Washington
D.C., November 9,
2007 - In anticipation of the planned launch of the final Defense Support Program (DSP) satellite tomorrow evening, which was originally scheduled to be orbited in October 2005, the National Security Archive has posted on the Web a collection of declassified documents tracing the history of the program from its roots as Subsystem G of WS-117L in 1957. At that time the U.S. began seriously planning to deploy satellites that would detect the infrared signals emitted by intercontinental ballistic missiles in order to provide warning of a Soviet missile attack.
The documents posted today, obtained through the Freedom of Information Act and archival research, include documents on the theoretical work behind the concept of space-based missile detection, the early doubts about the feasibility of such detection, and 1960s research and development work on the Missile Defense Alarm System (MIDAS). They also include documents on the evolution of the DSP--with regard both to its capabilities and its use for a variety of additional missions, including the detection of intermediate-range missiles, bombers flying on afterburner and spacecraft. In addition, a number of documents focus on the decades-long search for a follow-on system to DSP.
Compiled by National Security Archive Senior Fellow Dr. Jeffrey T. Richelson, the documents in this briefing book originated with the Defense Department, Air Force, U.S. Space Command, Air Force Space Command, Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center, Aerospace Corporation, Government Accounting Office, and other organizations.
Electronic Briefing Book
Space-Based
Early Warning: From MIDAS to DSP to SBIRS
By Jeffrey T. Richelson
As early as 1948, U.S. government scientists were investigating the possibility
of detecting and tracking ballistic missiles by the heat generated
when they were launched, including the heat or infrared signals
from their missile plumes. In 1955, the work of two members
of the RAND Corporation staff, William Kellogg and Sidney Passman,
on infrared detection of missiles "captured the attention
of various science advisory committees" and created support
for development of an infrared warning satellite. (Document
1, Document 2).
The next year, the Air Force selected the Lockheed Corporation
to build a photographic reconnaissance satellite. Lockheed proposed
a number of additional systems, including a satellite equipped
with an infrared radiometer and telescope to detect both the
hot exhaust gases emitted by long-range jet bombers and large
rockets as they climbed through the atmosphere. As a result,
before the end of 1957, Lockheed's proposal became Subsystem
G of Weapons System 117 (WS-117L), the overall Defense Department
space-based reconnaissance and surveillance program. (Note
1)
By early November 1958, Subsystem G had become MIDAS - the
Missile Defense Alarm System (MIDAS). Throughout 1959 and for
a number of years afterwards plans for a future MIDAS constellation
were drawn up and revised-with the number of satellites and
their orbital characteristics changing from plan to plan. Thus,
a January 1959 plan recommended an operational constellation
of twenty spacecraft operating at 1,000 miles while a revised
plan, produced later that year, envisioned a constellation of
twelve spacecraft at 2,000-mile altitudes. (Note
2)
Between 1959 and the end of 1963 there were three salient features
to the MIDAS program-revised plans, internal and external reviews
of the feasibility of MIDAS (and indeed of the whole concept
of infrared detection from space), and the launch of test satellites.
While some were afraid that background radiance and cloud clutter,
among other potential problems, would prevent an effective system
from being developed, others in the Air Force and contractor
organizations were more optimistic. (Document
3 and Document 4)
The attempt to determine the feasibility of MIDAS began on
February 26, 1960, when MIDAS 1 was launched from the Atlantic
Missile Range. Unfortunately, the satellite and booster never
separated and landed in the Atlantic Ocean. MIDAS-2 was successfully
orbited on May 24, 1960, but the transmission of infrared data
to a ground readout station lasted only for a brief time before
the satellite's communication link failed. It would not be until
the launch of MIDAS 7, on May 9, 1963, that a MIDAS satellite
would clearly demonstrate the ability to detect missile launches-detecting
the launch of both Minuteman and Polaris missiles, whose launch
had been scheduled to provide a test for MIDAS. While a booster
malfunction prevented MIDAS 8 from reaching orbit, MIDAS 9 was
also successful in detecting missile launches. (Note
3) (Document 8)
Despite the success of MIDAS 7 and 9, there was no immediate
move to deploy an operational system, as there were still issues
concerning costs and the exact capabilities a warning satellite
might also have, such as the ability to detect to the signatures
of a nuclear detonation. In 1966, a new series of test launches
began with the objective of demonstrating that the satellites
could operate for as many as six months and detect submarine-launched
and medium-range missiles as well as ICBMs. The tests were also
intended to demonstrate the ability to detect launch points
to within eight to ten miles. (Document 9)
Three tests were conducted in 1966-in June, August, and October.
While the first mission failed due to booster problems, the
next two were successful. One or both of the two successful
missions detected the infrared signature of SS-N-6 missiles,
which was extraordinarily dim-thus demonstrating the sensor's
ability to detect a wide range of missiles, both liquid and
solid-fueled. As a result, the decision was made to go ahead
with construction and deployment of an operational constellation
of early warning satellites. (Note 4)
The satellites launched in 1966 were part of Program 461, as
MIDAS had become known before the end of 1963. The program to
produce an operational constellation was first known as Program
949, then Program 647, and then finally designated the Defense
Support Program (DSP). In contrast to the satellites associated
with the MIDAS and 461 programs, which orbited about 2,000 miles
above the earth, the DSP satellites were supposed to be launched
into a geostationary orbit-22,300 miles above a point on the
equator, allowing them to maintain a constant view of the third
of the earth that their sensor could monitor. While the first
of those satellites, launched on November 5, 1970, would fail
to attain the proper orbit, the second did, placing it a position
over the equator that allowed it to monitor Soviet and Chinese
missile launches. (Note 5)
After two more successful launches, the U.S. established a
three-satellite DSP constellation-with satellite stations over
the Atlantic, Pacific, and Eurasia. Eventually, in addition
to three operational satellites, two retired satellites would
be maintained in reserve. Then, subsequent to the launch of
DSP-14 in June 1989, a four-satellite operational constellation
was established, with the creation of a European station. That
constellation has been maintained since that time. Throughout the DSP program the data from the constellation
has been augmented by data from infrared sensors carried by
the two or three National Reconnaissance Office signals intelligence
satellites operating in highly-elliptical orbit at any given
time. Over the life of the program, the satellites have detected
thousands of strategic and tactical missile launches, as well
as French and Chinese atmospheric nuclear detonations-the later
via its infrared sensor and the nuclear detonation detection
sensors also carried on the spacecraft. (Note 6)
Since the first launch, the capabilities of DSP satellites have been enhanced.
The first model of the satellite, which encompassed Flights
1-4, had an expected lifetime of 1.25 years (commonly exceeded)
and 2000 detectors. The most recent model DSP-1, first orbited
in 1989, had an expected lifetime of 5 years (also exceeded)
and 6000 detectors-which provided far more accurate estimates
of the coordinates associated with missile launches, an improvement
intended to allow DSP to provide more precise information in
the event of a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union. The newer
model also could detect infrared radiation from two different
parts of the electromagnetic spectrum (making it harder to jam)
as well as having both a below-the-horizon and above-the-horizon
capability. (Document 26, Document
28)
In addition to the evolution in DSP capabilities, there has
also been an evolution of missions and customers. As previously
noted, DSP was originally established to detect strategic missiles
launched against the United States, whether by the Soviet Union
or China, and to detect nuclear detonations. The ability of
DSP sensors to detect shorter-range offensive and surface-to-air
missiles allowed it to detect and provide intelligence on missiles
fired during regional conflicts-such as the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988)
as well as the 1991 Persian Gulf War. (Note 7, Document 24, Document
25)
In addition, the discovery that DSP's infrared sensor was detecting
the flight of Soviet Backfire bombers, one version of which
would be used to attack U.S. naval vessels in the event of war,
led to the SLOW WALKER program. Its ability to detect the infrared
signal reflecting off of spacecraft resulted in the FAST WALKER
program. The ability to detect infrared events of sufficient
intensity has also allowed DSP to provide data on aircraft crashes,
ammunition dump explosions, and industrial processes. (Note
8) (Document 16a, Document 16b, Document
39)
A key element of the DSP system has been the ground stations
used to control the satellites and receive the data they collect.
Control over and processing of data from the first satellite
stationed over Eurasia and its successors was the responsibility
of the Overseas Ground Station (OGS) at Nurrungar, in the Australian
Outback-the source of much political controversy. A second ground
station at Buckley AFB in Colorado, the CONUS Ground Station
(CGS), would control the Atlantic and Pacific satellites. Later
on, to control the European satellite, the European Ground Station (EGS)
was established at Kapaun, Germany. In addition to the large
processing stations, a number of mobile ground terminals were
built to allow DSP data to be received in the event of the destruction
of any of the fixed stations. In addition, Joint Tactical Ground
Stations (JTaGS) were deployed to Europe and Asia as part of
the SLOW WALKER program. In 2000, the OGS and EGS were closed
down, while relay stations were established at Pine Gap, Australia
and Menwith Hill, United Kingdom to send the data back to CGS
for processing. (Note 9) (Document
19, Document 20, Document
28).
While generations of DSP satellites demonstrated expanding
capabilities, consideration of a follow-on system began as early
as 1979. An initial concern, as noted above, was to improve
DSP's ability to contribute data in the midst of a nuclear conflict
with the Soviet Union-by making the satellites and ground stations
more survivable and able to provide more detailed information,
such as the precise coordinates of Soviet missile launches.
In addition, since the creation of the Strategic Defense Initiative
by President Ronald Reagan in March 1983, plans for future launch
detection satellites needed to be integrated into plans for
national missile defense.
Debates and disagreements over issues such as costs and technical
requirements, within the executive branch and between the executive
branch and Congress, resulted in a host of DSP follow-on programs
having been proposed and then cancelled for over fifteen years.
Thus, the Advanced Warning System (AWS), Boost Surveillance
and Tracking System (BSTS), the Follow-On Early Warning System
(FEWS), and Alert, Locate, and Report Missiles (ALARM) program,
along with their acronyms, all came and went between 1979 and
1995. (Note 10) (Document
30a, Document 30b)
In 1995, the Air Force announced a new follow-on program-the
Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS). The program was to consist
of four operational satellites in geostationary orbit, two infrared
sensors on highly-elliptical orbiting National Reconnaissance
Office satellites, and a SBIRS-Low segment that would be a crucial
element of national missile defense. The low-earth orbiting
portion of SBIRS has since been renamed the Space Tracking and
Surveillance System (STSS), although its actual deployment is
uncertain. Problems with the infrared sensors for the high-altitude
satellites, schedule delays, and large increases in projected
costs delayed the expected first launch of a SBIRS satellite,
now expected in 2008. They also resulted in the decision to
establish an Alternative Infrared Satellite System (AIRSS) program,
should the decision be made not to procure more than the first
two dedicated SBIRS satellites. (Note 11)
(Document 39, Document
40, Document 41, Document
42) The performance of a SBIRS sensor on an NRO satellite
launched in June 2006 produced optimism that the SBIRS program
would continue beyond the first two satellites; and in June
2007, the Air Force decided to purchase a third geosynchronous
SBIRS satellite, with an option to buy a fourth. In October 2007, new problems with the SBIRS effort were reported--although it still appeared the Air Force was going to purchase the third SBIRS spacecraft and begin investing in parts for a fourth. (Note
12)
Read
the Documents
Note:
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Document
1: J.A. Curcio and J.A. Sanderson, Naval Research Laboratory,
NRL Report No. N-3327, Further Investigations of the Radiation
from Rocket Motor Flames, July 26, 1948. Classification
Unknown
Source: Freedom of Information Act
This paper examines the radiation emitted by the flames of
rocket motors burning nitric acid and aniline as well as alcohol
and oxygen. The objective of the reported research was to gather
data that could be employed for a number of purposes-including
optical detection tracking and homing on those targets.
Document
2: William W. Kellogg and Sidney Passman, Rand Corporation,
RM-1572, Infrared Techniques Applied to the Detection and
Interception of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, October
21, 1955. For Official Use Only
Source: Freedom of Information Act
This study was written by an expert on infrared technology
(Passman) and an expert on high-altitude earth observation (Kellogg).
They noted that a basic characteristic of an ICBM is the heat
that it generates during takeoff and re-entry into the atmosphere
and that hot metal is a good emitter of infrared radiation.
They go on to examine alternative means for detecting missile
launches from emitted radiation, observing the limitations of
airborne detection and suggesting that satellite-based detection
might be feasible.
Document
3: President's Science Advisory Committee, Report of
the Early Warning Panel, March 13, 1959. Secret
Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library
By March 1959, when the PSAC Early Warning Panel met, the Missile
Defense Alarm System (MIDAS) program--for the space-base
detection of missile launches--had been established and was in
the research and development phase. The report examines a number
of alternative approaches to missile launch detection-the Ballistic
Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) ground-based radars, a
fleet of U-2 aircraft equipped with infrared detection, as well
as MIDAS. With respect to MIDAS, the panel concluded that construction
of such a system was not yet justified.
Document
4:
DDR&E Ad Hoc Group, Report on MIDAS (Draft), November
1, 1961. Secret
Source: National Archives and Records Administration
The DDR&E Ad Hoc Group, consisting of governmental and
outside representatives, and chaired by Jack Ruina, head of
the Advanced Research Projects Agency, was appointed by Secretary
of Defense Robert McNamara to study the MIDAS program. The draft
version of the report-that would be finalized by the end of
the month-asserted that it was impossible to predict whether
an operationally significant version of MIDAS could be developed
within the following decade and examined the problems facing
any attempt to produce an effective, operational system.
Document
5: Harold Brown, Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force (Research and Development), Subject: MIDAS
System, June 25, 1962. Classification Unknown
Source: Freedom of Information Act
This memo was written at a time when there was still significant
doubt within the Defense Department as to whether the MIDAS
program could produce an operational system but strong belief
in the program within the Air Force and its contractors. Director
of Defense Research and Engineering Harold Brown warns the Air
Force not to try to deploy an operational constellation under
the cover of launching a series of research and development
satellites.
Document
6: B.A. Schriever, Commander, Air Force Systems Command
to Honorable Eugene M. Zuckert, Subject: DOD Program Change
(4.4.040) on MIDAS (239A), August 13, 1962. Secret
Source: Freedom of Information Act
In this letter to the Secretary of the Air Force, General Bernard
Schriever, commander of the Air Force Systems Command, conveyed
his concern over Secretary of Defense McNamara's order to the
Air Force, issued a week earlier, to drop all deployment plans
for MIDAS and reorganize the program. He questioned the Defense
Secretary's view on the declining future importance of early
warning, emphasized the need to make a commitment to deploy
a system, and disputed whether some of the alleged impediments
to development of a system were truly problems.
Document 7: Roswell L. Gilpatric,
Memorandum for the Secretary of the Air Force, Subject:
MIDAS, December 28, 1962. Secret
Source: Freedom of Information Act
On December 17, 1962, launch of the sixth MIDAS test satellite
failed after the booster broke up and exploded shortly after
launch. Eleven days later, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric
informed the Air Force secretary Eugene Zucker that the Defense
Department still considered it unwise to proceed with MIDAS
as an operational system and that a number of alternatives might,
collectively, provide the capability promised by the higher-risk
MIDAS.
Document
8: Adam Yarmolinsky, Memorandum for Mr. Timothy J. Rearden,
Special Assistant to the President, May 31, 1963 w/att: "A
MIDAS Satellite Was Successfully Launched by Air Force on 9
May 1963 from Vandenberg AFB." Secret
Source: Freedom of Information Act
The launch of MIDAS 7 represented a turning point in the battle
over whether space-based warning of missile launches was feasible.
The satellite's infrared sensor was to be tested against the
launch of Air Force and Navy missiles. Yarmolinsky's memo reports
on the results from the first half of the satellite's forty-seven
days in operation - and notes its sensor's successful detection
of each launch.
Document 9: Robert
E. McClellan, Space and Missile Systems Office, History of the
Space Systems Division, July - December 1965, October 1968 (excerpt)
Secret
Source: Freedom of Information Act
Despite the successful detections in 1963, MIDAS did not evolve
into an operational program. By 1965, it had been designated
Program 461-in keeping with security procedures that intended
to obscure the mission of each program. One component of the
program, involving the detection of submarine-launched missiles
was designated Program 266 in October 1965. This portion of
the SAMSO history explains plans for the Research Test Series
intended to help produce an operational space-based early warning
system.
Document 10: Robert F.
Piper, Space and Missile Systems Office, History of the Space
and Missile Systems Organization, 1 July 1967 - 30 June 1969,
Volume I, March 1970. (excerpt). Secret
Source: Freedom of Information Act
Developmental work on a space-based launch detection capability
continued into1966 and 1967 under Program 461. Meanwhile, on
November 1, 1966 the Air Force designated Program 949 as a follow-on
to 461. This portion of a SAMSO history discusses the objectives
of the new program, plans for further launches of developmental
satellites, the sensors the satellites were to carry, and plans
for an overseas ground station.
Document 11: Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center,
Synthesis of "Preliminary Analysis of the Project Hot Spot
IR Signals," December 7, 1973 and "Applications of
Infrared Tactical Surveillance," May 29, 1975. Unclassified
Source: Freedom of Information Act
While the DSP satellites were developed for the purpose of
detecting Soviet strategic missile launches, government personnel
and contractors involved in the program would soon discover
that the infrared sensor could also detect a number of other
events of interest - including the launch of shorter-range missiles
such as the Scud - a capability that would be of great value
in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. This synthesis describes the effort
made, at the Australian ground station, during the 1973 Yom
Kippur War to monitor Egyptian Scud launches employing the DSP
satellite located over the Horn of Africa.
Document 12: William
G. Hyland to Helmut Sonnenfeldt, December 13, 1975. Secret
Source: Freedom of Information Act
On five occasions in October and November 1975, a DSP satellite
(DSP-E) picked up intense infrared returns. On one instance
the illumination lasted for more than four hours. One fear was
that the satellite had been the target of Soviet lasers in an
attempt to test the Soviet ability to "blind" the
U.S. reconnaissance and surveillance satellites. This memo to
an aide to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger provides background
on the events and possible explanations. Ultimately, it was
concluded that the most likely source of the signals were pipeline
fires.
Document
13: Ellis E. Lapin, "Surveillance by Satellite,"
Journal of Defense Research, 8, 2 (Summer 1976), Secret
Source: Freedom of Information Act
Written by an individual who was involved in the DSP program
for several decades, and published in a classified journal,
this article provides technical details on the operation of
the infrared sensor, the data reduction process, the types of
data that can be produced by the satellite's infrared and nuclear
detonation detection sensors, the accomplishments of the program
since the first DSP launch in November 1970-which included the
detection of gas fires, midair collisions, large fires, and
surface-to-air missile activity.
Document 14: HQ ADCOM to HQ USAF,
Subject: Knowledge of the DSP System, October 10, 1980.
Classification Unknown
Source: Freedom of Information Act
The issue of how well the Soviet Union understood the capabilities
of U.S. reconnaissance and surveillance satellites was one that
continually concerned the operators of those systems. This message
is an attempt to provide some answers with regard to DSP.
Document 15: HQ ADCOM to
HQ USAF, Subject: Flight 9 Operational Status, April
14, 1981. Classification Unknown
Source: Freedom of Information Act
The ninth DSP satellite was placed into orbit on March 16,
1981 and stationed over the Atlantic. Two weeks later President
Ronald Reagan was wounded during an assassination attempt. This
memo, from the Aerospace Defense Command, noted problems with
the satellite and that it had generated false missile launch
warnings on two occasions-on April 5 and 13. The later false
reports "could have resulted in unacceptable posturing
of SAC [Strategic Air Command] forces," according to the
memo.
Document
16a: HQ SPACECOM to HQ USAF, Subj: Navy SLOW WALKER
Support, May 9, 1983
Document 16b: D.L. Ritchey,
"Backfire Supersonic Performance," Air Force Foreign
Technology Bulletin, May 27, 1975
Source: Freedom of Information Act
The discovery of DSP's detection of the infrared emissions
of Backfire aircraft assigned to Naval Aviation units flying
on afterburner led the Navy to establish a program to access
and exploit that data. The first document includes a rarely-seen
reference to the SLOW WALKER program. The second provides information
on the aircraft that was the main target of the program.
Document
17: Air Force Space Command, History of Space Command,
ADCOM, January - December 1984, n.d. (excerpt). Classification
Unknown
Source: Freedom of Information Act
This portion of the 1984 Air Force Space Command history describes
the events related to the DSP constellation that year. It discusses
movements of the satellites, problems with satellites, efforts
made to fix the problems, and future initiatives to provide
more capable sensors.
Document
18:
Air Force Space Command, History of Air Force Space Command,
January - December 1987, n.d. (excerpt). Classification
Unknown
Source: Freedom of Information Act
This portion of the 1987 Air Force Space Command history essentially
covers two topics-developments with the satellite constellation
that year as well as the controversy in Australia over the presence
of the Overseas Ground Station at Nurrungar. The debate over
the ground station's presence was heightened in 1987 due to
the publication of Desmond Ball's A Base for Debate, which examined
the ground station issue, which is discussed in detail in the
history.
Document
19: John Schenk, Air Force Space Command, Subject: European
Ground Station (EGS), Contingency Planning, March 2, 1990. Classification
Unknown
Source: Freedom of Information Act
In the 1980s, the DSP constellation was expanded from three
operational satellites to four. In addition to adding a satellite
to the space segment, a ground station was also added. In addition
to the stations at Buckley AFB, Colorado and Nurrungar, Australia
a station was added Kapaun, Germany (the European Ground Station).
With the collapse of the East German government in 1989, the
U.S. began to consider the possibility that a unified German
government might wish that foreign military forces vacate German
territory. This memo is one example of the contingency planning
that was initiated.
Document
20: Col. Glenn P. Doss, Air Force Space Command, Subject:
Deputy Commander (Woomera) Controversy, April 20, 1990.
Secret
Controversy over the Australian ground station was not restricted
to the debate over whether Australia should continue to provide
a home for the station. There was also a disagreement between
the United States and Australia over the powers of the Overseas
Ground Station Deputy Commander--a post held by an Australian--when
the American commander was not present. This memo is one of
several that addressed the issue.
Document
21:
Air Force Space Command, History of Air Force Space Command,
January - December 1990, n.d. Classification Not Available
Source: Freedom of Information Act
This extract from the 1990 history provides information on
DSP operations as well as the issues involving the ground stations
in Europe and Australia. With regard to the later it fills in
much of what is redacted from the Doss memo (Document 20)
Document
22:
HQ USSPACECOM to HQ USCENTCOM, Subj: Potential for Tactical
Application of Ballistic Missile Launch Notification, June
20, 1990. Secret
Source: Freedom of Information Act
From the very beginning of the DSP program it was clear that
the satellite's sensors could detect tactical as well as strategic
ballistic missiles-creating the possibility that DSP could be
used to provide warning and other information to commanders
in the field. With the end of the Cold War it was easier for
theater commanders to request DSP support. This memo responds
to a request from the U.S. Central Command for such support.
It provides information on U.S. Space Command's creation of
a system for the transmission of DSP data concerning tactical
missile launches, as well as on the data that DSP is capable
of providing.
Document 23: HQ USSPACECOM, Memorandum for Record, "DSP
Tactical Support," circa March 1991. Secret
Source: Freedom of Information Act
This memorandum recounts a meeting at U.S. Space Command headquarters
to resolve issues concerning the access to DSP and other technical data, mutual support of tactical warning efforts,
warning of strategic attack versus warning of theater missile
attack, and the use of DSP to support specific service programs.
Document 24: Air
Force Space Systems Division, DSP Desert Storm Summary Briefing,
June 1991. Secret
Source: Freedom of Information Act
During the 1991 Persian Gulf War DSP played a key role in providing
warning of Iraqi Scud missile launches (of which there 88)-whose
targets were in Bahrain, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. This heavily
redacted briefing provides some details of DSP capabilities
and performance during the war- including why DSP failed to
provide warning of the Scud that fragmented above Dhahran and
whose warhead fell onto a warehouse that was housing American
soldiers, killing 28 and wounding about 100.
Document
25: United States Space Command, United States Space
Command Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm Assessment,
January 1992. (extract) Secret
Source: Freedom of Information Act
The full assessment covers the contribution of a variety of
space systems to the operations that first halted Iraq's advance
and then forced the retreat of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The
extract reprinted here concerns the contribution of the DSP
satellites.
Document
26: Col. John Kidd and 1 Lt. Holly Caldwell, AIAA 92-1518,
DSP Support to a Changing World, AIAA Space Programs
and Technologies Conference, March 24-27, 1992, Huntsville,
Ala. Unclassified
Source: Freedom of Information Act
This briefing, given by the DSP program director, provides
a history of the DSP program-including such subjects as the
collection and processing of data by the satellite, improvements
in DSP capabilities, DSP ground stations, and the evolving missile
threat.
Document
27: Harry N. Waldron, History of the Space and Missile
Systems Center, October 1994 - September 1997, Volume I.
March 2002. (excerpt). For Official Use Only
Source: Freedom of Information Act
This extract from the SMSC history covers both past and current
DSP operations and capabilities as well as plans for the follow-on
system-the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS). Specific topics
discussed include satellite capabilities, ground stations, use
of DSP for tactical warning, and envisioned SBIRS capabilities.
Document
28: Space Based Infrared Systems (SBIRS) System Program
Office, Defense Support Program (DSP): A Pictorial Chronology
1970-1998, n.d. Unclassified
Source: Air Force Public Affairs
This booklet was prepared for a celebration of the Defense
Support Program. It provides a breakdown of different DSP "models"
and their capabilities, DSP program directors in the government
and industry, a launch history, the phases of the program, DSP
use in Operation Desert Storm, and information on DSP ground
stations.
Document
29: General Accounting Office, Case Study of the Air
Force Advanced Warning System, July 31, 1986. Unclassified
Source: General Accounting Office
Even before DSP had completed its first decade of operations,
thought was being given to a follow-on system - particularly
one that would be more survivable in the event of an actual
war with the Soviet Union. This document provides a history
of one of the early proposed follow-ons-the Advanced Warning
System.
Document 30a:
Assistant Secretary of Defense C3I, Report to the Congress
on the Follow-On Early Warning System, April 15, 1991.
Secret
Document 30b: Memorandum
for Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications
& Intelligence), Subject: Follow-On Early Warning System,
November 18, 1991. Secret w/att: Integrated Program Assessment
for the Follow-On Early Warning System
Source: Freedom of Information Act
The first report provided Congress with information, redacted
from the declassified version, on DoD's view on the need for
an improved system, DSP performance in Desert Storm, and the
objectives on the Follow-On Early Warning System (FEWS)-as the
planned successor to the DSP system was known at the time. The
remaining portion of the memo provides background, an explanation
of why the AWS was cancelled, the impact of the new system
on DSP ground stations, and acquisition plans. The second memo
and attached report focuses on the benefits of FEWS, the cost
drivers and tradeoffs, and risk assessment and risk reduction
plans.
Document
31: General Accounting Office, Early Warning Satellites:
Funding for Follow-On System is Premature, November 1991. Unclassified
Source: General Accounting Office
Despite DoD's support for FEWS, the General Accounting Office
was skeptical, as they explained in this report, that funding
of satellite development was currently justified. It examines
some of the history of the consideration of DSP follow-on programs,
and some possible alternatives to FEWS.
Document
32:
Maj. Gen. Garry Schnelzer, AFPEO/SP, Air Force Space Sensor
Study, April 12, 1993. Classification Unknown
Source: Freedom of Information Act
The cancellation of AWS and then criticism of FEWS, was part
of what would be a prolonged search for a follow-on system.
A major study in the search process was conducted by the Air
Force Program Executive Officer for Space. The study examined
the capabilities and costs of a number of alternative systems
- both in geosynchronous as well as low-altitude orbit - that
might be used for the missile launch detection mission.
Document 33: Guido W. Aru
and Carl T. Lunde, Aerospace Corporation, DSP-II: "Preserving
the Air Force's Options," Executive Overview, April
23, 1993. For Official Use Only
Source: Freedom of Information Act
The Schnelzer study recommended continuation of the FEWS program-a
recommendation that was popular in the Air Force and with the
U.S. Space Command. There were dissenters-both in the Aerospace
Corporation (which provided technical support to the Air Force
and National Reconnaissance Office) and the Space Systems Division
of the Air Force Systems Command.
This executive overview summarizes the results of a 500-page
study, which questioned some of the requirements established
for a follow-on to DSP (largely on the grounds that they were
relics of the Cold War) and proposed an alternative that the
authors believed would satisfy reasonable launch detection requirements
at far less cost.
Document
34: Letter, Charles Horner, CINC, US Space Command, to Pete
Aldridge, President, Aerospace Corporation, May 24, 1993. Unclassified
Source: Freedom of Information Act
Upon learning of the contents of the Aru and Lunde study (Document
30) U.S. Space Command commander-in-chief Charles Horner sent
this hand-written note to the Aerospace Corporation's president
expressing his anger at the report's contents.
Document
35: Col. Joe Bailey, System Program Director, Space-Based
Early Warning Systems, "Point Paper on DSP-II TOR,"
May 24, 1993. For Official Use Only
Source:
Freedom of Information Act
This point paper provides a concise background, overview, and
critique of the Aru and Lunde DSP-II report (Document 30), released
under the name of the head of the director of Space-Based Early
Warning Systems (responsible for both DSP and successor program)
of the Air Force Space and Missile System Center. The critique
focuses in part on the requirements not met by the proposed
alternative to FEWS. Other criticisms involved the projected cost
of the alternative as well as the tone of the report.
Document
36a: E.C. Aldridge Jr., President, Aerospace Corporation
To General Charles A. Horner, Commander, Air Force Space Command,
May 27, 1993. Unclassified
Source: Freedom of Information Act
Document 36b: E.C. Aldridge
Jr., President, Aerospace Corporation, To General Charles A.
Horner, June 22, 1993. Unclassified
Source: Freedom of Information Act
These two letters are responses by Aerospace Corporation president
Aldridge to General Horner concerning the DSP-II study (Document
30) - the first only a few days after Horner's handwritten complaint
of May 24 (Document 31). In his May 27 letter Aldridge states
Aerospace "clearly understands ... that the FEWS capability
is the only concept that satisfies the needs of the operational
commander."
Document
37: Report of the Space-Based IR Sensors/Technical Support
Group, October 1993. For Official Use Only
Source: Freedom of Information Act
While Aerospace Corporation analysts might not have been authorized
to produce a report questioning the need for FEWS, a review
group appointed by Under Secretary of Defense John Deutch was.
The group was headed by Robert Everett of the MITRE Corporation.
While the group did not support the DSP-II proposal, it also
suggested an alternative to FEWS. The group's report examined
the requirements associated with FEWS as well as capabilities
that a follow-on system needed to have and what type of system
would satisfy those requirements.
Document
38:
Guido William Aru, Statement before the House of Representatives
Committee on Government Operations, Legislation and National
Security Subcommittee, February 2, 1994. Unclassified
Source: House Committee on Government Operations
The controversy over the follow-on to DSP, which included charges
that FEWS opponents were being intimidated, was one topic of
early 1994 Congressional hearings on strategic satellite systems.
In his testimony Guido Aru provided his view of the issues involved,
the results of his research, as well as actions directed against
him and his co-author.
Document 39: Air Force Space Command,
SBIRS Overview Brief Combat Air Force Commander's Conference
16-17 November 1998, November 16-17, 1998. Classification
Unknown
Source: Freedom of Information Act
In 1995, the long process to find a successor to DSP appeared
to have concluded with the approval of the Space-Based Infrared
System (SBIRS) program. Among the topics covered by this briefing
are SBIRS mission areas, the SBIRS constellation, the allocation
of tasks to specific parts of the constellation, SBIRS connection
to national missile defense, and DSP detections of aircraft
explosions.
Document
40: General Accounting Office, Defense Acqusitions:
Space-Based Infrared System-low at Risk of Missing Initial Deployment
Date, February 2001. Unclassified
Source: General Accounting Office
In this report GAO specifies a number of reasons why it
believes that the SBIRS-Low system might miss its initial deployment
date--including the gap between the beginning of production and
the availability of test results and the immaturity of key satellite
technologies.
Document 41: General Accounting
Office, GAO-04-48, Defense Acquisitions: Despite Restructuring
SBIRS High Program Remains at Risk of Cost and Schedule Overruns,
October 2003, Unclassified
Source: General Accounting Office
Despite the optimism generated by the selection of SBIRS as
the DSP follow-on, problems emerged with the new sensors, which
were intended to be more capable than those carried on DSP spacecraft.
As result, projected costs increased substantially while the
date when the first SBIRS would be launched kept receding. This
General Accounting Office study provides a detailed examination
of the problems experienced by the SBIRS program as well as
an evaluation of remaining risks with regard to cost and schedule
delays.
Document 42: Office of
the Secretary of Defense, Report to the Defense and Intelligence
Committees of the Congress of the United States on the Status
of the Space Based Infrared System Program, March 2005. Unclassified
Source: Freedom of Information Act
This unclassified document, over fifty pages in length, provides
a description of the SBIRS mission, technical difficulties,
management adjustments, remaining areas of risk (with regard
to the ground and space segments), and assessments of the confidence
in cost and schedule projections.
Notes
1. Jeffrey T. Richelson, America's
Space Sentinels: DSP Satellites and National Security (Lawrence,
KS.: University Press of Kansas, 1999), pp. 8-9.
2. Ibid., p. 11; N.W. Watkins, "The MIDAS Project: Part I
Strategic and Technical Origins and Political Evolution 1955-1963,"
Journal of the British Interplanetary Society 50, 1997,
pp. 215-224.
3. Richelson, America's Space Sentinels,
pp. 14-37.
4. Ibid., p. 45.
5. William Beecher, "U.S. Lofts Satellite
for Spotting Attack by Soviet or China," New York Times,
November 7, 1970, pp. 1,9.
6. Richelson, America's Space Sentinels,
pp. 73-74, 129-130.
7. Ibid., p. 159; Department of Defense, Conduct
of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress (Washington,
D.C.: Department of Defense, 1992), p. 240.
8. Richelson, America's Space Sentinels,
pp. 95-109.
9. Ibid., pp. 137-156; Desmond Ball, A Base
for Debate: The US Satellite Station at Nurrungar (Sydney:
Allen & Unwin Australia, 1987).
10. Richelson, America's Space Sentinels,
pp. 177-221.
11. U.S. Air Force, Fact Sheet, "Space
Based Infrared Systems," October 2006.
12. Amy Butler, "In Recovery," Aviation
Week & Space Technology, June 4, 2007, pp. 24-26; "USAF
Decides to Buy Third SBIRS High from Lockheed," Space
News, June 25, 2007, p.3; Jeremy Singer, "For Troubled SBIRS Program, 3rd and 4th Craft Closely Tied," Space News, October 22, 2007, p. 4.
