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Recently declassified documents from archives in the former
Soviet Union and memoirs of senior Soviet military and political leaders
present the complex and tragic story of the ten years of the Soviet military
involvement in Afghanistan. Most observers agree that the last war
of the Soviet Union created or aggravated the internal dynamics that eventually
culminated in the dissolution of the country itself. The documents
presented here shed light on the most important moments in the history
of the Soviet war in Afghanistan—the Afghan government’s requests for assistance,
the Soviet Union’s initial refusal of troops, the reversal of this policy
by a small group of the Politburo and the Soviet decision to invade; the
expansion of the initial mission to include combat operations against the
Afghan resistance; early criticism of the Soviet policy and of the People’s
Democratic party of Afghanistan (PDPA) regime; and the decision to withdraw
the troops. Taken together, these materials suggest some lessons
that might be drawn from the Soviet experience of fighting a war in Afghanistan.
The decision to send troops was made after a long
deliberation and repeated requests from the leadership of the PDPA, Prime
Minister Hafizullah Amin and President Nur Mohammad Taraki. The Politburo
discussions show that the Soviet leaders were very reluctant to send troops,
and responded to the Afghan requests with shipments of military equipment,
but not troops, throughout the spring and summer of 1979. However,
the overthrow of Taraki by Amin in September just after Taraki’s return
from Moscow heightened Soviet paranoia about the possibility that Amin
would become another Sadat and turn towards the U.S. The actual decision
to invade was made in secret by a very small group of Politburo members,
against the strong and openly expressed opposition of the military, and
only then rubber-stamped by the other Politburo members. Both Chief
of USSR General Staff Marshal Ogarkov and his Deputy General of the Army
Akhromeev voiced strong objections to introducing troops on the grounds
that the proposed limited contingent of forces would not be able to fulfill
its objectives.
The decision to send troops was made on the basis
of limited information. According to Soviet veterans of the events,
KGB sources were trusted over the military intelligence (GRU) sources.
This partly reflected the growing influence of the KGB Chairman Yu. V.
Andropov, who controlled the flow of information to General Secretary Brezhnev,
who was partially incapacitated and ill for most of 1979. KGB reports
from Afghanistan created a picture of urgency and strongly emphasized the
possibility of Amin’s links to the CIA and U.S. subversive activities in
the region. (President Carter had already signed a secret “finding”
in July 1979 authorizing covert aid to the Afghani opponents of the Taraki-Amin
regime.)
Afghanistan did not fit into the mental maps and
ideological constructs of the Soviet leaders. Their analysis of internal
social processes in Afghanistan was done through the conceptual lens of
Marxist-Leninist doctrine, which blinded the leadership to the realities
of traditional tribal society. Believing that there was no single
country in the world, which was not ripe for socialism, party ideologues
like Mikhail Suslov and Boris Ponomarev saw Afghanistan as a “second Mongolia.”
Such conceptualization of the situation led to the attempts to impose alien
social and economic practices on Afghan society, such as the forced land
reform.
The Soviet decision makers did not anticipate the
influential role of Islam in the Afghan society. There were very
few experts on Islam in the Soviet government and the academic institutions.
The highest leadership was poorly informed about the strength of religious
beliefs among the masses of the Afghan population. Political and
military leaders were surprised to find that rather than being perceived
as a progressive anti-imperialist force, the Afghanis as foreign invaders,
and “infidels.” Reports from Afghanistan show the growing awareness of
the “Islamic factor” on the part of Soviet military and political personnel.
The Afghan communist PDPA never was a unified party;
it was split along ethnic and tribal lines. The infighting between the
“Khalq” and the “Parcham” factions made the tasks of controlling the situation
much more challenging for Moscow notwithstanding the great number of Soviet
advisors at every level of the party and state apparatus. The Soviet
underestimation of ethnic tensions within Afghan society was one of the
reasons of the unsuccessful policy of national reconciliation.
The war in Afghanistan had a major impact on domestic
politics in the Soviet Union. It was one of the key factors in the
delegitimization of Communist Party rule. Civil society reacted to the
intervention by marginalizing the Afghan veterans. The army was demoralized
as a result of being perceived as an invader. . The prominent dissident
and human rights activist, Academician Andrei Sakharov, publicly denounced
the atrocities committed by the Soviet Army in Afghanistan. The image
of the Soviet Army fighting against Islam in Afghanistan also contributed
to a rapid rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Central Asian republics
and possibly to the strengthening of the independence movement in Chechnya,
both of which continue to pose major security threats to Russia today.
The Soviet Army also quickly realized the inadequacy
of its preparation and planning for the mission in Afghanistan. The initial
mission—to guard cities and installations—was soon expanded to combat,
and kept growing over time. The Soviet reservists, who comprised
the majority of the troops initially sent in, were pulled into full-scale
combat operations against the rebels, while the regular Afghan army was
often unreliable because of the desertions and lack of discipline.
The Soviet troops had absolutely no anti-guerrilla
training. While the formal mission of the troops was to protect the
civilians from the anti-government forces, in reality, Soviet soldiers
often found themselves fighting against the civilians they intended to
protect, which sometimes led to indiscriminate killing of local people.
Operations to pursue and capture rebel formations were often unsuccessful
and had to be repeated several times in the same area because the rebels
retreated to the mountains and returned to their home villages as soon
as the Soviet forces returned to their garrisons. Soviet traditional
weaponry and military equipment, especially armored cars and tanks were
extremely vulnerable on Afghani terrain.
The Soviet troops also suffered from the confusion
about their goals—the initial official mission was to protect the PDPA
regime; however, when the troops reached Kabul, their orders were to overthrow
Amin and his regime. Then the mission was changed once again, but
the leadership was not willing to admit that the Soviet troops were essentially
fighting the Afghan civil war for the PDPA. The notion of the “internationalist
duty” that the Soviet Limited Contingent was fulfilling in Afghanistan
was essentially ideological, based on the idea that Soviet troops were
protecting the socialist revolution in Afghanistan whereas the experience
on the ground immediately undermined such justifications.
The realization that there could be no military solution
to the conflict in Afghanistan came to the Soviet military leadership very
early on. The issue of troop withdrawal and the search for a political
solution was discussed as early as 1980, but no real steps in that direction
were taken, and the Limited Contingent continued to fight in Afghanistan
without a clearly defined objective.
Early military reports emphasized the difficulty
of fighting on the mountainous terrain, for which the Soviet Army had no
training whatsoever. Parallels with the American War in Vietnam were
obvious and frequently referred to by the Soviet military officers.
Note on Soviet sources
The main Soviet sources on the decision to intervene in Afghanistan
come from the Russian Presidential Archive, the Ministry of Defense Archive
and from the published memoirs of Soviet officers and political leaders.
They belong to the following categories: the minutes of the CC CPSU
Politburo discussions, which were declassified by President Yeltsin’s executive
decree in 1992, the KGB and military intelligence reports from Kabul, many
of which were published in the influential study The Tragedy and Valor
of Afghan by veteran of the Afghan War General Alexander Lyakhovsky,
political letters from USSR Ambassadors in Afghanistan to the Soviet Foreign
Ministry from the Russian Foreign Ministry Archives, memoranda of conversations
of the Soviet Ambassadors and other leaders with their Afghan counterparts
found in the Center for Preservation of Contemporary Documentation in Moscow,
analytical letters to the Central Committee and the military leadership
also found in the Center for Preservation of Contemporary Documentation.
Among the most important memoirs on the Soviet war in Afghanistan are those
by former Deputy USSR Foreign Minister Georgy M. Kornienko and the last
Commander of the Soviet Limited Contingent of Forces in Afghanistan, General
Boris Gromov. Some of the most important documents on the Soviet
War in Afghanistan were published in the English translation in the Cold
War International History Project Bulletin, No. 8-9, Winter 1996-1997.
The documents presented below provide an insight
into some of the most important aspects of the Soviet decision making on
the Afghan war from the decision to send in the troops to the decision
to withdraw the Soviet Limited Contingent.
The following documents are published here in English
translation. In some cases we have also included the cover page of
the original Russian document.
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe
Acrobat Reader to view.
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Document
1
CC CPSU Politburo Session March 17-18, 1979 |
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Document
2
Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Soviet Premier Alexei
Kosygin and Afghan Prime Minister Nur Mohammed Taraki, March 18, 1979 |
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Source: Cold War International
History Project Bulletin, Issues 8-9, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 145-146. |
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Document
3
Transcript of A. N. Kosygin-A.A. Gromyko-D.F. Ustinov-B.N. Ponomarev-N.M.
Taraki Conversation on March 20, 1979 |
In March 1979, the Soviet leadership had to face a difficult
situation as a result of the violent uprising in Herat, where several Soviet
military advisers were executed, and the situation seemed to be spinning
out of the PDPA's control. The Afghan leadership asked for urgent
Soviet military assistance. Overall, there were over 20 requests
for military assistance from the Afghan leadership in 1979. In the
telephone conversation with Afghan Prime Minister Taraki, Soviet Premier
Alexei Kosygin explains to his Afghan counterpart that the Soviet Union
would not send troops, and encourages Taraki to rely on the local population,
and specifically to mobilize industrial workers of the Herat province,
which shows the lack of understanding of the local situation on the part
of the Soviet leadership (industrial workers, the “proletariat,” which
was supposed to be the base of the socialist revolution were practically
non-existent in Afghanistan). The Politburo session, convened urgently
to discuss the situation in Herat, shows the differences of opinion among
the participants: while practically all Politburo members were against
sending Soviet troops to Afghanistan, some of them at the same time argued
that “we cannot lose Afghanistan.” The decision arrived at after
much deliberation and summed up by General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev
was that economic and military assistance with equipment and advisers would
be provided but no Soviet troops would be sent to Afghanistan.
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Document
4
Andropov-Gromyko-Ustinov-Ponomarev Report to CC CPSU on the Situation
in Afghanistan, June 28, 1979 |
|
Source: Cold War International
History Project Bulletin, Issues 8-9, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 152-153. |
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Document
5
Minutes of Conversation of General Secretary Brezhnev with Erich Honecker,
October 4, 1979 |
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Document
6
Andropov-Gromyko-Ustinov-Ponomarev Report to the CC CPSU on the Situation
in Afghanistan, October 29, 1979 |
Minutes of Conversation between Brezhnev and Honecker, and
Andropov-Gromyko-Ustinov-Ponomarev’s reports to Brezhnev in the summer
and fall of 1979 shed light on Soviet thinking on wider geostrategic implications
of the situation in Afghanistan, the impact of the Iranian revolution in
the region, perceived U.S. goals, and the suspected cooperation between
Amin and the American special services. All these considerations
contributed to the sense of urgency among the Soviet leadership.
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Document
7
Personal Memorandum from Andropov to Brezhnev, early December 1979 |
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Source: Cold War International
History Project Bulletin, Issues 8-9, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 159-160. |
According to former USSR Ambassador to the United States Anatoly
Dobrynin, this unusual memorandum from Andropov to Brezhnev was especially
influential in changing the General Secretary’s position on the issue of
sending Soviet troops into Afghanistan.
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Document
8
Alexander Lyakhovsky’s Account of the Decision of the CC CPSU Decision
to Send Troops to Afghanistan—from The Tragedy and Valor of Afghan (Moscow,
1995) |
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Document
9
“Situation in “A”. Handwritten CC CPSU Politburo Decision to
Introduce Troops into Afghanistan, December 12, 1979 |
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Document
10
Georgy Kornienko’s Account of the Politburo Decision to Send Soviet
Troops in Afghanistan, from Georgy M. Kornienko, The Cold War: Testimony
of a Participant, (Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1994) pp. 193-195 |
Excerpts from Lyakhovsky’s book and Georgy M. Kornienko’s memoir
The
Cold War: Testimony of a Participant (Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya,
1994) present detailed accounts of how the final decision to send troops
was made. The only documentary evidence of that highly secret decision
is the handwritten document “On the Situation in A” of December 12, 1979
signed by the Politburo members.
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Document
11
Gromyko-Andropov-Ustinov-Ponomarev Report to CC CPSU on the Events
in Afghanistan on December 27-28, 1979; December 31, 1979 |
|
Source: Cold War International
History Project Bulletin, Issues 8-9, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 160-161. |
The Soviet reading of the situation in Afghanistan is also
represented in this report presented to the Politburo on December 31, after
the invasion.
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Document
12
Session of the CC CPSU Politburo, January 17, 1980 |
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Document
13
Session of CC CPSU Politburo, Janury 28, 1980; Gromyko-Andropov-Ustinov-Ponomarev
Report to CC CPSU on the Situation in Afghanistan, January 27, 1980 |
|
Source: Cold War International
History Project Bulletin, Issues 8-9, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 163-165. |
 |
Document
14
On the Changing Mission of the Soviet Forces in Afghanistan, from Alexander
Lyakhovsky, The Tragedy and Valor of Afghan |
The Politburo sessions of January 17 and 28, 1980 carried extensive
discussions of the situation in Afghanistan. Lyakhovsky and other
authors report that at the same time, the top Soviet military and political
leadership held secret deliberations on the possibility of early withdrawal
of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the first combat operations
of the Soviet troops led to the change in the original mission of the Limited
Contingent to include combat operations against the rebels.
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Document
15
“Pravda” Correspondent Schedrov’s Letter to the CC CPSU on the Situation
in Afghanistan, November 12, 1981 |
The letter of “Pravda” correspondent Schedrov to the CC CPSU
of November 12, 1981 reflects early criticism of Soviet involvement in
Afghanistan along with a realization of the inadequacy of a military solution.
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Document
16
Excerpt from KGB USSR and General Staff Report of December 1982 |
|
Source: Alexander Lyakhovsky, Tragedy
and Valor of Afghan, Iskon, Moscow 1995, p. 263, Translated by Svetlana
Savranskaya |
This report prepared by the KGB USSR and the General Staff
states that the Soviet Commander of the Turkmen Military District and the
Main Soviet Adviser in Afghanistan were given orders to capture an American
citizen working with the mujahedeen.
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Document
17
Anatoly Chernyaev’s Notes from the Politburo of the CC CPSU Session
of October 17, 1985 |
|
Source: Anatoly Chernyaev, My
Six Years with Gorbachev, Penn State University Press, translated by
Robert English/Elizabeth Tucker, p. 42 |
At the Politburo session of October 17, 1985, General Secretary
Gorbachev proposed to make a final decision on Afghanistan and quoted from
citizens’ letters regarding the dissatisfaction in the country with the
Soviet actions in Afghanistan. He also described his meeting with
Babrak Karmal during which Gorbachev told the Afghan leader: “we will help
you, but with arms only, not troops.”Chernyaev noted Gorbachev’s negative
reaction to the assessment of the situation given by Defense Minister Marshal
Sergey Sokolov.
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Document
18
Session of CC CPSU Politburo, November 13, 1986 |
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Source: Cold War International
History Project Bulletin, Issues 8-9, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 1787-181. |
The first serious Politburo discussion of the need to withdraw
Soviet troops from Afghanistan, which included the testimony of Marshal
Sergei Akhromeev is reflected in the Minutes of November 13, 1986.
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Document
19
Minutes of the Politburo of the CC CPSU Session of February 23-26,
1987 |
|
Source: Anatoly S. Chernyaev’s
Diary, Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya |
In his remarks to the Politburo on February 23 and 26, General
Secreatry Mikhail S. Gorbachev return to the issue of the need to withdraw
Soviet troops from Afghanistan several times. He emphasizes the need
to withdraw the troops, and at the same time struggles with the explanation
for the withdrawal, noting that “we not going to open up the discussion
about who is to blame now.” Gromyko admits that it was a mistake
to introduce the troops, but notes that it was done after 11 requests from
the Afghan government.
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Document
20
Colonel Tsagolov’s Letter to USSR Minister of Defense Dmitry Yazov
on the Situation in Afghanistan, August 13, 1987 |
Criticism of the Soviet policy of national reconciliation in
Afghanistan and analysis of general failures of the Soviet military mission
there is presented in Colonel Tsagolov’s letter to USSR Defense Minister
Dmitry Yazov of August 13, 1987. This letter represents the first
open criticism of the Afghan war from within the military establishment.
Colonel Tsagolov paid for his attempt to make his criticism public in his
interview with Soviet influential progressive magazine “Ogonek” by his
career—he was expelled from the Army in 1988.
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Document
21
CC CPSU Letter on Afghanistan, May 10, 1988 |
|
Source: Alexander Lyakhovsky, Tragedy
and Valor of Afghan, Iskon, Moscow 1995, Appendix 8, Translated by Svetlana
Savranskaya |
On May 10, 1988, the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of the USSR issued a “closed” (internal use) letter to all Communist Party
members of the Soviet Union on the issue of withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan.
The letter presents the Central Committee analysis of events in Afghanistan
and Soviet actions in that country, the problems and the difficulties the
Soviet troops had to face in carrying out their mission. In particular,
the letter stated that important historic and ethnic factors were overlooked
when the decisions on Afghanistan were made in the Soviet Union. The letter
analyzes Soviet interests in Afghanistan and the reasons for the withdrawal
of troops.
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Document
22
Minutes of the Session of CC CPSU Politburo, January 23, 1989 |
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Source: Cold War International
History Project Bulletin, Issues 8-9, Winter 1996/1997, pp. 181-184. |
The Politburo session of January 24, 1989 deals with issues
of troops withdrawal and the post-war Soviet role in Afghanistan, as well
as possible future development of the situation there.
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Document
23
Excerpt from Statement of the Soviet Military Command in Afghanistan
on the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops, February 14, 1989 |
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Source: Alexander Lyakhovsky, Tragedy
and Valor of Afghan, Iskon, Moscow 1995, Appendix 11, Translated by Svetlana
Savranskaya |
On April 7, 1988, USSR Defense Minister signed an order on
withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. In February 1989, the Defense
Ministry prepared a statement of the Soviet Military Command in Afghanistan
on the issue of withdrawal of troops, which was delivered to the Head of
the UN Mission in Afghanistan on February 14, 1989—the day when the last
Soviet soldier left Afghanistan. The statement gave an overview of
Soviet-Afghan relations before 1979, Soviet interpretation of the reasons
for providing internationalist assistance to Afghanistan, and sending troops
there after the repeated requests of the Afghan government. It criticized
the U.S. role in arming the opposition in disregard of the Geneva agreements,
and thus destabilizing the situation in the country. In an important
acknowledgement that the Vietnam metaphor was used to analyze Soviet actions
in Afghanistan, they military explicitly referred to “unfair and absurd”
comparisons between the American actions in Vietnam and the presence of
Soviet troops in Afghanistan.
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