Introduction
Mexico's tragedy unfolded on the night of October 2, 1968, when
a student demonstration ended in a storm of bullets in La Plaza
de las Tres Culturas at Tlatelolco, Mexico City. The extent of
the violence stunned the country. Although months of nation-wide
student strikes that preceded October 2nd had prompted an increasingly
repressive response from the Díaz Ordaz regime, no one
was prepared for the bloodbath that Tlatelolco became. When the
shooting stopped, hundreds of people lay dead or wounded, as Army
and police forces seized thousands of surviving protesters and
dragged them away.
More shocking still was the cover-up that kicked in as soon as
the smoke cleared. Eye-witnesses to the killings pointed to the
President's "security" forces, who had entered the plaza
bristling with weapons, backed by armored vehicles. But the government
pointed back, claiming that extremists and Communist agitators
had initiated the violence. Who was responsible for Tlatelolco?
The Mexican people have been demanding an answer ever since.
Thirty-five years later, the Tlatelolco tragedy has grown large
in Mexican memory, and lingers still. It is Mexico's Tiananmen
Square, Mexico's Kent State: when the pact between the government
and the people began to come apart and Mexico's extended political
crisis began.
To commemorate the anniversary of Tlatelolco, the National Security
Archive has expanded on a set of 30 documents we made public in
1998 by assembling a larger collection of our most interesting
and richly-detailed records about Mexico in 1968. Many of the
documents were many recently released in response to the Archive's
Freedom of Information Act requests; all of them come from the
secret archives of the CIA, FBI, Defense Department, the embassy
in Mexico City and the White House. The records provide a vivid
glimpse inside U.S. perceptions of Mexico at the time, and discuss
in frank terms many of the most sensitive aspects of the Tlatelolco
massacre that continue to be debated today: the political goals
of the protesting students, the extent of Communist influence,
Diaz Ordaz's response, and the role of the Mexican military and
civilian security agents in helping to crush the demonstrations.
Times have changed since 1998. Mexico's political transition
encouraged the government to take important steps toward clarifying
the past. In November 2001, President Vicente Fox announced the
creation of a special prosecutor's office, charged with unearthing
new information about the events of October 2, 1968 and to bring
judicial charges against those responsible for the deaths of the
students. Fox also ordered the release of an extraordinary collection
of government records produced by Mexico's intelligence and military
services during decades of state-sponsored violence, from the
1960s to the 1980s, including records on the killing at Tlatelolco.
Mexican researchers are just beginning to plumb the depths of
the recently opened files of the regime's domestic spy apparatus
and military archives. In the meantime, details about the Tlatelolco
massacre continue to trickle out through newly declassified U.S.
documents. None provide a definitive answer to the questions that
linger, but they do contain a revealing glimpse into what happened
that night, thirty-five years ago.
An Embassy Confused
Like many Mexicans, officials of the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City
were unprepared for the strength of the student protests and the
violence unleashed by the Díaz Ordaz regime in response.
Reporting out of the Embassy was often confused during the crisis,
probably because Embassy officials were closer than those of other
U.S. agencies to the Mexican political class and tended to believe
its propaganda. On the one hand, the Embassy had an underlying
faith in the hegemony of the regime; on the other, U.S. officials
discounted the possibility that the students might be capable
of mounting a serious challenge to the government.
Prompted by a request from Washington after the riots in France
that May, the Embassy wrote several assessments of the Mexican
student body that failed to predict the coming storm. On June
14, less than six weeks before the first clash between students
and security forces, the Embassy confidently predicted that nothing
comparable to the upheaval in Paris could happen in Mexico:
The government and the official party (PRI) maintain persuasive
contact throughout the country with the people, which serves not
only to give the party and the government a continuing assessment
of popular feeling but also to "sell" to the people
governmental decisions and policies. [. . .] The government has
diverse means of gauging and influencing student opinion, and
it has shown itself able and willing, when unrest exceeds what
it considers acceptable limits, to crack down decisively, to date
with salutary effects. Furthermore, student disorders, notwithstanding
the wide publicity they receive, simply lack the muscle to create
a national crisis. . .
The United States knew long before the violence began that the
Mexican government feared attempts to disrupt the Olympic Games,
which were scheduled to begin on October 12 in Mexico City. In
April, and again in May, the Pentagon received urgent requests
from the Mexican military for military radios, several tons of
gunpowder and mortar fuses, which it sent. (Later, in mid-August,
the Defense Intelligence Agency would pass a request to Washington
from the Mexican Army for riot control training material.)
Once the disturbances broke out, the Embassy was quick to adopt
the regime's line that the student protests were inspired by hard-line
communists. Citing evidence that the Communist Party, with the
complicity of the Soviet Embassy, had engineered the clash of
July 26, U.S. officials wrote in a secret cable for the White
House that "Embassy considers that strong possibility exists
Moscow has ordered PCM (Partido Comunista de México) to
adopt more militant tactics." It was a position they would
change within days, as a more realistic analysis replaced the
fictions spun for public consumption by the Díaz Ordaz
government about foreign influence on the movement.
U.S. confusion also arose because the regime was itself divided
over what tactic to take with the students. Although the first
riots in late July were met with violent police and military force,
much of August passed with little coercive intervention on the
part of the government, though plenty of behind-the-scenes manipulation.
Central to the regime's decision-making was a key figure in the
government - and one of the Embassy's main sources of information
- Interior Secretary Luis Echeverría Alvarez. Echeverría
has, over the years, repeatedly denied having been a protagonist
during the student disturbances of 68. As recently as 1998 he
told a reporter from El Universal that he played only a
minor role at the behest of President Díaz Ordaz, who would
later name him candidate for the PRI in the 1970 national elections.
The journalist, Irma Rosa Martínez, asked Echeverría
whether his involvement in the events of 68 affected his chances
to be nominated for president.
- Pues me favoreció a mí porque yo no intervine
en nada. Eso fue, lo manejó todo el presidente, todo, lo
político y lo militar, con el secretario de la Defensa.
Yo hize una vez declaraciones para el diálogo público
y hasta ahí. No me perjudicó en nada.
- Pero a usted como secretario de Gobernación ¿no
le habían encargado encarar esta parte del problema, la
negociación?
- No, no, no. Todo lo manejó el presidente. Todo, todo.
No hubo negociación. Cuando había borlote los dejaba
y luego mandaba al Ejército.
But according to CIA and State Department documents, Echeverría
created and headed a key working group of senior government officials
designed to fashion a response to the student protests immediately
after they broke out on July 26. The CIA station observed on July
31, that "A 'Strategy Committee," under the direction
of Minister of Government Luis Echeverría, is of the opinion
that the current wave of student disturbances has been brought
under control." In Washington, the State Department's Bureau
of Intelligence and Research (INR) identified the committee as
being at the heart of the government's efforts to head off the
students - whether by force or by coercion. Following the first
confrontation between police and students, the INR wrote on August
6,
The committee decided to allow the students to effervesce
for a time hoping that the situation would not become violent.
However, troops were alerted and moved into position. The government
apparently considered the period around the 29th crucial and when
it acted, it used massive force in an effort to convince the rampaging
students that it would not tolerate a breakdown in public order.
[. . .]
At the same time that force was being applied, the government
worked quietly with the rector of the National Autonomous University
and some student leaders. The strategic committee, acting on instructions
from the president, advised the rector to encourage demonstrations
on the university campus and even to criticize the government.
At that early stage, the regime was still unsure which hand to
play: the mano dura or the mano conciliatoria. The
CIA reported on July 31 that both DFS chief Fernando Gutiérrez
Barrios and Fernando Solana, Secretary General of UNAM, had confirmed
privately that "neither the Mexican government nor the university
management has any plans for dealing with the current problem
of student protests and agitation."
CIA on the Ground
While the Embassy struggled to make sense of the regime's strategy,
the CIA was busy gathering raw intelligence on events as they
unfolded. Curiously, most of the CIA records declassified on 1968
come from its covert directorate, and represent field reporting
from the agency's station in Mexico City. The documents have the
advantage of being vivid snapshots taken from the ground; they
have the disadvantage of containing little analysis or "finished
intelligence" that would help put the events into context.
It is clear from the declassified record that the CIA station
in Mexico reported almost daily on the disturbances of July 26
- October 2, using sources that included Fernando Gutierrez Barrios
and other officials within the DFS, Luis Echeverría, officials
within the President's Office, an official in the Education Secretariat,
university contacts (including administrators and students), and
intelligence gathered by "trained observers" - which
could be American officers from the station or Mexican "liaison"
intelligence officers.
Information was gathered on every aspect of the crisis, but the
CIA's resources were most intensively focused on leftist students
and "known agitators" (such as UNAM students Luis González
de Alba, Gilberto Guevara Niebla, Romero González Medrano,
Jesus Rodríguez, Roberta Avendano and Ignacio Rodríguez),
radical professors (such as the IPN's Fausto Trejo Fuentes and
Eli de Gortari), political tendencies within the various schools
at UNAM, and the activities and whereabouts of known Communist
Party members.
In particular, the CIA tracked attempts by the regime to penetrate
and influence the university community from within. CIA officers
tended to perceive such efforts through the lens provided by their
sources inside the regime. Following UNAM Rector Javier Barros
Sierra's decision to support the student cause and lead protest
rallies inside the University City - a step taken in an effort
to avoid violence and convince whatever moderate tendencies existed
within the government that the students could demonstrate responsibly
- the station wrote, on August 9, that
The government's strategy over the past week - temporizing
concessions mixed with arm-twisting and encouraging university
rectors to make common cause with the students in order to exert
a moderating influence - was effective. Two mass student marches
took place without disorder, and there has been no significant
violence this week.
Like the Embassy, the station suffered from being too close to
its sources. The CIA was still convinced in mid-August that Díaz
Ordaz and his men could divide and conquer the 1968 student movement
in the capital as they had other protests in the states during
the 1960s: (August 10) "Government is aware that there are
divisions among the various student factions, and it is actively
involved in creating further division so that no really unified
leadership group emerges." But as the crisis dragged on and
became more violent, the CIA began to recognize the change that
was taking place. As the station observed on September 9,
This experience has shown that the government and the Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI) do not possess the power and near total
control over public behavior which existed previously. While there
is little doubt that Mexican students have been influenced by
student uprisings in the U.S. and Europe, the recent student disturbances
have been a new experience for Mexico and may provide an indication
of things to come. The old order is passing, and [. . .] students
have found they can be a significant element in the nation's decision
making process, and they are no longer contented with the patronizing
attitude of the government.
Shortly before the confrontation on October 2, the agency's dispatches
to Washington began to reflect the sense that the Díaz
Ordaz regime was closing in on the movement. On September 26,
just six days before Tlatelolco, the station sent a cable describing
clashes between security forces and students of Vocational Schools
Two and Five. A policeman shot and killed a student outside of
one of the schools; the next day, students gathered at the home
of the victim to join the family in a funeral march to the cemetery.
"The occasion was being watched by members of the security
service," reported the CIA.
The government policy currently being followed to quell the
student uprisings calls for immediate occupation by the army and/or
police of any school which is being used illegally as a center
of subversive activity. [. . .] Both the Minister of Government
(Gobernación) and the head of the Office of Federal Security
(DFS) state that, in their opinion, no danger exists that the
Olympic games will be affected, and, further, that the situation
will be under complete control very shortly, meaning a cessation
of all acts of violence. [Emphasis added.]
Massacre at Tlatelolco
There are no eyewitness reports from "trained observers"
present at the Plaza de las Tres Culturas among the U.S. declassified
documents. What exist are summaries of what was believed to have
happened, as collected from press accounts, intelligence officers
and Mexican government officials. In the hours and days immediately
after the bloodshed, all the U.S. agencies operating inside Mexico
- the Embassy, the CIA station, the Defense Department and the
FBI - initially accepted the regime's line that pre-positioned
student snipers had provoked the massacre.
By mid-October, however, American officials had backed away from
that theory and were expressing uncertainty as to whether students
or government security agents had started the confrontation. "Versions
differ," wrote the Embassy to Washington on October 20, "as
to whether the first shots came from the Plaza or from the nearby
Chihuahua Apartment Building and as to whether they came from
the students or the agents of law enforcement."
Defense Intelligence Agency reporting contradicted official accounts
of beleaguered Mexican troops trying to keep order as radical
students attacked. On October 18, the military attaché
described the scene: "There was considerable disorganization
among Army elements present [. . .] and there was some indiscriminate
firing by soldiers who fired wildly at the apartment buildings,
rather than trying to locate the exact source of the sniper fire.
No indiscriminate firing by soldiers into the crowd in the plaza
was reported, however. These same sources did say that soldiers
were observed looting shops in the ground floors of some of the
apartment buildings, a situation which indicates they were not
very well controlled by their officers."
As the dust cleared in the days following the bloodshed, American
officials took note of Mexican government attempts to divert the
blame for the confrontation away from the regime. In one report
written by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research on October
10, the State Department revealed that the government had "arranged"
to have student leader Socrates Campos Lemus accuse dissident
PRI politicians such as Carlos Madrazo of funding and orchestrating
the student movement. "The government's motives in doing
this are as yet unclear, but it may have been trying to shift
the blame for its inept handling of the affair to persons that
it feels can be destroyed politically fairly easily."
U.S. officials stood resolutely by Díaz Ordaz after Tlatelolco,
despite Washington's dim view of his government's actions. One
day after Tlatelolco, the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin
America, Covey Oliver, wrote the Secretary that, "We believe
it important to avoid any indication that we lack confidence in
the [Government of Mexico's] ability to control the situation."
And in a review of "contingency scenarios" drafted by
the U.S. Embassy in November, the ambassador urged Washington
to be prepared to grant financial assistance and economic support
packages to Mexico in the event of continued or increased student
violence, as a way of showing U.S. support for the regime.
But the United States recognized the deeper significance of the
Tlatelolco massacre, and the enormous chasm that had been opened
between an intransigent regime and students demanding change.
On October 10, the State Department wrote an insightful and pessimistic
coda to the affair.
It seems unlikely that the PRI can bring about a fundamental
solution to the problem without changing the widespread conviction
that it is entrenched, stagnant, and primarily self-serving. The
students have to be convinced that, despite the enormous graft
and dishonesty which have become hallmarks of the PRI, the party
is still, or will become again, a vital force for political and
social change, as well as economic growth. The present leadership
does not appear to be disposed to comprehend the magnitude of
the problem of student alienation and to accept it as a serious
warning that the party is not responding to the legitimate needs
of an increasingly vocal segment of Mexican society.
|
Still Secret
Although
the United States government has declassified dozens of
documents on the massacre of Tlatelolco from the secret
archives of the CIA, State Department, Pentagon, FBI and
White House, certain key records remain classified and inaccessible
to the public.
--
Declassified White House documents indicate that the CIA
produced an analysis based on intelligence reports two days
after the Tlatelolco massacre took place. Dated October
4, the document is called "Mexico's Student Crisis."
It has not yet been made public.
--
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) also produced
a report on October 4 which, according to a formerly-secret
telegram from the State Department dated October 7, "attributed
outbreak [of violence in Tlatelolco] to confusion between
army and security agents." This would contradict the
Mexican government's official story that armed student snipers
were responsible for the shooting on October 2. The report
has not been made public.
--
No document written by the U.S. Embassy's Legal Attaché
- who served as the FBI's representative in Mexico - has
been declassified and made public.
--
In a November 1 letter written by the State Department's
Mexican Affairs Director, Maxwell Chaplin, to U.S. Embassy
Chargé Henry Dearborn, Chaplin points out the "intense
interest of the Washington intelligence community"
in Mexico and mentions a CIA document that has never been
made public: a "pessimistic and controversial"
memorandum "on the implications for Mexican political
stability of the student disorders."
--
The CIA published a secret special report on Mexico on January
17, 1969, titled "Challenges to Mexico's Single-Party
Rule." A large portion of the document is dedicated
to the student protests and the government's reaction, including
the clash at Tlatelolco. The agency released a heavily-excised
version of the report on March 2002; most of the document
remains secret.
--
Finally, not one document declassified by the U.S. government
discusses at any length evidence that government agents
operating as snipers from the windows of the Tlatelolco
apartment complex may have initiated the massacre of October
2. The Defense Intelligence Agency in particular - which
had defense attachés gathering intelligence on the
Mexican military at the time - should have produced internal
cables, memoranda and analyses discussing the presence of
government snipers.
|
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
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Documents
U.S.
Embassy in Mexico City:
Document 1
June 14, 1968
[Embassy Review of Mexican Student Movement]
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential telegram
On the heels of the previous month's student unrest in France,
the U.S. Embassy sends Washington an analysis of the evolving
student situation in Mexico. Citing solid Revolutionary Institutional
Party (PRI) control over the key peasant and labor sectors, the
Embassy argues that while growing discontent may indeed come to
a head in a few years time, at present major unrest will most
likely be avoided. "There are not now present in Mexico conditions
such as appear to have caused the French crisis, and it is most
unlikely that such conditions will rapidly develop here to critical
proportions, at least until after 1970 when President Díaz
Ordaz' term ends."
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 13-2 Mex, Box 2341
Document 2
July 6, 1968
[Mexico's Youth]
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential telegram
In another review of the student situation in Mexico, the Embassy
cautions that "growing unemployment, expanding urban poverty,
limits on arable land," and "slowing rates of industrial
expansion" may feed future unrest. But the short-term conclusions
remain essentially sanguine: "Situation with respect to youth
in Mexico is unlikely to reach critical proportions at least in
[next] few years."
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 13-2 Mex, Box 2340
Document 3
July 27, 1968
Riot in Central Mexico City
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, limited official use telegram
Following the outbreak of rioting and clashes between students
and police on July 26 near Mexico City's central plaza (Zócalo),
the Embassy reports that the events were instigated by the Mexican
Communist Youth (JCM). According to the Embassy, during a peaceful
demonstration held by the National Federation of Technical Students
(FNET), members of the JCM inspired some demonstrators to riot.
The Mexican police used the disturbances as an excuse to break
into Communist Party (PCM) headquarters, arrest several PCM leaders
and ransack the party's files.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 23-8 Mex, Box 2343
Document 4
July 28, 1968
Student Disturbances - Mexico
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, limited official use telegram
Two days after the downtown riots, the Embassy reports that dozens
of students have been jailed including the First Secretary of
the Mexican Communist Party, Gerardo Unzueta, and Arturo Ortiz
Marban, President of the JCM. "Police public position regarding
disturbances is they were instigated by leftist agitators for
purpose creating atmosphere unrest. Embassy concurs in this general
estimate and will be analyzing situation in further depth as information
becomes available."
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 23-8 Mex, Box 2343
Document 5
July 30, 1968
[Communist Role in Student Protest]
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, secret telegram
After several reports citing communist responsibility for the
July 26 riots, the Embassy endorses the Mexican government's claim
that the orders came directly from Moscow via the Soviet Embassy.
While admitting that "Mexicans often blame foreign elements
for such incidents and PCM lately has stressed its desire to pursue
legal means," the Embassy nevertheless supports the regime's
claim to "solid evidence corroborating public charges of
Mexico City police chief that Communist Party engineered July
26 student fracas. Govt evidence also includes indications of
Soviet Embassy complicity (including taunt by a PCM official that
security police would find no important documents since they were
all in Soviet Embassy)."
Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Library, National Security Files
CO-Mexico, Vol. IV, Box 60, "Mexico, memos & misc., 1/68-10/68"
Document 6
July 31, 1968
Student Disturbances
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential telegram
"Relative calm restored" after Mexico City Mayor Alfonso
Corona del Rosal meets with National Polytechnic Institute (IPN)
student leaders and agrees to withdraw troops from school property
and release many of those jailed. In a departure from its more
sanguine analysis of the previous month, the Embassy argues that
police brutality and university autonomy are now key issues that
may draw more National University (UNAM) students into the fray.
"Local press seeking to give impression that worst is over
but Embassy believes danger remains strong of renewed demonstrations
with ever present possibility of violence."
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 13-2 Mex, Box 2340
Document 7
August 2, 1968
Analysis of Student Disturbances
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential telegram
As more information on the July student violence comes in, the
Embassy projects less certainty on the source of the disturbances,
admitting that the "for psychological reasons" the Mexican
government continues "stressing communist and foreign culpability
but degree to which this is case not entirely certain." At
the same time the Embassy's focus has turned more to the political
dynamics involved in the unrest. "One disturbing consequence
of riots, whoever the instigators, has been evident predisposition
of large number of young Mexicans including many of high school
age, to resort to violence. Window breaking, looting, use of Molotov
cocktails, attempted seizure of arms, represent new dimensions
in Mexican student agitation." According to a confidential
police source, four students died in the clashes and 200 were
wounded, but the regime has decided to hide these casualty figures.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 23-8 Mex, Box 2343
Document 8
August 22, 1968
Student Situation
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential telegram
With the student movement appearing to grow in strength, the
Embassy reports on an August 20 rally at University City that
draws an attendance of 15,000. "Rally oratory dominated by
hard line: reiterated refusal participate in Corona del Rosal's
tripartite commission, no change in demands." The telegram
also cites mounting evidence of communist involvement in the student
movement as well as indications that divisions within student
leadership circles are wide.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 13-2 Mex, Box 2340
Document 9
August 23, 1968
Review of Student Disturbances in Mexico in Recent Years
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, limited official use airgram
In this long report to the State Department on the recent history
of student unrest in Mexico, the Embassy lists over forty separate
incidents since 1963. Nevertheless the Embassy insists that the
present crisis involves unprecedented levels of violence and student
involvement. "As in the past, the degree of Communist culpability
is ambiguous. However, the July-August disturbances have thus
far involved higher levels of violence by the students, unprecedented
numbers of those involved, and greater degree of animus against
the central government than has ever been the case in the past."
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 13-2 Mex, Box 2340
Document 10
August 27, 1968
Student Disorders
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential telegram
On the eve of a massive student demonstration planned for August
27, the Embassy reports that the Díaz Ordaz government
has recently been taking a hands off approach to the protests.
The students have been permitted to direct an unprecedented level
of public criticism at the government and the President, with
the expectation that, barring a major show of force by the regime,
students will simply lose interest in demonstrating. At the same
time, "government agents active behind the scenes [are] attempting
to divide and weaken support of extremist strike leaders."
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 13-2 Mex, Box 2340
Document 11
August 29, 1968
August 27 Student Demonstration
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential telegram
The Embassy reports that around 100,000 people participated in
the "largest student demonstration yet" while engaging
in the "most vigorous verbal assaults yet on government and
president with usual excoriation police brutality, repression."
Despite the enormous turnout, the Embassy concludes that "neither
students nor government won victory. Students still fail [to]
involve workers or other sectors in demonstration. Government
efforts and passage of time not weakening student resolve. Still
no agreed time, place for student-government 'dialogue'."
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 13-2 Mex, Box 2340
Document 12
August 30, 1968
Civil Disorder - Student Activities
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential telegram
The Embassy reports that the Mexican government has gone on the
offensive to destroy the student movement. While the press has
been instructed to take a harder editorial line against the protestors,
the security apparatus has begun employing more force. "GOM
[Government of Mexico] implicitly accepts consequence that this
will produce casualties. Leaders of student agitation have been
and are being taken into custody….In other words, GOM offensive
against student disorder has opened on physical and psychological
fronts."
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 13-2 Mex, Box 2340
Document 13
September 6, 1968
[After the Presidential Informe]
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, secret telegram
In a secret cable discussing the annual presidential address
to the nation of September 1, the Embassy argues that Díaz
Ordaz has "put national honor and prestige of the presidency
on the line" with forceful statements pledging "continued
agitation will be suppressed." The Embassy notes that the
government appears to be united over this new hardline stance,
and that the permissive period allowed by the regime has clearly
come to an end: "Mexicans expect president above all to be
strong decisive personality and, if permissive period extended
too long, general public might conclude President lacks means
or courage to deal with students. Ensuing loss of respect for
President would, within Mexican political system, create grave
dangers."
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 13-2 Mex, Box 2340
Document 14
September 23, 1968
George Denney's Conversation with Víctor Urquídi
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential memoranda of conversation
Just a few days after a machine gun attack on the elite Colegio
de México, the school's rector, Dr. Victor Urquídi,
lunches with Embassy officials. Urquídi provides a surprisingly
candid commentary attributing student unrest to poor social conditions
nationwide while offering harsh criticism of the government. "The
most striking aspect of Dr. Urquídi's remarks was his willingness
to air his bitterness especially against the President before
a visitor whom he was meeting only for the first time. […]
It was obvious that the university situation was uppermost on
his mind, and his own attitude clearly reflects a mood which currently
is gripping the entire academic community."
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, February 1998
Document 15
September 26, 1968
Sitrep 1800 September 25
U.S. Embassy, confidential telegram
The Embassy reports sporadic violence between students and security
forces as the government cracks down on the movement. Five out
of the ten leaders of the student-run National Strike Council
(CNH) have been arrested, the rest are in hiding. According to
the situation report, army troops from the 43rd Infantry Battalion
of Toluca (Estado de México) took part in fighting on September
21, marking the first time that soldiers from outside the capital
have been used in the disturbances.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 13-2 Mex, Box 2340
Document 16
September 27, 1968
[Mexican Government Continues Crack Down]
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, secret telegram
As the start of the Olympic Games draws near, the Embassy considers
how that deadline may be affecting the Mexican government's approach
to the student disturbances. "Govt at moment not seeking
compromise solution with students but rather seeking to put end
to all organized student actions before Olympics….Aim of
Govt believed to be to round up extremist elements and detain
them until after Olympics." Both Interior Ministry Luis Echeverría
Alvarez and the head of the Federal Security Directorate (DFS),
Fernando Gutiérrez Barrios, discuss the government's tactics
toward the National Strike Council (CNH) with Embassy officials.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 13-2 Mex, Box 2340
Document 17
September 27, 1968
Sitrep September 27, 1968
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential telegram
In its latest update the Embassy reports on the regime's continued
assault on the National Strike Council (CNH). The start of the
Olympics is beginning to loom large, with Mexican Foreign Secretary
Antonio Carrillo Flores declaring that "Mexico will tell
[the UN General Assembly] it will honor promise to carry out Olympic
Games."
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 13-2 Mex, Box 2340
Document 18
October 1, 1968
Sitrep September 30, 1968
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, limited official use telegram
The Embassy reports that the student coordinating committee "has
meeting planned for October 2, in Plaza of Three Cultures. GOM
has not indicated if it will permit the meeting." All military
commanders have now been granted the authority to move against
student protesters in the provinces without checking with the
central government.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 13-2 Mex, Box 2340
Document 19
October 3, 1968
[October 2 Riots]
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential telegram
On the morning after the Tlatelolco massacre, the U.S. Embassy
reports to Washington that "situation clearly more serious
than anything previous in current student unrest." At this
early stage following the bloodshed, the Embassy accepts the Mexican
government's explanation of what happened. "Interesting question
upon which Emb lacks info is whether occupants apartment houses
voluntarily cooperated with students in positioning snipers or
whether they did so under duress. [. . .] Fact that snipers had
prepared positions (and apparently ambushed soldiers) should be
obvious even to opponents of government and should dilute standard
counterargument that government provoked matters."
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 13-2 Mex, Box 2340
Document 20
October 18, 1968
[Embassy Reporting During Student Riots]
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential letter
[Note: Response to a letter sent by the State Department. See
Document 40.]
In a letter to the State Department's Maxwell Chaplin, Counselor
of Political Affairs Wallace Stuart defends Embassy reporting
during the student crisis. He agrees the Embassy was unable to
clarify exactly how the shooting on October 2 began, pointing
out that "[CIA reports] that they had some 15 differing and
sometimes flatly contradictory versions of what happened, all
from either 'generally reliable sources' or 'trained observers'
on the spot!"
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, February 1998
Document 21
October 20, 1968
Review of Mexico City Student Disturbances
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, limited official use airgram
The Embassy provides a long, detailed review of the student crisis
from its initial flare up in July to the inauguration of the Olympics
on October 12.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 13-2 Mex, Box 2340
Document 22
October 22, 1968
Student Disorders
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential memorandum of conversation
Embassy Political Officer Robert Service lunches with university
professor and PRI politician, Victor Torres Arriaga, who ascribes
the government's use of repressive tactics with the student movement
to fear: "fear of letting the students have a truly independent
political existence." No student newspaper, for example "is
permitted to publish openly and without controls." Torres
observes that he has "never seen the students so determined
or unified," despite the events of October 2. Nevertheless
he predicts that most students will ultimately join "the
'system' within two years after leaving student ranks."
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, February 1998
Document 23
October 29, 1968
Analysis and Implications of Student Disorders
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential telegram
Nearly a month after the October 2 massacre, the U.S Embassy
offers an analysis of possible long-term implications of Tlatelolco.
Past student upheaval in Mexico has often been limited to local
or university-related issues. This time, however, "Anti-government,
anti-Díaz Ordaz thrust of several demonstrations and emphasis
on 'democracy' suggest general political dissatisfaction among
active and perhaps broad sector of Mexican university population."
The Embassy suggests that the result of the regime's decision
to choose repression over negotiation could indicate "increasing
influence of Army and right within establishment."
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 13-2 Mex, Box 2340
Document 24
November 3, 1968
Student Unrest: Comments on Enclosure CA-10592
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential airgram
Responding to papers written by an ad hoc "Student Unrest
Group" in Washington, the Embassy points out that student
protests and demonstrations are not unusual in Mexico and that
it is unlikely to create major instability in the country due
to a lack of support among other political sectors. The Embassy
also emphasizes that student political leaders are generally held
in check by the nature of the one-party system. "Mexican
student leaders are aware that their political futures, at least
for the next 5-10 years, will most probably depend on their relationships
with the official party. That realization may not noticeably dampen
their ardor for change as long as they are functioning as student
leaders in a protest situation, but it does make them more susceptible
to official blandishments once they leave the student ranks."
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 13-2 Mex, Box 2340
Document 25
November 5, 1968
Contingency - Scenarios
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential telegram
This telegram examines likely political, social and economic
contingencies in the event of three alternative scenarios regarding
the Mexican student crisis: 1. differences between the students
and government are settled amicably; 2. the tense stalemate continues;
and 3. the violence escalates. The Embassy points out that in
the event of more violence, the United States should be prepared
to show its backing for the Díaz Ordaz government by offering
increased financial and economic support.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 13-2 Mex, Box 2340
Document 26
December 4, 1968
Provincial School Support of Capital Students
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, airgram
In this cable, the U.S. Embassy gives highlights of the limited
student activism that took place outside Mexico City during the
months of conflict in the capital. Government controls over the
university communities in the provinces are one reason the protests
did not spread extensively outside the Federal District; another
were the regime's successful efforts to prevent contacts between
capital and provincial students during the crisis.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 13-2 Mex, Box 2340
Department
of State:
Document 27
July 31, 1968
Student Disturbances in Mexico
Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, confidential memorandum
On the heels of the late July riots in Mexico City the Secretary
of State is given a summary of the information coming from the
U.S. Embassy. While popular support for the students is believed
to be relatively weak, it is thought that the Mexican government
might use the disturbances as a pretext to remove communist leaders
suspected of planning to create disturbances during the Olympics
in October.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 23-8 Mex, Box 2343
Document 28
August 2, 1968
Mexican Student Demonstrations
Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, limited official
use memorandum
The Secretary of State is informed of the latest activities in
Mexico including a "massive" march led by the Rector
of the National University. "Student grievances remain, the
pressure on the government continues strong, and further disorders
are still a possibility, especially when the suppressed news of
several student deaths becomes public."
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 23-8 Mex, Box 2340
Document 29
August 6, 1968
Mexican Student Riots Highly Embarrassing But Not a Threat
to Stability
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, secret intelligence note
Reporting on the late July violence in Mexico City, this State
Department intelligence note reveals the intimate involvement
of then Secretary of the Interior Luis Echeverría Alvarez
in the government's response to the student movement. "The
government, as it has in the past, moved quickly with all the
force it deemed necessary as soon as it was convinced that the
situation was getting out of control. A strategic committee of
the Secretariat of Interior, the head of which has presidential
ambitions, and other high government officials was established
immediately after violence erupted July 26."
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 23-8 Mex, Box 2343
Document 30
August 16, 1968
Mexican Student Demonstrations Continue Despite Government
Efforts
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, secret intelligence note
As the government works behind the scenes to coopt or influence
student and university leaders, the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research (INR) argues that more violence could be in the offing.
While students appear dissatisfied with the small olive branches
being offered them, the government does not want to appear weak
through concessions to their demands. "As the time factor
grows more important, President Díaz Ordaz may decide to
appeal to student patriotism while offering to accede to some
student demands. But he will retain the capability and willingness
to deal harshly and effectively with new disorders."
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 23-8 Mex, Box 2343
Document 31
August 28, 1968
Mexico - Student Protests Continue
Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, confidential information
memorandum
This latest update for the Secretary of State on the student
crisis calls the upcoming presidential informe crucial for Díaz
Ordaz in light of what appears to be a failing strategy to diffuse
the student movement. "The size and intensity of the [August
27] protest is remarkable, particularly in view of the GOM's offer,
last week, to negotiate with the students on their grievances....[T]he
GOM's tactic of letting the discontent run its course does not
appear to be working and has left the initiative with the students."
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 23-8 Mex, Box 2343
Document 32
August 29, 1968
Mexican President's Decision to Use Force Against Students
May Exacerbate Differences
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, confidential intelligence
note
The INR reports that "President Díaz Ordaz has had
enough of student demonstrations and insults and has decided to
use force to put down future disorders." The President's
patience was apparently snapped by the massive demonstration in
the Zócalo on August 27, during which students insulted
him with obscene placards and slogans. The INR questions the regime's
decision to rely on repression in place of negotiating. "At
least some of the student demands do not appear excessive. [.
. .] But the administration has been unwilling to accede to any
demands probably because it is completely out of character for
the government to allow any sector of Mexican society to challenge
its authority."
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 23-8 Mex, Box 2343
Document 33
September 20, 1968
Mexico - Prospects Following Occupation of the National University
Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, confidential information
memorandum
Following the unprecedented occupation by army troops of the
National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) on September 18,
Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America Covey Oliver tells
the Secretary of State that the Mexican government "has now
committed itself to coercion."
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 23-8 Mex, Box 2340
Document 34
September 25, 1968
[Request for Daily Situation Reports]
State Department, secret telegram
As the Olympic Games approach, the State Department requests
its embassy in Mexico to produce daily situation reports on developments
related to the clash between students and the Díaz Ordaz
government. Specifically, the Department seeks information on
student leadership and estimates of the implications of the disorders
on the Olympics.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 13-2 Mex, Box 2340
Document 35
September 26, 1968
Mexican Government's Use of Force Probably Forecloses the Possibility
of a Compromise Solution to the Student Conflict
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, confidential intelligence
note
In a prescient intelligence note, INR analysts predict both the
inevitability of violence in the coming days and the possibility
these events will beget more dissidence in the future. "The
PRI, the official party which has ruled Mexico for almost 40 years,
is unaccustomed to having any sector of society challenge its
authority. Students, however, have shown that the government and
thus the party, while powerful, is not invincible. Perhaps the
lesson will not be entirely lost on other groups not completely
satisfied with the status quo."
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 13-2 Mex, Box 2340
Document 36
October 1, 1968
Mexican Situation
Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, confidential information
memorandum
On the eve of the Tlatelolco massacre, this memorandum notes
that tensions appear to be easing but could easily boil over once
again. "The student demands are unmet, tempers continue high,
and any violent incident, even if accidental, could easily provoke
a new round of disturbances. A mass meeting scheduled for tomorrow,
October 2, should provide an opportunity to gauge the amount of
support remaining for the students' cause."
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 23-8 Mex, Box 2343
Document 37
October 3, 1968
Mexican Situation
Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, confidential information
memorandum
The day after the Tlatelolco massacre this State Department information
memorandum calls the violence of the night before "the result
of provocation by student extremists and gross over-reaction by
the security forces." The events are seen as a major blow
to the Díaz Ordaz regime and a potential death blow to
the Olympic games. Covey Oliver warns, however, that U.S. officials
should avoid giving the impression that Washington lacks confidence
in the regime.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 23-8 Mex, Box 2343
Document 38
October 7, 1968
[Request for Embassy Assessment of Student Disorders]
State Department, secret telegram
In the wake of the October 2 events, the State Department seeks
more reporting from the U.S. Embassy on the origins of the violence,
the amount of foreign influence involved, and estimates on the
number killed. "Request comment on reports disseminated by
FBI October 4 and 5 on origin of firing. [. . .] One report attributed
outbreak to confusion between army and security agents, other
implicated Trotskyist terrorist group, Olympia Brigade, which
not previously identified."
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 13-2 Mex, Box 2340
Document 39
October 10, 1968
Mexico: Current Unrest Springs from Widespread Student Disaffection
and Alienation
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, confidential intelligence
note
As the extent of the October 2 violence becomes clearer, the
latest analysis from INR argues that despite the Mexican government's
efforts to pass off the student unrest as the result of isolated
grievances, the dissatisfaction is widespread and profound. "The
government has sought to place blame on the communists and has
periodically announced that foreign elements are involved. [.
. .] The administration seems not to realize that extremists,
even with the aid of foreign elements, could hardly have sustained
the unrest over such a long period if student dissatisfaction
were not deep and widespread." The report also puzzles over
the government's motives in having "arranged" for Sócrates
Campos Lemus, a captured student leader, to charge publicly that
dissident PRI politicians had funded and organized the student
movement.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 23-8 Mex, Box 2343
Document 40
October 11, 1968
[State Department Critique of Embassy Reporting]
State Department, confidential letter
[Note: For the U.S. Embassy response, see Document 20]
Maxwell Chaplin of the State Department's Office of Mexican Affairs
criticizes the U.S. Embassy's reporting on events in Mexico City
for failing to compete adequately with press and intelligence
reports.
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, February 1998
Document 41
October 14, 1968
[Request for Deep Analysis of Recent Events]
State Department, secret telegram
In a secret telegram directed to its U.S. Embassy in Mexico,
the State Department requests an in-depth analysis of the situation
in Mexico at present and in the future relating to the causes
of student and other disturbances. "[R]igorous intellectual
exercise of this kind is badly needed and urgently sought."
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 13-2 Mex, Box 2340
Document 42
November 1, 1968
[Priorities for U.S.-Mexico Policy]
State Department, confidential letter
With U.S. presidential elections approaching, the head of the
State Department's Mexico Desk, Maxwell Chapin, writes to U.S.
chargé Henry Dearborn about the future of U.S. policy in
Mexico. In his letter, he refers to the recent "intense interest
of the Washington community in Mexican developments" in light
of the student disorders.
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, February 1998
Document 43
Circa November 15, 1968
Student Violence and Attitudes in Latin America
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, confidential working draft
According to this draft analysis of student unrest in Latin America,
the disorders in Mexico are the worst in the hemisphere. The continued
violence demonstrates a deep and widespread dissatisfaction with
the government of Mexico, and has severely damaged Mexico's reputation
as being the "most stable and progressive country in Latin
America."
Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Library, National Security Files
Intelligence File, Box 3, "Student Unrest"
Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA):
Document 44
March 28, 1968
Security Conditions in Mexico City
CIA, secret intelligence estimate
In preparation for a visit to Mexico City by Vice President Hubert
Humphrey, the CIA issues a special assessment of security conditions
in Mexico. Written several months before the first serious wave
of student demonstrations began, the document describes the country
as a model of stability, with President Díaz Ordaz firmly
in control and a ruling party which "virtually monopolizes
Mexican politics."
Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Library, National Security Files
National Intelligence Estimates, Box 8, "80/90 Latin America"
Document 45
July 19, 1968
Student Unrest Troubles Mexico
CIA, secret intelligence summary
When students launch a series of country-wide protests in July,
initial U.S. reporting out of Mexico alerts Washington to several
issues that come up again in subsequent reports: the potential
danger posed by the strikes to the Olympic Games, their political
significance, and the role of the "international" left.
This CIA analysis discusses Cuban influence on a student strike
at the University of Veracruz. Demonstrators seek to disrupt the
Olympic Games, although the PRI electoral fraud in local and gubernatorial
elections also may serve as cause for further unrest.
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, March 2002
Document 46
July 30, 1968
Mexico City Sitrep
CIA Station in Mexico, confidential intelligence information cable
CIA reports on the formation of the National Strike Council (CNH)
on July 29. "The formation of the strike committee wrested
control of student activities at UNAM from the communist youth
of Mexico (JCM) which had dominated the situation up to that time."
While students remain agitated, "those who are advocating
violent action are still in the minority."
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, January 2000
Document 47
July 31, 1968
Mexico City Sitrep
CIA Station in Mexico, confidential intelligence information cable
Following the violation of university autonomy by Mexican security
forces on July 30, the CIA notes that this has become the major
issue of contention for students. Agency sources within the government,
however - specifically, Fernando Gutiérrez Barrios, head
of the Federal Security Directorate (DFS), and Fernando Solana
Morales, Secretary General of the National University - confide
that neither the government nor the university administration
has any plans in place to deal with student unrest.
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, January 2000
Document 48
July 31, 1968
Mexico City Sitrep
CIA Station in Mexico, confidential intelligence information cable
This CIA report identifies Interior Secretary Luis Echeverría
Alvarez as head of a new "Strategy Committee," created
to design the government's response to the student disturbances.
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, March 2002
Document 49
August 1, 1968
Mexico City Sitrep
CIA Station in Mexico, confidential intelligence information cable
A decision is anticipated from Mexico City Mayor Alfonso Corona
del Rosal as to whether a student demonstration planned for the
afternoon of August 1 will be allowed. The cable indicates that
the CIA station is monitoring the political tendencies in the
different schools at UNAM.
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, March 2002
Document 50
August 1, 1968
Mexico City Sitrep
CIA Station in Mexico, confidential intelligence information cable
As students prepare for an unauthorized demonstration in south
central Mexico City, the local police are put under the command
of the army. The CIA relays reports that "students are circulating
knives and small arms with which to protect themselves in the
event they are 'attacked' by police or military forces during
the demonstration."
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, March 2002
Document 51
August 2, 1968
Mexico City Sitrep
CIA Station in Mexico, confidential intelligence information cable
According to CIA sources, the Mexican Communist Party has declared
a state of emergency and has ordered its major leaders to scatter
around the country. "It was agreed also that all party activity
in the Federal District would be suspended until further notice."
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, March 2002
Document 52
August 2, 1968
Mexico City Sitrep
CIA Station in Mexico, confidential intelligence information cable
The CIA reports that no further student demonstrations are formally
planned. However, students have presented a list of six major
demands mostly pertaining to grievances with the police. This
cable also reports on a student whose brother was killed by military
troops but whose body subsequently disappeared. "Troops pushed
[the student] out of the building and took his brother's body
away in an ambulance. As of 2 August the family was unable to
determine what happened to the body."
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, March 2002
Document 53
August 2, 1968
Students Stage Major Disorders in Mexico
CIA, secret intelligence summary
The CIA argues that the July 26 riots in Mexico city represent
"a classic example of the Communists' ability to divert a
peaceful demonstration into a major riot." However, the agency
remains skeptical of Mexican government assertions of Soviet involvement.
"Although the government claims to have solid evidence that
the Communist Party engineered the fracas on 26 July and reportedly
has indications of Soviet Embassy complicity, it is unlikely that
the Soviets would so undermine their carefully nurtured good relations
with the Mexicans."
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, March 2002
Document 54
August 7, 1968
Mexico City Sitrep
CIA Station in Mexico, confidential intelligence information cable
Student groups give the government 72 hours to accept their demands
or they will call a nationwide strike. The CIA reports on two
"communist" professors providing leadership to students:
Fausto Trejo Fuentes, a man who was reportedly rejected for membership
by the Communist Party for being "too radical," and
Eli de Gortari, a former rector of the University of Morelia with
"an extensive communist background."
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, January 2000
Document 55
August 8, 1968
Mexico City Sitrep
CIA Station in Mexico, confidential intelligence information cable
Agency sources call the student strike actions at the UNAM "completely
Communist inspired and led." According to the report, however,
Communist students have decided not to take prominent public positions
within the university community, but instead to discredit elected
student leaders. "There is no loyalty among the students
to their elected leaders so, for the present, the Communists have
a free hand."
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, March 2002
Document 56
August 8, 1968
Mexico City Sitrep
CIA Station in Mexico, confidential intelligence information cable
A massive demonstration planned for August 9 is being labeled
by Mexican government officials as "the most critical day
thus far experienced in the current wave of student unrest."
According to this report, "the Office of the Presidency is
in a state of considerable agitation because of anticipated further
disturbances."
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, January 2000
Document 57
August 9, 1968
Mexican Students Threaten to Prolong Crisis
CIA Station in Mexico, confidential intelligence summary
Despite the apparent success of the Mexican government's strategy
to moderate the student crisis - "temporizing concessions
mixed with arm-twisting and encouraging university rectors to
make common cause with the students in order to exert a moderate
influence" - the situation remains unsettled. CIA reports
that the pressure on Díaz Ordaz to restore calm is "particularly
intense because of Mexico's desire to project a good image internationally."
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, March 2002
Document 58
August 10, 1968
Mexico City Sitrep
CIA Station in Mexico, confidential intelligence information cable
Rumors are rampant about student corpses that disappeared after
the riots of July 26-29, although a CIA source claims that "charges
that the bodies of students have been cremated at the military
hospital are not true; there is no crematorium at the military
hospital." Meanwhile, the government is working to create
division within the various student groups "so that no really
unified leadership group emerges."
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, March 2002
Document 59
August 16, 1968
Mexico City Sitrep
CIA Station in Mexico, secret intelligence information cable
In the aftermath of a massive demonstration on August 13, CIA
notes that information on the student movement is often contradictory,
emerging as it does from the many different factions involved.
This cable highlights two interesting intelligence reports regarding
the students. First, former President Lázaro Cárdenas
is supposedly supporting the movement in order to weaken the present
government and open the way for a military man to take the Presidency
in 1970. CIA also reports that "fugitive political leader"
Genaro Vázquez López promised law students that
a guerrilla movement would soon be under his leadership in Guerrero.
Vázquez's subsequent guerrilla activities later helped
to inspire the Mexican government's "Dirty War" of the
1970s.
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, March 2002
Document 60
August 16, 1968
Mexican Student Crisis Still Unresolved
CIA, secret intelligence summary
The march of August 13 was peaceful but the event also featured
unusually sharp criticism of the President, "who traditionally
is immune from personal attack." Also noted are urgings from
"tourist and commercial interests" for "early action"
by the Mexican President to put an end to the unrest. Information
in this document originally withheld under the Freedom of Information
Act but later released following an appeal by the National Security
Archive indicates that Díaz Ordaz may have planned to use
Mexico City mayor Alfonso Corona del Rosal as a scapegoat for
government mishandling of events. "A politician's inability
to preserve the peace in the area of his charge has more than
once provided the President with an excuse to abort a political
career. Corona del Rosal has been mentioned as Díaz Ordaz'
possible successor, and it is possible that the President has
decided to 'burn' him."
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, March 2002
Document 61
August 23, 1968
Mexican Government in Quandary over Student Crisis
CIA, top secret intelligence review
CIA says the Mexican government may be underestimating students'
ability to continue large-scale, disciplined demonstrations. The
present impasse is due to the government's belief that a) giving
in to students would invite further demands and b) ignoring situation
most likely will lead to further disruption. Document claims that
Communist youths are involved in the crisis. CIA says that further
violent outbreaks can be expected.
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, March 2002
Document 62
August 28, 1968
Mexico City Sitrep
CIA Station in Mexico, confidential intelligence information cable
Over 200,000 people participate in the August 27 rally in Mexico
City's Zócalo. The rally remained orderly despite some
incendiary graffiti drawn on the walls of the National Palace
calling for the execution of the President. Students plan a sit-in
at the Zócalo until the President's September 1 informe.
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, March 2002
Document 63
August 30, 1968
Mexico City Sitrep
CIA Station in Mexico, confidential intelligence information cable
The Professors' Coordinating Committee meets at the UNAM to discuss
the current situation and expresses consternation that "the
government desires to end the problem once and for all before
1 September and that the situation could degenerate into very
violent clashes, given the highly angered state of the students."
Thugs are said to have taken control of a National Polytechnic
Institute (IPN) preparatory school shouting, "viva Díaz
Ordaz!"
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, March 2002
Document 64
August 30, 1968
Mexican Military Alert for Possible Cuban Infiltration of Arms
Destined for Student Use
CIA Station in Mexico, [classification excised] intelligence information
cable
CIA source claims that Cuba is prepared to smuggle arms to students
for September demonstrations in Mexico. In response, Mexican Navy
and army troops along the coast are put on high alert.
Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Library, National Security Files
CO-Mexico, Vol. IV, Box 60, "Mexico, memos & misc., 1/68-10/68"
Document 65
August 31, 1968
Mexico City Sitrep
CIA Station in Mexico, confidential intelligence information cable
As August draws to a close, press reports state that the student
National Strike Council has ordered its followers to allow the
September 1 Presidential informe to go ahead without disturbance.
CIA cautions, however, that the Council has only marginal leadership
clout at the moment and lacks "any base of supporters. Most
of the action in the student movement centers around the IPN."
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, March 2002
Document 66
September 6, 1968
Mexican Government Stalls Student Movement
CIA, secret intelligence summary
While the Mexican government has made minor concessions to protesting
students, the approach of the Olympics will most likely lead the
Díaz Ordaz administration to meet further demonstrations
with very tough measures.
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, May 1998
Document 67
September 9, 1968
Situation Appraisal: Status of the Mexico City Student Movement
CIA Station in Mexico, secret intelligence information cable
In a document synthesizing previously reported information, the
CIA Station reports that students are increasingly organized,
and able to exercise some influence on national affairs. The Mexican
government has not been unified in action against the protesters,
and President Díaz Ordaz continues to avoid becoming personally
involved. While no hard evidence exists that Cubans or Soviets
masterminded the student demonstrations, the Mexican government
continues to inspire such rumors. The cable concludes that "the
old order is passing" and the PRI has lost control over public
behavior.
Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Library, National Security Files
CO-Mexico, Vol. IV, Box 60, "Mexico, memos & misc., 1/68-10/68"
Document 68
September 13, 1968
Mexico City Sitrep
CIA Station in Mexico, confidential intelligence information cable
Just a few hours prior to a planned student demonstration, the
CIA Station once again emphasizes the difficulty it encounters
in attempting to decipher developing events. "The status
of the student movement is clouded by many conflicting reports."
While student leaders have called for a peaceful, silent protest,
some leaflets circulating call for violence against the U.S. Embassy.
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, March 2002
Document 69
September 13, 1968
Mexican Students Still Spar with Government
CIA, secret intelligence summary
CIA refers to the Mexican government's "behind the scenes
maneuvering to divide the students," including efforts by
the officially-inspired "committee of the authentic student
body" to quash future student strikes.
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, March 2002
Document 70
September 26, 1968
Mexico City Sitrep
CIA Station in Mexico, confidential intelligence information cable
Events indicate that the Mexican government is now making a concerted
effort to stamp out the student protests. A peaceful demonstration
planned for September 25 was stifled by security forces at its
starting point. In another incident, a student was shot and killed
by police during a standoff at a preparatory school. "The
government policy currently being followed to quell the student
uprisings calls for immediate occupation by the army and/or police
of any school which is being used illegally as a center of subversive
activity. This policy will continue to be followed until complete
calm prevails."
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, March 2002
Document 71
September 27, 1968
Violence Grows in Mexico Student Crisis
CIA, top secret intelligence review
CIA reports "stresses" on and within the Mexican political
establishment stemming from student unrest and the increasingly
violent confrontations between protesters and the Mexican security
forces.
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, May 1998
Document 72
September 27, 1968
Mexico City Sitrep
CIA Station in Mexico, confidential intelligence information cable
Following a relatively small rally by several thousand students
in the Tlatelolco plaza, CIA continues to stress the uncertainty
surrounding events. It is no longer clear how much sway the National
Strike Council has in the wake of recent arrests.
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, March 2002
Document 73
October 2, 1968
Situation Appraisal: Student Capability to Cause Disruption
to the Olympics
CIA Station in Mexico, confidential intelligence information cable
CIA reports that the Mexican government's determination to hold
a successful Olympic Games should preclude any major incidents.
However random, unsuspected acts cannot be ruled out. "Any
estimate, such as this one, of the likelihood of intentional acts
designed to disrupt the normal course of events must take into
account the presence of radicals and extremists whose behavior
is impossible to predict. Such persons and groups do exist in
Mexico."
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, March 2002
Document 74
October 3, 1968
Mexico City
CIA Station in Mexico, confidential cable
An early report on the events at Tlatelolco back the Mexican
government's official explanation of events. "The first shots
were fired by the students who had taken up positions in the Edificio
Chihuahua, an apartment building in the plaza. Some of the students
were in possession of automatic weapons. Army troops who later
entered this building discovered many weapons and considerable
quantities of ammunition."
Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Library, National Security Files
CO-Mexico, Vol. IV, Box 60, "Mexico, memos & misc., 1/68-10/68
(cont.)"
Document 75
October 3, 1968
Mexico City
CIA Station in Mexico, confidential cable
Another early report on the violence of October 2 underestimates
the numbers killed while confirming the sniper fire from surrounding
buildings. "Casualties suffered during the evening and early
morning hours included twenty four civilians dead, many of whom
were students, and one hundred thirty seven civilians wounded….There
were more fatalities among the army troops because they were exposed
to sniper fire from the upper floors of nearby buildings."
According to this account, the first shots in the confrontation
were fired by students.
Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Library, National Security Files
CO-Mexico, Vol. IV, Box 60, "Mexico, memos & misc., 1/68-10/68
(cont.)"
Document 76
October 4, 1968
Mexico City Sitrep
CIA Station in Mexico, confidential intelligence information cable
In the aftermath of Tlatelolco CIA analysts attempt to gauge
whether or not the students will now respond with more violence.
"An ugly mood has prevailed among students following their
encounter with government forces on the evening of 2 October,
and many are talking of taking reprisal measures against the government."
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, March 2002
Document 77
October 4, 1968
A Renewed Violence in Mexico
CIA, secret intelligence summary
CIA reports that the Tlatelolco incident has raised questions
about Mexico's ability to provide security for the Olympics. This
cable cites "trained observers" who believed the students
instigated the incident and notes that the Mexican government
is determined to avoid a disruption of the Olympics both in the
City and outside. "All military zone commanders now have
authority to move against disorderly students in the provinces
without checking with the capital."
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, March 2002
Document 78
October 8, 1968
Mexico City Sitrep
CIA Station in Mexico, confidential intelligence information cable
In the wake of "revelations" by student leader Sócrates
Campos Lemus about secret political backing for the student movement,
the CIA Station reports that many students have long suspected
Campos Lemus of being a government agent.
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, March 2002
Document 79
October 11, 1968
Mexico City Sitrep
CIA Station in Mexico, confidential intelligence information cable
While some students continue activities on the eve of the Olympics,
the Mexican government is doing all it can to present a perfectly
calm atmosphere for the games. "The government has distributed
thousands of free tickets to the inaugural ceremony to persons
known to be loyal to the regime to insure that the President's
speech will be applauded, and to reduce the number of tickets
available to students." CIA also reports that many intellectuals
fear a crack down on their number following the Olympics and have
begun seeking work abroad.
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, March 2002
Document 80
November 1, 1968
Mexican Government Readies for More Student Trouble
CIA, secret intelligence summary
Although it is unclear whether students will continue the strike,
this document suggests that the "new left" (extremists)
within the student movement seek to prolong the unrest and continue
their provocations against the Mexican government. Mexican officials
are preparing for future violence. "Two 1,500-man army unites
are in training for use in the event of further violence, and
the government is likely to move to a harsh policy of repression
if its moderate conciliatory tactics fail."
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, March 2002
Document 81
November 30, 1968
The Situation in Mexico
CIA, secret intelligence memorandum
The situation has calmed somewhat in Mexico City with many UNAM
students are now espousing a more moderate line. "During
the past two weeks the government has threatened that it would
close the universities if the situation did not soon return to
normal. There would be widespread criticism for such a move now
since the situation appears to be improving."
Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Library, National Security Files
CO-Mexico, Vol. IV, Box 60, "Mexico, memos & misc., 1/68-10/68"
Document 82
December 6, 1968
Mexican Student Strike Apparently Waning
CIA, secret intelligence summary
Document states that despite intermittent attacks by extremist
groups, the student strike in Mexico is nearly over. In the wake
of a student vote to end the strike, class attendance is rising.
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, May 1998
Document 83
January 17, 1969
Challenges to Mexico's Single Party Rule
CIA, secret intelligence summary
As students return to classes, the "authentic context"
to student strikes is becoming clear: the demonstrations of 1968
represent a strong warning to the government of Mexico. Although
Mexican officials claimed "outside agitation" was the
basis of the unrest, this still heavily-excised "Special
Report" states that most reports linking the student movement
to subversion remain unsubstantiated. Finally, this document states
that the events at Tlatelolco caused severe political damage to
the Mexican government and suggests that the official handling
of the disturbances was "inept. [. . .] The Díaz Ordaz
administration lost considerable face during the prolonged and
sometimes violent strike."
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, March 2002
Department
of Defense:
Document 84
May 24, 1968
[Mexican Request for Military Radios]
State Department, letter
In the late spring the State Department writes to the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
requesting that Mexican orders of military radios be expedited
through the transfer of some units already earmarked for the Department
of Defense. "In view of the importance which the Mexican
Government gives to the smooth functioning of the Olympic games,
and our own Government's desire to see that this even be as successful
as possible, I recommend prompt and favorable consideration of
this request."
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Def 19-8 Mex, Box 1699
Document 85
July 18, 1968
Out-of-Channels Request from Mexico
State Department, memorandum
In preparation for the fall Olympic Games the Mexican Secretariat
of Defense places an order for weapons and supplies from the United
States.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Def 12-5 Mex, Box 1578
Document 86
August 15, 1968
Troops Used to Help Quell Mexico City Student Riots
Defense Intelligence Agency, confidential intelligence information
report
A chronological account of Mexican military involvement in disbanding
student protests in Mexico City during the week of July 29. While
this DIA report states that the military performed "creditably,"
it also notes some charges of "over-reaction" - such
as the alleged "hazing" of students inside one school
- and calls the regime's denials that students were killed by
security forces "the official government line." According
to the document, Gen. Cristoforo Mazón Pineda has been
appointed to head a special military "Task Force" to
deal with the unrest in Mexico City, with Gen. Mario Ballesteros
Prieto second in command. After an appeal by the National Security
Archive for further declassification of this document, some additional
passages were released on alleged communist involvement in the
student movement, as well as information that the Army requested
riot control training material from the United States.
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, May 2001
Document 87
September 24, 1968
Army Intervenes on Additional Occasions in Mexico City Student
Situation
Defense Intelligence Agency, confidential intelligence information
report
Report states that Mexican Army troops were again employed to
disperse protesting students, from August 28 into the month of
September. The period marked the first known involvement of troops
from outside Mexico City, indicating the increasing seriousness
of the matter. The September 18 occupation of UNAM also indicates
that the position of the Mexican government is hardening.
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, April 1997
Document 88
October 18, 1968
Army Participation in Student Situation, Mexico City
Defense Intelligence Agency, confidential intelligence information
report
This DIA report provides a summary of military involvement in
the student crisis from the end of September until the start of
the Olympic games. The report emphasizes that there had been "an
intense concern among almost all Mexicans that the student situation
would either prevent or hamper the Olympics. It is believed that
this feeling has had an effect on government and Army actions,
which on several occasions could possibly be called 'over-reactions,'
caused primarily by the desire to settle or at least arrest the
problem, by force if necessary, to avoid effect on the Olympics."
The report also summarizes the theories surrounding the events
at Tlatelolco on October 2 where students are still considered
to have been the most likely instigators of the violence.
Source: Released to Carlos Puig under the Freedom of Information
Act, June 1994
Document 89
October 22, 1968
Mexican Army Preparations to Cope with Future Student Disturbances
in Mexico City
Defense Intelligence Agency, confidential intelligence information
report
Following the close of the Olympic games and the expected return
of students to classes, the Mexican military expects a resurgence
in student protest activity. To counter possible future violence,
the military is training two special 1,500-man units, one of which
this DIA document says carries the name "Brigada Olympia."
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, May 2001
Document 90
October 23, 1968
Status of Brig Gen José Hernández Toledo
Defense
Intelligence Agency, confidential intelligence information report
Gen. José Hernández Toledo, wounded at Tlatelolco,
is recovering at a Mexican military hospital. A source tells the
DIA that the Mexican Army "had taken good care" of the
18 foreigners (including some Cubans) involved in the events at
Tlatelolco. When asked to clarify, the source said "good
care" meant detention at Military Camp No. One.
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, April 1997
Document 91
March 14, 1969
General Officers in Disfavor with Secretary of Defense
Defense Intelligence Agency, confidential intelligence information
report
Generals Ballesteros Prieto and Luis Gutiérrez Oropeza
are both out of favor with the Minister of Defense because they
ignored his orders to keep troops out of Tlatelolco. According
to source, soldiers were merely supposed to surround students
and observe with the intention of confining the demonstrators
to that part of the city.
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, May 2001
Document 92
May 16, 1969
Presidential Succession and Probability of Student/Government
Violent Confrontation
Defense Intelligence Agency, secret intelligence information report
Luis Echeverría Alvarez has been chosen to be the next
presidential candidate for the PRI and therefore the next president
of Mexico. The report states that future student disorders are
unlikely because the students feel public opinion has turned against
them.
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, May 2001
Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI):
Document 93
August 23, 1968
Criminal Activities at 1968 Olympic Games in Mexico City, Foreign
Police Cooperation
FBI, confidential memorandum
FBI headquarters conveys a request from the Legal Attaché
in Mexico City - the FBI's representative working inside the U.S.
Embassy in Mexico. The "Legat" has asked that an alert
be broadcast to FBI field offices for information regarding "known
United States criminals" with plans to travel to Mexico for
the Olympic Games in October. Not only would providing such information
to Mexican security agents contribute to the security of the Olympics,
but it would also "be most beneficial to [the Legal Attaché's]
liaison program" - that is, relations between U.S. and Mexican
intelligence services.
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, June 1997
Document 94
September 6, 1968
Criminal Activities at 1968 Olympic Games in Mexico City, Foreign
Police Cooperation
FBI, [classification excised] report
A report from the Special Agent in Charge in Dallas, Texas, to
the Director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover, provides information
regarding two men en route to Mexico City to attend the Olympics.
The men carry "bull whips, machettes [sic] and literature
concerning black power." Any additional information found,
says the report, will be furnished "to assist Mexican authorities."
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, June 1997
Document 95
September 26, 1968
Olympic Games, Mexico City, Mexico: October 12-27, 1968
FBI, confidential memorandum
As the student disturbances continue, the FBI goes on alert for
the movement of "U.S. subversive elements" into Mexico,
which the agency believes may try to disrupt the Olympic Games,
participate in student uprisings, or use the international games
to spy against the United States.
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, June 1997
Document 96
October 1, 1968
Olympic Games, Mexico City, Mexico-October 12-27, 1968
FBI, confidential letter
Document discusses potential threats to the Olympic Games. These
include individual U.S. citizens with histories of subversive
activity and anti-Castro Cubans, who are expected to try and harass
Cuban athletes during the games. The FBI urges that information
about potential subversives be provided to the U.S. and Mexican
governments.
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, June 1997
Document 97
October 1, 1968
Olympic Games, Mexico City, Mexico, October Twelve - Twenty
Seven, Nineteen Sixty Eight
FBI, confidential cable
To protect U.S. athletes during the Olympics, the FBI must establish
a liaison in the U.S. Embassy for channeling information to U.S.
Olympic team officials regarding safety concerns. Cable emphasizes
the necessity of concealing the FBI's role to avoid jeopardizing
ongoing FBI operations in Mexico.
Source: Released to National Security Archive under the Freedom
of Information Act, June 1997
White
House
Document 98
July 31, 1968
Student Disturbances in Mexico City
White House, secret memorandum
William Bowdler, White House special assistant for Latin America,
alerts President Lyndon B. Johnson to recent clashes between student
demonstrators and the government in Mexico. Mexican authorities
claim to have "solid evidence" that the Communist Party,
with Soviet complicity, engineered the July 26 riot, writes Bowdler,
although the United States does not have corroborating evidence.
The riots are not cause for concern. "There is no reason
to think that Mexican security forces cannot control the situation."
Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Library, National Security Files
CO-Mexico, Vol. IV, Box 60, "Mexico, memos & misc., 1/68-10/68"
Document 99
August 29, 1968
Student Situation in Mexico
White House, confidential cable
National Security Adviser Walter Rostow reports to President
Johnson that the Mexican government's conciliatory strategy has
not quelled student disturbances, and a return to a "get-tough,
no-nonsense posture" is inevitable. Rostow suggests that
while the violence is not likely to damage Díaz Ordaz's
administration, it will no doubt affect the Olympics in a negative
manner.
Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Library, National Security Files
CO-Mexico, Vol. IV, Box 60, "Mexico, memos & misc., 1/68-10/68"
Document 100
September 19, 1968
[Mexican Troops Invade UNAM Campus]
White House, confidential cable
Rostow alerts President Johnson to the military's decision to
occupy schools run by the National Autonomous University in response
to the student strike and take-over of university buildings.
Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Library, National Security Files
CO-Mexico, Vol. IV, Box 60, "Mexico, memos & misc., 1/68-10/68"
Document 101
September 27, 1968
Security Considerations in Mr. Nixon's Planned Visit to Mexico
White House, secret memorandum
Rostow forwards to the President a memorandum and an estimate
from the CIA. The CIA is concerned about security conditions in
Mexico and suggests that presidential candidate Richard Nixon
cancel his plans to visit Mexico during the Olympic Games. If
he does go, the CIA document warns, Mexican security forces would
have hard time protecting him, and "anti-U.S. extremists"
could cause "some nasty incidents."
Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Library, National Security Files
CO-Mexico, Vol. IV, Box 60, "Mexico, memos & misc., 1/68-10/68"
Document 102
October 5, 1968
Mexican Riots - Extent of Communist Involvement
White House, secret memorandum
[Partial transcript]
Three days after the violent clash at Tlatelolco, President Johnson
is informed of conflicting reports from the U.S. Embassy about
foreign communist influence on the student movement. In a heavily-excised
memorandum (attached), the CIA concludes that the unrest was sparked
by domestic politics; the FBI has sent a confused report accusing
a "joint shock group" of radical leftists called the
"Olympia Brigade" for starting the shooting. The FBI
source estimates that to 200 people may have been killed or mortally
wounded at Tlatelolco.
Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Library, National Security Files
CO-Mexico, Vol. IV, Box 60, "Mexico, memos & misc., 1/68-10/68"
Document 103
October 9, 1968
Mexican Riots
White House, secret memorandum
In an attachment to this White House memorandum, the CIA addresses
issues raised by FBI sources and concludes that a) no evidence
exists of significant foreign influence in the riots, b) external
influences included moral support and some financial support,
but not the supply of weapons, and c) the Trotskyist "Brigada
Olympia" referred to a leftist student group created to interfere
with the Olympic Games.
Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Library, National Security Files
CO-Mexico, Vol. IV, Box 60, "Mexico, memos & misc., 1/68-10/68"
Document 104
October 14, 1968
Mexico Riots
White House, confidential cable
National Security Adviser Walter Rostow receives a copy of a
U.S. Embassy cable analyzing the Mexican student riots. Addressing
what is clearly a continuing White House concern, the cover memo
states that the violence appears to have been sparked by student
extremists, and that foreign influence was negligible.
Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Library, National Security Files
CO-Mexico, Vol. IV, Box 60, "Mexico, memos & misc., 1/68-10/68"
Document 105
December 11, 1968
Your Meeting with President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, Friday,
December 13, 1968
State Department, confidential memorandum
Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, briefs President Johnson on Mexico
in anticipation of his upcoming meeting with President Díaz
Ordaz. Referring to the student riots, Rusk tells LBJ that the
disturbances were drawing to an end. "The prolonged nature
of the conflict, and the fact that the Government of Mexico resorted
to heavy repression on several occasions, have somewhat marred
President Díaz Ordaz' image. The President, however, remains
in firm control of his Government and continues to enjoy broad
support throughout Mexico."
Source: National Archives, RG 59, 1967-69
Pol 7 Mex, Box 2339
