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August 27, 2003 vigil held in support of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission's report, at the Paseo de los Héroes Navales (Lima, Peru)


The Search for Truth
The Declassified Record on Human Rights Abuses in Peru

Edited by Tamara Feinstein,
Director, Peru Documentation Project
August 28, 2003

Previous Archive Releases on Peru

"Montesinos: Blind Ambition"
The Peruvian Townsend Commission report and declassified U.S. documentation

Peru in "The Eye of the Storm"
Declassified U.S. documentation on human rights abuses and political violence

Shoot-Down in Peru
The secret U.S. debate over intelligence sharing in Peru and Colombia

"Fujimori's Rasputin"
The declassified files on Peru's former Intelligence Chief, Vladimiro Montesinos



"True 'genocide' against Ashaninkas began in Jan 90… S[endero] L[uminoso] assassinations vary-from the 'simple' style with a single knife thrust into the throat to the 'torture' style w[h]ere fingers are cut off, eyes gouged out, and then ritual multiple stabbings by younger SL members undergoing 'initiation'. The mass killings and the deliberate torture deaths are meant to terrify the Indians into submission…"
  [intelligence reporting on Shining Path attacks of Ashaninka Indians in Satipo province]
Defense Intelligence Agency Cable
April 9, 1990
"Common methods of torture included placing a stick behind the victim's knees, making him squat so that his arms could be tied in front of him with the arms looped under the stick at the elbow joint and then hanging the victim from a rafter. Our source claimed that this method had been learned from 'the Americans' but did not elaborate."
  [former Peruvian army officer describing 'interrogation' techniques of suspects]
Secret U.S. Embassy (Lima) Cable
June 10, 1994

On Thursday, August 28, 2003, the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission released its final report, investigating 20 years of internal conflict and human rights abuses in Peru from 1980 to 2000. From the initial burning of ballot boxes by the Shining Path in Chusqui, Ayacucho, on May 17, 1980, to the eventual flight of former President Alberto Fujimori to Japan in November 2000, Peru has been witness to many forms of political violence and human rights violations, committed by both government forces and insurgent groups. This briefing book offers a selection of historical materials from U.S. government sources that sheds light on this brutal period. They are taken from a recent special release of records to the Peruvian people by the Bush administration and from collections of declassified documents obtained by the National Security Archive through the Freedom of Information Act. Both were important sources for the Truth Commission's report.

Truth and Reconciliation

In June 2001, interim President Valentin Paniagua established the groundwork for a Truth Commission, later reaffirmed by President Alejandro Toledo in September of the same year. This Truth and Reconciliation Commission was charged with determining the causes of internal violence in Peru between May 1980 and November 2000; contributing to the clarification of the crimes and human rights violations perpetrated during this period; identifying those responsible for these violent acts; evaluating proposals for reparation to the victims and their families; recommending reforms as preventive measures; and establishing follow-up mechanisms for its recommendations.

Over the course of the past two years, the Commission accomplished these tasks by establishing five different regional offices, which collected a total of 16,885 testimonies. Staff input these testimonies into a complex database system, which they used to analyze the findings. In addition to individual testimonies, the Commission hosted a number of public hearings, where victims could openly relate their experiences. Other dialogues and meetings with key actors and sectors of society were conducted to allow these groups an opportunity to put forth their views on what had happened during the 20-year period. The Commission produced seven Regional Histories and 19 In-Depth Studies, with the aim of researching particularly relevant cases. It also began an initiative to help clarify the fate of the disappeared, in concert with the International Red Cross, the Peruvian Ombudsman's Office, and the National Coordinator for Human Rights. The Commission created a judicial team to analyze the pattern of violence, crimes and human rights abuses, and an ad-hoc working group to evaluate cases in which individual responsibilities might be established and pursued in the criminal justice system. The working group performed a number of exhumations as part of its investigations.

As the culmination of the Commission's work, the 12-volume final report (along with seven annexes) will be presented before the Peruvian people in an official ceremony in Huamanga, Ayacucho on August 29, 2003. A copy of the final report will be posted on-line at the International Center for Transitional Justice's website.

Special Declassification of U.S. Documents

Among the various sources of information the Commission used to compile its report were declassified U.S. government documents. On November 27, 2001, the Commission, with the assistance of the National Security Archive, officially requested the Bush administration's assistance in obtaining an expedited declassification of U.S. documents relating to human rights in Peru. The Commission originally requested an expedited inter-agency review on a list of key cases and subjects. Although the Bush administration briefly considered the possibility, in the end the Commission received an expedited State Department-only review process, omitting any materials from other relevant agencies. On January 6, 2003, the US Embassy delivered 326 declassified State Department documents to the Commission's main office in Lima.

The Bush administration's response, while falling considerably short of the Commission's request, was nonetheless important. Declassified U.S. documents can provide insight into the broader political process and context, the structure and activities of different institutions and geographical regions, and the private perspectives and positions of government and military officials, as well as provide illuminating details on specific events and human rights cases. For all these reasons, the newly released materials will contribute to a broader understanding of the abuses that took place in Peru during the period under review.

However, it is important to treat declassified documents as a source with care, as the Peruvian case demonstrates. First, a release of this size accounts for only a tiny fraction of the entire record, most of which remains classified and out of public reach. Not only is the full picture of events from the U.S. point of view unavailable, but researchers must keep in mind the question of why only these materials and not others were released. One should also not expect to receive new information on every human rights case of interest. Much of the information will be more corroborative in nature than new and revealing. Some cases may not be mentioned at all in the documents, or only very superficially. In part, this depends on the level of interest the U.S. government had in the subject at the time, and on the willingness of relevant sources to confide pertinent details to American officials on specific cases. Finally, in reading these documents, one also has to take into account that their content can be influenced by the personal bias of both the writer and the sources from which s/he gets his/her information.

Technical Analysis of the New Release

An analysis of the 1,985 pages of documentation released directly to the Commission - most of which were U.S. Embassy cables - shows that 230 of the 326 documents had been previously released to the National Security Archive in some form, while 96 had not. Of those 230 previously released documents: 34 contained more security deletions than the Archive's version; 32 were released to the Commission in more complete form, and 161 had the same level of excisions, while three had different portions excised with no clear "better" copy. Of the 326 documents released to the Commission, six were exact duplicates released twice. One hundred and thirty-one of the 326 documents were released to the Commission with excisions, and the majority of the excised material was withheld under the B1 (1.5D) exemption of the FOIA, which refers to information that cannot be released because it would threaten U.S. foreign relations. For a full analysis of the special release of declassified documents in Excel format and links to the actual documents themselves, please click here.

Sources on Peru from the National Security Archive

Separate from and in addition to the 326 documents released directly to the Commission from the State Department, the National Security Archive has submitted a large group of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests relating to Peru over the years. This resulted in the declassification of thousands of documents from multiple agencies. This includes documentation from other important U.S. agencies that did not respond to the Commission's request. These documents are drawn from four different collections and projects at the National Security Archive: 1) Lynda Davis Human Rights Collection, started by a former Archive analyst in the early 1990 and including human rights documentation from 1980 to the early 1990s; 2) Drug Policy Collection, started in the early 1990s by Kate Doyle and including policy and military strategy documents from the 1980s and early 1990s; 3) Bigwood Donation, donated by free-lance journalist Jeremy Bigwood; and 4) Peru Documentation Project Collection, started in the late 1990s and including documents on key human rights cases from 1980 to 2000. The Archive shared these documents with the Truth Commission.

This briefing book is a selection of some of the most representative documents from the period studied by the Truth Commission. The documents in this publication are drawn from all four collections of the National Security Archive, as well as the special declassification made to the Commission itself. The documents span the period 1981 to 2000, and include information on key human rights cases, as well as profiles of the actors involved in the violence. The materials not only reveal details of specific actions but also lend insight into the way the U.S. government viewed the events taking place in Peru, as well as how policy was shaped to deal with escalating human rights violations.

What the Documents Reveal

The documents begin with a grave underestimation by the CIA of the nascent Shining Path in 1981. They follow the growing conflict with the - at times - contradictory positions of clamoring for more effective counterinsurgency tactics by the Peruvian government, and demonstrating a mounting concern regarding human rights abuses. It is clear that the rival policy objectives of counterdrug policy, respect for human rights, and concerns about the insurgent threat to U.S. interests abroad were not always easily reconciled or given equal weight. Information from the Peruvian government versus information from the human rights community and Peruvian press were often widely divergent. The U.S. government did not always have access to inside information that could allow it to evaluate better which of the widely opposing views were most accurate. Atrocities were clearly committed on both sides of the conflict, but Washington's dilemma was how to assist the Peruvian regime in curbing a brutal insurgency which was committing massacres, assassinations and other violence, while at the same time pressuring the Lima government not to commit its own abuses.

Perhaps the most chilling documents in this briefing book are revelations made by a Peruvian officer within the military's apparatus of terror, whose testimony caused U.S. Embassy officers to question the United States' own inadvertent contribution to the violence through military assistance programs. The officer revealed that U.S. government training for the deactivation of terrorist bomb threats provided to the Peruvian military was used by the Peruvian officer and others like him to perfect their ability to build better bombs to be used against assassination targets.

By the time the revelations emerged from this former army officer, the U.S. government had already begun to act on its own grave concerns over Peruvian government abuses. On April 28, 1994, the National Security Council ordered an interagency review to be conducted by NSC Senior Director for Democracy Morton Halperin. This study into human rights abuses in Peru was inspired in part by pressure from the Congress at the time, but the conclusions of the report have never been disclosed to the public. While the U.S. has released a great deal of declassified material on Peru (especially from the State Department) the record on this vital aspect of U.S. foreign relations is still far from complete. Hopefully, the government will continue to make sincere efforts to fill the gap.

[Note: This briefing book should be read as a contribution and elaboration to the information revealed in the earlier 2002 "Eye of the Storm" briefing book.]

About the Peru Documentation Project

The Peru Documentation Project is directed by Tamara Feinstein. The Project began to focus on human rights in Peru prior to the downfall of Vladimiro Montesinos at the request of human rights investigators in Peru. The Project is grateful for the support of the John D & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Arca Foundation, the John Merck Fund, the Ford Foundation, and the Open Society Institute.



Click here for a full analysis of the 326 declassified documents released directly to the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Excel format, including links to the documents themselves.

Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.

Document 1: Central Intelligence Agency Review, Latin American Review: Peru Keeping Terrorism in Check, July 3, 1981, 6pp.

Source: National Security Archive Request (Lynda Davis - Human Rights)

This very early CIA analysis of the Shining Path and the growing violence in the Andean Highlands demonstrates the flawed ability of U.S. intelligence to accurately predict the growing threat of the Shining Path. The CIA discounts the rise in "terrorist activities" as of lesser impact, or concern, in comparison with the insurgency of the 1960s. The CIA notes that "the present incidents not only differ in scope and intensity, but President Belaunde is unlikely to overreact and set off a chain of events similar to those that led to his ouster in 1968."

Document 2: Central Intelligence Agency Review, Latin American Review: Peru Terrorism May Threaten Civilian Government, March 15, 1982, 5pp.

Source: National Security Archive Request (Lynda Davis - Human Rights)

After less than a year from producing the previous document, the CIA dramatically changes its assessment of the threat posed by terrorism in Peru. It notes that there has been some success in discrediting the government security forces and provoking a military intervention, as occurred in the 1960's. It also recounts details of the March 3, 1982 prison attack by the Shining Path, killing 10 and freeing 247 inmates, characterizing the incident as the most serious terrorist act since President Belaunde took office.

Document 3: U.S. Embassy (Lima) Cable, Peruvian Terrorism: The Nature of the Threat, April 20, 1982, Secret, 9pp.

Source: National Security Archive Request (Kate Doyle - Drug Policy)

The U.S. Embassy in Lima offers an extensive analysis of the developing crisis with the Shining Path in Peru. The cable details the Shining Path's structure, philosophy, activities, and evaluates claims of foreign support and drug trafficking links. The document notes that the Shining Path's initial "sabotage campaign," starting with election box bombings in 1980 through the March 1982 bombing of the Palace of Government, has been an effective method of creating great public unease at low-overhead costs, while the new tactic of bombing electric tower shows an "increased sophistication."

Document 4: U.S. Embassy (Lima) Cable, Peruvian Terrorism Turns Bloodier, but not Necessarily According to Plan, April 8, 1983, Confidential, 3pp.

Source: National Security Archive Request (Lynda Davis - Human Rights)

This cable describes recent massacres in Lucanamarca and Huancasancos committed by the Shining Path and alludes to the government retaliation. It speculates on the changing attitudes towards the Shining Path, and how these fit into both Shining Path and government strategies.

Document 5: U.S. Embassy (Lima) Cable, Peru: Sendero Terrorist Counterattack, April 20, 1983, Confidential, 5pp.

Source: National Security Archive Request (Lynda Davis - Human Rights)

This update on the situation in Peru, including more details on Lucanamarca and Huancasancos, notes the failure of the Peruvian government to contain the growing violence in the highlands, and warns of the potential for "an upping of the ante by the security forces," if the situation continues.

Document 6: U.S. Embassy (Lima) Cable, Peru: Assessment of Short Term Prospects, September 2, 1983, Secret, 11pp.

Source: National Security Archive Request (Kate Doyle - Drug Policy)

This document describes the current status of political affairs in Peru, and evaluates the status of the conflict with Sendero. It speculates that the change in tactics by Sendero, to focus more attacks in the Lima where all the wealth and power is concentrated in Peru, has "fundamentally altered the terrorism equation." It notes mounting pressure on the government from both elite and average citizens to deal with the problem.

Document 7: U.S. Embassy (Lima) Cable, Incidents in Emergency Zone Lead to Human Rights Concerns, August 13, 1984, Confidential, 1pg.

Source: National Security Archive Request (Lynda Davis - Human Rights)

The U.S. Embassy debates the ramifications of the disappearance of prominent campesino organizer Jesus Oropeza Chonta and La Republica correspondent Jaime Ayala. The embassy is not thoroughly convinced that these two incidents are linked, or are part of a larger policy shift in counterinsurgency tactics. However, the embassy warns that these incidents, along with other reports of an emerging pattern of "tough measures" by the military, may develop into a "source of serious concern" to the United States. The US Ambassador has raised these concerns with Prime Minister Mariategui and has plans to discuss the issue with Army Commanding General Julia later in the week.

Document 8: U.S. Embassy (Lima) Cable, Profile of Politically Motivated Terrorism in Peru, March 26, 1985, Secret, 14pp.

Source: National Security Archive Request (Tamara Feinstein - Peru Documentation Project)

This document provides an overview of activities and strategies of the Shining Path and the newly emergent Revolutionary Tupac Amaru Movement (MRTA). It describes the cyclical nature of Shining Path violence, and its waxing and waning influence in various provinces.

Document 9: U.S. Embassy (Lima) Cable, Garcia Administration and the Peruvian Military, January 14, 1986, Confidential, 10pp.

Source: National Security Archive Request (Tamara Feinstein - Peru Documentation Project)

This cable profiles the relationship between newly elected President Alan Garcia and the Peruvian military. It highlights a number of points of contention between Garcia and the military; and demonstrates Garcia's reliance on high public approval rating to restrain actions against him by the military. It characterizes human rights as the most explosive issue of contention, noting general fear within the army caused by Garcia's firing of Generals Enrico, Jamara and Mori after the Accomarca and Pucayacu massacres.

Document 10: Central Intelligence Agency Review, The Insurgency Review: Peru Insurgents Hold the Initiative, June 1987, 6pp.

Source: National Security Archive Request (Lynda Davis - Human Rights)

This CIA analysis focuses mainly on the Shining Path; its structure, history, and growing base. It also describes the rise of Lima-based activities of the MRTA. It concludes that the insurgents currently have the momentum of the war on their side, and shows little faith in President Garcia's ability to develop an effective and comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy in the short-term.

Document 11: U.S. Embassy (Lima) Cable, Lawyer for SL Leader Morote Assassinated, July 30, 1988, Confidential, 3pp.

Source: National Security Archive Request (Lynda Davis - Human Rights)

This cable describes the assassination of Peruvian lawyer Manuel Febres Flores by the paramilitary group, "Democratic Commando Rodrigo Franco." Despite police speculation that the Shining Path or MRTA may have been responsible; the Embassy notes it is more likely that a government or APRA paramilitary was responsible. The embassy admits that they know such paramilitary groups exists and that they have acted before; but that because Febres's murder is of such a sensational nature compared to previous acts, it "marks a new stage in Peru's terrorist conflict."

Document 12: U.S. Embassy (Lima) Cable, First Arrest of Rodrigo Franco Command Suspects, May 24, 1989, Confidential, 5pp.

Source: National Security Archive Request (Lynda Davis - Human Rights)

This document describes the arrest of three Rodrigo Franco Command (CRF) suspects, occurring just after the first official government acknowledgement that the paramilitary group exists. The cable cites the rumors of Peruvian Minister of Interior Mantilla playing an important role in directing the CRF, and debates the likelihood of a probe into the CRF actually succeeding. The embassy comments that, "the CRF is known to sow its own brand of terror, following behind the SL in an attempt to convince inhabitants that they should be more fearful of the CRF than of the SL."

Document 13: U.S. Embassy (Lima) Cable, Rodrigo Franco Command Nears First Anniversary Mark, July 18, 1989, Confidential, 21pp.

Source: National Security Archive Request (Lynda Davis - Human Rights)

This cable describes the history, activities and political context of the Rodrigo Franco Command (CRF). It also evaluates rumors of the CRF's ties to the APRA government, DIRCOTE and Minister of the Interior Mantilla.

Document 14: Defense Intelligence Agency Cable, Ashaninka Indians in North Satipo also under SL Attack, April 9, 1990, 5pp.

Source: National Security Archive Request (Lynda Davis - Human Rights)

This document describes the ongoing conflict between the Ashaninka Indians and the Shining Path. It attributes the conflict to the Ashininkas refusal to cooperate and for resisting encroachment on their land. It describes the Shining Path murder of resistant Ashaninkas as turning to "genocide" after January 1990.

Document 15: Central Intelligence Agency Analysis, Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement: Growing Threat to US Interests in Peru, March 28, 1991, Secret, 10pp.

Source: Jeremy Bigwood Request (Donation to Archive)

This CIA analysis profiles the MRTA, its structure, strategy, foreign ties, activities and the threat it poses to U.S. interests.

Document 16: U.S. Embassy (Lima) Cable, SL Kills Two Polish Priests; Other Instances, August 12, 1991, Confidential, 8pp.

Source: State Department Release to Truth and Reconciliation Commission

This cable describes the murder of two Polish priests by the Shining Path in Ancash, as well as other Shining Path and MRTA attack and government counter attacks. The cable describes the military's distrust of ICRC in the conflicted areas.

Document 17: U.S. Embassy (Lima) Cable, Rondas Urbanas Against Sendero, March 2, 1992, Confidential, 9pp.

Source: National Security Archive Request (Lynda Davis - Human Rights)

This document describes the impact of the Shining Path murder of local leader Maria Elena Moyano on the debate over "rondas urbanas" (urban self-defense committees). It notes Moyano's murder has lead to a clamor for "autonomous" rondas to provide security from the Shining Path, but a reluctance and distrust of rondas sponsored by the government's security forces.

Document 18: Defense Intelligence Agency Cable, Military and Police Reaction to Increased Bombings, July 24, 1992, Confidential, 4pp.

Source: National Security Archive Request (Tamara Feinstein - Peru Documentation Project)

The Defense Intelligence Agency reports on an escalating and less discriminating bombing campaign by the Shining Path, and the government reaction.

Document 19: U.S. Southern Command Cable, Rondas and Counterinsurgency in Peru, September 8, 1992, Secret, 6pp.

Source: National Security Archive Request (Tamara Feinstein - Peru Documentation Project)

Southern Command provides a detailed analysis of the phenomenon of "Rondas Campesinos," Peru's version of civil defense patrols. The analysis outlines the history of the development of rondas and their role in counterinsurgency efforts, noting Fujimori's recent efforts to incorporate rondas into his current counterinsurgency strategy.

Document 20: U.S. Embassy (Lima) Cable, Ayacucho Mayor on Huayallao Massacre, October 20, 1992, Confidential, 5pp.

Source: State Department Release to Truth and Reconciliation Commission

In this cable, the mayor of a neighboring town describes the Shining Path massacre at Huayallao, Ayacucho. The mayor describes broader problems in the region resulting from the conflict.

Document 21: U.S. Embassy (Lima) Cable, Cantuta/Cieneguilla Investigations, September 22, 1993, Confidential, 7pp.

Source: National Security Archive Request (Tamara Feinstein - Peru Documentation Project)

This cable describes the problems surrounding the investigations into the La Cantuta massacre, including the closing of the civilian investigation into the case. It reports the request of the victims' families to have U.S. assistance in testing the remains found at the mass grave in Cieneguilla against DNA of the La Cantuta victims, since the Peruvian government claims it does not have the funds to perform the test. The embassy notes that they had already offered forensic help when the mass grave was first discovered, but had received no reply from the Peruvian government. The embassy also critiques the lack of independent civilian investigation into the case.

Document 22: Defense Intelligence Agency, Officer not in Jail, December 21, 1993, Secret, 4pp.

Source: National Security Archive Request (Tamara Feinstein - Peru Documentation Project)

This Defense Intelligence Agency cable provides more information on the whereabouts of convicted officer Telmo Hurtado who participated in the Accomarca Massacre in Peru. Despite the fact that Hurtado was sentenced to six years in prison earlier that year for his participation in the massacre, he is now out of prison, on active duty, and has been promoted to captain.

Document 23: U.S. Embassy (Lima) Cable, Claimed Member of "Colina" Describes Barrios Altos Executions, March 15, 1994, Secret, 11pp.

Source: National Security Archive Request (Tamara Feinstein - Peru Documentation Project)

The US Embassy relates the contents of a document describing the origin and activities of the La Colina death squad. The author was allegedly a member of this group, and the embassy provides speculation as to why this document was leaked and the veracity of its claims.

Document 24: U.S. Embassy (Lima) Cable, [Excised] Views the Fujimori Government, March 24, 1994, Secret, 10pp.

Source: National Security Archive Request (Tamara Feinstein - Peru Documentation Project)

In this cable, a former ally of National Security advisor Vladimiro Montesinos describes his take on the Fujimori administration. The Embassy cautions that the source is somewhat embittered, and his information should be "taken with a large grain of salt" but that he was also in an excellent position to form judgments on the issues he discussed. The source is convinced that Montesinos fully controlled the groups that committed the La Cantuta and Barrios Altos massacres; and that because of this the Fujimori government would be forced to continue to hide the truth of what happened.

Document 25: National Security Council, Human Rights Abuses in Peru, April 28, 1994, 1pp.

Source: Jeremy Bigwood Request (Donation to Archive)

The National Security Council orders an interagency review on human rights abuses in Peru, to be directed by Morton Halperin. The review is in response to U.S. congressional concern over the role of Vladimiro Montesinos, the National Intelligence Service (SIN) and Army Intelligence (SIE) in these abuses.

Document 26: U.S. Embassy (Lima) Cable, Ex-Army Officer Alleges Army Intelligence Role in 1991 Letter Bombings of Opposition, June 1, 1994, Secret, 7pp.

Source: National Security Archive Request (Tamara Feinstein - Peru Documentation Project)

Two journalists describe their meeting with an ex-Army Officer who claims to have carried out five letter bombings originally targeted by SIN Chief Vladimiro Montesinos. The Embassy plans to set up a meeting with the officer, and asks for guidance from the State Department to corroborate the claims made by the journalists.

Document 27: US Embassy (Lima) Cable, Systematic Human Rights Violations Under Fujimori: Ex-Army Officer Describes his Role in Assassinations, Letter Bombs, Rape and Torture, June 30, 1994, Secret, 29pp.

Source: National Security Archive Request (Tamara Feinstein - Peru Documentation Project)

The ex-Army officer mentioned in the previous cable sits down with embassy officers to recount in detail his participation in various human rights abuses from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s. He describes the structure of the army and intelligence units who participated in these acts, and his personal involvement in human rights abuses. This includes detailed descriptions of the types of torture used by the military; human rights and opposition candidates named as assassination targets; and the use of anti-bomb training assistance from the U.S. to create better bombs for assassination attempts. The Embassy concludes that "None of the source's statements on methods are new. What was striking, not to say chilling, about his allegations - apart from his total lack of remorse - was his insistence that such violations were the norm, rather than excesses."

Document 28: U.S. Embassy (Lima) Cable, Ex-Montesinos Collaborator Pins Bombing of Opposition Politician on Vladimiro Montesinos, August 22, 1994, Secret, 6pp.

Source: National Security Archive Request (Tamara Feinstein - Peru Documentation Project)

A former Montesinos ally, who now is openly opposed to him, alleges that Montesinos was directly linked to a May 1990 bombing of opposition congressman Fernando Olivera. The source claimed that Montesinos openly alluded to his involvement in the bombing during a campaign strategy session with Fujimori. The cable notes that it cannot judge the veracity of the allegations.

Document 29: U.S. Embassy (Lima) Cable, Peru: Update on Barrios Altos Case, June 9, 1995, Secret, 6pp.

Source: National Security Archive Request (Tamara Feinstein - Peru Documentation Project)

Tensions mount between the civilian judge in the November 1991 Barrios Altos massacre case and military justice authorities that want the case transferred to them. National Security Advisor Vladimiro Montesinos and Army Chief Hermoza both have refused to testify before the civilian judge. The embassy speculates that the case is unlikely to remain in civilian court, but that the publicity may make it harder for Fujimori to pardon those convicted of the La Cantuta massacre.

Document 30: U.S. Embassy (Lima) Cable, General Robles Detention Update, December 2, 1996, Confidential, 7pp.

Source: National Security Archive Request (Tamara Feinstein - Peru Documentation Project)

This cable recounts the details of the detention of General Robles by the military after his public accusations that a military death squad had been involved in a recent bombing of a television station. Robles had been previously forced to flee the country in 1993 after he revealed links between the government-sponsored La Colina death squad, and the La Cantuta and Barrios Altos massacres. General Robles' wife opines that if there had not been an immediate public outcry this time to his disappearance from the human rights community and others, he may have joined the ranks of the "disappeared."

Document 31: U.S. Embassy (Lima) Cable, General Robles Amnestied and Released, December 10, 1996, 8pp.

Source: National Security Archive Request (Tamara Feinstein - Peru Documentation Project)

The Fujimori administration's approval drops as a result of the detention of General Robles, and the amnesty proposed by Fujimori and enacted by Congress by point to a trend of greater tension between Fujimori and the military intelligence hierarchy.

Document 32: U.S. Embassy (Lima) Cable, All but One Tortured Oxapampa Detainee Released, April 24, 1997, Confidential, 5pp.

Source: National Security Archive Request (Tamara Feinstein - Peru Documentation Project)

This document describes the military detention, torture and release of 48 Oxapampa residents in February and March 1997, who were falsely accused of being MRTA members. Even seven soldiers were accused in the hysteria, and possible 2 suspects were killed. President Fujimori's public acknowledgement and criticism of the incident was initially overlooked, due to the furor over another sensational torture case involving the murder of intelligence agent Mariela Barreto and the torture of agent Leonor La Rosa by the government. However, both of these cases of government abuse were eclipsed by the euphoria following the successful end of the MRTA hostage crisis.

Document 33: U.S. Embassy (Lima) Cable, Journalist Fabian Salazar Alleges Torture by Intelligence Agents, May 31, 2000, Confidential, 7pp.

Source: National Security Archive Request (Tamara Feinstein - Peru Documentation Project)

This cable describes allegations by journalist Fabian Salazar that SIN officials broke into his office, confiscated incriminating videos and brutally tortured him.


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