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PRESS ADVISORY
April 1, 2002 |
For Further information Contact:
Piero Gleijeses - 202 363-3815 (h)
Piero Gleijeses - 202 663-5779 (w)
Peter Kornbluh - 202 994-7116 |
SECRET CUBAN DOCUMENTS ON HISTORY OF AFRICA INVOLVEMENT
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 67
Edited by Peter Kornbluh
NEW BOOK based on Unprecedented Access to Cuban Records;
True Story of U.S.-Cuba Cold fear Clash in Angola presented in Conflicting
Missions
Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive today posted a selection
of secret Cuban government documents detailing Cuba's policy and involvement
in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s. The records are a sample of dozens of
internal reports, memorandum and communications obtained by Piero Gleijeses,
a historian at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies,
for his new book, Conflicting
Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University
of North Carolina Press).
Peter Kornbluh, director of the Archive’s Cuba Documentation Project,
called the publication of the documents “a significant step toward a fuller
understanding Cuba’s place in the history of Africa and the Cold War,”
and commended the Castro government’s decision to makes its long-secret
archives accessible to scholars like Professor Gleijeses. “Cuba has
been an important actor on the stage of foreign affairs,” he said. “Cuban
documents are a missing link in fostering an understanding of numerous
international episodes of the past.”
Conflicting Missions provides the first comprehensive history
of the Cuba's role in Africa and settles a longstanding controversy over
why and when Fidel Castro decided to intervene in Angola in 1975. The book
definitively resolves two central questions regarding Cuba's policy motivations
and its relationship to the Soviet Union when Castro astounded and outraged
Washington by sending thousands of soldiers into the Angolan civil conflict.
Based on Cuban, U.S. and South African documents and interviews, the book
concludes that:
Castro decided to send troops to Angola on November 4, 1975, in response
to the South African invasion of that country, rather than vice versa as
the Ford administration persistently claimed;
The United States knew about South Africa's covert invasion plans, and
collaborated militarily with its troops, contrary to what Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger testified before Congress and wrote in his memoirs.
Cuba made the decision to send troops without informing the Soviet Union
and deployed them, contrary to what has been widely alleged, without any
Soviet assistance for the first two months.
Professor Gleijeses is the first scholar to gain access to closed Cuban
archives—a process that took more than six years of research trips to Cuba—including
those of the Communist Party Central Committee, the armed forces and the
foreign ministry. Classified Cuban documents used in the book include:
minutes of meetings with Fidel Castro, Che Guevara's handwritten correspondence
from Zaire, military directives from Raul Castro, briefing papers from
intelligence chieftain, Manuel Piniero, field commander reports, internal
Cuban government memoranda, and Cuban-Soviet communications and military
accords.
In addition to research in Cuba, the author also worked extensively
in the archives of the United States, Belgium, Great Britain, and West
and East Germany, teaching himself to read Portuguese and Afrikaans so
that he could evaluate primary documents written in those languages.
Gleijeses also interviewed over one hundred fifty protagonists, among
them the former CIA station chief in Luanda, Robert Hultslander who spoke
on the record for the first time for this book. "History has shown," Hultslander
noted, "that Kissinger's policy on Africa itself was shortsighted and flawed."
He also commented on the forces of Jonas Savimbi, the rebel chief recently
killed in Angola: "I was deeply concerned ... about UNITA's purported ties
with South Africa, and the resulting political liability such carried.
I was unaware at the time, of course, that the U.S. would eventually beg
South Africa to directly intervene to pull its chestnuts out of the fire."
In this first account of Cuba's policy in Africa based on documentary
evidence, Gleijeses describes and analyzes Castro's dramatic dispatch of
30,000 Cubans to Angola in 1975-76, and he traces the roots of this policy—from
Havana's assistance to the Algerian rebels fighting France in 1961 to the
secret war between Havana and Washington in Zaire in 1964-65 and Cuba's
decisive contribution to Guinea-Bissau's war of independence from 1966-1974.
"Conflicting Missions is above all the story of a contest, staged in
Africa, between Cuba and the United States," according to its author, which
started in Zaire in 1964-65 and culminated in a major Cold War confrontation
in Angola in 1975-76. Using Cuban and US documents, as well as the semi-official
history of South Africa's 1975 covert operation in Angola (available only
in Afrikaans), this book is the first to present the internationalized
Angolan conflict from three sides—Cuba and the MPLA, the United States
and the covert CIA operation codenamed IAFEATURE and South Africa, whose
secret incursion prompted Castro's decision to commit Cuban troops.
Conflicting Missions also argues that Secretary Kissinger's account
of the US role in Angola, most recently repeated in the third volume of
his memoirs, is misleading. Testifying before Congress in 1976, Kissinger
stated "We had no foreknowledge of South Africa's intentions, and in no
way cooperated militarily." In Years of Renewal Dr. Kissinger also
denied that the United States and South Africa had collaborated in the
Angolan conflict; Gleijeses' research strongly suggests that they did.
The book quotes Kissinger aide Joseph Sisco conceding that the Ford administration
"certainly did not discourage" South Africa's intervention, and presents
evidence that the CIA helped the South Africans ferry arms to key battlefronts.
The book also reproduces portions of a declassified
memorandum of conversation between Kissinger and Chinese leader Teng Hsiao-p'ing
which shows that Chinese officials raised concerns about South Africa's
involvement in Angola in response to Ford and Kissinger's entreaties for
Beijing's continuing support. The memcon quotes President Ford as telling
the Chinese "we had nothing to do with the South African involvement."
Drawing on the Cuban documents, the book challenges Kissinger's account
in his memoirs about the arrival of Cubans in Angola. The first Cuban military
advisers did not arrive in Angola until late August 1975, and the Cubans
did not participate in the fighting until late October, after South Africa
had invaded.
In assessing the motivations of Cuba's foreign policy, Cuba's relations
with the Soviet Union, and the nature of the Communist threat in Africa,
Gleijeses shows that CIA and INR intelligence reports were often sophisticated
and insightful, unlike the decisions of the policymakers in Washington.
Summaries of the Cuban documents, and several declassified U.S. records
relating to Cuba and Africa, follow:
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe
Acrobat Reader to view.
Document
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January 13, 1976, Department of State Cable,
“Cuban Military Intervention in Angola: Report Number 9.” (Document obtained
from Department of State files through FOIA). |
The Department of State reports on the Soviet flights of Cubans
to Angola. “Cuba may have begun to use 200 passenger capacity IL-62 aircrafts
(Soviet) in its airlift support operations.” The document also makes estimates
on the number of Cubans fighting in Angola, and speculates on possible
military maneuvers to occur in the near future.
Document
2 |
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January 6, 1976, Memorandum from Cuban Army,
“Conversation with the Soviet Ambassador.” (Document from the Centro de
Informacion de la Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, CIDFAR,
[Center of Information of the Armed Forces]). |
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English translation of this document |
In this memorandum a high ranking Cuban military official describes
a meeting with Vitali Vorotnikov, Soviet Ambassador to Cuba, in which he
informs Raúl Castro that Aeroflot will provide ten charter flights
to fly Cubans into Angola. Most other countries had refused the Cubans
landing rights under pressure from the United States. The Soviets offered
these ten flights, but no more.
Document
3 |
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December 18, 1975, Cable from Arquimides Columbié,
[Political Situation in Angola]. (Document from the Centro de Informacion
de la Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, CIDFAR, [Center of
Information of the Armed Forces]). |
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English translation of this document |
Arquimides Columbié, the highest ranking Cuban civilian
in Africa during the Angolan war, cables Havana describing a meeting with
a Soviet source that shows the USSR’s profound mistrust of the MPLA. The
source tells Columbié that he is wary of Swedish and Brazilian recognition
of the MPLA government because the Swedes could acquire “influence…over
President Neto and other MPLA leaders.” The Brazilian action is seen by
the Soviet source as possibly influenced by the United States, since the
U.S. knows “it would be fairly easy for the Brazilians to manipulate MPLA
leadership.”
Document
4 |
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December 3, 1975, White House Memorandum of
Conversation with Chinese Officials, “The Soviet Union; Europe; the Middle
East; South Asia; Angola” (Document obtained by National Security Archive,
from National Archives Record Group 59. Records of the Department of State,
Policy Planning Staff, Director’s Files (Winston Lord), 1969-1977, Box
373). |
This conversation between President Gerald Ford, Secretary
of State Henry Kissinger and Chinese Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p’ing demonstrates
that high-ranking Chinese officials raised concerns about U.S. entreaties
to continue their participation in Angola because of South Africa’s involvement.
Vice Premier Teng states, “As I mentioned to you just now, the primary
problem is the involvement of South Africa. If you can get South Africa
out of Angola as soon as possible, or find some other means to replace
South Africa on the southern front, this would be good.”
Document
5 |
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August 11, 1975, Memorandum, “Report about
my visit to Angola,” from Major Raúl Diaz Arguelles to Major Raúl
Castro Ruz. (Document from the Centro de Informacion de la Defensa de las
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, CIDFAR, [Center of Information of the
Armed Forces]). |
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English translation of this document |
This memo describes meetings between the Cuban representatives
and Angolan President Agostinho Neto. In his report to the head of the
Cuban Army Raúl Castro, Raúl Diaz Arguelles talks about handing
over 100,000 dollars to the MPLA as well as fielding their requests to
train Angolans both in Cuba and Angola. Neto goes on to complain about
lackluster Soviet aid and expresses his wish to turn Angola into a “vital
issue in the fight between imperialism and socialism.” The Cubans agree,
and Diaz Arguelles recommends helping the Angolans “directly or indirectly”
in their cause.
Document
6 |
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June 27, 1975, NSC Minutes, “Angola” (Document
obtained from Gerald Ford Library, NSC Meetings File, Box 2) |
In a meeting including President Ford, Secretary of State Kissinger,
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, and CIA Director William Colby
among others, U.S. intervention in Angola's civil war is discussed.
In response to evidence of Soviet aid to the MPLA, Secretary Schlesinger
says, “we might wish to encourage the disintegration of Angola.” Kissinger
describes two meetings of the 40 Committee oversight group for clandestine
operations in which covert operations were authorized: “The first meeting
involved only money, but the second included some arms package.”
Document
7 |
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November 22, 1972, Memorandum, “The Shipment
of Comrades to Angola and Mozambique,” From Major Manuel Piñeiro
Lozada to Major Raúl Castro Ruz. (Document from the Centro
de Informacion de la Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, CIDFAR,
[Center of Information of the Armed Forces]). |
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English translation of this document |
This document, written by Cuba's famous intelligence operative,
Manuel Piñeiro, shows the early Cuban Government contacts with the
MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and original MPLA
requests for low-level training and logistical assistance in Angola. The
memo describes Cuban plans to send a delegation to Angola and Mozambique
to ascertain what kind of support Cuba could give to independence struggles
in those two nations.
Document
8 |
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November 21, 1967, CIA Special Memorandum,
“Bolsheviks and Heroes: The USSR and Cuba.” (Document obtained through
FOIA) |
This report by the CIA's National Board of Estimates describes
a low point in relations between Moscow and Havana shortly after Che Guevara’s
death. The report begins by bluntly stating, “Brezhnev thinks that Castro
is some sort of idiot, and Castro probably isn’t too fond of Brezhnev either.”
Much of the tension between the two allies, according to this analysis,
has been caused by Cuba’s encouragement of guerrilla warfare in many Latin
American countries while the Soviets tried to expand both diplomatic and
economic ties with those governments the Cubans were trying to overthrow.
In this handwritten letter, Che Guevara, using his code name
“Tatu,” the Swahili word for the number three, writes to Fernandez Padilla
(code name "Rafael") who heads the Cuban intelligence operations in Dar-es-Salaam.
Padilla's unit is providing support for the Cuban presence in Zaire.
In his letter, Guevara describes some of the organizational problems that
were common in this operation including carelessness with money, and the
need for multivitamins and access to a grocery store to avoid malnutrition
among Cuban personnel. A week after the letter was written, on November
21st, Cuban troops, including Che Guevara, withdrew from Zaire.
Document
10 |
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October 20, 1963, Memorandum, Ministry of the
Revolutionary Armed Forces, Cuba, Major Raúl Castro to Majors Flavio
Bravo and Jorge Serguera. (Document from the Centro de Informacion de la
Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, CIDFAR, [Center of Information
of the Armed Forces]). |
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English translation of this document |
On the eve of the first Cuban military mission to Algeria,
Major Raúl Castro, head of the Cuban Armed Forces, writes a memorandum
to two of the leaders of the mission with specific rules of conduct for
the Cuban troops while in Algeria. Castro stresses extreme self-control
amongst the troops, prohibiting alcoholic beverages, or intimate relationships
with women; as well as humility, imploring the men to be modest and not
“act like experts.” Along with the code of conduct, Castro encourages “complete
and absolute” respect for Algerian customs and religion. While Che Guevara
looked into possible Latin American operations, Raúl Castro supervised
this early operation in Northern Africa.
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