|
|
A National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book
William Ferroggiaro, Editor
August 20, 2001
|
On April 6, 1994, Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana’s personal
plane, a gift from French president Francois Mitterand, was shot
down as it returned to Rwanda, killing Habyarimana, Burundian president
Cyprien Ntarymira, and members of their entourages. The two presidents
were returning from Tanzania, where they’d met with regional leaders concerning
events in Burundi. Habyarimana himself was pressed to implement the
power-sharing Arusha Accord his government had concluded with the rebel
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in August 1993, which capped three years
of war, cease-fires and negotiations. To do so, however, would mean
the effective end of his 20-year, one-party rule over Rwandan politics
and society. Extremists in the military and government bitterly opposed
the accord; they are the likely culprits in his assassination. Within
an hour of the plane crash, the Presidential Guard, elements of the Rwandan
armed forces (FAR) and extremist militia (Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi)
set up roadblocks and barricades and began the organized slaughter, starting
in the capital Kigali, of nearly one million Rwandans in 100 days time.
Their first targets were those most likely to resist the plan of genocide:
the opposition Prime Minister, the president of the constitutional court,
priests, leaders of the Liberal Party and Social Democratic Party, the
Information Minister, and tellingly, the negotiator of the Arusha Accord.
Those who hesitated to join the campaign, such as the governor of a southern
province, were quickly removed from positions of influence or killed.
As a US intelligence analyst noted in late April,
“The plan appears to have been to wipe out any RPF ally or
potential ally, and thus raise the costs and limit the possibility of an
RPF/Tutsi takeover… No end to the unprecedented bloodshed is yet in sight.”
(US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Intelligence Assessment, "Roots of the Violence in Rwanda”, April 29, 1994)
As the killing intensified, the international community deserted Rwanda.
Western nations landed troops in Rwanda or Burundi in the first week to
evacuate their citizens, did so, and left. The UN mission (UNAMIR),
created in October 1993 to keep the peace and assist the governmental transition
in Rwanda, sought to intervene between the killers and civilians.
It also tried to mediate between the RPF and the Rwandan army after the
RPF struck from Rwanda to protect Tutsi and rescue their battalion encamped
in Kigali as part of the Accord. On April 21, 1994, the United Nations
Security Council, at the behest of the United States—which had no troops
in Rwanda—Belgium, and others, voted to withdraw all but a remnant of UNAMIR.
The Security Council took this vote and others concerning Rwanda even as
the representative of the genocidal regime sat amongst them as a non-permanent
member. After human rights, media, and diplomatic reports of the
carnage mounted, the UN met and debated and finally arrived at a compromise
response on May 16. UNAMIR II, as it was to be known, would be a
more robust force of 5,500 troops. Again, however, the world failed
to deliver, as the full complement of troops and materiel would not arrive
in Rwanda until months after the genocide ended. Faced with the UN’s
delay, but also concerned about its image as a former patron and arms supplier
of the Habyarimana regime, France announced on June 15 that it would intervene
to stop the killing. In a June 22 vote, the UN Security Council gave
its blessing to this intervention; that same day, French troops entered
Rwanda from Zaire. While intending a wider intervention, confronted
with the RPF’s rapid advance across Rwanda, the French set up a “humanitarian
zone” in the southwest corner of Rwanda. Their intervention succeeded
in saving tens of thousands of Tutsi lives; it also facilitated the safe
exit of many of the genocide’s plotters, who were allies of the French.
On July 4, the RPF took the capital, Kigali; two weeks later, it announced
a new government comprised of RPF leaders and ministers previously selected
for the transition government called for in the Arusha Accord. With
the RPF’s takeover, and with the encouragement of extremist radio, Rwandans
implicated in the slaughter, their relatives and those who feared the arrival
of the RPF, fled to neighboring countries. In the end, the extremists
killed nearly one million Rwandans, approximately one-tenth of the population.
Were it not for the RPF’s military prowess, the genocide would have continued.
Despite overwhelming evidence of genocide and knowledge as to its perpetrators,
United States officials decided against taking a leading role in confronting
the slaughter in Rwanda. Rather, US officials confined themselves
to public statements, diplomatic demarches, initiatives
for a ceasefire, and attempts to contact both the interim
government perpetrating the killing and the RPF. The US did
use its influence, however, at the United Nations, but did so to discourage
a robust UN response (Document 4 and Document
13). In late July, however, with the evidence of genocide
littering the ground in Rwanda, the US did launch substantial operations—again,
in a supporting role—to assist humanitarian relief efforts for those displaced
by the genocide.
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe
Acrobat Reader to view.
|
Document
1 |
Facsimile from Maj. Gen. Romeo Dallaire, Force Commander,
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, to Maj. Gen. Maurice Baril,
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Request for Protection
for Informant”, January 11, 1994. |
|
Source: US House of
Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on
International Operations and Human Rights, “Hearing: Rwanda: Genocide and
the Continuing Cycle of Violence”, May 5, 1998 |
|
In this notorious “genocide fax” (originally published in The
New Yorker), Gen. Dallaire warns UN peacekeeping officials—Maj. Gen.
Maurice Baril, the military adviser to Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
and Kofi Annan, who at the time was Under Secretary General for PKO (peacekeeping
operations) and is now UN Secretary General—of the existence of arms caches,
a plot to assassinate Belgian UN peacekeepers and Rwandan members of parliament,
and the existence of lists of Tutsis to be killed. Dallaire informs
New York of his intention to raid the caches, but foreshadowing later developments,
Annan and DPKO official Iqbal Riza refuse the request, citing UNAMIR’s
limited mandate. Instead, they order Dallaire to apprise the president
of Rwanda of the informant’s allegations, despite the fact that the arms
caches and assassination plan are the work of those close to the president.
On April 7, the day after the shoot down of the President’s plane, members
of the Presidential Guard carry out this plan, torturing, killing, and
mutilating 10 Belgian soldiers in the UN contingent protecting the Prime
Minister, who was also their target. As foreseen by the plan’s authors,
Belgium quickly withdrew their contingent from UNAMIR, breaking the backbone
of the force. Within two weeks, the UN Security Council voted to
reduce UNAMIR to a token presence, removing the last impediment to the
slaughter.
|
Document
2 |
Memorandum from Prudence Bushnell, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, through Peter Tarnoff, Under Secretary
for Political Affairs, to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, “Death
of Rwandan and Burundian Presidents in Plane Crash Outside Kigali”, April
6, 1994. Limited Official Use |
|
Source: Freedom of
Information Act release by the US Department of State |
|
Bushnell, the State Department’s number two official for Africa
matters, who would lead the State Department’s initial day-to-day efforts
during the genocide, advises Secretary of State Warren Christopher of the
assassination of Rwandan president Habyarimana and Burundian president
Ntaryamira. Bushnell alerts Christopher that “widespread violence”
is likely upon the death of the president. Ominously, she reports
that “the military intend(s) to take over power temporarily”, and that
they are “very resistant to working with the current (interim) Prime Minister”.
Indeed, the Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyama, a member of the opposition
MDR party, will be assassinated by members of the Presidential Guard the
following day.
|
Document
3 |
Memorandum from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Middle East/Africa, through Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs, to Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, “Talking Points
On Rwanda/Burundi”, April 11, 1994. Confidential. |
|
Source: Freedom of
Information Act release by the Office of the Secretary of Defense |
|
This document—apparently produced as a briefer for a dinner
between Under Secretary Frank Wisner, the third ranking official at the
Pentagon, and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger—shows the Pentagon’s
candid assessment about events in Rwanda only five days after the shoot
down of the Rwandan president’s plane. Pentagon Africa analysts conclude:
if the peace process fails, “a massive bloodbath (hundreds of thousands
of deaths) will ensue”; the “UN will likely withdraw all forces”; and the
US will not get involved “until peace is restored”. That these shocking
details are offered as dinner conversation reveals the extent to which
Pentagon analysts accepted it as inevitable.
|
Document
4 |
US Department of State, cable number 099440, to US Mission
to the United Nations, New York, “Talking Points for UNAMIR Withdrawal”,
April 15, 1994. Confidential. |
|
Source: Freedom of
Information Act release by Department of State |
|
This telegram forwards Department of State guidance to the
US Mission to the UN in New York instructing US diplomats there that “the
international community must give highest priority to full, orderly withdrawal
of all UNAMIR personnel as soon as possible.” Advising that this
withdrawal does not require a UN Security Council resolution—which would
have likely focused international criticism—the Department instructs the
mission “that we will oppose any effort at this time to preserve a UNAMIR
presence in Rwanda.” April 15 was the first of two days of UN Security
Council debate on next steps in Rwanda—for which the Rwandan ambassador
was present and about which he reported back to the interim government
in Rwanda. Over that same weekend, aware the UN Security Council
was in retreat, the interim Council of Ministers, the genocide’s architects,
met in Kigali and decided to take the program of extermination to the rest
of the country.
|
Document
5 |
Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White
House, “Statement by the Press Secretary”, April 22, 1994. Non-classified. |
|
Source: Freedom of
Information Act release by the Department of State |
|
Many consider this statement by the White House—done at the
urging of Human Rights Watch—as the penultimate US initiative during the
genocide. In naming and calling on four Rwandan military leaders
to “end the violence”, it is probably the sole example of high-level attention—however
brief—trained on officials involved in the genocide.
|
Document
6 |
Discussion Paper, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Middle East/Africa Region, Department of Defense, May 1,
1994. Secret. |
|
Source: Freedom of
Information Act release by Office of the Secretary of Defense |
|
A product of an intra-agency process comprised of working level
Pentagon action officers with expertise in African affairs, humanitarian
and refugee affairs, public affairs, and special operations, and also officials
of the Joint Staff’s Strategic Plans and Policy division, this memo for
the record provides an inside glimpse at the various goals, options and
tactics discussed at a meeting of officials charged with day-to-day responsibility
for the Rwanda crisis. It is filled with cautions against the US
becoming committed to action. Genocide comes up in the discussion:
“Be Careful. Legal at State was worried about this yesterday—Genocide
finding could commit USG to “do something”.
|
Document
7 |
US Department of State, cable number 113672, to US Embassy
Bujumbura and US Embassy Dar es Salaam, “DAS Bushnell Tells Col. Bagosora
to Stop the Killings”, April 29, 1994. Limited Official Use. |
|
Source: Freedom of
Information Act release by the Department of State |
|
State Department officials at the working level contacted Rwandan
officials regularly to urge an end to the killing—to little effect.
In this cable, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
Prudence Bushnell challenges Col. Theoneste Bagosora, cabinet director
in Rwanda’s Ministry of Defense and the coordinator of the genocide, as
to who is responsible for the massacres. Ironically, his call for
a cease-fire echoes the US call for the same, albeit for very different
reasons. The telegram also highlights the US government’s pre-occupation
with returning to a “peace process”, when much of Rwanda is littered with
corpses.
|
Document
8 |
Memorandum for the Vice President, et. al., “PDD 25: U.S.
Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations”, May 3, 1994. Confidential
with Secret attachment. |
|
Source: Mandatory Declassification
Review release by the National Security Council |
|
|
Document
9 |
White paper, Department of State, “The Clinton Administration’s
Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations”, May 1994. Non-classified. |
|
Source: Mandatory Declassification
Review release by the National Security Council |
|
Presidential Decision Directive 25 guides US government policy
on peacekeeping operations, setting forth criteria that must be met before
US participation can occur. The document stipulates three different
sets of criteria depending on the anticipated level of engagement.
One of the most controversial policy documents of the Clinton Administration’s
first term, this directive was under development for more than a year,
and during the review was the subject of bureaucratic infighting, leaks
to the press, and strong Congressional criticism. While much information
in the directive itself remains classified, the State Department issued
an executive summary as a “white paper”, which spells out the thresholds
and criteria for US involvement in peace operations.
|
Document
10 |
Memorandum from Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security, National Security
Council, “Rwanda: Jamming Civilian Radio Broadcasts”, May 5, 1994.
Confidential. |
|
Source: Freedom of
Information Act release by the Office of the Secretary of Defense |
|
As the carnage continued and a robust response by the US or
others was not forthcoming, human rights groups, members of Congress, and
others urged the Clinton Administration to counter or “jam” extremist radio
broadcasts in Rwanda. These broadcasts spread fear amongst the Rwandan
populace, urged participation in the killing, shamed those who sought not
to participate, and in many cases, specifically named and provided the
whereabouts of those to be killed. As such, the radio broadcasts
were essential to the fulfillment of the program of extermination.
In this memo, Frank Wisner, the number three official at the Pentagon,
acknowledges internal discussions about the feasibility of countering the
hate radio. He replies to Sandy Berger, the deputy to National Security
Adviser Tony Lake, that undertaking the initiative to “jam” the radio would
be “ineffective and expensive”; a “wiser” activity would be to assist the
“relief effort”.
|
Document
11 |
Defense Intelligence Report, Defense Intelligence Agency,
“Rwanda: The Rwandan Patriotic Front’s Offensive”, May 9, 1994. Secret/NOFORN
(not releasable to foreign nationals). |
|
Source: Freedom of
Information Act release by the Defense Intelligence Agency |
|
Produced one month into the genocide, this report declares
that “Almost immediately after President Habyarimana was killed, in Kigali
the Presidential Guard began the systematic execution of prominent Tutsi
and moderate Hutu” and that the violence is “directed by high-level officials
within the interim government”. It identifies the army as pursuing
a “genocide …to destroy the leadership of the Tutsi community.” In
contrast to many of the public statements of US officials at the time,
this analysis shows that the government did discern between the planned
slaughter of civilians and the renewed warfare between the Rwandan armed
forces and the rebel RPF.
|
Document
12 |
Memorandum of Conversation, Office of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Middle East/Africa Region, Department of Defense,
“Rwanda Interagency Telecon”, drafted by Lt. Col. Michael Harvin, circa
May 11, 1994. Secret. |
|
Source: Freedom of
Information Act release by the Office of the Secretary of Defense |
|
This memorandum serves as a vivid account of the differing
perspectives and postures of the players engaged in the response to the
crisis in Rwanda, complete with exclamation marks indicating the memo drafter’s
incredulity at a participant’s remarks. The interagency teleconference
on Rwanda occurred daily, serving an information exchange function and
an option vetting function. Attending from the Pentagon side at this
meeting are officials from the Middle East/Africa office, the peacekeeping/peace
enforcement office, and the office of the Assistant Secretary for Special
Operations & Low Intensity Conflict, in addition to military members
of the Joint Staff. This report demonstrates the gulf between the
views of the State Department and National Security Council officials and
the views of Pentagon and military officials: “the meeting degenerated
into a NSC/State attempt to sign-up the Principals to support a Chapter
VII operation wearing Chapter VI sheep’s clothing, with OSD and Joint Staff
in stiff opposition.” In translation, this refers to NSC and State
representatives’ efforts to persuade senior Pentagon officials and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to agree to “peace enforcement” (read possible combat
operations) in Rwanda, rather than waiting in vain for a ceasefire that
will not come in order to do “peacekeeping”.
|
Document
13 |
US Department of State, cable number 127262, to US Mission
to the United Nations, New York, “Rwanda: Security Council Discussions”,
May 13, 1994. Confidential. |
|
Source: Freedom of
Information Act release by the Department of State |
|
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff
and senior officials, including the Director of the Joint Staff, drafted
and approved this cable delivering instructions to the US Mission in New
York for Security Council debate over replenishing UNAMIR. With much
of the killing completed and most of the remaining armed forces fleeing
the RPF’s countrywide advance, US officials argue against a UN plan for
a robust effort launched into Kigali to protect surviving Rwandans, rescue
others, and deliver assistance. Such a plan, “in current circumstances,
would require a Chapter VII mandate”, and the US “is not prepared at this
point to lift heavy equipment and troops into Kigali”. It is however,
willing to consider its own plan, “outside-in”, by which protective zones
would be established on Rwanda’s borders. Even this plan, however,
is likely to be “an active protection operation requiring the use of lethal
force.” As for the several thousand Rwandans in Kigali under deteriorating
UN protection, “we recommend that these ad hoc protective efforts should
continue until a suitable alternative arrangement can be ensured.”
Even when a plan for 5,500 troops with a protection mandate is finally
approved on May 17, the troops would not all be in place until September,
two months after the RPF captures the country and one month after Gen.
Dallaire completed his service in Rwanda.
|
Document
14 |
Action memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs George E. Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy,
Human Rights and Labor John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary of State for
International Organization Affairs Douglas J. Bennet, and Department of
State Legal Adviser Conrad K. Harper, through Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff and Under Secretary of State for Global
Affairs Tim Wirth, to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, “Has Genocide
Occurred in Rwanda?”, May 21, 1994. Secret. |
|
Source: Freedom of
Information Act release by the Department of State |
|
The internal debate over whether genocide was occurring in
Rwanda in 1994 and US officials’ use of the term began nearly as soon as
the killing began. Nevertheless, Department of State officials refrained
from characterizing it as such for weeks. While on June 10 Secretary
of State Warren Christopher finally publicly called the Rwandan slaughter
“genocide”, on May 21 he had authorized Department officials—“in light
of the stark facts in Rwanda”—to use the formulation “acts of genocide
have occurred” and authorized delegations to agree to resolutions using
various formulations of the term. The memo argues for consistency
with the use of the term with relation to Bosnia. A previous memo
dated May 16, sought approval to use the term “genocide has occurred”,
but this formulation didn’t hold. Interestingly, the principal officials
here find no legal obligation in the use of either formulation; but in
avoiding use of the “genocide label”, US “credibility will be undermined
with human rights groups and the general public”.
|
Document
15 |
Memorandum from Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and
Research Toby T. Gati to Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
George Moose and Department of State Legal Adviser Conrad Harper, “Rwanda
– Geneva Convention Violations”, circa May 18, 1994. Secret/ORCON
(originator controlled). |
|
Source: Freedom of
Information Act release by the Department of State |
|
This intelligence analysis, prepared for Secretary Christopher’s
decision as to use of the genocide label, finds “substantial, circumstantial
evidence implicating senior Rwandan government and military officials in
the widespread, systematic killing” of Tutsis and moderate Hutus.
The RPF, “unlike government forces”, “does not appear to have committed
Geneva Convention defined genocidal atrocities.” The analysts report
that between “200,000 to 500,000” are dead. It also finds it credible
that “Hutu elements in the military” “killed Habyarimana in order to block”
the power-sharing Arusha Accords and “eliminate the Tutsi-dominated RPF
and sympathetic Hutus”.
|
Document
16 |
Draft Legal Analysis, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department
of State, drafted by Assistant Legal Adviser for African Affairs Joan Donoghue,
May 16, 1994. Secret. |
|
Source: Freedom of
Information Act release by the Department of State |
|
This legal analysis, like the preceding intelligence analysis,
was prepared for Secretary of State Christopher’s decision concerning the
public use of the term “genocide” to describe events in Rwanda. In
analyzing the applicability of definitions from the Genocide Convention
of 1948 to the events in Rwanda, the assistant legal adviser finds that
there is “little question” that genocidal acts have occurred in Rwanda;
finds that “most of those killed in Rwanda have been Tutsi civilians”;
and finds that “acts have apparently been committed with the requisite
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the Tutsi group”. She also
argues that ascertaining an accurate figure for numbers of deaths “is not
critical to this analysis” that genocide has occurred.
|
|