The
Taliban File Part III
Pakistan
Provided Millions of Dollars, Arms,
and "Buses Full of Adolescent Mujahid" to the Taliban
in the 1990's
Edited
by Sajit Gandhi
(202) 994-7239
gandhi@gwu.edu
March
19, 2004
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Above:
CIA poster on "Afghanistan's Key Players," circa
2001 (full image) |
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Washington, DC - Pakistan provided millions of dollars, arms,
and "buses full of adolescent mujahid," to the Taliban in
the 1990's, according to declassified State Department documents obtained
by the National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information
Act, and posted today on the Web.
This third installment of The Taliban
File, edited by Archive research associate Sajit Gandhi,
includes:
- An August 27, 1997 cable in which U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan
Thomas Simons comments on Pakistan's claim that its total aid to
the Taliban through the end of 1996 had been only 20 million rupees
(approximately one-half million dollars). Simons notes that this
amount "did not include access to Pak wheat and POL (Note
1), or the trucks and buses full of adolescent mujahid
crossing the frontier shouting 'Allahu Akbar,' and going into the
line with a day or two of weapons training." "That,"
Simons' noted, "was Pakistan's real aid." (Document
4)
- An October 30, 1997 United Nations cable in which former United
Nations Special Mission for Afghanistan (UNSMA) charge Norbert Hull
candidly discusses his meetings with Pakistan Foreign Ministry official
Iftikhar Murshed. Murshed indicated to Hull that Pakistani Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif "bluntly demanded that the Taliban make
a gesture of goodwill," despite Mullah Rabbani's claim that
Afghan interim President Barnahuddin Rabbani was politically irrelevant.
(Document 5)
- A March 9, 1998 cable on a meeting between the U.S. Deputy Chief
of Mission Alan Eastham and a source who appears to be Pakistan
Foreign Ministry official Iftikhar Murshed, who for the first time
admitted that Pakistan provided arms supplies to the Taliban. (Document
6)
- A July 1, 1998 cable indicating that the Pakistani Prime Minister
had recently signed off on a 300 million rupee (approximately 6.5
million dollars) payment to Taliban officials and military commanders,
despite the potential that Pakistan-due to sanctions imposed after
its May 1998 nuclear tests-could potentially default on its own
international loans. (Document 8)
- A July 2, 1998 cable that not only confirms the planned Pakistani
300 million rupee (approximately 6.5 million dollars) payment, but
also indicates that even though certain Taliban officials thought
it might be easier to "force bin Laden out" of Afghanistan
rather than trying to control him, Supreme Taliban leader Mullah
Omar's commitment to Osama bin Laden (UBL) precluded this from happening.
This cable also shows U.S. concern over repressive Taliban edicts
discriminating against women. (Document
9)
Note: The following documents
are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe
Acrobat Reader to view.
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Document
1
U.S. Department of State Report, "Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations,"
circa January 1996, Confidential, 4 pp. |
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Source: Freedom of Information
Act Release to the National Security Archive. |
In this summary, the Department of State reports on Afghanistan-Pakistan
relations, including the impact each state has on the stability
of the other. The report discusses the effects of arms and narco-trafficking--lawlessness,
creation of an arms culture, and bombings and assassinations in
the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP)-- foreign interference in
Afghanistan from India, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia, and concludes
with U.S. views and policy interests vis-à-vis Afghanistan.
According to the State Department summary Pakistan does "not
have a well-conceived end-game for their policy of supporting the
Taliban and opposing [Afghan interim President Barnahuddin] Rabbani."
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Document
2
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad) Cable, "Pakistan [Excised] On Afghanistan,
HUA, Bin Laden," February 27, 1997, Confidential, 1 pp. |
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Source: Freedom of Information
Act Release to the National Security Archive. |
This cable reports former U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan
Robert Oakley's visit to Pakistan for non-official meetings with
Pakistanis. While there, Oakley reviewed the situation in Afghanistan,
including the possible long-term dangers that Taliban military success
could create. His interlocutors discuss the possibility of a "Pushtoon
nationalist/Islamic radical blowback," concern over the presence
of Harkut ul-Ansar (HUA) camps and fighters inside Afghanistan with
the approval of the Taliban and UBL, and Pakistani leverage over
the Taliban. According to the source, Pakistan's Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) has not only advocated that Pakistan recognize
the Taliban as Afghanistan's government, but also indicates that
the ISI has warded off Pak Foreign Ministry "attempts to close
certain Madrassas (religious schools) in the tribal agencies and
near the Afghan border, which have been the spawning grounds for
Taliban hard-liners."
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Document
3
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad) Cable, "Afghanistan: Straight Talk
with [Excised]," August 12, 1997, Confidential, 11pp. |
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Source: Freedom of Information
Act Release to the National Security Archive. |
In U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Thomas Simons' meeting with
a source who appears to be Shamshad Ahmad, Pakistani envoy to the
United Nations, the two men discuss overall Pakistani policy towards
the Taliban. Showing excitement over the replacement of UNSMA head
Norbert Holl, Ahmad tells Simons that Pakistan wants to "promote
inter-Afghan dialogue," and ensure greater United Nations success
in bringing peace to Afghanistan. Simons warns Ahmad, after Pakistani
recognition of the Taliban in May, that any impression of Pakistan's
preference for Holl's replacement Lakdar Brahimi will only fuel rumors
that Pakistan is pro-Taliban.
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Document
4
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad) Cable, "Afghanistan: [Excised] Briefs
the Ambassador on his Activities. Pleads for Greater Activism
by U.N." August 27, 1997, Confidential, 5 pp. |
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Source: Freedom of Information
Act Release to the National Security Archive. |
The cable discusses an unidentified source's activities in support
of a peaceful resolution for Afghanistan, including meetings in
Tehran with Iranian officials, in Dubai with Tajik Yunus Qanuni,
and in Kandahar with Taliban ministers Mullah Hassan and Mullah
Jalil, whom he advised to improve their image in the international
community. U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Thomas Simons, while offering
his own analysis of the various parties involved in Afghanistan,
comments on Pakistan's claim that its total aid to the Taliban through
the end of 1996 had been only 20 million rupees (one-half million
dollars), indicating that that amount "did not include access
to Pak wheat and POL(I), or the trucks and buses full of adolescent
mujahid crossing the frontier shouting "Allahu Akbar,"
and going into the line with a day or two of weapons training."
"That," Simons noted, "was Pakistan's real aid."
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Document
5
United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan (Islamabad) Cable,
"Present Pakistani Initiatives in Afghanistan," October
30, 1997, Unclassified, 3 pp. |
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Source: Freedom of Information
Act Release to the National Security Archive. |
In this UN cable, former head of the United Nations Special Mission
for Afghanistan (UNSFMA) Norbert Hull, candidly reports on his meeting
with Pakistan Foreign Ministry official Iftikhar Murshed. Murshed
discusses the details of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's phone call
and subsequent meeting with Taliban official Mullah Rabbani, in
which Sharif "bluntly demanded that the Taliban make a gesture
of goodwill," towards other factions and meet with Afghan interim
president Barnahuddin Rabbani. Murshed also gave his impression
of the G8 meeting focusing on Afghanistan, the Afghan UN seat, and
potential oil embargoes, labeling the meeting "a non-event."
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Document
6
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad) Cable, "Afghanistan: [Excised] Describes
Pakistan's Current Thinking," March 9, 1998, Confidential,
9 pp. |
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Source: Freedom of Information
Act Release to the National Security Archive. |
In a meeting between the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad's Deputy
Chief of Mission Alan Eastham and a source who appears to be Pakistan
Foreign Ministry official Iftikhar Murshed, the officials review U.S.
concerns about Osama bin Laden's recent fatwa, the six plus two process
for a peaceful resolution to the Afghan civil war, a proposed meeting
of Ulema (religious scholars) comprised of both Taliban and members
of what would come to be known as the Northern Alliance, border security
and protection of its 40 "jeepable" border crossing points,
and outside players in Afghanistan. Murshed asserted that Iran was
exerting strong influence in the North, and said that the Government
of Pakistan "had not provided arms and ammunition to the Taliban
since three or four months." According to the cable's comments
this seems to be the first time that Murshed or any Pakistani official
admitted that Pakistan provided arms supplies to the Taliban.
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Document
7
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad) Cable, "Afghanistan: [Excised] Criticizes
GOP's Afghan Policy; Says It Is Letting Policy Drift," June
16, 1998, Confidential, 2 pp. |
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Source: Freedom of Information
Act Release to the National Security Archive. |
Pakistan's Afghan policy and Pakistan's trouble controlling
the border areas were the subjects of embassy talks with a source
who appears to be former Pakistani Interior Minister Nasrullah Babar.
Babar, hinting at the lack of Pakistani interest in controlling its
border with Afghanistan, suggested that ties between Pakistani and
Afghan Pashtuns are strengthening, which could have negative consequences
for Afghanistan. Babar also discussed the ISI's involvement in Afghanistan,
indicating that he "personally supported the deployment of ISI
officers operating out of the Pakistani Embassy in Kabul, and from
Herat, Kandahar, and the Jalalabad Consulates." In this way,
he said, not only can the ISI provide the Taliban with advice, the
Government of Pakistan (GOP) also possesses the ability to monitor
what the ISI is doing.
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Document
8
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad) Cable, "Bad News on Pak Afghan Policy:
GOP Support for the Taliban Appears to be Getting Stronger,"
July 1, 1998, Confidential, 2 pp. |
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Source: Freedom of Information
Act Release to the National Security Archive. |
This cable, sourced by journalist Ahmed Rashid (Note
2) and UN political adviser Arnie Schifferdecker, shows
Pakistan's growing support for the Taliban during the late 1990's.
According to Rashid, and confirmed by other sources, the Pakistani
government recently agreed to provide the Taliban 300 million rupees
(approximately 6.5 million dollars) in financial support. The money,
which was to be delivered at a rate of 50 million rupees (approximately
one million dollars) a month, was earmarked to pay the salaries
of Taliban officials and commanders. Schifferdecker noted that his
source, Pakistan's Afghan desk officer Ayyaz Wazir confirmed the
amount of aid, but declared that it was for "humanitarian assistance."
This discourse occurs in the wake of India and Pakistan's May
1998 nuclear tests. The Embassy comment notes that some observers
see increased regional tension between India and Pakistan as the
catalyst for increased Pakistani funding for the Taliban, while
others think the increased financial constraints on Pakistan in
the aftermath of the tests will force the Government of Pakistan
(GOP) to limit its support to the Taliban.
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Document
9
U.S. Embassy (Islamabad) Cable, "Afghanistan: In July 2 Meeting,
[Excised] Defends Discriminatory Edicts on Women and Girls, and
Controls on NGO's," July 2, 1998, Confidential, 9 pp. |
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Source: Freedom of Information
Act Release to the National Security Archive. |
This cable discusses a meeting between U.S. Embassy official
Joe Novak and a source who appears to be Taliban official Abdul Mujahid.
The cable notes that U.S. officials urged the Taliban to withdraw
edicts that discriminate against women and that impose new controls
on non-governmental organizations (NGO's).
The Taliban official (Mujahid) responded by indicating his personal
discomfort with the new Taliban edicts against women, despite defending
the Taliban position. He then went on to confirm that the GOP has
committed to giving the Taliban 300 million rupees (approximately
6.5 million dollars) "for humanitarian activities." When
embassy official Novak rejoined that there were reports that the
money was "earmarked to pay the salaries of Taliban officials
and military commanders," and not humanitarian activities,
Mujahid just smiled.
Mujahid also stated that the Taliban kept tight control of Osama
bin Laden and that while it might be easier to force bin Laden out
of the country, this would be implausible because of Supreme Taliban
leader Mullah Omar's commitment to him.
Notes
1. The abbreviation POL stands for Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants.
2. Ahmed Rashid covered Afghanistan-Pakistan relations for the
Far Eastern Economic Review, and is the author of Taliban:
Militant Oil, Islam, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia.
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