Operation
Intercept: The perils of unilateralism
by
Kate Doyle
In the weeks before the Bush administration launched
the war in Iraq, the Mexican press was brimming with speculation
about the punishment the United States might inflict if the Fox
government did not vote with the U.S. in the United Nations. That
vote never came.
There are, of course, historical reasons for such anxiety. Mexico
has been the target of U.S. reprisal in the past, during disputes
over issues such as migration and the narcotics trade. American
presidents have used the border, in particular, as a bargaining
chip, holding it hostage during tricky or troublesome negotiations
when the United States was determined to get its way.
A look back at one of those episodes - Operation Intercept -
highlights a stark truth about US-Mexico relations in the 21st
century. The size and economic significance of the trade flowing
between the two countries today makes unilateral, punishing action
by the United States against its neighbor impossible to sustain.
The border no longer belongs only to the United States; it is
a shared wall. That is a dramatic change, and should give Mexico
a new sense of partnership with the United States.
Remember the drug war?
It began on the border between Mexico and the United States.
The year was 1969. In Washington, a new president occupied the
White House - the first Republican in eight years - determined
to prove he could establish law and order in a nation that seemed
to be spinning out of control. Richard M. Nixon had campaigned
on the promise that he would wage a relentless fight against the
narcotics trade. He chose Mexico as his first battleground.
At the time, U.S. concerns were focused not only on rising drug
use at home but also among American soldiers in Vietnam. With
drug treatment programs in their infancy, Washington turned its
attention abroad - on the countries that produced, processed and
exported narcotics.
Mexico wasn't the only target, but it was the first. As senior
administration officials began to plot an assault on the flow
of marihuana from its neighbor, they also prepared plans to attack
the heroin trade in Turkey, where most of the world's opium was
grown, and France, where organized crime rings smuggled the processed
heroin into the United States. The plan led eventually to the
destruction of the infamous French Connection.
The idea for a "war on drugs" grew out of a campaign
pledge Nixon made in September 1968 in Anaheim, California. Anaheim,
in the state's Orange County, was then - and remains today - a
spawning ground for grassroots political conservatism. This was
the home of Nixon's "silent majority," his deep political
base among white, middle-class Americans who feared the political
and social changes that were roiling U.S. society in the late
1960s. Before an audience of white-collar workers and suburban
housewives, the Republican candidate promised that, if elected,
he would "move against the source of drugs."
Two months after Nixon took office, he established the Special
Presidential Task Force Relating to Narcotics, Marihuana and Dangerous
Drugs, placing his hard-line attorney general, John Mitchell,
and Secretary of the Treasury David Kennedy in charge. The narcotics
task force based its work on the premise that one of the most
serious challenges facing the United States was drug abuse. With
representatives from ten different federal agencies, the group
spent eight weeks assessing the dangers of marihuana, the flow
of drugs over the Mexican border, and strategies to control drug
smuggling and marihuana cultivation. When its report was released
on June 6, it singled out Mexico as the primary supplier of marihuana
and a source for a large amount of other dangerous drugs, including
heroin. According to the task force, Mexican free-lance smugglers
and organized traffickers were "largely responsible for the
marihuana and drug abuse problem" that Nixon and his supporters
so vehemently deplored.
The group's solution, as stated in the introduction to the report,
was to launch "in the immediate future… a concerted
frontal attack on the illegal importation into and subsequent
illegal sale and use of marihuana, narcotics and dangerous drugs
in the United States." In practical terms this meant a crack
down on the border with Mexico, with or without Mexican cooperation.
As senior presidential aide John Erhlichman told Nixon in a memorandum
on June 18, the task force recommended that the Mexican government
"be forced into a program of defoliation of the marihuana
plants." The weapon used to bludgeon Mexico into compliance
would be a massive surprise attack on Mexico's border by U.S.
law enforcement personnel, code named "Operation Intercept."
Intercept was plotted in secret to produce an unprecedented slow-down
of all plane, truck, car and foot traffic - legitimate or not
- flowing from Mexico into the southern United States. In order
to achieve their goals, the president's top enforcement advisors
deployed thousands of extra Border, Customs and Immigration agents
along the 2,000 mile line that separates the countries, from just
north of Tijuana to Brownsville, Texas. Once in place, the agents
were charged with stopping and inspecting anything that moved.
Where traditionally U.S. officials would wave nineteen out of
twenty vehicles through the lines, now each and every cargo was
subjected to a thorough search, creating an instant nightmare
for millions of legal commuters and commercial traders.
The plan was put into effect with only a minimal level of consultation
with the Mexicans. As Newsweek reporter Elaine Shannon
described in her 1988 book on the drug war (Desperados: Latin
Drug Lords, U.S. Lawmen, and the War America Can't Win, Viking),
Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst went to Mexico City
in June of 1969 to try to convince the Díaz Ordaz government
to go after the smugglers. "The Mexican officials were cordial
but noncommittal. Kleindienst grew visibly annoyed as he realized
that the sessions were, in the words of an aide, 'just an exercise
in hospitality.'" (47) Other administration officials were
less charitable. G. Gordon Liddy - a senior advisor in the Department
of Treasury who would later be convicted for the Watergate break-in
- also described the U.S. effort to prod the Mexicans in his autobiography
(Will: The Autobiography of G. Gordon Liddy, St. Martin's
Paperbacks, 1998). "The Mexicans," wrote Liddy, "using
diplomatic language of course, told us to go piss up a rope. The
Nixon administration didn't believe in the United States' taking
crap from any foreign government. Its reply was Operation Intercept."
(185)
While his officials plotted the details of the operation, Nixon
was getting ready to meet Díaz Ordaz in a ceremony dedicating
the new Amistad ("Friendship") Dam, near Ciudad Acuña,
Coahuila. It would be the first encounter between the outgoing
Mexican chief of state and the new U.S. president, and carried
great symbolic significance. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger
pointed this out in his secret briefing paper to Nixon just days
before the ceremony: "The meeting at Amistad Dam is important
because it will demonstrate the continuation of the close
and constructive relations which exist between the United States
and Mexico. It will give you an opportunity to establish your
personal interest in maintaining a special relationship with the
Mexican President." (Emphasis in the original.) Choreographing
the encounter, Kissinger went on:
You may wish to say
-- You value our cordial relations with Mexico as an essential
element of our foreign policy.
-- The excellent relations between our countries rest on mutual
respect for each other's sovereignty, as well as on our mutual
interests.
-- You share President Díaz Ordaz' desire to maintain
close personal relations, as your predecessors did.
-- You intend to consult with him from time to time on matters
of mutual interest.
Nixon was also given comments to make to Díaz Ordaz about
the narcotics issue, but although they hinted at what was to come
they contained no specific warning about the operation, which
was then in its final planning stages. "We are very much
concerned about the problem of drug abuse in the United States,"
wrote Kissinger for the president. "We appreciate Mexico's
continuing cooperation in trying to meet this problem…We
are considering plans for major enforcement efforts… [We]
hope that our enforcement officials can continue to work together
closely."
Just days before Operation Intercept went into effect on September
21, the United States finally alerted Mexico to the planned crackdown
when Ambassador Robert McBride met first with Foreign Secretary
Antonio Carrillo Flores and then Interior Secretary Luis Echeverría
to discuss what was about to happen. Although McBride carefully
explained the task force findings, the significance of the drug
problem to the new Nixon administration and the outlines of the
imminent action, he left the meetings worried that the officials
did not fully grasp the difficulties the crackdown might cause.
Mexico reacted with shock and horror when Operation Intercept
was implemented. A flurry of phone calls and hastily called meetings
ensued, with the Mexicans increasingly agitated over what they
felt was a betrayal of an implicit understanding between the two
nations to consult and cooperate with each other on matters of
bilateral significance. As tempers frayed and the lines at the
border grew longer, Carrillo Flores took the unusual step of writing
a personal letter to Nixon in late September. Carrillo urged the
president to correct the "excesses" of an action that
had been "negligible in stopping the traffic of marihuana
and drugs, but great in harming the economy on both sides of the
border and in creating frictions and bad publicity for the United
States."
"[I realize,"] Carrillo continued, ["that it is]
totally unorthodox to address you. I will never do it again. But
in this case I am convinced you have the opportunity of doing
something for which all Mexicans will be grateful. (They simply
can not understand that two weeks after you met with our President,
the most drastic, and for many, unfriendly measure against Mexico
was taken.)"
Not all U.S. agencies supported the tactics of Operation Intercept.
Driven by Nixon's focus on crime, it was designed and executed
by senior officials from key U.S. law enforcement agencies such
as Justice and Treasury. The State Department - which represented
the interests of diplomacy with Mexico - was essentially cut out
of the process. Throughout the crackdown, the U.S. embassy in
Mexico sharply opposed the policy, as the ambassador wrestled
with breaking the news to the Mexicans and then managing their
response. McBride warned of "catastrophic consequences"
for relations between the countries, and at one point tried to
convince administration officials to cancel the plan altogether.
Leaks in early September about U.S. intent, he claimed, "have
obviously alerted [the drug traffickers to the] need for caution
in their nefarious operations, and doubtless those involved have
taken precautions to ride out the storm. While I am aware of enormity
of problem, I wonder if Operation Intercept in its present marred
condition is really worth risking serious difficulties with Mexicans."
Another dissenting agency was the Bureau of the Budget - predecessor
to the Office of Management and Budget, which assists in the preparation
of the federal budget and monitors government spending. On September
29, as Week Two of the border crackdown was underway, the agency
sent a scathing critique to the White House of the June report
that had served as the catalyst for Operation Intercept, calling
it a "grossly inadequate basis for Presidential decision"
and warning that its recommendations were based on faulty or unproven
assertions.
Despite a public relations campaign designed by Nixon aides to
promote the operation, press coverage on both sides of the border
was derisive. Statistics on the amount of drugs seized and smugglers
captured were far lower than expected. But as Liddy pointed out
in his autobiography, the goal of Operation Intercept was not,
in fact, to freeze the flow of drugs. "For diplomatic reasons
the true purpose of the exercise was never revealed. Operation
Intercept, with its massive economic and social disruption, could
be sustained far longer by the United States than by Mexico. It
was an exercise in international extortion, pure, simple, and
effective, designed to bend Mexico to our will." (185-6)
Mexican objections eventually had the desired effect. By mid-October
Intercept was called off, replaced by a new anti-drug agreement
between Mexico and the United States called "Operation Cooperation,"
in which both countries collaborated on designing a shared strategy
to reduce the production of narcotics inside Mexico and its movement
across the border.
Operation Intercept served United States interests in several
ways. It was the fulfillment of a campaign promise by a new Republican
president to show that he could be tough on lawlessness, and thus
earned Nixon domestic political points in his first year of office.
It served as the opening shot in what would rapidly become a global
war on drugs-a war that would far outlast the Nixon White House
and would occupy successive administrations for decades to come.
And finally, it was an exercise in the politics of coercion, whereby
Washington used economic and political blackmail to pressure Mexico
into moving on an issue that mattered to the United States.
In the end, the crisis did push Mexico into committing more resources
to a concerted drug eradication and enforcement policy, and led
to Operation Condor in the 1970s, which included a defoliation
campaign using the toxic "Paraquat" herbicide. But whatever
the intended outcome was, Intercept also led to a series of unintended
consequences that undermined the lessons the U.S. longed to teach
Mexico.
Combined with effects of the global war on drugs during the Nixon
administration, Mexico's attack on marihuana growers and the end
of the opium trade in Turkey resulted in a new and hungry heroin
market in the United States, which incipient Mexican crime organizations
were only too happy to fulfill. The introduction of Colombian
cocaine in the mid-1970s helped transform Mexico's traffickers
into a powerful mafia that could afford sophisticated technology
to protect its interests, and the enormous drug profits that ensued
threatened to destroy Mexican law enforcement with new levels
of corruption.
Could Operation Intercept happen today? It might: in the name
of counterterrorism, the new department of Homeland Security has
the authority and the capability to close the border down. And
clearly, Washington's penchant for unilateral action is as strong
as ever.
But U.S.-Mexico relations have changed dramatically since 1969,
and the concept of "interdependence" has taken on a
whole new meaning. Back then far fewer Mexicans were living and
working in the United States. And the cross-border economy was
a trickle compared to the quarter of a trillion dollars
in annual cross border trade today.
The United States could close the border for a few hours, even
a few days, but the damage it would inflict on itself by unilaterally
shutting it in the name of national security would become crippling
after that. Mexico knows it must act as a true partner to the
United States in this time of war and heightened security, and
it already has - by sending 18,000 military troops to the border
crossings, airports, bridges, ports and key energy facilities
linked to the United States.
Perhaps the first lesson of Intercept is that pragmatism, not
personalismo, must guide bilateral relations. Whether the
two presidents are shaking hands in front of the Amistad Dam or
comparing boots in Guanajuato, the myth of the "special relationship"
has been carefully nurtured for many decades. It needs to be discarded.
Photo ops are never a good substitute for the (admittedly difficult)
crafting of mutually acceptable bilateral policies, and policies
are not favors to be handed out to an old friend; they are tools
to serve national interests.
Second, unilateralism carries a heavy cost. In 1969, it was expensive
in the short-term, damaging relations with Mexico and hurting
local economies on both sides of the border, and worse in the
long term. (More drug war, anyone?)
Finally, Nixon launched Operation Intercept because he could.
Today, any attempt by the United States to punish or castigate
Mexico that resulted in real harm to the Mexican economy would
automatically lead to collateral damage to the U.S. economy in
turn. Viewed in that light, the fears expressed in countless editorial
and opinion pieces in the Mexican press as Fox equivocated over
how to vote in the United Nations on the war in Iraq were anachronistic,
out of synch with the realities of U.S.-Mexican interdependence
today.
The real lessons of Intercept are that no nation, not even the
United States, can shut its doors to valuable legal trade and
travel. What Henry Kissinger wrote back in 1969 - that relations
between the United States and Mexico should be based on "mutual
interests" - may not have been true back then, but it is
closer to the truth today.
Documents
Document 1
June 6, 1969
Task Force Report: Narcotics, Marijuana & Dangerous Drugs
Special Presidential Task Force, report
After a speech in Anaheim, CA on September 16, 1968 (coincidentally
Mexico's Independence Day) in which President Nixon pledges to
"move against the source of drugs," the Special Presidential
Task Force on Narcotics, Marihuana and Dangerous Drugs is created.
Six months after Nixon takes office, the Task Force delivers its
report to the President, providing the analysis that would spawn
"Operation Intercept." The report focuses almost entirely
on marijuana and gives special attention to the smuggling of the
drug from Mexico into the United States, recommending better profiling
of drug runners and the improvement of detection technology. The
report also recommends asserting economic pressure on Mexico by
making Tijuana off limits to American military personnel. "Although
a relatively small percentage of the military element is involved
in the smuggling of narcotics, the social and commercial atmosphere
produced by the drug trade in Tijuana greatly affects their activities.
Should Tijuana be placed off limits to all military personnel,
the action could be considered as an inducement for better drug
control along the border." Finally, the report signals a
new era in which the War on Drugs is elevated to "the highest
rank of those matters affecting the vital interests of the nation."
[Note: Although the Task Force report is not technically classified,
most of the document remains withheld by the Nixon Library for
national security reasons. The denial is under appeal by the National
Security Archive.]
Source: National Archives, Nixon
Presidential Materials
White House Special Files: Staff Members and Office Files
Egil Krogh, Box 30,
"Operation Intercept" (Task Force Tab)
Document 2
June 18, 1969
[Task Force Report]
White House, memorandum
Shortly after the completion of the Narcotics Task Force's report,
White House senior advisor John Ehrlichman forwards it and a summary
of its recommendations to President Nixon. In his memo to the
President, Ehrlichman eschews the more diplomatic language of
the actual report and cuts straight to the point: "The task
force recommends that the Mexican government be forced into a
program of defoliation of the marijuana plants (using borrowed
or leased equipment from the United States) by commencing a campaign
of strict enforcement and customs inspection at the border."
Source: National Archives, Nixon
Presidential Materials
White House Central Files: Subject Files
FG 221, Box 5
Document 3
June 27, 1969
"Action Task Force" Narcotics, Marihuana and Dangerous
Drugs
White House, memorandum
As June comes to a close, President Nixon sets the recommendations
of the narcotics report in motion, ordering the creation of a
new "Action Task Force" which will take "immediate
steps calculated to make a frontal attack on the narcotic, marihuana
and dangerous drug traffic across the Mexican border." The
President here describes the general profile of the new outfit
as well as strict guidelines for its activities. "The work
of the task force shall be confidential and any and all publicity
with respect to its work and accomplishments shall be released
only by the White House."
Source: National Archives, Nixon
Presidential Materials
White House Central Files: Subject Files
FG 221, Box 5
Document 4
July 23, 1969
[Meeting with Díaz Ordaz]
U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, confidential telegram
In the weeks leading up to Operation Intercept, U.S. officials
would provide the Mexican Government with a number of vague hints
as to the Action Task Force's plans. In late July U.S. Ambassador
Robert McBride presents President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz with
perhaps the first of these tips, informing the Mexican leader
that "highest level of U.S. Government was deeply concerned
about problems of narcotics traffic entry into United States from
Mexico." Díaz Ordaz appears to suspect nothing out
of the ordinary, responding that he is also very concerned about
the problem and "would be glad to have Mexican delegation
continue to discuss this subject at high levels with [the U.S.]."
Source: National Archives, Record
Group 59
CFPF 67-69, POL Mexico-US, Box 2344
Document 5
Circa September 5, 1969
Your Meeting with Mexican President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz
White House, secret memorandum
Just prior to the meeting at Amistad Dam between Díaz
Ordaz and Nixon, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger provides
the American President with background papers and talking points
for the summit. Kissinger emphasizes that the "meeting at
Amistad Dam is important because it will demonstrate the continuation
of the close and constructive relations which exist between the
United States and Mexico" and "give you an opportunity
to establish your personal interest in maintaining a special relationship
with the Mexican President." On the narcotics question, Nixon
is advised "to inform President Díaz Ordaz of our
concern and general intentions…and to reassure him that we
will consult with Mexico before firm decisions are taken in matters
which affect Mexico."
Source: National Archives, Nixon
Presidential Materials
National Security Files, VIP Visits, Box 947
"President Nixon Trip to Mexico Sept 8, 1969 Briefing Book"
Document 6
September 12, 1969
[Leaks Reducing Chances of Operation's Success]
U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, secret telegram
As the start date for Intercept grows near, Ambassador McBride
reports that several important leaks to the press have greatly
reduced the chances that the operation can yield enough drug interdiction
success to merit what will likely be significant damage to U.S.
relations with Mexico. "Leaks from U.S. Navy (which have
indicated date of operation) and through New York Times have obviously
alerted everyone to need for caution in their nefarious operations,
and doubtless those involved have taken precautions to ride out
storm. While I am aware of enormity of problem, I wonder if Operation
Intercept in its present marred condition is really worth risking
serious difficulties with the Mexicans."
Source: National Archives, Record
Group 59
CFPF 1967-69, Economics INCO Drugs 17 US-Mexico, Box 1034
"1/1/67"
Document 7
September 18, 1969
Operation Intercept
U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, secret telegram
Just three days prior to the inauguration of Operation Intercept,
Ambassador McBride briefs Mexican Secretary of the Interior Luis
Echeverría Alvarez on the details of the plan. According
to McBride, Echeverría's response was fairly "non-committal"
and expressed no "exception or reservations" about the
plan. However, the U.S. Ambassador recommends caution in interpreting
this response. "Although he expressed no concern about Operation
Intercept at this particular meeting I think it may be that he
did not grasp fully the inconveniences and difficulties that it
may cause."
Source: National Archives, Record
Group 59
CFPF 1967-69, Economics INCO Drugs 17 US-Mexico, Box 1034
"1/1/67"
Document 8
September 19, 1969
[Halt Briefings of the Mexican Government]
U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, secret telegram
On the eve of Intercept and with notable dismay, Ambassador McBride
reports that every possible effort has been made to convey to
the Mexican Government the seriousness of the impending operation.
Despite these efforts, according to McBride, Intercept will likely
have disastrous results for U.S.-Mexican relations. "When
this operation is put fully into effect, it may well have catastrophic
consequences in terms of our relations with Mexico but I would
like to make it absolutely clear that there is nothing further
we can do here to cushion the impact."
Source: National Archives, Record
Group 59
CFPF 1967-69, Economics INCO Drugs 17 US-Mexico, Box 1034
"1/1/67"
Document 9
September 29, 1969
[Budget Bureau Comments on Marijuana Policy]
White House, memorandum
About a week after the start of Intercept, the Budget Bureau
furnishes an extremely critical evaluation of the operation and
the policy recommendations that led to it. The Bureau blames the
Presidential Task Force for providing the President with "no
policy options, no pro's and con's, and no cost estimates."
Specifically, the memo argues that the potential damage to U.S.-Mexican
relations was never properly assessed, nor was the negative economic
impact this operation would have on the U.S. side of the border
where business has been depressed by "50-90 percent".
Finally the Bureau scathingly critiques the Task Force's failure
to assess potential negative consequences for the drug fight itself.
By focusing on marijuana, the report argues, the operation could
have the effect of moving users off "soft" drugs and
on to "hard" substances like heroin, while boosting
the mafia elements that traffic in those harder drugs.
Source: National Archives, Nixon
Presidential Materials
White House Special Files: Staff Members and Office Files
Egil M. Krogh, Box 30
Document 10
Circa September 30, 1969
[Antonio Carillo Flores to Nixon]
Secretariat of Foreign Relations, personal letter
As internal pressures mount on the Mexican Government to respond
to the border situation, Foreign Secretary Carillo Flores takes
the unorthodox step of writing a letter directly to President
Nixon and pleading for the American leader to correct Operation
Intercept's "excesses". By eschewing normal diplomatic
protocol and writing directly to Nixon, Carillo Flores emphasizes
his government's urgent desire to find a solution to the situation.
In the process he argues that Operation Intercept's "results
have been negligible in stopping the traffic of marihuana and
drugs, but great in harming the economy of both sides [of] the
border and in creating frictions and bad publicity for the United
States."
Document transcription below:
Dear Mr. President: Yesterday I talked at length with Secretary
Rogers about "Operation Intercept," and how, according
to all the information we have, its results have been negligible
in stopping the traffic of marihuana and drugs, but great in
harming the economy on both sides [of] the border and in creating
frictions and bad publicity for the United States.
I hope it will be possible for you (as our Ambassador has
already asked for to the State Department) to review that operation
and to order its excesses be corrected.
[I realize that it is] totally unorthodox to address you.
I will never do it again. But in this case I am convinced you
have the opportunity of doing something for which all Mexicans
will be grateful. (They simply can not understand that two weeks
after you met with our President, the most drastic, and for
many, unfriendly measure against Mexico was taken.)
Respectfully yours, Antonio Carrillo Flores, Secretary of
Foreign Relations
P.S. Secretary Rogers was extremely attentive and sympathetic.
But naturally the authority is yours.
Source: National Archives, Nixon
Presidential Materials
White House Central Files: Subject Files
HE 5-1 Narcotics, Box 17
"7/1/69 - 12/31/69"
Document 11
October 2, 1969
Operation Intercept
Department of State, confidential memorandum
In response to the acrimony provoked by Operation Intercept,
the State Department provides its own analysis of the situation,
concluding that "the Mexican reaction to 'Intercept' has
been more hostile than anticipated and, if it continues, may well
affect U.S.-Mexican relations in areas unrelated to narcotics
control." The Department blames press leaks for undermining
its efforts to give Mexico advance notice on the operation. These
efforts, it argues, could have "proved our willingness to
take them into our confidence", and thus perhaps have tempered
the Mexican government's response once Intercept got underway.
Nevertheless, State attributes the "stronger than expected"
reaction by Mexico to "discourteous treatment," particularly
a "rigorous customs inspection" to which the Mexican
Consul General was subjected in El Paso. Among average Mexicans,
however, the operation "as expected…provoked strong
hostility," which State attributes to "a feeling of
wounded dignity on the part of the Mexicans inspired by the intense
personal search they are subjected to. Mexican sensitivity about
their dignity, their suspicion that at heart Americans regard
them as inferior beings, causes them to react at a high emotional
pitch."
Source: National Archives, Nixon
Presidential Materials
White House Special Files: Staff Members and Office Files
Egil M. Krogh, Box 53
"Report to the President on Operation Intercept" (Department
of State Tab)
Document 12
Circa October 5, 1969
Letter to you from Mexican Foreign Minister on Operation Intercept
White House, memorandum
Responding to the personal note from Carillo Flores to Nixon,
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger delivers the letter
to the President along with a response for him to sign. In the
cover memorandum Kissinger notes that the Mexican Foreign Minister's
"unusual step" of writing directly to Nixon "does,
in fact, underline the intensity of the Mexican feeling about
Operation Intercept." Concluding that the situation is "becoming
a serious problem" for the bilateral relationship, Kissinger
explains that the response to Carillo Flores "is a longer
and warmer letter than might normally be sent to a Foreign Minister,
but I think the occasion calls for it."
Source: National Archives, Nixon
Presidential Materials
White House Central Files: Subject Files
HE 5-1 Narcotics, Box 17
"7/1/69 - 12/31/69"
Document 13
October 7, 1969
[Nixon to Antonio Carillo Flores]
White House, personal letter
Following Kissinger's recommendation, Nixon signs off on the
"warm" response to Carillo Flores, expressing both his
continued concern over the drug issue and the willingness of the
U.S. Government to meet with the Mexicans on the issue. "I
am sure that the bilateral talks which will be held will be able
to find ways to achieve the objectives of Operation Intercept
with minimum disruption of this kind."
Source: National Archives, Nixon
Presidential Materials
White House Central Files: Subject Files
HE 5-1 Narcotics, Box 17
"7/1/69 - 12/31/69"
Document 14
October 7, 1969
[Operation Intercept has Accomplished its Objectives]
White House, memorandum
On the same day he signs off on a letter to Mexico's Foreign
Minister on the Intercept situation, Nixon indicates to his senior
advisor, John Ehrlichman, that the objectives of the operation
have been accomplished. "It would appear that this is the
time to negotiate since we have proved our point pretty effectively."
Source: National Archives, Nixon
Presidential Materials
White House Central Files: Subject Files
HE 5-1 Narcotics, Box 17
"7/1/69 - 12/31/69"
Document 15
October 21, 1969
[Operation Cooperation Negotiations in Mexico]
U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, confidential telegram
One week before formal bilateral negotiations on the newly named
"Operation Cooperation" begin, Ambassador McBride offers
his prognosis for their success or failure. Noting the desire
of both sides to stem the drug traffic while maintaining "a
cordial and indeed special relationship," McBride sees much
potential for a successful outcome. However he also emphasizes
that a negative result could hold "disagreeable consequences
for U.S. in other countries not to mention a collapse of our relationships
in this key country of the hemisphere which is so closely watched
by other countries to see if U.S. protestations of good fellowship
can be taken seriously."
Source: National Archives, Record
Group 59
CFPF 1967-69, Economics INCO Drugs 17 US-Mexico, Box 1034
"10/1/69"
Document 16
October 30, 1969
Joint Declaration of the United States and Mexican Delegations
Joint U.S. and Mexican Government communiqué
Following the agreement of October 10 to change the name of Operation
Intercept to "Operation Cooperation," official bilateral
talks are held in Mexico City on October 27 and 29. As a result
of these talks, "delays, irritations and inconveniences at
the border and at other ports of entry had been reduced to virtually
pre-Operation Intercept levels." In concert with this action,
it was agreed to create a "joint working group" to identify
"possible bases for agreement between the two Governments
and to report their findings to the two Governments." In
addition, Mexico reaffirmed that "in accordance with Mexican
national policy and the provisions of the Mexican Constitution,
its Government's efforts to continue intensifying the fight against
the illegal traffic of narcotics would continue to be carried
out exclusively by Mexican personnel under Mexican direction."
Source: National Archives, Nixon
Presidential Materials
White House Special Files: Staff Members and Office Files
Egil M. Krogh, Box 31
Document 17
December 11, 1969
Narcotics, Marihuana and Dangerous Drugs: Working Group Report
No. 10
U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, telegram
After signing the "Joint Communiqué" in late
October, Mexican and U.S. officials meet for weeks in Mexico City
to agree on the specific outlines of a cooperative effort to reduce
drug production, drug trafficking and drug abuse. Having reached
agreement on the design of the new counternarcotics program, however,
the Mexican delegation suddenly balks at signing the final report
- a decision sparked by an inaccurate article in the Mexican press
claiming that Operation Intercept will become permanent U.S. policy.
Ambassador McBride cables the bad news to Washington and describes
it as the product of residual resentment in Mexico over the way
Intercept was carried out. "In last minute eruption of their
still smoldering bitterness about Operation Intercept and absolute
unwillingness to do anything under pressure, real or imagined,
from U.S., Mexicans today refused to sign joint working group
(JWG) report due December 15." The Mexicans ultimately reverse
their position, and the report is signed and published on December
12.
Source: National Archives, Record
Group 59
CFPF 1967-69, Economics INCO Drugs 17 US-Mexico, Box 1034
"11/1/69"
Document 18
January 9, 1970
Country Analysis and Strategy Paper
Department of State, confidential airgram (extract)
In early January the State Department's annual Country Analysis
and Strategy Paper (CASP) on Mexico is finally delivered, though
somewhat behind schedule. The report, which was delayed after
the Intercept crisis forced some revisions to the original text,
emphasizes the importance of Mexico to the United States based
on a long common border and the fact that "Mexico's ability
to maintain reasonable political stability and a broad compatibility
with U.S. aims and institutions is essential to U.S. security."
The report notes the need to understand how "domestic political
realities and strong nationalist sentiment" in Mexico can
turn seemingly ordinary "new interventions" like Operation
Intercept into political crises. Citing billions of dollars in
exports to and investments in Mexico by the U.S., the document
also emphasizes the great interdependency of the two countries,
noting that such high levels of economic exchange are unique in
U.S. relations with the Third World. "In this sense we should
regard Mexico as a special case in our relations with the developing
countries in that success or failure of the country's short and
longer-term development policies can directly affect important
U.S. economic as well as security interests. By the same token,
the reverse is true; Mexico depends on the United States for trade,
tourism and capital which are vital to its economic development."
Source: National Archives, Record
Group 59
CFPF 70-73, POL 1 Mexico-US, Box 2477
