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Documents, audio,
reconnaissance photographs, and other material from
the historic 40th anniversary conference in Havana,
Cuba.
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28 October
1962: The U.S. Navy shadows the second Soviet
F-class submarine to surface, after repeated
rounds of signaling depth charges on 27 October
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U.S. and Soviet Naval Encounters During the
Cuban Missile Crisis
National Security Archive Electronic
Briefing Book No. 75
William Burr and Thomas S. Blanton, editors
October 31, 2002
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Washington, D.C., 31 October 2002-- Forty years ago
today, the U.S. Navy forced to the surface a Soviet
submarine, which unbeknownst to the Navy, was carrying
a nuclear-tipped torpedo. This was the third surfacing
of a Soviet submarine during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
After a day of persistent tracking by the U.S. destroyer,
the Charles P. Cecil, commanded by Captain Charles
Rozier, Soviet submarine B-36, commanded by Captain
Aleksei Dubivko, exhausted its batteries forcing it
to come to the surface. On 27 and 30 October respectively,
U.S. Navy anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces surfaced
Soviet submarines B-59 and B-130. No one on the U.S.
side knew at the time that the Soviet submarines were
nuclear-armed; no one knew that conditions in the Soviet
submarines were so physically difficult and unstable
that commanding officers, fearing they were under attack
by U.S. forces, may have briefly considered arming the
nuclear torpedoes. Indeed, one of the incidents--the
effort to surface B-59 on 27 October 1962--occurred
on one of the most dangerous days of the missile crisis,
only hours after the Soviet shoot-down of a U-2 over
Cuba and as President Kennedy was intensifying threats
to invade Cuba.
The U.S.-Soviet conflict over nuclear deployments on
Cuba that produced the October 1962 crisis has necessarily
been a focal point of public interest, but the drama
that unfolded above and below Caribbean waters is now
receiving greater attention. While experts on the missile
crisis, as well as the participants themselves, have
been long aware of the cat-and-mouse game between U.S.ASW
forces and Soviet submarines during October and November
1962(1), only in recent months has
the hidden history of Soviet submarine operations during
the crisis become more widely known. In the spring of
2002, Russian researcher Alexander Mozgovoi began the
revelations when he published The Cuban Samba of
the Quartet of Foxtrots, which is available only
in Russian and was not released through ordinary commercial
channels.(2) Earlier this fall, U.S.
Navy veteran Peter A. Huchthausen, who served on the
U.S.S. Blandy during the crisis, published October
Fury, which for the first time brings together the
recollections of American and Russian participants in
the confrontation between U.S. destroyers and Soviet
submarines.(3) Thanks to Mozgovoi's
and Huchthausen's efforts, as well as the recent Havana
conference on the missile crisis which produced new
details on submarine operations,(4)
interested readers now know that Soviet "Foxtrot"
(NATO classification) submarines heading toward Cuba
were the spearhead of an effort to develop a Soviet
naval base at Mariel Bay, Cuba. One of the most startling
disclosures was that each of the submarines carried
a nuclear-tipped torpedo, which greatly raised the dangers
of an incident as the U.S. Navy carried out its efforts
to induce the beleaguered Soviet submariners to bring
their ships to the surface.(5)
During the missile crisis, U.S. naval officers did
not know about Soviet plans for a submarine base or
that the Foxtrot submarines were nuclear-armed. Nevertheless,
the Navy high command worried that the submarines, which
had already been detected in the north Atlantic, could
endanger enforcement of the blockade. Therefore, under
orders from the Pentagon, U.S. Naval forces carried
out systematic efforts to track Soviet submarines in
tandem with the plans to blockade, and possibly invade,
Cuba. While ordered not to attack the submarines, the
Navy received instructions on 23 October from Secretary
of Defense McNamara to signal Soviet submarines in order
to induce them to surface and identify themselves. Soon
messages conveying "Submarine Surfacing and Identification
Procedures" were transmitted to Moscow and other
governments around the world. The next morning, on 24
October, President Kennedy and the National Security
Council's Executive Committee (ExCom) discussed the
submarine threat and the dangers of an incident. According
to Attorney General Robert Kennedy, when Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara reviewed the use of practice
depth charges (PDCs), the size of hand grenades, to
signal the submarines, "those few minutes were
the time of greatest worry to the President. His hand
went up to his face & he closed his fist" (see
document three). Within a few days, U.S. navy task groups
in the Caribbean had identified Soviet submarines in
the approaches to Cuba and were tracking them with all
of the detection technology that they had at their disposal.(6)
The U.S. effort to surface the Soviet submarines involved
considerable risk; exhausted by weeks undersea in difficult
circumstances and worried that the U.S. Navy's practice
depth charges were dangerous explosives, senior officers
on several of the submarines, notably B-59 and B-130,
were rattled enough to talk about firing nuclear torpedoes,
whose 15 kiloton explosive yields approximated the bomb
that devastated Hiroshima in August 1945. Huchthausen
includes a disquieting account of an incident aboard
submarine B-130, when U.S. destroyers were pitching
PDCs at it. In a move to impress the Communist Party
political officer, Captain Nikolai Shumkov ordered the
preparations of torpedoes, including the tube holding
the nuclear torpedo; the special weapon security officer
then warned Shumkov that the torpedo could not be armed
without permission from headquarters. After hearing
that the security officer had fainted, Shumkov told
his subordinates that he had no intention to use the
torpedo "because we would go up with it if we did."(7)
Possibly even more dangerous was an incident on submarine
B-59 recalled by Vadim Orlov, who served as a communications
intelligence officer. In an account published by Mozgovoi
(see document 16), Orlov recounted the tense and stressful
situation on 27 October when U.S. destroyers lobbed
PDCs at B-59. According to Orlov, a "totally exhausted"
Captain Valentin Savitsky, unable to establish communications
with Moscow, "became furious" and ordered
the nuclear torpedo to be assembled for battle readiness.
Savitsky roared "We're going to blast them now!
We will die, but we will sink them all." Deputy
brigade commander Second Captain Vasili Archipov calmed
Savitsky down and they made the decision to surface
the submarine. Orlov's description of the order to assemble
the nuclear torpedo is controversial and the other submarine
commanders do not believe that that Savitsky would have
made such a command.
Soviet submarine commanders were highly disciplined
and unlikely to use nuclear weapons by design, but the
unstable conditions on board raised the spectre of an
accident. Orlov himself believes that the major danger
was not from the unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon
but from an accident caused by the interaction of men
and machines under the most trying of circumstances.
Captain Joseph Bouchard, the author of a major study
on Naval operations during the missile crisis, supports
this point when he suggests that the "biggest danger"
was not from "deliberate acts" but from accidents,
such as an accidental torpedo launch.(8)
If the Soviets had used nuclear torpedoes, by accident
or otherwise, the U.S. would have made a "nuclear
counter-response."(9) U.S. aircraft
carriers had nuclear depth charges on board, while non-nuclear
components (all but the fissile material pit) for more
depth charges were stored at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (see
document 49). Fortunately, the U.S. and Soviet leadership,
from heads of state to naval commanders wanted to avoid
open conflict; cool heads, professionalism, and some
amount of luck, kept the crisis under control.
The documents that follow, culled mostly from the U.S.
Navy's operational archives,(10) show
how U.S. destroyers and patrol aircraft pursued Soviet
submarines during the crisis and after it had subsided,
in November. Some of the documents give an overview
of the submarine tracking operation while others provide
detail on the encounters with Soviet submarines in late
October and early November. Of the four submarines that
secretly left for Cuba on 1 October, the U.S. Navy detected
and closely tracked three: 1) B-36, commanded by Aleksei
Dubivko, and identified by the U.S. Navy as C-26 (and
later found to be identical with another identified
submarine C-20), 2) B-59, commanded by Valentin Savitsky,
and identified as C-19, and 3) B-130, commanded by Nikolai
Shumkov, and identified as C-18. Only submarine B-4,
commanded by Captain Rurik Ketov, escaped intensive
U.S. monitoring (although U.S. patrol aircraft may have
spotted it). In a major defeat of the Soviet mission,
these three submarines came to the surface under thorough
U.S. Navy scrutiny.
Some Soviet submarines may have escaped U.S. detection
altogether. While the four Soviet Foxtrot submarines
did not have combat orders, the Soviet Navy sent two
submarines, B-75 and B-88, to the Caribbean and the
Pacific respectively, with specific combat orders. B-75,
a "Zulu" class diesel submarine, commanded
by Captain Nikolai Natnenkov, carried two nuclear torpedoes.
It left Russian waters at the end of September with
instructions to defend Soviet transport ships en route
to Cuba with any weapons if the ships came under attack.
Although the Soviets originally intended to send a nuclear-powered
submarine for transport ship defense (see document 2),
only a diesel submarine was available. Once President
Kennedy announced the quarantine, the Soviet navy recalled
B-75 and it returned to the Soviet Union by 10 November,
if not earlier. Another submarine, B-88, left a base
at Kamchatka peninsula, on 28 October, with orders to
sail to Pearl Harbor and attack the base if the crisis
over Cuba escalated into U.S.-Soviet war. Commanded
by Captain Konstatine Kireev, B-88 arrived near Pearl
Harbor on 10 November and patrolled the area until 14
November when it received orders to return to base,
orders that were rescinded that same day, a sign that
Moscow believed that the crisis was not over. B-88 did
not return to Kamchatka under the very end of December.
While the U.S. Navy detected and surfaced most of the
submarines en route to Cuba, it remains to be seen whether
it detected any traces of submarines B-75 or B-88.(11)
I. Soviet Plans to Deploy Submarines
1. Report from General Zakharov
and Admiral Fokin to the Defense Council and Premier
Khrushchev on Initial Plans for Soviet Navy Activities
in Support of Operation Anadry, 18 September 1962,
describing arrangements to send to Cuba a squadron of
submarines, including a brigade of torpedo submarines
and a division of missile submarines, with two submarine
tenders.
Source: Volkogonoff Collection, Library
of Congress, Manuscript Division, Reel 17, Container
26. Translated by Gary Goldberg for the Cold War International
History Project and the National Security Archive.
2. Report from General Zakharov
and Admiral Fokin to the Presidium, Central Committee,
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, on the Progress
of Operation Anadyr, 25 September 1962, indicating plans
to equip the submarine brigade with one nuclear torpedo
on each submarine and to send a nuclear attack submarine
to protect the transport ship Aleksandrovsk.
Source: Volkogonoff Collection, Library
of Congress, Manuscript Division, Reel 17, Container
26. Translated by Gary Goldberg for the Cold War International
History Project and the National Security Archive.
II. Cables, reports, deck logs,
and after-action reports on U.S. ASW operations
1. Excerpt from meeting of the
Executive Committee (Excom) of the National Security
Council, 10:00 A.M.--11:15 A.M., 24 October 1962,
during which President Kennedy and his advisers discussed
the Soviet submarine problem and the Navy's procedures
for signaling the submarines with practice depth charges.
Source: Philip Zelikow and Ernest R.
May, editors. The Presidential Recordings John F. Kennedy,
The Great Crises, Vol. III (New York, W.W. Norton, 2001),
pp. 190-194; John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA.
2. COMASWFORLANT (Commander,
Anti-Submarine Warfare Forces, Atlantic) cable to Task
Group 81.5 (Bermuda ASW Task Group), 24 October 1962,
noting task group report on "probable" submarine
sighting (probably C-18) and requesting patrol flights
to find the submarine.
Source: Washington Navy Yard, Naval Historical
Center, Operational Archives Branch, Cuba History Files,
Boxes 68-71, file: 21 (A) SS/ASW Contacts (Closed)-1
(hereinafter cited as CHF, with file name)
3. Commander TG 81.5 cable to
task group elements, 25 October 1962, assigning
"highest priority" to effort to track C-18,
with a patrol squadron VP 45 assigned the task on a
"continuing basis."
Source: CHF, 21 (A) SS/ASW Contacts (Closed)-1
4. Commander TG 81.5 cable to
COMASWFORLANT, 25 October 1962, noting that ASW
squadron "Woodpecker Nine" made a visual sighting
of a Soviet Foxtrot submarine, probably C-18.
Source: CHF, 21 (A) SS/ASW Contacts (Closed)-1
5. CTG 81.5 cable to CTF 81
(Commander Task Force 81) (COMASWFORLANT), 25 October
1962, reporting on visual sighting of C-18 (Soviet
submarine B-130).
Source: CHF, 21 (A) SS/ASW Contacts (Closed)-1
6. "OpNav [Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations] 24 Hour Resume of Events
250000Q to 260000Q", 26 October 1962, recounting
blockade and ASW efforts as well as the preparation
of forces for an invasion of Cuba.
Source: Washington Navy Yard, Naval Historical
Center, Operational Archives, Flag Plot Cuba Missile
Crisis 31-2, file: Misc. Information
7. CTG 136.2 (Commander, Essex
Task Group) cable to COMASWFORLANT, 26 October 1962,
confirming that submarine C-18, identified with hull
number 945, dove after a sighting by ASW aircraft.
Source: CHF, 21 (A) SS/ASW Contacts (Closed)-1
8. CTG 81.5 cable to COMASWFORLANT,
26 October 1962, reporting sighting by "Woodpecker
Five" of submarine cataloged as C-19 (Soviet submarine
B-59). Patrol aircraft maintaining "mad contact,"
that is, contact through magnetic anomaly detection
(MAD).(12)
Source: CHF, 21 (A) SS/ASW Contacts (Closed)-1
9. CINCLANT cable to AIG [Address
Indicator Group?] 930, JCS, CINCARIB, et al., "Current
ASW Status," 26 October 1962, showing visual
sightings and SOSUS (sound surveillance system)(13)
contacts with Soviet submarines--including C-18, C-19,
and C-20--since 22 October.
Source: CHF, 21 (A) SS/ASW Contacts (Closed)-1
10. CTU 81.7.9 (Element of
Caribbean ASW Group/Roosevelt Roads Naval Station, Puerto
Rico) cable to CTF 81 (COMASWFORLANT), 27 October 1962,
summarizing "current ASW activity" in the
vicinity of Guantanamo Bay (GITMO).
Source: CHF, 21 (A) SS/ASW Contacts (Closed)-1
11. CTG 81.1 (element of COMSAWFORLANT?)
cable to CTF 81 (COMASWFORLANT), "Appreciation
of SOSUS Activity in Western Atlantic from 23001Z to
273100Z," 27 October 1962, reports seven SOSUS
contacts with conventional Soviet submarines, although
noting difficulty of using SOSUS to track C-18 and C-19
Source: CHF, 21 (A) SS/ASW Contacts (Closed)-1
12. CINCLANT cable to JCS,
"Summary of Soviet Submarine Activities in Western
Atlantic to 271700Z," 27 October 1962, reporting
various visual sightings and various technical intelligence
contacts of Soviet submarines through radar, SOSUS,
MAD, as well as Julie and Jezebel sonobuoys.(14)
Source: CHF, 21 (A) SS/ASW Contacts (Closed)-1
13. Deck Log Book [Excerpts]
for U.S.S. Beale, DD 471, showing tracking and signaling
operations, with use of practice depth charges (PDCs),
and eventual surfacing of submarine C-19 on the evening
of 27 October (local time). The Beale was part of the
Randolph ASW task group 83.2.
Source: National Archives, Record Group
24, Records of Bureau of Naval Personnel (hereinafter
cited as RG 24), Deck Logs 1962, box 74
14. Deck Log Book [Excerpts]
for U.S.S. Cony, DD 508, also part of TG 83.2, showing
its role in tracking, signaling, and surfacing submarine
C-19.
Source: RG 24, Deck Logs 1962, box 178
15. Deck Log Book [Excerpts]
for U.S.S. Bache, DD 479, which tracked C-19 (identified
as PROSNABLAVST) on 28 October
Source: RG 24, Deck Logs 1962, box 57
16. Recollections of Vadim
Orlov (USSR Submarine B-59), "We Will Sink Them
All, But We Will Not Disgrace Our Navy," Orlov's
account includes the controversial depiction of an order
by Captain Valentin Savitsky to assemble the nuclear
torpedo.
Source: Alexander Mozgovoi, The Cuban
Samba of the Quartet of Foxtrots: Soviet Submarines
in the Caribbean Crisis of 1962 (Moscow, Military Parade,
2002). Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya, National
Security Archive.
17. CTG 81.1 cable to CTF,
"Appreciation SOSUS Activity from 271201Z-2843000Z,"
28 October 1962, reporting that SOSUS system "total
remaining above normal", including 6 contacts of
Soviet conventional submarines: C-18, C-19, C-20, and
C-23.
Source: CHF, 21 (A) SS/ASW Contacts (Closed)-1
18. Deck Log Book [Excerpts]
for U.S.S. Barry, DD 933, which tracked C-19 (PROSNABLAVST)
on 29 October
Source: RG 24
19. COMASWFORLANT cable to
AIG 43, 29 October 1962, describing C-19 as "raising
and lowering masts and snorkel indicating hydraulic
difficulties and/or repairs."
Source: CHF, 21 (A) SS/ASW Contacts (Closed)-1
20. COMASWFORLANT cable to
AIG 43, 30 October 1962, reporting that the Barry
lost contact with C-19 after it "went deep."
Source: CHF, 21 (A) SS/ASW Contacts (Closed)-1
21. COMASWFORLANT cable to
AIG 43, 30 October 1962, on surfacing of Foxtrot
submarine C-18 (B-130), side number 945, late in the
evening of 29 October at 2310Z (Greenwich meridian time).
Source: CHF, 21 (A) SS/ASW Contacts (Closed)-1
22. CTG 136.2 (Essex Task Group)
cable to COMASWFORLANT, 30 October 1962, reports
that C-18 "remaining on the surface."
Source: CHF, 21 (A) SS/ASW Contacts (Closed)-1
23. COMASWFORLANT cable to
AIG 43, 30 October, reporting that C-18 [B-130]
submerged early in the morning at 3000622Z, but that
destroyers and aircraft were holding sonar (sound navigation
and ranging)(15) and MAD contacts.
Source: CHF, 21 (A) SS/ASW Contacts (Closed)-1
24. U.S.S. Speed Cable to COMASWFORLANT,
30 October 1962, on MAD and sonar contacts with
Soviet submarine C-26 (B-36), although "have not
attempted special surfacing signals viewed as part of
lifted quarantine."
Source: CHF, 21.SS/ASW
25. U.S.S. C.P. Cecil cable
to COMASWFORLANT, 30 October 1962, reporting B-36
[C-26]'s "strong attempt [to] break contact ...
in radical course changes and speeds to 15 [knots] and
false echo cans."
Source: CHF, 21.SS/ASW
26. U.S.S. C.P. Cecil Cable
to COMASWFORLANT, 30 October 1962, reports that
contact was evaluated as "submarine" in light
of 30 MAD contacts by patrol aircraft. "Maintaining
continuous sonar contact" of C-26 [B-36]
Source: CHF, 21.SS/ASW
27. CTG 136.2 to COMASWFORLANT,
31 October 1962, reports surfacing of C-18 [B-130]
after 14 hours of continuous contact by destroyers and
patrol aircraft. "Sub was evasive using decoys,
depth changes, backing down" but "sonar contact
[was] never lost." After surfacing, submarine stated
its number as 945 and stated that it needed no assistance.
Source: CHF, CHF, 21 (A) SS/ASW Contacts
(Closed)-1
28. Deck Log Book [Excerpts]
for U.S.S. Blandy, DD 943, which played a critical
role in the surfacing of C-18 (B-130).
Source: RG 24, Deck Logs 1962, Box 91.
29. CTG 135.1 (element of invasion
task group) cable to COMASWFORLANT, 31 October 1962,
on radar and visual sighting of submarine cataloged
as C-21 (possibly Soviet submarine B-4).(16)
Source: CHF, 21 (A) SS/ASW Contacts (Closed)-2
30. U.S.S. C.P. Cecil cable
to COMASWFORLANT, 31 October, on efforts to hold
contact with submarine C-26 [B-36] whose "evasive
tactics" were increasing. "Submarine launched
false target cans at least three occasions."
Source: CHF, 21.SS/ASW
31. U.S.S. Aldebaran cable to
COMASWFORLANT, 31 October 1962, reports on surfacing
of C-26 [B-36] at 11054Z. The U.S.S. Cecil will monitor
the submarine whose crew was "taking turns airing
topside." The term "xmas" found in paragraph
4 stands for "unknown non-American submarine."
Source: CHF, 21.SS/ASW
32. Aleksei F. Dubivko, "In
the Depths of the Sargasso Sea"
Source: On the Edge of the Nuclear Precipice
(Moscow: Gregory Page, 1998). Translated by Svetlana
Savranskaya
33. CTG 81.1 cable to CTF 81,
31 October 1962, "Appreciation of SOSUS Activity
from 301301Z to 311300Z," reports high detection
visibility although a decrease in SOSUS contacts.
Source: CHF, 21.SS/ASW
34. CINCLANT cable, to JCS,
1 November 1962, "Summary of Soviet Submarine
Activities in Western Atlantic 271700Z to 311700Z,"
reviews previously reported and new submarine contacts
through Jezebel, LOFAR (low frequency analysis and recording),
and other detection systems.
Source: CHF, 21.SS/ASW
35. U.S.S. C.P. Cecil cable
to COMASWFORLANT, 2 November 1962, reports that
the Cecil is keeping watch of C-26 [B-36], whose crew
"worked on fittings under superstructure deck."
C-26 submerged later in the day (see document 36).
Source: CHF, 21.SS/ASW
36. Deck Log Book [Excerpts]
for the U.S.S. Keppler, which monitored C-18 in
early November.
Source: RG 24, 1962 Deck Logs, box 467
37. CTG 135.1 cable to COMASWFORLANT,
3 November 1962, providing status report on contacts
with C-21 : "our attitude has changed from confidence
to frustration to doubt as the nature of the contacts
varied. My present evaluation [is] that the original
contact was a positive sub sighting."
Source: CHF, 21 (A) SS/ASW Contacts (Closed)-2
38. COMASWFORLANT cable to AIG
43 et al., 3 November 1962, on the status of C-18,
C-19, C-21, and C-26, among other contacts.
Source: CHF, 21.SS/ASW
39. U.S.S. Zellars cable to
COMASWFORLANT, 4 November 1962, on unsuccessful
efforts to track C-21.
Source: CHF, 21.SS/ASW
40. Special Report of the CNO
Submarine Contact Evaluation Board As of 5 November
1962," 5 November 1962, showing confirmed sightings
of Soviet submarines, but noting that contact C-21B
is "tentative" because of a "lack of
confirming evidence."
Source: Source: CHF, 21.SS/ASW 2
41. COMASWFORLANT cable to
supporting elements, 5 November 1962, "Summary
Soviet Submarine Activity in the Western Atlantic to
051700Z Third Report," reporting status of
C-18, C-19, C-21, and C-26
Source: Source: CHF, 21.SS/ASW 2
42. CTU 81.7.9 (element of
COMASWFORLANT) cable to COMASWFORLANT, 6 November 1962,
on continuing efforts to track C-21 as well as the possible
detection, through LOFAR and ECM (electronic countermeasures)
of a nuclear submarine
Source: CHF, 21 (A) SS/ASW Contacts (Closed)
43. U.S.S. Keppler cable to
COMASWFORLANT, 8 November 1962, on continued monitoring
of C-18 (B-130), which appears to be experiencing "mechanical
difficulty in separating fuel from water for diesel
engines."
Source: CHF, 21 (A) SS/ASW Contacts (Closed)
44. COMASWFORLANT cable to
AIG 43, 9 November 1962, on rendezvous by C-18 (B-130)
with an unidentified surface ship, probably Russian
tugboat, Pamir.
Source: CHF, 21.SS/ASW
45. U.S.S. Keppler cable to
COMASWLANT, 9 November 1962, on C-18's unsuccessful
attempts to submerge.
Source: CHF, 21 (A) SS/ASW Contacts (Closed)
46. COMASWFORLANT cable to
CTG 81.9, 9 November 1962, reporting that if Soviet
tugboat Pamir is escorting and C-18 and both "are
homeward bound", surveillance operation will soon
end. As it turned out, the Pamir towed C-18 (B-130)
back to port near Murmansk, a three-week voyage.
Source: CHF, 21 (A) SS/ASW Contacts
47. Carrier Division Sixteen,
"Report of ASW Barrier Operations During the Cuban
Missile Crisis by Group Built Around Randolph,"
14 December 1962, describing aerial patrol efforts
to track C-19. During one of the helicopter operations
on 27 October, after PDC "surfacing signals exploded,"
sonar picked up noise caused by hatches slamming shut
"leaving no doubt that we had a submarine contact."
Source: U.S. Navy Freedom of Information
Act Release
48. Commanding Officer, Patrol
Squadron Five, "Report of Support of Cuban Missile
Crisis Operations," 15 December 1962, showing
surveillance efforts against Soviet submarine C-26,
which surfaced because its "undersea capability
... had been evidently exhausted through continued restriction
of its movement by air and surface units since the evening
of 29 October 1962."
Source: U.S. Navy Freedom of Information
Act Release
49. Table showing deployment
of non-nuclear components of nuclear depth charges at
Guantanamo Bay, 1961-1963
Source: Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense for Atomic Energy, "History of the Custody
and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons (U), July 1945 - September
1977," February 1978, Department of Defense Freedom
of Information Act Release
III. Charts
The following charts showing ship deployments and movements
on each day of the Cuban missile crisis were the work
of "Flag Plot" and "ASW plot," special
components of the office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
With these charts, formerly classified "Top Secret",
one can track the massive buildup of blockade and invasion
forces during the days after 22 October as well as the
systematic effort to locate Soviet submarines and other
Soviet ships. As the intensity of the crisis grew, the
demands of senior officials for more timely information
led Flag Plot to produce these charts four times daily;
as the crisis ebbed, however, charts were produced only
once a day. As the details of submarine sightings accumulated,
by the end of October CNO staffers began to produce
a daily "ASW Plot" chart that included brief
summaries of encounters with Soviet submarines.
Source for charts: Washington Navy Yard,
U.S. Naval Historical Center, Operational Archives,
"Flag Plot Cuban Missile Crisis" files: "Op-Sum
Oct 62" and "Op-Sum Nov 62"
1. Carib
As Of 22 Oct 1962 0800Q (17)
2. Carib
As of 23 October 1962 0800Q
3. Carib
As of 24 October 1962 0800Q
4. Carib
As of 24 October 1962 1200Q
5. Carib
As of 24 October 1962 2230Q
6. Carib
As of 25 October 1962 0300Q
7. Carib
As of 25 October 1962 0800Q
8. Carib
As of 25 October 1962 1200Q
9. Caribbean
As of 25 October 1962 2000Q
10. Caribbean
As of 25 October 1962 2400Q
11. Caribbean
As of 26 October 1962 0800Q
12. Caribbean
As of 26 October 1962 1200Q
13. Caribbean
As of 26 October 1962 1800Q
14. Caribbean
As of 26 October 1962 2400Q
15. Caribbean
As of 27 October 1962 0600Q
16. Caribbean
As of 27 October 1962 1200Q
17. Caribbean
As of 27 October 1962 1800Q
18. Caribbean
As of 27 October 1962 2400Q
19. Caribbean
As of 28 October 1962 0600R (18)
20. Caribbean
As of 28 October 1962 1200R
21. Caribbean
As of 28 October 1962 1800R
22. Caribbean
As of 28 October 1962 2400R
23. Caribbean
As of 29 October 1962 0600R
24. Caribbean As of 29 October
1962 1200R
25. Caribbean
As of 29 October 1962 1800R
26. "Cuba
ASW Plot," circa 29 October 1962
27. Caribbean
As of 29 October 1962 2400R
28. "Cuba
ASW Plot As of 300000R Oct 62"
29. Caribbean
As of 30 October 1962 0600R
30. Caribbean
As of 30 October 1962 1400R
31. Caribbean
As of 30 October 1962 2400R
32. "Cuba
ASW Plot As of 310000 R Oct 62"
33. Caribbean
As of 31 October 1962 0600R
34. Caribbean
As of 31 October 19621200R
35. Caribbean
As of 31 October 1962 2400R
36. "Cuba
ASW Plot As of 010000 R Nov 1962"
37. Caribbean
As of 1 November 1962 0600R
38. Caribbean
As of 1 November 1962 2400R
39. "Cuba
ASW Plot as of 020000 R Nov 62"
40. Caribbean
As of 2 Nov. 1962 0600R
41. Caribbean
As of 2 Nov. 1962 0600R
42. "Cuba
ASW Plot As of 030000 R Nov 1962"
43. Caribbean
As of 3 Nov. 1962 0600R
44. "Cuba
ASW Plot as of 040000R Nov 1962"
45. Caribbean
As of 4 Nov. 1962 0600R
46. "Cuba
ASW Plot As of 050000R Nov 1962
47. Caribbean
As of 5 Nov. 1962 0600R48.
"Cuba ASW Plot As of 060000R Nov 1962"49.
"Cuba ASW Plot As of 070000R Nov 1962"
IV. Photographs
1. Photograph of Soviet submarine
B-59 taken by U.S. Navy photographers, circa 28-29
October, 1962
Source: U.S. National Archives, Still
Pictures Branch, Record Group 428, Item 428-N-711201
2. Photograph of Soviet submarine
B-59 taken by U.S. Navy photographers, circa 28-29
October, 1962
Source: U.S. National Archives, Still
Pictures Branch, Record Group 428, Item 428-N-711199
3. Photograph of Soviet submarine
B-59 taken by U.S. Navy photographers, circa 28-29
October, 1962
Source: U.S. National Archives, Still
Pictures Branch, Record Group 428, Item 428-N-711200
4. Photograph of Soviet submarine
B-36 (conning tower number 911), taken by U.S. Navy
photographers, circa 31 October-2 November 1962
Source: U.S. National Archives, Still
Pictures Branch, Record Group 428, Item 428-N-711198
5. Photograph of Soviet submarine
B-130 (conning tower number 945), taken by U.S.
Navy photographers, circa 30 October-8 November 1962
Source: collection of Dino Brugioni,
former senior officer, National Photographic Intelligence
Center (NPIC).
6. Photograph of Soviet submarine
B-130 (conning tower number 945), taken by U.S.
Navy photographers, circa 30 October-8 November 1962
Source: Dino Brugioni collection
7. Photograph of Soviet submarine
B-130 (conning tower number 945), taken by U.S.
Navy photographers, circa 30 October-8 November 1962
Source: Dino Brugioni collection
Notes
1. For one of the most significant studies of naval
operations during the crisis, see Joseph Bouchard, Command
in Crisis: Four Case Studies (New York, Columbia
University Press, 1992).
2. For Mozgovoi's book, see Anatoly
Yurkin, "Book on actions of Soviet subs during
1962 Caribbean crisis," Tass, 19 June 2002.
3. Peter Huchthausen, October Fury (New
York: John Wiley, 2002)
4. See <htttp://www.nsarchive.org/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/>
5. For press coverage of these
revelations as well as of the Havana conference, see
"Soviets Set to Fire," Sunday Herald Sun
(Melbourne), 23 June 2002; 'How Cuban Crisis Put World
Minutes from Nuclear Oblivion," The Scotsman,
13 October 2002, and "Soviets Close to Using A-Bomb
in 1962 Crisis, Forum is Told," The Boston Globe,
13 October 2002, and "Forty Years After Missile
Crisis, Players Swap Stories," The Washington
Post, 13 October 2002.
6. For details, see Bouchard,
Command in Crisis, pp. 120-121. See also Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations, "The Naval Quarantine
of Cuba, 1962", 1963, posted at <http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq90-5.htm>.
For the ExCom meeting, see Philip Zelikow and Ernest
R. May, editors. The Presidential Recordings John
F. Kennedy, The Great Crises, Vol. III (New York,
W.W. Norton, 2001), pp. 190-194.
7. See Huchthausen, October
Fury, pp. 204-213; and Orlov memoir
(document 16)
8. Interview with Vadim Orlov
by Svetlana Savranskaya, National Security Archive,
17 October 2002, Moscow; Captain Joseph Bouchard, communication
with editor, 16 September 2002. Indicating what can
go wrong, Bouchard cited the accidental launching of
a torpedo by a Soviet destroyer during a NATO exercise
in October 1983 and a torpedo inadvertently accidentally
launched by a U.S. Navy frigate in December 1983. See
London Times, 8 October 1973, and Washington
Post, 20 December 1983.
9. Telephone interview with Rear Admiral
Carl J. Seiberlich (retired) by William Burr, 14 September
2002.
10. Unfortunately, files at the operational
archives that were open to researchers last spring are
now closed until at least March 2003 while the archives
undergoes renovation of its records storage system.
See <http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/nhcorg10.htm>
11. Alexander Mozgovoi, The Cuban
Samba of the Quartet of Foxtrots; interviews with
Alexander Mozgovoi and Vadim Orlov by Svetlana Savranskaya,
National Security Archive, 16 and 17 October 2002, Moscow.
12. Magnetic anomaly sensors are "used
to detect the natural and manmade differences in the
Earth's magnetic field."; the passing of large
ferrous objects such as ships and submarines passing
through the earth's magnetic field can produce detectable
changes. To detect a change or anomaly an ASW aircraft
mut be practically overhead or very close to a submarine's
position. See Federation of American Scientists, Military
Analysis Network, "Air Anti-Submarine Warfare,"
<http://www.fas.org/man/dod/-101/sys/ac/asw.htm>.
13. SOSUS is the Navy's strategic
underwater network of passive sonar (sound navigation
and ranging) detectors and hydrophones deployed on the
ocean floor to detect and differentiate submarine noise
from normal oceanic background sound. The hydrophones
are deployed at major natural choke points that the
shipping of adversaries is forced to use. An early SOSUS
station was established in the Bahamas. See S. F. Tomajczk,
Dictionary of the Modern United States Military
(Jefferson, North Carolina, McFarland & Company,
1996).
14. Julie and Jezebell are types of sonobouys that
use sonar technology to detect a submarine either actively
(through reflected acoustical pulse), or passively,
by detecting sound, for example, with hydrophones. Most
sonobouys are small and cylindrical in shape and are
distributed by aircraft or ships. Julie sonobouys release
charges that explode at predetermined depths to provide
echo-ranging data, while Jezebel sonobouys are airborne
devices that can detect low-frequency sounds originating
from underwater sources of energy. See Tomajczk, Dictionary
of the Modern United States Military, for entries
on SONAR, sonobouys, Jezebel and Julie.
15. See note 11 (above).
16. Huchthausen, October Fury,
p. 234.
17. Standing for Quebec, Q signified
Eastern Daylight Time plus four hours. An explanation
of changes in the time scheme is unavailable; see Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations, "The Naval Quarantine
of Cuba, 1962", p. 1.
18. Standing for Romeo, R signified
Eastern Daylight time plus five hours.
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