Document 1
U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Selective Genocide, March
28, 1971, Confidential, 2 pp.
Source: Record Group 59, Subject Numeric File 1970-73,
Pol and Def, Box 2530
Consul General Archer Blood reports of "a reign of terror
by the Pak Military" in East Pakistan. Blood indicated
that evidence is surfacing suggesting that Awami League supporters
and Hindus are being systematically targeted by the Martial
Law Administrators.
Document 2
Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger, Situation in Pakistan, March
28, 1971, Secret, 2 pp.
Source: NPMP, National Security Council Files,
Country Files, Middle East, Box 625
NSC official Sam Hoskinson tells Kissinger that events in East
Pakistan have taken a turn for the worse. More significantly,
this memorandum acknowledges both American recognition of the
"reign of terror" conducted by West Pakistan, and
the need to address the new policy issues that have been created
as a result of the terror.
Document 3
U.S. Embassy (New Delhi) Cable, Selective Genocide, March
29, 1971, Confidential, 1 pp.
Source: Record Group 59, Subject Numeric File 1970-73,
Pol and Def, Box 2530
Ambassador Keating expresses his dismay and concern at repression
unleashed by the Martial Law Administrators with the use of
American military equipment. He calls for the U.S. to "promptly,
publicly, and prominently deplore" the brutality. Washington
however, never publicly spoke out against West Pakistan.
Document 4
U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Killings at University, March
30, 1971, Confidential, 3 pp
Source: Record Group 59, Subject Numeric File 1970-73,
Pol and Def, Box 2530
Blood reports an American's observation of the atrocities committed
at Dacca University. The observer indicates that students had
been "shot down in rooms or mowed down when they came out
of building in groups." In one instance, the MLA set a
girls dormitory on fire and then the girls were "machine-gunned
as they fled the building."
Document 5
U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Extent of Casualties in Dacca,
March 31, 1971, Confidential, 2 pp.
Source: Record Group 59, Subject Numeric File 1970-73,
Pol and Def, Box 2530
Blood reports that an estimated 4-6,000 people have "lost
their lives as a result of military action" since martial
law began on March 25. He also indicates that the West Pakistani
objective "to hit hard and terrorize the population"
has been fairly successful.
Document 6
U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Sitrep: Army Terror Campaign
Continues in Dacca; Evidence Military Faces Some Difficulties
Elsewhere, March 31, 1971, Confidential, 3 pp.
Source: Record Group 59, Subject Numeric File 1970-73,
Pol and Def, Box 2530
Blood indicates that Martial Law Administrators are now focusing
on predominantly Hindu areas. "Congen officer heard steady
firing of approximately 1 shot per ten seconds for 30 minutes."
Cable also reports that naked female bodies found "with
bits of rope hanging from ceiling fans," after apparently
being "raped, shot, and hung by heels" from the fans.
Document 7
U.S. Department of State Cable, USG Expression of Concern on
East Pakistan; April 6, 1971, Confidential, 8 pp.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP),
National Security Council Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 578.
During a conversation with Assistant Secretary Sisco, Pakistani
Ambassador Agha Hilaly asks that "due allowance be made
for behavior of Pak officials and others during what had amounted
to civil war for a few days," because the "army had
to kill people in order to keep country together." Expressing
concern over the situation and bloodshed as well as use of U.S.
arms in repression, Sisco observed that the US is "keenly
sensitive to problems and feelings on developments [in East
Pakistan]."
Document 8
U.S. Consulate (Dacca) Cable, Dissent from U.S. Policy Toward
East Pakistan, April 6, 1971, Confidential, 5 pp. Includes
Signatures from the Department of State.
Source: RG 59, SN 70-73 Pol and Def. From: Pol
Pak-U.S. To: Pol 17-1 Pak-U.S. Box 2535
In one of the first "Dissent Cables," Blood transmits
a message denouncing American policy towards the South Asia
crisis. The transmission suggests that the United States is
"bending over backwards to placate the West Pak [sic] dominated
government and to lessen likely and deservedly negative international
public relations impact against them." The cable goes on
to question U.S. morality at a time when "unfortunately,
the overworked term genocide is applicable."
Document 9
Memorandum for the President, Policy Options Toward Pakistan,
April 28, 1971, Secret, 6 pp. Includes Nixon's handwritten Nixon
note
Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Country Files: Middle
East, Box 625
Kissinger presents Nixon with U.S. policy options directed
towards the crisis in East Pakistan. Nixon and Kissinger both
feel the third is the best as it, as Kissinger writes, "would
have the advantage of making the most of the relationship with
Yahya, while engaging in a serious effort to move the situation
toward conditions less damaging to US and Pakistani interests."
At the end of the last page Nixon writes, "To all hands:
Don't squeeze Yahya at this time."
Document 10
Memorandum of Conversation (Memcon) M.M. Ahmad, Agha Hilaly, Henry
Kissinger and Harold H. Saunders May 10, 1971, (3:05 - 3:30 p.m.),
Secret /NODIS, 4 pp.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP),
National Security Council Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 578.
U.S. and Pakistani officials discuss the potential for a political
solution in East Pakistan. Kissinger indicates Nixon's "high
regard" and "personal affection" for Yahya and
that "the last thing one does in this situation is to take
advantage of a friend in need." He also offers American
assistance so as to not compound "the anguish" that
Pakistan "is already suffering," as a result of the
repression in East Pakistan.
Document 11
Memcon The President, M.M. Ahmad, Agha Hilaly, and Harold H. Saunders,
May 10, 1971, (4:45 - 5:20 p.m.), Secret /NODIS, 4 pp.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP),
National Security Council Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 578.
Nixon and Pakistani officials discuss a potential political
solution in East Pakistan. Nixon expresses sympathy for Pakistan
by indicating that "Yahya is a good friend," and seemingly
in response to the genocide like repression in the East, says
he "could understand the anguish of the decisions which
[Yahya] had to make." Nixon also declares that the U.S.
"would not do anything to complicate the situation for
President Yahya or to embarrass him."
Document 12
Department of State, Memorandum for the President, Possible
India-Pakistan War, May 26, 1971, Secret, 4 pp.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP),
National Security Council Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 575.
As early as May 1971 the State Department became aware that
a war was possible between India and Pakistan. This memorandum
denotes three causes that may lead to an India-Pakistan war:
(1)continued military repression in the East, (2) the refugee
flow into India, and (3) Indian cross-border support to Bengali
guerillas (the Mukti Bahini).
Document 13
Memcon Kenneth Keating, Henry Kissinger, and Harold Saunders June
3, 1971, (4:00 P.M.). Attached to Cover Sheet Dated June 21, 1971,
Secret /NODIS, 6 pp.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP),
National Security Council Files Country Files: Middle East, Box
596.
Kissinger, Keating, and Saunders discuss the situation in Pakistan
and American military assistance. Kissinger indicates that Nixon
wants to give Yahya a few months to fix the situation, but that
East Pakistan will eventually become independent. Kissinger
points out that "the President has a special feeling for
President Yahya. One cannot make policy on that basis, but it
is a fact of life."
Document 14
Memorandum for RADM Daniel J. Murphy, Dr. Kissinger's Reports
of Conversations in New Delhi, July 7, 1971, Top Secret/Sensitive/Eyes
Only, 4 pp.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP),
National Security Council Files, Haig Chron, Box 983.
Relaying his impressions of his visit to India, Kissinger describes
the strong feelings about the heavy burden placed upon India
by the refugees from East Pakistan. In his meetings with Indian
officials, Kissinger discussed the East Pakistan situation,
military assistance to Pakistan, and China. He assures the Indians
that the U.S. "would take the gravest view of any unprovoked
aggression against India."
Document 15
Memcon, Dr. Sarabhai, Dr. Haksar, Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Winston Lord,
July 7, 1971, (1:10 - 2:50 p.m.), Secret/Sensitive,
4pp.
Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Pres/HAK Memcons, Box 1025
Just days before Kissinger's secret trip to China, Indian and
U.S. officials discuss numerous issues, including the Soviet
Union, the situation in East Pakistan, arms transfers to Pakistan,
and China. During the conversation, Kissinger assures the Indians
that "under any conceivable circumstance the U.S. would
back India against any Chinese pressures." He also states
that "In any dialogue with China, we would of course not
encourage her against India."
Document 16
Department of State, Cable, Indo-Pakistan Situation, July
15, 1971, Secret, 7 pp.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP),
National Security Council Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 578.
Indian Ambassador to the United States L.K. Jha and Acting
Secretary John Irwin discuss the East Pakistan situation, a
possible political solution, American military assistance to
Pakistan, and the role of the UN in refugee camps.
Document 17
Memorandum for Dr, Kissinger, Military Assistance to Pakistan
and the Trip to Peking, July 19, 1971, Secret, 2 pp. Includes
handwritten Kissinger note on bottom of second page.
Source: NPMP NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 574
Saunders discusses U.S. Aid to South Asia, specifically noting
the connections between U.S. military assistance to Pakistan
and Pakistan's role in the China initiative. Kissinger writes,
"But it is of course clear that we have some special relationship
to Pakistan."
Document 18
Memorandum for the Presidents File, President's Meeting with
Ambassador Joseph Farland, July 28, 1971, Secret, 5 pp. Attached
to Cover Memoranda
Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Country Files: Middle
East, Box 626
Nixon expresses his concern over the South Asian conflict to
Ambassador Farland, "not only for its intrinsic tragedy
and danger, but also because it could disrupt our steady course
in our policy toward China."
Document 19
NSC Paper, South Asia: Cutting of Military and Economic Assistance,
July 30, 1971, Secret, 5 pp.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP),
National Security Council Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 570.
The NSC staff discusses Congressional reaction to the conflict
in East Pakistan and American military assistance. The Administration
has chosen quiet diplomacy as means to motivate Yahya to avert
famine and create conditions in which the refugees may return
from India. "We have not openly condemned Yahya. He appreciates
this."
Document 20
Handwritten Letter from President Nixon to President Yahya, August
7, 1971, 4 pp. Attached to cover page.
Source: RG 59 PPC S/P, Directors Files (Winston
Lord), Box 330.
Nixon writes to personally thank Yahya for his assistance in
arranging contacts between the U.S. and China. At a time when
West Pakistani troops were engaging in a repression of East
Pakistan, Nixon told Yahya that "Those who want a more
peaceful world in the generation to come will forever be in
your debt."
Document 21
Memorandum for the Record: The President, Henry Kissinger, John
Irwin, Thomas Moorer, Robert Cushman, Maurice Williams, Joseph
Sisco, Armistead Seldon, and Harold Saunders, August 11, 1971,
Secret, 7 pp.
Source: NPMP NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 578
The NSC Senior Review Group discusses the situation in East
Pakistan and increasing tensions between India and Pakistan.
The President indicates that "the big story is Pakistan,"
and he expresses his concern from the standpoint of human suffering.
While Nixon suggests that some Indian and Pakistani interest
might be served by war, it is not in American interests as "the
new China relationship would be imperiled, probably beyond repair."
While stating that the Indians are more "devious"
than the "sometimes extremely stupid" Pakistanis,
the U.S. "must not-cannot-allow" India to use the
refugees as a pretext for breaking up Pakistan. Despite the
conditions in the East, which Ambassador Blood described as
"selective genocide," Nixon states that "We will
not measure our relationship with the government in terms of
what it has done in East Pakistan. By that criterion, we would
cut off relations with every Communist government in the world
because of the slaughter that has taken place in the Communist
countries."
Document 22
Department of State, Cable, Letter from Prime Minister Gandhi,
August 14, 1971, Secret, 4 pp.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National
Security Council Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 578.
Indira Gandhi, in a letter to President Nixon, notes that the
refugee flow has not slowed, and has reached approximately seven
million. She questions U.S. efforts to work towards a political
solution in East Pakistan as well as American arms transfers
to Pakistan.
Document 23
Memorandum for the President, My August 16 Meeting with the
Chinese Ambassador in Paris, August 16, 1971, Top Secret/Sensitive/Eyes
Only, 16 pp. Includes Memorandum of Conversation between Huang
Chen, Tsao Kuei Sheng, Wei Tung, Henry Kissinger, Vernon Walters,
and Winston Lord Dated August 19, 1971.
Source: RG 59, PPC S/P, Directors Files (Winston
Lord), Box 330.
Kissinger in a memorandum to Nixon describes his talks with
the Chinese Ambassador in Paris. Kissinger explains to the Chinese
that the U.S. is prevented from giving any military assistance
to Pakistan because of Congress, but supports Chinese assistance
by stating that the U.S. would "understand it if other
friends of Pakistan will give them the equipment they need."
He also declares that the U.S. "will do nothing to embarrass
the government of Pakistan by any public statements."
Document 24
Memorandum for the President, Implications of the Situation
in South Asia, August 18, 1971, Secret, 4 pp.
Source: NPMP NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 570
Kissinger discusses the developments in South Asia including
Yahya's stand to not grant independence in the East, the serious
insurgency movement underway in East Pakistan, and the continued
flow of refugees into India. He suggests that American strategy
give Yahya a face-saving way of taking the political steps necessary
to re-establish normal conditions. While Kissinger wrote in
his memoirs, "We had no national interest to prevent self-determination
for East Pakistan," the documents show he believed otherwise.
In this record, at a time when rapprochement with China was
in the national interest, Kissinger suggests that "a U.S.
effort to split off part of Pakistan in the name of self-determination
would have implications for Taiwan and Tibet in Peking's eyes."
Document 25
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad), Cable, Arrests of East Pakistan Intellectuals,
September 17, 1971, Confidential, 3 pp.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP),
National Security Council Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 576.
Indicates that repression of intellectuals in the East continues,
but on a reduced scale. Ambassador Farland advises that the
best policy is to continue the current practice of "persistent
but quiet pressure on GOP toward better treatment of East Pakistanis
in all categories."
Document 26
Memorandum for General Haig, Pakistan/India Contingency Planning,
Secret/Eyes Only, November 15, 1971, 3 pp. Includes JCS Cable.
Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 570
The U.S. disguising the movement of the nuclear aircraft carrier,
the USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal for evacuation purposes,
gladly lets the ship movement represent possible American involvement
in the conflict, especially if it expanded to a superpower confrontation.
Admiral Welander from the NSC Staff indicates that the JCS has
approved, for planning purposes only, the CINCPAC concept to
ready a USS attack carrier to dissuade "third party"
involvement in the South Asia crisis.
Document 27
United States Embassy (Islamabad) Cable, Pakistan Crisis,
November 18, 1971, Secret, 9 pp. Attached to Presidents Saturday
Briefing and includes United Stated Embassy (New Delhi) Cables
Dated November 15 and 16, 1971.
Source: Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP),
National Security Council Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 570
Keating suggests that Gandhi is trying to "cool"
the political climate in India while continuing to exert pressure
on Pakistan. The Presidents Briefing indicates however, that
India is stepping up its support for the guerillas fighting
in East Pakistan, action that could "goat" the Pakistanis
into a full scale war.
Document 28
White House, Telephone Conversations (Telcon), Dated December
4 and December 16, 1971, 11 pp. Includes Cover Sheet Dated January
19, 1972
Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Country Files: Middle
East, Box 643.
These telcons show Nixon and Kissinger's knowledge of third
party transfers of military supplies to Pakistan. Haig summarizes
the Telcons to Kissinger by writing that the telcons, "confirm
the President's knowledge of, approval for and, if you will,
directive to provide aircraft to Iran and Jordan," in exchange
for providing aircraft to Pakistan. The telcons also show that
Kissinger and Nixon, following the advice of Barbara Walters,
decide to put out a White House version of the facts involved
with the South Asian crisis through John Scali. Nixon express
his desire to, "get some PR out on the- - put the blame
on India. It will also take some blame off us."
Document 29
National Security Council Memorandum for Henry Kissinger, Jordanian
Transfer of F-104's to Pakistan, Secret, December 7, 1971,
7 pp. Includes State Department Cable to Jordan, State Department
Memo to Kissinger, and United States Embassy (Amman) cable. First
page has handwritten Kissinger note in which he, in reference
to the title and secrecy of the issue, suggests "that title
should have been omitted."
Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 575
Saunders discusses Yahya's request for military equipment from
the U.S. and other sources, specifically Jordan. He also observes
that "by law," the U.S. "cannot authorize"
any military transfers unless the administration was willing
"to change our own policy and provide the equipment directly."
This would rule out any transfer of American military equipment
for Pakistan, supplied by the U.S., or any third party.
Document 30
Background Briefing with Henry Kissinger, December 7, 1971, 14
pp.
Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 572
As a result of American media criticism towards the U.S. position
on the India-Pakistan conflict, Kissinger in an attempt to straighten
the record conducts a "background" press briefing.
Kissinger presents the U.S. position using many questionable
facts.
Document 31
United States Embassy (New Delhi) Cable, U.S. Public Position
on Road to War, Secret, December 8, 1971, 3 pp.
Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 572.
Responding to a news story based on Kissinger's background
briefing, Keating argues that many of Kissinger's statements
can not be supported. Specifically, Keating questions Kissinger's
reference to Indian requests for a relief program, the Pakistani
offer of amnesty to Awami Leaguers, and his claim that Washington
has favored autonomy for East Pakistan.
Document 32
Event Summary by George H.W. Bush, December 10, 1971, 7 pp.
Source: George Bush Presidential Library. George
H.W. Bush Collection. Series: United Nations File, 1971-1972,
Box 4.
UN Ambassador Bush describes the December 10 meeting between
Kissinger and the Chinese delegation to the United Nations.
While discussing the India-Pakistan crisis, Kissinger reveals
that the American position on the issue was parallel to that
of the Chinese. Kissinger disclosed that the U.S. would be moving
some ships into the area, and also that military aid was being
sent from Jordan, Turkey, and Iran. Some of this aid was illegally
transferred because it was American in origin. Bush also reports
that Kissinger gives his tacit approval for China to provide
militarily support for Pakistani operations against India. Bush
expresses his personal doubts in the administration's "Two
State Departments thing," and takes issue with Kissinger's
style, in one instance calling him paranoid and arrogant.
Document 33
NSC List, Courses of Actions Associated with India/Pakistan
Crisis, Top Secret/Sensistive, December 8, 1971, 2 pp.
Source: NPMP, Country Files: Middle East, Box 643.
Possible American courses of action with regards to the India/Pakistan
crisis included notification to China that the U.S. would "look
with favor on steps taken" by Beijing to "demonstrate
its determination to intervene by force if necessary to preserve
the territorial integrity of West Pakistan to include subtle
assurance the Government of the United States will not stand
by should the Soviet Union launch attacks against the PRC."
Document 34
Department of State Cable, Pakistan Request for F-104's,
Secret, December 9, 1971, 2 pp.
Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 573.
The transfer of F-104 planes to Pakistan from both Jordan and
Iran is under review at "very high level of USG."
Document 35
Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Appraisal, Communist
China's Capability to Support Pakistan, Secret, December 9,
1971, 3 pp.
Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 572.
The DIA assesses the limits and possibility of Chinese support
to the Pakistanis. It opines that while Chinese support will
be limited to political, diplomatic, and propaganda for the
time being, the PRC could initiate small attacks in the high
mountainous areas in the East, and therefore occupy Indian troops
without "provoking Soviet retaliatory moves."
Document 36
Memcon, Huang Ha, T'ang Wen-sheng, Shih Yen-hua, Alexander Haig,
Winston Lord, Top Secret/Sensitive, Exclusively Eyes Only, December
12, 1971 (3:50-4:20), 9 pp.
Source: RG 59, PPC S/P, Directors Files (Winston
Lord), Box 330.
In a discussion of the India-Pakistan situation, Haig declares
that the U.S. is doing everything it can do to facilitate transfers
of fighter planes and military supplies from Jordan, Iran, and
Saudi Arabia to Pakistan.
Document 37
Department of State of Cable, Carrier Deployment in Indian
Ocean, Secret, December 14, 1971, 2 pp.
Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 578
Indian Ambassador Jha expresses his concern over American deployment
of a Nuclear Carrier in the Indian ocean.
Document 38
Department of State, Situation Report #41, Situation in India-Pakistan
as of 0700 hours (EST), Secret, December 14, 1971, 4 pp.
Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 573
The State Department sees the possibility of a ceasefire in
the East; Notes that Eleven Jordanian F-104 fighter aircraft
have possibly been sent to Pakistan.
Document 39
Department of State, Situation Report #44, Situation in India-Pakistan
as of 0700 hours (EST), Secret, December 15, 1971, 4 pp.
Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 573
Heavy fighting is turning in favor of the Indians, while cease-fire
plans continue to be in the works. A controversy is brewing
with regards over the U.S. decision to send a nuclear carrier
into the Bay of Bengal.
Document 40
United States Embassy (Islamabad) Cable, Top Secret/ Exclusive
Eyes Only, December 15, 1971, 1 pp.
The present trickle of Mig-19's and F-104's will not hold off
the Indians. Handwriting next to Mig-19's notes "China"
and next to F-104's notes "Jordan."
Document 41
United States Embassy (New Delhi), Cable, Deployment Carrier
Task Force in Indian Ocean, Secret, December 15, 1971, 2 pp.
Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 573
Keating describes his difficulty in explaining the rationale
behind the deployment of a carrier task force. He also suggests
that the decision to send the task force into the Indian Ocean
has only encouraged Yahya to continue the Pakistani military
effort.
Document 42
Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Memorandum, India-Pakistan
Situation Report (As of 1200 EST), Top Secret, December 16,
1971, 6 pp.
Source: NPMP, May Release, MDR# 4.
India has ordered a unilateral cease fire upon the unconditional
surrender of West Pakistani forces in East Pakistan. Despite
the cease-fire, American officials in Dacca report that "no
one seems to be in effective control of the situation,"
and that fighting continues "between Bengalis and scattered
"Mujahid/Razakar/West Pakistani elements." Also, in
a heavily excised paragraph, the CIA reports that a squadron
of American origin, Jordanian F-104's was delivered to Pakistan
on 13 December, despite an American embargo on military supplies
to both India and Pakistan. This embargo includes third party
transfers of American equipment to either of the parties.
Document 43
Department of State, Cable, Supply of Third Country US Arms
to Pakistan, Secret, December 23, 1971, 1 pp.
Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 575
Secretary Rogers suggests that Keating neither confirm nor
deny allegations that the U.S. endorsed Jordanian and Iranian
transfer of American arms to Pakistan.
Document 44
United States Embassy (Tehran), Cable, F-5 Aircraft to Pakistan,
Secret, December 29, 1971, 3 pp. Includes DOD cable.
Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Indo-Pak War, Box 575
Embassy Iran reports that three F-5A Fighter aircraft, reportedly
from the United States, had been flown to Pakistan to assist
in the war efforts against India. A Northrop official matches
the aircraft to a group of planes originally slated for sale
to Libya, but which were then diverted to USG control in California.
This information suggests that not only did Washington look
the other way when Jordan and Iran supplied U.S. planes to Pakistan,
but that despite the embargo placed on Pakistan, it directly
supplied Pakistan with fighter planes.
Document 45
National Security Council, Notes, Anderson Papers Material, January
6, 1972, 5 pp.
Source: NPMP, NSC Files, Country Files: Middle
East, Box 643.
The Nixon administration, during the East Pakistan crisis convened
meetings of the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) to discuss
the situation in South Asia. Records of these meetings were
kept, and somehow leaked to Syndicated columnist Jack Anderson.
Anderson's articles, based on classified WSAG minutes became
contentious, not only because they quoted from leaked classified
material, but also for their racy content. Kissinger and others
in the administration became upset at Anderson's exposure of
White House policies because, among other things, it revealed
the tilt towards Pakistan, despite the genocidal conditions
in the East.
Notes
1. Anderson, Jack with George Clifford. The
Anderson Papers. (New York: Random House, 1973) 214.
2. Brown, W. Norman. The United States and
India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1972) 217. Other public estimates of the final death toll
range from one to three million.
3. Ganguly, Sumit. Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan
Tensions since 1947. (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,
2001) 61.
4. Anderson: 215.
5. American military assistance was cutoff to
Pakistan following the commencement of violence in East Pakistan.
Then in early December 1971, when the conflict grew to an India-Pakistan
war, aid to India was also suspended. See documents 23
and 29. In the former, Kissinger
acknowledges that American assistance to Pakistan is forbidden
by Congress, whereas in the latter Harold Saunders observes that
"by law," the U.S. "cannot authorize" any
military transfers, including third party transfers, unless the
administration was willing "to change our own policy and
provide the equipment directly."
6. Document 8,
a cable transmission from Consul General Archer Blood to the State
Department has been very controversial. Known as the "Blood
Telegram," its low classification (Limited official use)
led to its high dissemination among government officials. The
day after it was sent, the State Department reclassified the message
as secret, in efforts to limit its spread. Blood's role in the
transmission of this cable has been blamed for his being transferred
out of Dacca by the Administration. Kux, Dennis. The United
States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. (Washington,
D.C.: Woodrow Wilson/Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001); Blood,
Archer. Oral history interview, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection.
Georgetown University Library, June 1990.
7. See Note 5.
8. See Also Burr, William ed. The Kissinger
Transcripts. (New York: The New Press, 1998); Ganguly, Sumit.
Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947.
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001); Hitchens, Christopher.
The Trials of Henry Kissinger. (New York: Verso Books,
2001); Sisson, Richard and Leo E. Rose. War and Secession:
India, Pakistan, the United States, and the Creation of Bangladesh.
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Kissinger, Henry.
The White House Years. (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1979).