Washington,
August 27, 2004 - A newly declassified document
obtained by the National Security Archive shows that amidst vast
human rights violations by Argentina's security forces in June
1976, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told Argentine Foreign
Minister Admiral Cesar Augusto Guzzetti:
"If there are things that have to be done, you should
do them quickly. But you should get back quickly to normal procedures."
Kissinger's comment is part of a 13-page Memorandum
of Conversation reporting on a June 10 meeting
between Secretary Kissinger and Argentine Admiral Guzzetti in
Santiago, Chile.
After a series of pleasantries, Guzzetti went into the substance
of the meeting by stating: "Our main problem in Argentina
is terrorism. It is the first priority of the current government
that took office on March 24. There are two aspects to the solution.
The first is to ensure the internal security of the country; the
second is to solve the most urgent economic problems over the
coming 6 to 12 months. Argentina needs United States understanding
and support…."
Replying to Guzzetti's report on the situation, Secretary Kissinger
said: "We have followed events in Argentina closely.
We wish the new government well. We wish it will succeed. We will
do what we can to help it succeed."
At a time when the international community, the U.S. media, universities,
and scientific institutions, the U.S. Congress, and even the U.S.
Embassy in Argentina were clamoring about the indiscriminate human
rights violations against scientists, labor leaders, students,
and politicians by the Argentine military, Secretary Kissinger
told Guzzetti: "We are aware you are in a difficult period.
It is a curious time, when political, criminal, and terrorist
activities tend to merge without any clear separation. We understand
you must establish authority."
Only two weeks earlier, on May 28, Ambassador Robert Hill had
presented a U.S. demarche on human rights to Admiral Guzzetti.
The Embassy was deeply concerned about the kidnapping and torture
of three American women, among them the Fulbright coordinator
for Argentina, Elida Messina, and the wave of attacks against
political refugees from the Southern Cone. In contrast to Hill's
efforts, according to the memorandum of conversation Secretary
Kissinger told Guzzetti:"In the United States we have
strong domestic pressures to do something on human rights…
We want you to succeed. We do not want to harrass [sic] you. I
will do what I can…."
Another document recently unearthed by the National Security
Archive and posted
for the first time here, shows that on July
9, 1976, Secretary Kissinger was explicitly briefed on the rampant
repression taking place in Argentina: "Their theory is
that they can use the Chilean method," Kissinger's top
aide on Latin America Harry Shlaudeman informed him, "that
is, to terrorize the opposition - even killing priests and nuns
and others."
Documents published earlier by the National Security Archive
show that in September 1976 Ambassador Hill complained again to
Guzzetti about the astounding human rights violations occurring
in Argentina. Guzzetti rebuffed him saying that, "When
he had seen SECY of State Kissinger in Santiago, the latter had
said he 'hoped the Argentine Govt could get the terrorist problem
under control as quickly as possible.' Guzzetti said that he had
reported this to President Videla and to the cabinet, and that
their impression had been that the USG's overriding concern was
not human rights but rather that GOA "get it over quickly."
Kissinger reiterated this message during another meeting with
Guzzetti in New York on October 7 telling him "the quicker
you succeed the better." Later, Ambassador Hill sent
a bitter complaint to the Department of State that Guzzetti had
returned to Argentina in a "state of jubilation"
after meeting the Secretary. [See Kissinger
to Argentines on Dirty War: "The quicker you succeed the
better", December 4, 2003]
"The Memorandum of Conversation explains why the Argentine
generals believed they got a clear message from the Secretary
that they had carte blanche for the dirty war," said Carlos
Osorio, Director of the Southern Cone Documentation Project at
the National Security Archive. "It appears that Secretary
Kissinger gave the 'green light' to the Argentine military during
the June 1976 meeting with Guzzetti in Santiago," he added.
The June10 Memorandum of Conversation was obtained by the National
Security Archive's Southern Cone Documentation Project through
a Freedom of Information Act request to the Department of State
filed in August 2002 and appealed in February 2004. The document
was misdated June 6, 1976. The meeting took place during the morning
of June 10, 1976, when Secretary Kissinger met with several foreign
dignitaries attending the OAS General Assembly in Santiago. That
afternoon he traveled to Mexico City [See Secretary
Kissinger's travels at the Department of State
Historian's web page and the Secretary's
calendar of events for that day].
In Santiago, Guzzetti told Secretary Kissinger of the difficulties
the Argentine security forces faced in dealing with the refugees,
mostly because of lack of information: "[refugees] do
not want to register… We have no names. Only the refugee
committees know something in detail…"
A day earlier, on June 9, 1976 clandestine Argentine security
forces had ransacked the Catholic Commission for Refugees in Buenos
Aires and stolen refugee records. The day after Guzzetti and Secretary
Kissinger met, on June 11, twenty-four Chilean and Uruguayan refugees
were kidnapped, held illegally for two days, and tortured by a
combined Argentine-Chilean-Uruguayan squadron.
Guzzetti also described the intelligence coordination with neighboring
dictatorships: "The terrorist problem is general to the
entire Southern Cone. To combat it, we are encouraging joint efforts
to integrate with our neighbors… All of them: Chile, Paraguay,
Bolivia, Uruguay, Brazil." This collaboration was codenamed
Operation Condor.
At the time of the meeting, the Department of State suspected
that the Southern Cone military regimes were carrying out a coordinated
attack against refugees in Argentina; indeed Kissinger received
a special telegram from Washington briefing him on this issue
just before he met with Guzzetti that morning. But the Memorandum
of Conversation contains no reference by Secretary Kissinger regarding
the human rights concerns posed by the Southern Cone security
cooperation.
By the end of 1976, 10,000 Argentines had been disappeared or
assassinated by the Argentine security forces; half a dozen American
citizens had been kidnapped and tortured. On the international
front, the cooperation between Argentine military and intelligence
forces and other Southern Cone militaries left hundreds of Uruguayans,
Chileans, Bolivians, Paraguayans, and Brazilians disappeared,
tortured, and/or dead.
What follows are excerpts from the Memorandum
of Conversation and a chronology
of events surrounding the June 10 meeting,
based on previously declassified documents.
Chronology
of events surrounding the June 10, 1976 Kissinger-Guzzetti meeting
Includes
links to source documents
Excerpts
from the meeting:
"Guzzetti: Our main problem in Argentina is terrorism.
It is the first priority of the current government that took
office on March 24. There are two aspects to the solution. The
first is to ensure the internal security of the country; the
second is to solve the most urgent economic problems over the
coming 6 to 12 months. Argentina needs United States understanding
and support…
The Secretary: We have followed events in Argentina closely.
We wish the new government well. We wish it will succeed. We
will do what we can to help it succeed. We are aware you are
in a difficult period. It is a curious time, when political,
criminal, and terrorist activities tend to merge without any
clear separation. We understand you must establish authority.
Guzzetti: The foreign press creates many problems for us,
interpreting events in a very peculiar manner. Press criticism
creates problems for confidence. It weakens international confidence
in the Argentine government…
The Secretary: The worst crime as far as the press is concerned
is to have replaced a government of the left.
Guzzetti: It is even worse than that.
The Secretary: I realize you have no choice but to restore
governmental authority. But it is also clear that the absence
of normal procedures will be used against you.
…
Guzzetti [on thousands of refugees in Argentina]: They have
come from all our neighboring countries: Uruguay, Paraguay,
Bolivia, as well as Chile… Many provide clandestine support
for terrorism. Chile, when the government changed, resulted
in a very large number of leftist exiles. The Peronist government
at the time welcomed them to Argentina in large numbers.
The Secretary: You could always send them back.
Guzzetti: For elemental human rights reasons we cannot
send them back to Chile… No one wants to receive them.
There are many terrorists.
The Secretary: Have you tried the PLO? They need more terrorists.
Seriously, we cannot tell you how to handle these people. What
are you going to do?
…
The Secretary: I understand the problem. But if no one
receives them, then what can you do?
Guzzetti: We are worried about their involvement in the
terrorism problem. But many fear persecution, and do not want
to register.
…
The Secretary: And how many of these do you feel are engaged
in illegal activities?
Guzzetti: It is difficult to say. Perhaps 10,000. Only
150 Chileans are legal. We have no names. Only the refugee committees
know something in detail. But their problems create unrest,
and sometimes even logistic support for the guerrillas
The Secretary: We wish you success.
…
Guzzetti: The terrorist problem is general to the entire
Southern Cone. To combat it, we are encouraging joint efforts
to integrate with our neighbors… All of them: Chile, Paraguay,
Bolivia, Uruguay, Brazil.
The Secretary: I take it you are talking about joint economic
activities?
Guzzetti: Yes. Activities on both the terrorist and the
economic fronts.
The Secretary: Oh. I thought you were referring only to
security. You cannot succeed if you focus on terrorism and ignore
its causes.
…
The Secretary: Let me say, as a friend, that I have noticed
that military governments are not always the most effective
in dealing with these problems…
So after a while, many people who don't understand the
situation begin to oppose the military and the problem is compounded.
The Chileans, for example, have not succeeded in getting
across their initial problem and are increasingly isolated.
You will have to make an international effort to have your
problems understood. Otherwise, you, too, will come under increasing
attack. If there are things that have to be done, you should
do them quickly. But you must get back quickly to normal procedures.
…
The Secretary: It is certainly true that whatever the origin,
terrorism frequently gains outside support. And this outside
support also creates pressures against efforts to suppress it.
But you cannot focus on terrorism alone. If you do, you only
increase your problems.
Guzzetti: Yes, there is a need for balance between political
rights and authority.
The Secretary: I agree. The failure to respect it creates
serious problems. In the United States we have strong domestic
pressures to do something on human rights.
Guzzetti: The terrorists work hard to appear as victims
in the light of world opinion even though they are the real
aggressors.
The Secretary: We want you to succeed. We do not want to
harrass [sic] you. I will do what I can…
…
[At 9:10 the Secretary and Guzzetti leave for a word alone.
At 9:14 they re-emerge, and the meeting ends.]"
Thanks
to:
Martin Andersen, author of Dossier Secreto: Argentina's Desaparecidos
and the Myth of the 'Dirty War' (Westview, 1993) and first
to report on Secretary Kissinger's "green light" in
The Nation in 1987; John Dinges, author of The Condor
Years (The New Press, 2004); and Peter Kornbluh, author of
The Pinochet File (The New Press, 2003) for their instructive
books and advice.