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| National Security Archive |
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Carlos Osorio 202/994-7000
Thomas Blanton 202/994-7000
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Victor Abramovich 011
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PRESS RELEASE
ARGENTINE MILITARY BELIEVED U.S. GAVE
GO-AHEAD FOR DIRTY WAR
New State Department documents show conflict between
Washington and US Embassy in Buenos Aires over signals to
the military dictatorship at height of repression in 1976
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No.
73 - Part II
Edited by
Carlos Osorio
Assisted by
Kathleen Costar, research and editorial assistance
Florence Segura, research assistance
of the National Security Archive
Natalia Federman, research assistance and Spanish translation
of CELS
Washington, D.C., 21 August 2002 - State
Department documents released yesterday on Argentina's dirty
war (1976-83) show that the Argentine military believed
it had U.S. approval for its all-out assault on the left
in the name of fighting terrorism. The U.S. Embassy in Buenos
Aires complained to Washington that the Argentine officers
were "euphoric" over signals from high-ranking
U.S. officials including then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.
The Embassy reported to Washington that after Mr. Kissinger's
10 June 1976 meeting with Argentine Foreign Minister Admiral
Guzzetti, the Argentine government dismissed the Embassy's
human rights approaches and referred to Kissinger's "understanding"
of the situation. The current State Department collection
does not include a minute of Kissinger's and Guzetti's
conversation in Santiago, Chile.
On 20 September 1976, Ambassador Robert Hill reported
that Guzzetti said "When he had seen SECY of State
Kissinger in Santiago, the latter had said he 'hoped the
Argentine Govt could get the terrorist problem under control
as quickly as possible.' Guzzetti said that he had reported
this to President Videla and to the cabinet, and that
their impression had been that the USG's overriding concern
was not human rights but rather that GOA 'get it over
quickly'."
After a second meeting between Kissinger and Guzzetti
in Washington, on 19 October 1976, Ambassador Robert Hill
wrote "a sour note" from Buenos Aires complaining
that he could hardly carry human rights demarches if the
Argentine Foreign Minister did not hear the same message
from the Secretary of State. "Guzzetti went to U.S.
fully expecting to hear some strong, firm, direct warnings
on his government's human rights practices, rather than
that, he has returned in a state of jubilation, convinced
that there is no real problem with the USG over that issue,"
wrote Hill.
The U.S. Embassy also disagreed with the State Department's
Bureau of Intelligence 19 July 1976 assessment that there
was a "murderous three-cornered battle going on in
Argentina amongst left-wing terrorists, government security
personnel and right wing goon squads." On 23 July
1976, Deputy Chief of Mission Maxwell Chaplin cabled Washington
that "The battle is a two-sided affair, not tri-cornered"
since "the only 'right-wing assassins' operating
in Argentina at this point, however, are members of the
GOA security forces."
Note: The following documents are in PDF
format.
You will need to download and install the free
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Acrobat Reader to view.
| Document 1: Subject: Conversation with
Undersecretary of the Presidency, May 25, 1976 |
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During May, several Argentines working with U.S. universities
and Ford Foundation grantees, and at least two American
citizens, were kidnapped or abused by Argentine security
forces. The Department and the Embassy discussed asking
the Videla government for reassurances that his government
did not plan to expel refugees as the rumor went. The Embassy
suspected that Argentine security forces were involved in
the killing of two Uruguayan former Senators living in Buenos
Aires - Michellini and Gutierrez Ruiz.
This cable summarizes a cordial morning conversation between
Ricardo Yofre, the Undersecretary General of the Office
of the Presidency, and Ambassador Robert Hill. Although
five pages long, Ambassador's Hill's concern for the human
rights situation in Argentina is evident in only three lines
at the beginning of the cable and there is no reaction to
Mr. Yofre's forewarning of more human rights violations:
"Dr. Yofre noted that there are two distinct complications
in checking the hardliners and in bringing the human rights
problem under control: a) the first is that the country
is in an all-out war against subversion. In the heat of
the battle there will inevitably be some violations of human
rights. And Yofre warned that the government plans to drastically
step up its campaign against the terrorists very shortly.
b) Secondly, he said, there are a number of groups who are
operating on their own…"
| Document 2: Subject: Request for instructions,
May 25, 1976 |
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At noon on May 25, the Embassy was shocked to learn of
the kidnapping of Fulbright program coordinator, Elida Messina,
and in this cable asked for the Department's permission
to launch a demarche on human rights on these terms:
"We fully understand that Argentina is involved
in an all-out struggle against subversion. There are however,
some norms which can never be put aside by governments dedicated
to a rule of law. Respect for human rights is one of them.
The continued activities of Triple A-type squads which have
recently murdered Michellini, Gutierrez Ruiz and dozen of
others and have just kidnapped a member of the Fulbright
Commission, Miss Elida Messina, damaging the GOA's generally
good image abroad. These groups seem to operate with immunity
and are generally believed to be connected with Argentine
security forces. Whether they are or not, their continued
operation can only be harmful to the GOA itself and cause
consternation among Argentina's friends abroad."
| Document 3: Subject: Demarche
to Foreign Minister on Human Rights, May 28, 1976 |
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"I then proceeded with demarche
as outlined in refs A and B. I concluded by noting that
some sort of statement on part of GOA deploring terrorism
of any kind, whether from left or right, and reaffirming
GOA's resolve to enforce law and respect human rights might
have very salutary effect."
"Comment: Though [Foreign Minister] Guzzetti
indicated his understanding of the problem, I did not
have the impression he really got the point. We will keep
working on him and others in GOA. Hill"
| Document 4: Subject: Murders in Argentina
- No intergovernmental Conspiracy, June 4, 1976 |
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For the previous two weeks, the Department of State had
requested its Embassies in the region to analyze suspected
cooperation among Southern Cone security forces (subsequently
known as "Operation Condor"). Edgardo Enriquez,
leader of the Chilean MIR, had been captured by Argentine
security forces and handed to the Chileans, along with Maria
Regina Pinto Marcondes, a Brazilian; former Bolivian president
Juan Jose Torres has been killed in Buenos Aires; and several
refugees mainly from Chile and Uruguay had been kidnapped.
This report from the head of the Bureau of Intelligence
and Research to Secretary Kissinger denies the cooperation,
and outlines a somewhat benign view of Southern Cone security
forces and of President Videla's responsibility for human
rights violations during all 1976 - claiming that the killing
of refugees in Argentina is not coordinated between intelligence
agencies and President Videla's government is not involved
in the Argentine carnage. This view was repeated in subsequent
INR reports, to which the Embassy objected (see Chaplin
cable below): Here INR concluded:
"There is no evidence to support the contention
that Southern Cone governments are cooperating in some sort
of international "Murder Inc." aimed at leftist
political exiles resident in one of their countries…
The fact that these incidents are occurring in Argentina
and not elsewhere in the Southern Cone suggests that they
are attributable to a uniquely Argentine set of circumstances.
Amidst the murderous three-cornered battle going on in Argentina
amongst left-wing terrorists, government security personnel
and right wing goon squads, exiles can become victims for
a number of reasons:
- Operational involvement with one of the Argentine
terrorist groups, as appears to have been the case with
Chilean MIR leader Edgardo Enriquez.
- Past association with foreign and/or Argentine leftist
groups, a fact that, in and itself, is sufficient cause
for death in the eyes of fanatical Argentine right-wingers.
This may have been the crime of Michelini, Gutierrez Ruiz
and Torres.
- Efforts by hardliners in the Argentine government
to force President Videla into more stringent suppression
of terrorists, a motivation which also may lie behind
the death of the prominent Uruguayan and Bolivian exiles.
In all likelihood, the assassinations are the work of
right-wingers, some of whom are security personnel. Argentine
President Videla probably does not condone or encourage
what is happening, but neither does he appear capable of
stopping it."
| Document 5: Subject: Secretary's Calendar
of Events (Santiago/Mexico City), June 10, 1976 |
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The recent declassification does not include
a single document reporting on the meeting of more than one
hour between U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Argentine
Foreign Minister Cesar Augusto Guzzetti at the OAS General
Assembly (OASGA) meeting in Santiago, at Hotel Carrera. Kissinger
was traveling later to Mexico City. The National Security
Archive obtained this copy of Secretary Kissinger's agenda
for that day (from files at the National Archives) and has
filed MDR and FOIA requests to obtain any other related documents.
| Document 6: Subject: Abduction of Refugees
in Argentina, June 16, 1976 |
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Deputy Chief of Mission, Maxwell Chaplin reported on a
meeting held on June 14 with "Mr. Pereya," the
highest civilian in the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Chaplin was acting under instructions of the Department
of State to raise concern for the recent kidnapping of Uruguayan
and Chilean refugees in Buenos Aires who had been tortured
and released on June 12.
"2. Charge expressed USG concern over refugee abductions,
and raised broader issue of human rights. To illustrate
for him how foreign press covered such matters and how Congressional
critics dealt with them, he was also provided with copies
of Washington Post story on abduction and remarks of Congressman
Koch at CIAR on June 7…
3. [excised] response was an impassioned, almost fanatic
defense of GOA. With regard to substance of the issue, Pereya
[sic] contended that GOA was doing best it could in an all-out
war with extremists; that it was not possible to prevent
occasional excesses by embattled security forces… he
and president Videla were as deeply and genuinely concerned
about the problems of human rights as any foreign observe.
He did not comment directly on the truth or falsehood of
the abduction reports
4. When he reached the topic of the UNHCR, [excised]'s
indignation was barely controlled. He said that Argentina
had provided refuge for over 500,000 Aliens since 1973 most
of them Chileans. The country had made an enormous effort
to deal with this problem, and the effort was totally unrecognized…
5. In a review of events at the OASGA, [excised] expressed
satisfaction over his conclusion that Secretary Kissinger
was realistic and understood the GOA problems. On human
rights, he stated that the Secretary had quoted from Herodotus
a reference to refugees taking over the city that gave them
refuge, and this indicated his implicit agreement with the
GOA's position."
| Document 7: Subject: South
America - Southern Cone Security Practices, July 23, 1976 |
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Full
Document (PDF) |
Deputy Chief of Mission, Maxwell Chaplin disagreed with
two points of recent report No. 526
by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) in
Washington. Chaplin wrote Washington that cooperation between
Southern Cone countries was tighter than the INR estimates,
as evidenced by the presence of Uruguayan and Chilean military
operating with Argentine security units. In addition, Chaplin
clarified that it was inaccurate to portray the situation
in Argentina as a struggle between the extreme right, the
extreme left and the government in between. Chaplin asserted
that "The battle is a two-sided affair, not tri-cornered"
since "the only 'right-wing assassins' operating in
Argentina at this point, however, are members of the GOA
security forces."
| Document 8: Subject: Other aspects of September
17 conversation with Foreign Minister, September 20, 1976 |
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Full Document (PDF) |
Ambassador Robert Hill had just come back from Washington
where massacres of prisoners and widespread human rights violations
by Argentine security forces, as well as mounting evidence of
assassinations of foreigners under Operation Condor, were cause
for concern. Hill was charged to raise the human rights issues
at the highest level of the Argentine government. But, as Hill
reported to Washington, "the Foreign Minister said that
GOA had been somewhat surprised by indications of such strong
concern on the part of the USG in human rights situation in
Argentina. When he had seen SECY of State Kissinger in Santiago,
the latter had said he 'hoped the Argentine Govt could get the
terrorist problem under control as quickly as possible.' Guzzetti
said that he had reported this to President Videla and to the
cabinet, and that their impression had been that the USG's overriding
concern was not human rights but rather that GOA "get it
over quickly."
| Document 9: Subject: Ambassador discusses
U.S.-Argentine Relations with President Videla, September
24, 1976 |
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"President said he had been gratified
when FONMIN Guzzetti reported to him that Secretary of State
Kissinger understood their problem and had said he hoped they
could get terrorism under control as quickly as possible.
Videla said he had the impression senior officers of the USG
understood situation his govt faces but junior bureaucrats
do not. I assured him this was not the case. We all hope Argentina
can get terrorism under control quickly - but to do so in
such a way as to do minimum damage to its image and to its
relations with other governments. If Security Forces continue
to kill people to tune of brass band, I concluded, this will
not be possible. I told him Secretary of State had told me
when I was in US that he wanted to avoid human rights problem
in Argentina."
| Document 10: Subject: Foreign
Minister Guzetti Euphoric over visit to United States, October
19, 1976 |
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Admiral Guzetti had just returned from the
U.S. and Ambassador Robert Hill wrote what Assistant Secretary
of State Schlaudeman termed "a sour note" to Secretary
of State Henry Kissinger protesting that the Argentine military
were not receiving a strong disapproving signal from Washington
for their human rights violations. Hill wrote that the Embassy
was now in an awkward position to present demarches on human
rights.
Hill wrote that:
"Guzzetti's remarks both to me and to the argentine
press since his return are not those of a man who has been
impressed with the gravity of the human rights problem as
seen from the U.S. Both personally and in press accounts
of his trip Guzzetti's reaction indicates little reason
for concern over the human rights issue. Guzzetti went to
us fully expecting to hear some strong, firm, direct warning
of his govt's human rights practices. Rather than that,
he has returned in a state of jubilation. Convinced that
there is no real problem with the USG over this issue. Based
on what Guzzetti is doubtless reporting to the GOA, it must
now believe that if it has any problems with the U.S. over
human rights, they are confined to certain elements of Congress
and what it regards as biased and/or uninformed minor segments
of public opinion. While that conviction lasts it will be
unrealistic and unbelievable for this embassy to press representations
to the GOA over human rights violations."
| Document 11: Subject: U.S.-Argentine Relations,
February 2, 1977 |
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As Jimmy Carter assumed the presidency, the Department
of State informed the U.S. Embassy in Argentina of the points
that were raised with Political Counselor Beauge at the
Argentine Embassy in Washington. The Department told Beauge
that the new administration attaches tremendous importance
to human rights. Beauge remarked that "it is essential
for your same message to come from all channels. This did
not happen in the past."
| Document 12: Subject: Henry
Kissinger Visit to Argentina, June 27, 1978 |
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U.S. Ambassador Raul Castro expressed concern that while
visiting Argentina, former Secretary of State Kissinger's
"repeated high praise for Argentina's action in wiping
out terrorism and his stress on the importance of Argentina
may have gone to some considerable extent to his hosts'
heads." Castro feared that the Military Junta will
use "Kissinger's laudatory statements as justification
for hardening their human rights stance."
| Document 13: Subject: Evolution
of U.S. Human Rights Policy in Argentina, September 11,
1978 |
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This INR study for Viron P. Vaky, Assistant
Secretary for Interamerican Affairs, highlighted that before
the Carter administration, the Argentine Military Junta thought
the U.S. government's human rights policy was mainly rhetoric
and that "Argentina would be protected for the duration
of its 'dirty war' by friends in the US executive and Congress
and/or the Pentagon."
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