II, September 24, October
1, 2, 1991 - Part
1 of 2 (10MB) - Part
2 of 2 (17MB)
"Nomination
of Robert M. Gates," Hearings Before the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, Volume
III, October 3, 4, 18, 1991 (15MB)
|