U.S.-Japan Relations and the Opening to China:

Nancy Bernkopf Tucker

Professor of History, Georgetown University

Working Paper No. 4

U.S.-Japan Project

The so-called Nixon Shocks placed enormous strains on the U.S.-Japan relationship, revealing, as they did, the limits to the partnership that the two countries had constructed since the end of W.W.II. Central to the disillusionment and friction that characterized the era was United States policy toward China and Washington's disregard of Japanese sensitivities on this issue. American policy makers managed to embarrass and alienate both officials and the public in Japan even though they were following an approach that Japan had advocated for decades. Further, they left the Japanese wondering what role Japan would play in a reconfigured Asia. In exploring the American side of these controversial developments, the critical questions revolve around the decision making in Washington, the discussions between the United States and China on the place of Japan in the new order, and input from and impact upon Japan of the new American China policy.

The greatest irony of the crisis triggered in U.S.-Japan relations by the American opening to China rested upon the preexisting tensions between Washington and Tokyo regarding the best way to interact with China. Japan's leaders had long argued that Ja pan's geographic position and economic makeup necessitated improved relations with China regardless of its political orientation. American officials had been only grudgingly receptive to that position. They had been even less responsive to Japanese efforts to moderate United States policies such as the American trade embargo, opposition to a United Nations seat for the PRC and denial of diplomatic recognition.

Japan had, of course, traditionally looked to the Asian mainland for raw materials and markets along with cultural enlightenment. Japan had borrowed heavily from Chinese cultural, religious and social practices and, prior to the 19th century decline in Chinese fortunes, the Japanese respected and feared China. As Japan modernized and strengthened itself by adapting to Western technology and ideas of imperialism, China became a target for Japanese expansion and efforts to make of the small island state a great power. Particularly as a result of Japan's colonial venture in Manchuria, the Japanese economy became intimately entwined with that of China. Japanese industry, for instance, depended upon supplies of coal and iron ore that could be procured cheaply from easily accessible mines in China's northeast.

After W.W.II and the end of Japan's dominion over China, the exploitative connec-tions of the wartime era disappeared, but Japan's needs remained and were, if anything, intensified given the immense task of reconstruction. Japan looked, as always, to C hina to meet many of its economic requirements. Tokyo's assumptions about the pivotal role China must play in Japan's recovery, however, were stymied by Chinese bitterness and disarray followed by communist victory. Had Chinese anger over Japanese wartime cruelty, and Chinese demands for reparations and fears of Japanese revival not been enough to complicate future relations, the outbreak of warfare in China alone would have made establishment of economic links extremely difficult. Then, when the communists won the civil war, the issue became the potential danger to Japan of dealing with communist forces and possibly becom-ing economically dependent upon them.

American policy in the late 1940s and 1950s sought to balance Japan's needs against Washington's determination to contain communism. The United States attempted to secure alternative sources of raw materials and markets for Japan but also agreed to lim ited Japanese trade with the Chinese mainland.¹ The Korean War temporarily disrupted the latter and Washington insisted that Japan adopt and retain stringent controls on trade with the Chinese far exceeding restrictions on exchange with the Soviet Union or the communist bloc in Europe. What the Japanese saw as unfair and debilitating trade controls became a central point of contention between the United States and Japan during the Eisenhower presidency. Only when Britain finally breached the American imposed China differential were the Japanese freed to pursue trade with China. As for diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Beijing, Washington remained adamantly opposed and had the power to prevent the Japanese from recog nizing the communist regime.²

Japan's efforts to persuade the United States that its China policy was misguided spanned the years from the end of the Second World War to the Nixon administration. Tokyo consistently believed that Washington's fears of the Chinese communist threat bo re little resemblance to reality; that China was not nearly as worrisome as the Soviet Union. Rather than being vulnerable to subversion by communist infiltration from China, the Japanese argued that they could have a beneficial influence among the Chines e, introducing concepts of democracy and freedom. Neither the explosion of a Chinese atomic bomb, despite Japan's nuclear allergy, nor the disarray of the Chinese Cultural Revolution made Japanese leaders significantly more critical of Beijing. Public opi nion polls indicated that in the mid-1960s nine of ten Japanese did not fear a Chinese nuclear attack and that by a three-to-one margin the public advocated diplomatic relations with the PRC.³

It is against this background of persistent Japanese pressure for improvement in Sino-American and, thereby, in Sino-Japanese relations that the Nixon policies proved such a shock to the Japanese. By acting precipitously and without any prior consultat ion, the United States government left Tokyo tied to an obsolete policy it had never supported, but had followed out of deference to the United States. Moreover, Washington demonstrated that rhetoric about partnership in the Pacific had been disingenuous; that the United States did not place sufficient importance upon its relations with Japan to solicit Japanese views on a crucial policy change, or to spare the Japanese government the humiliation of being publicly ignored. In fact, the Japanese had long f eared precisely such a scenario as the Asahi Shimbun had reminded its readers just two months earlier. Retailing a story commonly known in diplomatic circles, the newspaper told of the nightmare of an earlier Japanese ambassador to the United State s named Asakai who had dreamt that overnight Washington had resolved the Taiwan question, established relations with China and failed to tell Japan. But, the Asahi Shimbun reassured its readers, Japan would not "miss the bus" in this way since, acc ording to former Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer, "the United States and Japan have far too much invested in one another for Washington to adjust its relations with China without any consideration for the position of Japan."⁴

Remarking later on the first Nixon Shock, Henry Kissinger testified in his memoir that "the truth is that neither I nor my colleagues possessed a very subtle grasp of Japanese culture and psychology. We therefore made many mistakes...." It seems noneth eless arguable, from this most basic source on the policy making of the Nixon years, that the flaw went beyond a simple misunderstanding of Japanese culture to a fundamental discounting of the significance of the Japanese alliance. Kissinger lamented as " particularly painful" the need to cause embarrassment to Eisaku Sato, "a man who had done so much to cement the friendship between our two countries."⁵ But by naming Armin H. Meyer, a career foreign service officer, as t he United States ambassador to Japan rather than an influential political figure or a prestigious Japan specialist the administration suggested from the first its diminished interest in the Japanese.⁶

Exploration of how policy was made and why it resulted in such an affront to Tokyo must then begin with the individuals involved and the pressures upon them. What basic views of Japan did Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger entertain? How much did they k now about Japan and the Japanese politically and culturally? Were there historical experiences or personal exposures which preconditioned their approaches to Japan? What were their sources of information once in office? It has been alleged that Nixon and Kissinger shared contempt for and dislike of the Japanese, disparaging what they saw as obsequiousness and dishonesty among Japanese government leaders and diplomats.⁷ Are these assessments true? How did Nixon and Kissin ger balance personal emotions and rational factors in their foreign policy decision making? Even after the distress his policies had caused Nixon remained unre-pentant, remarking in his 1973 foreign policy report to Congress that a "mature alliance relati onship" does not entail a focus on "superficial public events."⁸ What of other individ-uals involved in the policy making process: were there other strong opinions that could have influenced the treatment of Japan? Mauri ce Stans, Secretary of Commerce, for example, suggested that Japan was "still fighting the war, only now instead of a shooting war it is an economic war."⁹ Similarly Secretary of the Treasury John Connally (who Nixon men tioned as a possible vice-presidential running mate) later used Japan bashing in his own election campaigning.

Analysts who have examined the Nixon Shocks often return to the events of November 1969 when Nixon met with Sato and reached an agreement on the reversion of Okinawa. Recognized from the first by the new Nixon administration as the principal potential problem in Japanese-American relations from Tokyo's point of view, policy makers undertook to resolve disputes over bases and nuclear weapons to reach a quick and mutually acceptable compromise. To do this the president had to overrule his military advise rs, deciding that Japanese-American friction would be a greater security threat in the region than having to negotiate use of the bases in Japan.¹⁰

From the White House vantage point, however, there was a second, possibly even more crucial issue, threatening Japanese-American accord. During the presidential election campaign Richard Nixon had courted southern voters by pledging to resolve textile trade problems with Tokyo. He urgently needed an adjustment by Japan on textile exports to the United States if the question was not to undermine him in the next election and so Nixon took the opportunity of the summit with Sato to press him on the matter .

As a result of a private conversation, Nixon concluded that Sato had pledged to break the existing impasse whereas Sato believed he had simply indicated an intention to try. Nixon appears to have understood little about Japanese negotiating style or bu reaucratic politics because the subsequent absence of progress left him surprised and angry. Henry Kissinger wrote sagely in retrospect of his realization that "there is literally no one capable of making a decision by himself. Only amateurs would seek to pressure an individual Japanese minister; even when he yields out of politeness, he cannot carry out his promise."¹¹ The question needs to be asked as to whether less detachment and wisdom at the time fueled a vindicti ve policy. When normalization with China became a serious prospect, some analysts contend, Nixon intentionally did not inform the Japanese in order to retaliate for what he saw as their obstructionism and deceit. Would the China shock have occurred if not for U.S.-Japan economic tensions over monetary policy and textiles? Did Nixon realize what the impact of such secrecy would be on the Japanese government? Did Nixon and Kissinger know that the Japanese foreign ministry had already been criticized as "the Asian Department of the United States State Department" because its policies appeared to be excessively deferential to Washington?¹² Expecting Sato to sympathize with his political vulnerability, did Nixon try to see t he internal imperatives with which Sato dealt? Did he fail to grasp the intricacies of Japanese politics or did he simply not care?

Nixon's seeming inability to comprehend the painfully slow and careful maneuvering required to produce a consensus and arrive at a policy in Japan stemmed from his more autocratic governing style which effectively silenced competing bureaucratic intere sts. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger ran foreign policy out of the White House and bypassed the State Department on all but routine matters. Thus they hid the entire opening to China from State Department interlopers who, as foreign service officers tas ked with responsibility for China policy, might have believed that they ought to know what was going on in the relationship. To Nixon and Kissinger, on the other hand, State Department officials had effectively been captured by Chiang Kai-shek's lobby and remained imbued with a narrow, ignorant anti-communism. On Japan the "Nixon White House -- frustrated by the textile case, tending to view Japan experts as Japan apologists -- took major actions affecting Tokyo without the experts even being informed, mu ch less involved."¹³ Ambassador Armin Meyer never met directly with the president and the White House excluded him from the 1969 summit talks with Sato despite the harm that did to his credibility in Tokyo.¹⁴

Examination of the events of the period should include assessments of the role of the bureaucracy. What pressures were focused on the White House? How did other agencies of the government try to bring their analyses and opinions to bear? What recommend ations were made regarding the treatment of and approach to Tokyo on the China question? Were Nixon and Kissinger provided with adequate studies of Sino-Japanese relations and the role of the United States in shaping the post-W.W.II Japanese response to C hina? Did they consult with other members of the administration or experts outside the government on dealing with Japan? Who vetoed the proposal from Secretary of State William Rogers that U. Alexis Johnson be sent to Tokyo to break the news personally th e day before the announcement? Did Nixon and Kissinger purposely use State Department officials to mislead the Japanese? As Ralph Clough, a former foreign service officer observed

Richard Nixon could ignore the bureaucracy that was, in the end, dependent upon him, but he did not feel as free to disregard public opinion. In fact a central question in exploring what went wrong in Japanese-American relations hinges upon Nixon's ass essment of domestic American politics. The president sought to open relations with China in part as an election gimmick. He believed that such an unexpected development would win him applause from the liberals who normally belittled him. At the same time, he anticipated that the China lobby and the right wing Republicans would not be pleased by the policy change and he justified the deep secrecy in which he shrouded the initiative as necessary to prevent impediments. Once the shift had been announced he e xpected that all but the diehards would go along. What weight did domestic politics, as opposed to security or economic considerations, actually have in the China opening? How serious a problem would leaks have been and did that threat justify such intens e secrecy? What were public opinion polls saying about American-Japanese relations? To what degree did Nixon risk antagonizing a public favorable toward Japan or did his anti-Japanese prejudices reflect a broader popular consensus?

Rather than pointing to domestic politics as a prime motivation for the China initiative, Nixon and Kissinger placed it squarely into a security context as a policy aimed to counter growing Soviet power and aggressiveness. In fact, as a result of the 1 968 Brezhnev Doctrine the Chinese felt themselves to be in possibly imminent danger from their northern neighbor. When border clashes in 1969 demonstrated the potential for disaster, rapprochement with the United States suddenly became appealing.

For Nixon and Kissinger the prospect of Sino-American reconciliation meant the opportunity to cut back on military budgets, readjust strategic theory as well as gaining leverage for ending the Vietnam War. As soon as the massive Chinese armies could be seen as a counterweight to the Soviet Union rather than as a challenge to the United States and its allies the balance of power in Asia and the world changed radically. Nixon announced that Washington would abandon a 2 and 1/2 war strategy for a 1 and 1/ 2 war strategy reflecting the fact that China no longer comprised a threat to American interests. Instead the Russians would have to deal with their nightmare scenario of a two front war.

Tokyo welcomed better Sino-American relations but the idea of strategic alignment provoked less enthusiasm. The Japanese worried about two aspects of Nixon administration security policy: American withdrawal from Asia and American alliance with China. Most disturbing would be a combination of the two.

The Nixon Doctrine had been articulated by the president in Guam early in 1969. During an impromptu news conference the president affirmed that the United States would continue to honor its defensive commitments in Asia, including provision of a nuclea r umbrella for its allies in the region. On the other hand, Nixon called upon Asian states to provide their own first line of defense, saying that the United States could no longer rush to fight fires wherever they broke out. The vision encompassed in the Nixon Doctrine of surrogate powers providing some of the regional support the United States would no longer extend meant that Japan would suddenly inherit major military responsibilities. The immediate reaction to the Nixon Doctrine among Asians, therefo re, ranged from consternation to fear. No one in the region wanted to see a remilitarized Japan; no one including the Japanese. Indeed, Japanese intellectuals wrote anxiously of a new era of international isolation for Japan as its neighbors attempted to circumscribe its growing economic and potential military might.¹⁶ Nevertheless the Nixon administration persisted in discussing the Japanese potential for building up their conventional force strength. Even more disturb ing they dropped hints that Tokyo might consider developing a nuclear weapons capability.

At the same time as Tokyo worried about American departure, it also dreaded the possibility that Washington might leave behind a Sino-American security understanding that excluded Japan.¹⁷ From Tokyo's perspective, t he only proper American approach to Beijing would entail confirmation of the enduring nature of the U.S.-Japan alignment and its primacy in America's Asian policy. In fact, Nixon and Kissinger's references to Japan in their discussions with the Chinese ap pear not only to have been brief but to have denigrated the alliance. Nixon, according to the president's memoirs, suggested that continuation of the U.S.-Japan security treaty relationship would be in China's interests because that would be the only way that Washington could keep the Japanese under control.¹⁸

Nixon and Kissinger in presenting themselves as gatekeepers with regard to Japanese militarism spoke directly to Chinese hostility toward and apprehension of Japan. Chinese concern about a resurgent Japan had arisen repeatedly in the postwar period, ge nerally at times when Beijing believed the United States was strengthening Japan unduly and unwisely. China particularly resented Japanese assertions of concern for its former colony on the island of Taiwan. In the 1969 Nixon-Sato communiqué Japan contended that "peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan." The Chinese reacted immediately and passionately, decrying the Japanese effort to recreate a sphere of influence in the region.¹⁹

Given these realities, what tactics did Nixon and Kissinger believe would best protect American security interests in Asia? What did the Nixon Doctrine actually signify? Did the president have a sincere commitment to devolution of power in the Pacific? ²⁰ Was Japan simply to pay a larger portion of the bills or did Nixon and Kissinger mean to have the Japanese play a larger military role? Did this mean a willingness to see the Japanese build serious conventional force capabilities? And what about nuclear weapons? Zhou Enlai told Ross Terrill in April 1971 that he thought the Pentagon might give Japan tactical nuclear weapons.²¹ Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird happened to be in Tok yo just as Kissinger conducted his first meetings with the Chinese in Beijing. Laird was quoted as suggesting that the United States would not be adverse to the development of Japanese nuclear arms.²² Similarly, Nixon h ad told Sato directly that the United States would understand if Japan felt that it ought to go nuclear. Although the State Department attempted to pretend that Sato had not understood Nixon correctly, the Japanese were left to wonder about American inten tions. Furthermore, in June 1975, Nixon told the Watergate special prosecutor that he and Kissinger warned Zhou Enlai that they would permit Japan to go nuclear if China did not follow through on rapprochement.²³ Did th ey threaten Zhou?

Clarity, of course, suffers since we know little about what the Americans and Chinese said to each other regarding Japan. Did the United States aggravate Chinese apprehensions, suggest joint precautions or try to use Japan to coerce China into making c oncessions? How enamored of the Chinese did the president and his secretary become and was the relationship with Japan seen as expendable? Was the anti-Soviet coalition with China simply that much more important than long term, but less focused, cooperati on with Japan? Mao Zedong magnanimously assured Kissinger in 1973 that China would never force Washington to chose between Beijing and Tokyo.²⁴ Had Kissinger allowed the chairman to believe that this would be a dilemma for the United States? When China's hostility toward Japan abated in 1972, did this follow from American promises to curtail Japanese militarism? Apparently Nixon did assure China that Washington would try to prevent Tokyo from placing military forces in Taiwan when Washington pulled American units out.²⁵ How did Nixon propose to do this? And what did Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Marshall Green and John Holdridge of the NSC staff tell the Japan ese when they went to Tokyo to brief Japanese leaders on the Shanghai communiqué? What did Kissinger add in his briefing of Ambassador Ushiba in Washington?

In justifying his disregard of Japanese sensitivities and producing the first Nixon shock Kissinger borrowed three points from Ambassador Armin Meyer's memoir: 1) the Japanese had proven themselves unable to keep secrets, 2) other US allies had an equa l, if not greater, right to hear of the new China opening, and 3) Japanese policy would not really be undercut but only preempted by the surprise United States change of course.²⁶ With regard to point one, preventing le aks, Kissinger implied that the Japanese had betrayed American confidences in the past and that the Japanese system appeared inherently leaky. What events led American policy makers to such conclusions? How much was the assessment of Japan a comparative j udgment or one influenced by leaks in the United States? When Prime Minister Tanaka visited Nixon in San Clemente in 1972 a Jack Anderson column revealed a secret American cable that embarrassed policy makers with its frank discussion of Sato's disillu-si onment with the United States.²⁷ Leaks certainly could not be considered a cultural phenomenon.

Others have contended that the surprise to Tokyo should not, in fact, have been as devastating as the Japanese claimed. Historian Roger Buckley argues that there had been both public and private hints before the July announcement. The fact that the Jap anese press chose to suggest that Tokyo had been hit with a thunderbolt actually was "less than honest."²⁸ Henry Kissinger reports that in March 1971 Zhou Enlai told former Japanese foreign minister Fujiyama Aiichiro to expect "a sudden dramatic improvement" in Sino-American relations.²⁹ Walter Isaacson proffers another intriguing possibility. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, utilizing the high technology available to him had ascertain ed that Kissinger had surreptitiously flown to Beijing. According to Isaacson, Laird told the Japanese Defense Minister who ought to have had enough time to warn the Prime Minister.³⁰ Had Sato been notified? If not, why not? Finally, Sato later told New York Times reporter James Reston that even a week's notice would not have alleviated the shock of the change in American policy.³¹

A second justification offered by Kissinger involved the difficult issue of who needed to be forewarned. Kissinger argued that there were others equally if not more deserving of notification so the administration decided not to contact any governments. Apart from Taipei, however, where the potential for truly destructive leaks would have been overwhelming, no other governing authority would appear to have had a greater claim to prior signaling than Tokyo. What reasoning went into this comparative calcu lus?

The final rationalization that Kissinger utilized focused on Japan's China policy, suggesting that the Japanese, who sought to move in the same direction, could not be said to have been undermined, only preempted. In fact, Tokyo began an immediate rest ructuring of its China policy in the wake of the Kissinger trip. Japan had earlier become China's principal trading partner when the latter's Soviet bloc connections declined. Now Japan sought to broaden economic contacts with political relations. China, however, refused to deal with Sato, whom the leadership identified with anti-China and pro-Taiwan policies of the past, although he attempted a series of informal initiatives. Instead China marked time by engaging in "invitational diplomacy," welcoming a succession of political and business figures to Beijing who could be wooed into supporting normalization.³² Then, once Tanaka Kakuei acceded to the premiership, China agreed to open diplomatic relations with breathtakin g speed. How did American policy makers react to Japan's aggressive efforts to open relations with the Chinese? Reportedly Japanese and American officials discussed Japan's policy at great length before Tanaka's September 1972 trip. What issues did the of ficials discuss? Did the United States try to slow the Japanese advance? Did the Americans help Tokyo to devise what became known as the Japanese formula for normalization? Ohira Masayoshi, a sometime prime minister and foreign minister, later noted that Japan would not have gone ahead without Washington's approval. Is that accurate and did the Americans know this?³³

Certainly one event in the autumn of 1971 served further to complicate Japan's position vis-à-vis China: Chirep. Since 1949 the People's Republic of China had been excluded from the United Nations and for much of that period the United States ha d organized the opposition to its admission. By 1969 the margin of votes excluding China had become so thin that everyone realized the balance would probably shift in 1970 and that year, for the first time, the majority voted for Beijing's admission. Afte r the Kissinger trip and the announcement that Nixon himself would go to China, the force of Washington's opposition to a UN seat for China proved far harder to maintain. Washington, nevertheless, sought to make a final effort at dual representation for C hina and Taiwan, hoping to prevent Taipei's ejection from the world forum. Recognizing that Japan also sought to preserve a Taiwan position inside the UN, Washington asked Japan to co-sponsor a resolution for dual representation. This request plunged the Foreign Ministry and the Liberal Democratic Party into a month of often heated debate over the toll that angering China would take on efforts to normalize relations with Beijing. Nevertheless, Sato finally opted for supporting the UN move. Above all, he w anted to protect Okinawa reversion and textiles from petulant American retaliation.³⁴ Did the United States threaten Japan to persuade Sato to go along with its UN resolution? Did American representatives realize that t he resolution was doomed and that the fallout would have more serious repercussions for Tokyo than for Washington? When were the Japanese told that Kissinger would travel to China just in time for the critical UN vote? Was the United States, as the Japane se suspected, simply putting on a show for Taipei? Or was the show actually a show for the American friends of Taiwan? Had Tokyo gotten caught in a bureaucratic struggle between Rogers and Kissinger?³⁵

A final, but quickly abortive, initiative followed from the opening to China and Japanese distress. Moscow, which apart from Tokyo and Taipei reacted most negatively to the news of Sino-American rapprochement, dispatched Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to Japan. There he began talks regarding a peace treaty for World War II which had never been signed between Moscow and Tokyo. This accelerated version of Soviet "smiling diplomacy" quickly ran into the barrier of the northern territories which Moscow re fused to surrender even as an inducement to Japan in difficult times. Moreover, once Japan moved ahead with Sino-Japanese normalization, Moscow returned to its more customary carping about Japanese militarism.³⁶

The Nixon shock, then, challenged the fundamental security structure that had organized and protected Asia since World War II. The United States not only had turned to China as a confederate in containing the Soviet Union, but in the process betrayed J apan. Whether Washington meant to "shake up and loosen the alliance" or, in fact, had behaved merely as "a willful, capricious giant" to some degree mattered little since in either case Washington's actions effectively undermined confidence in U.S. reliab ility, integrity and fortitude.³⁷ That Nixon followed the first shock with others drove home the point in Tokyo that American-Japanese relations had changed. Ohira Masayoshi called the new era one of "competitive coexis tence" and chided Japan to leave behind its habit of depending upon the United States.³⁸ Over the next two decades, to Washington's consternation, Japan increasingly did just that.

FOOTNOTES

1 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "American Policy Toward Sino-Japanese Trade in the Postwar Period: Politics and Prosperity," Diplomatic History (Summer 1984), pp. 183-208; Yasuhara Yoko, " Japan, Communist China, and Export Controls i n Asia, 1948-1952," Diplomatic History (Winter 1986), pp.75-89; Michael Schaller. The American Occupation of Japan (New York: Oxford, 1985); Ronald McGlothlen. Controlling the Waves (New York: Norton, 1993), pp. 23-49.

2 Shimizu Sayuri, "Perennial Anxiety: Japan-US Controversy over Recognition of the PRC, 1952-1958," Journal of American-East Asian Relations (Fall 1995), pp. 223-48. On the Dulles-Yoshida negotiations surround ing the Japanese Peace Treaty and the collateral treaty with Taiwan see, Warren I. Cohen, "China in Japanese-American Relations," in Akira Iriye and Warren I. Cohen (ed). The United States and Japan in the Postwar World (Lexington: University of Ke ntucky Press, 1989), pp. 37-43.

3 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "Threats, Opportunities and Frustrations in East Asia," in Warren I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (ed). Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World (New York: Cambridge, 1994), p. 126.

4 "The Bus to Peking," Asahi Shimbun, May 9, 1971, in The Pacific Rivals: A Japanese View of Japanese-American Relations (New York: Weatherhill, 1971), pp. 291-93. U. Alexis Johnson mentions Asakai's ni ghtmare in his memoirs and asserts that "I and everyone else involved in American policy toward Asia scoffed at the nightmare and assured them that such a thing would be impossible. They accepted our assurances at face value." The Right Hand of Power < /I>(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984), p. 553.

34 Fukui Haruhiro, "Tanaka Goes to Peking: A Case Study in Foreign Policymaking," in T.J. Pempel (ed). Policymaking in Contemporary Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 69-70; Zhao Quansheng. < I>Japanese Policymaking (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), pp. 72-73.

35 Meyer, Assignment, p. 140.

36 Clough. East Asia and U.S. Security, p. 73.

37 Destler, Managing an Alliance, p. 2.

38 Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, p. 297.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

NOTE: There has been considerably more written regarding the Japanese reaction to the Nixon Shock than on the reasons for the Shock.

Asahi Shimbun. The Pacific Rivals: A Japanese View of Japanese-American Relations. (New York: Weatherhill, 1971).

Buckley, Roger. U.S.-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, 1945-1990 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. The Fragile Blossom: Crisis and Change In Japan (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).

Clough, Ralph N. East Asia and U.S. Security (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975).

Cohen, Warren I., "China in Japanese-American Relations," in Akira Iriye and Warren I. Cohen (ed). The United States and Japan (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1989), pp. 36-60.

Destler, I.M., et al. Managing an Alliance: The Politics of U.S.-Japanese Relations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1976).

Fukui Haruhiro, "Tanaka Goes to Peking: A Case Study in Foreign Policymaking," in T.J. Pempel (ed). Policymaking in Contemporary Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 60-102.

Harding, Harry. A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China Since 1972

(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992).

Harrison, Selig. The Widening Gulf: Asian Nationalism and American Policy (New York: Free Press, 1978).

Hersh, Seymour M. The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House (New York: Summit, 1983).

Isaacson, Walter. Kissinger (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992).

Johnson, U. Alexis. The Right Hand of Power (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984).

Kalb, Marvin and Bernard. Kissinger (New York: Dell, 1974).

Kissinger, Henry. The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979).

Kissinger, Henry. Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982).

LaFeber, Walter, "Decline of Relations during the Vietnam War," in Akira Iriye and Warren I. Cohen (ed). The United States and Japan (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1989), pp. 96-113.

Litwak, Robert S. Détente and the Nixon Doctrine (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

Ronald McGlothlen. Controlling the Waves (New York: Norton, 1993).

Meyer, Armin H. Assignment: Tokyo (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974).

Moorstein, Richard and Morton Abramowitz. Remaking China Policy: U.S.-China Relations and Governmental Decisionmaking (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).

Morris, Roger. Uncertain Greatness (New York: Harper & Row, 1977).

Nixon, Richard. RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978).

Ogata Sadako, "The Business Community and Japanese Foreign Policy: Normalization of Relations with the People's Republic of China," in Robert A. Scalapino (ed). The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 175-203.

Ohira Masayoshi. Brush Strokes: Moments from My Life (Tokyo: Foreign Press Center, 1979).

Osgood, Robert E., "The Diplomacy of Allied Relations: Europe and Japan," in Robert

E. Osgood, et. al. Retreat from Empire?: The First Nixon Administration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 173-205.

Osgood, Robert E. The Weary and the Wary: U.S. and Japanese Security Policies in Transition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972).

Sato Seizaburo, "The Foundations of Modern Japanese Foreign Policy, " in Robert A. Scalapino (ed). The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 367-89.

Sato Seizaburo, Koyama Ken'ichi, and Kumon Shunpei. Postwar Politician: The Life of Former Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira (New York: Kodansha, 1990).

Schaller, Michael. The American Occupation of Japan (New York: Oxford, 1985).

Shimizu Sayuri, "Perennial Anxiety: Japan-US Controversy over Recognition of the PRC, 1952-1958," Journal of American-East Asian Relations (Fall 1995), pp. 223-48.

Sutter, Robert. The China Quandary: Domestic Determinants of U.S. China Policy, 1972-1982 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983).

Szulc, Tad. The Illusion of Peace: Foreign Policy in the Nixon Years (New York: Viking, 1978).

Terrill, Ross. 800,000,000: The Real China (New York: Dell, 1971).

Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf, "American Policy Toward Sino-Japanese Trade in the Postwar Period: Politics and Prosperity," Diplomatic History (Summer 1984), pp. 183- 208.

Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf, "Threats, Opportunities and Frustrations in East Asia," in Warren I. Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (ed). Lyndon Johnson Confronts the

World (New York: Cambridge, 1994).

Watanabe Akio, "Japanese Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs: 1964-1973," in Robert A. Scalapino (ed). The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 105-45.

Welfield, John. An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System (Atlantic Heights, NJ" Athlone Press, 1988).

Yasuhara Yoko, " Japan, Communist China, and Export Controls in Asia, 1948-1952," Diplomatic History (Winter 1986), 75-89.

Zhao Quansheng. Japanese Policymaking: The Politics Behind Politics (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993).

SECONDARY WORKS TO BE EXAMINED:

Ambrose, Stephen. Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician (New York, 1989).

Angel, Robert. Explaining Economic Policy Failure

Brandon, Henry. The Retreat of American Power

Hoff, Joan. Nixon Reconsidered (New York, 1994).

Katsumi Kobayashi. The Nixon Doctrine and US-Japanese Security Relations. California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, Discussion Paper #65, October 1975.

Kitamura Hiroshi. Psychological Dimensions of U.S.-Japanese Relations . Cambridge: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, Occasional Paper # 28, August 1971.

Kusano Atsushi, "Two Nixon Shocks and Japan-U.S. Relations," Princeton University

Research Monograph #50, 1987.

Ogata Sadako. Normalization with China: A Comparative Study of U.S. and Japanese Processes (Berekely: East Asian Institute Study, University of California, 1988).

Peking Review

Renmin Ribao

Solomon, Richard. Chinese Political Negotiating Behavoir, 1967-1984 (Santa Monica, RAND, 1995).

Whiting, Allen S. China Eyes Japan

RESEARCH MATERIALS

Nixon Presidential Papers

White House Central Files

White House Subject Files

Staff Member and Office Files

White House Special Files: H.R. Haldeman Papers: daily notes and diary

National Security Council Records

State Department Records

RG 59 General Records of the Department of State

RG 84 Foreign Post Records

Private Papers, Oral Histories and Interviews

Association for Diplomatic Studies Oral History Collection, Georgetown University.

Return to U.S.-Japan Project Home Page

Return to National Security Archive Home Page