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"Iraq
is not Afghanistan; U.S. should make commitment to Iraq like
Japan and Germany. Note military government idea did not go
down well."
- Overview, Future of Iraq Project
"The
period immediately after regime change might offer…criminals
an opportunity to engage in acts of killing, plunder, looting,
etc."
- Working Group on Transitional Justice in Iraq
"The
people of Iraq are being promised a new future and they will
expect immediate results. The credibility of the new regime
and the United States will depend on how quickly these promises
are translated to reality."
- Working Group on Transparency and Anti-corruption
Note:
The documents cited in this Electronic Briefing Book are in PDF
format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe
Acrobat Reader to view.
Washington,
DC, September 1, 2006 - The National Security
Archive is today posting State Department documents from 2002
tracing the inception of the "Future of Iraq Project,"
alongside the final, mammoth 13-volume study, previously obtained
under the Freedom of Information Act. "The Future of Iraq
Project" was one of the most comprehensive U.S. government
planning efforts for raising that country out of the ashes of
combat and establishing a functioning democracy. The new materials
complement previous postings on the Archive's site relating
to the United States' complex relationship with Iraq during
the years leading up to the 2003 invasion.
Background
on the Future of Iraq Project
Less than one month after the September 11 attacks, the State
Department in October 2001 began planning the post-Saddam Hussein
transition in Iraq. Under the direction of former State official
Thomas S. Warrick, the Department organized over 200 Iraqi engineers,
lawyers, businesspeople, doctors and other experts into 17 working
groups to strategize on topics including the following: public
health and humanitarian needs, transparency and anti-corruption,
oil and energy, defense policy and institutions, transitional
justice, democratic principles and procedures, local government,
civil society capacity building, education, free media, water,
agriculture and environment and economy and infrastructure.
Thirty-three total meetings were held primarily in Washington
from July 2002 through early April 2003. As part of the internal
bureaucratic battle for control over Iraq policy within the
Bush administration, the Department of Defense's Office of Reconstruction
and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), itself replaced by the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA) in May 2003, would ultimately assume
responsibility for post-war planning in accordance with National
Security Presidential Directive 24 signed on January 20, 2003.
According to some press accounts, the Defense Department largely
ignored the report, although DOD officials deny that.
The result of the project was a 1,200-page 13-volume report
that contains a multitude of facts, strategies, predictions
and warnings about a diverse range of complex and potentially
explosive issues, some of which have since developed as the
report's authors anticipated, and have contributed to miring
the U.S.-led nation-building experiment in disaster. The study's
existence has been known, and versions have leaked to the press
in the past. (Note 1) The report was marked
"For Official Use Only," a category reserved for information
that is deemed "sensitive but unclassified," which
means that it is not covered by any statute or regulation but
can still be withheld if government officials decide its disclosure
could "adversely impact" certain private or national
interests.
PART
I - The New Documents Cover Early Stages of the Future of Iraq
Project
The sample documents posted today were culled from 124 documents
released in full and 77 with excisions from State's Bureau of
Near Eastern Affairs. These materials provide a behind-the-scenes
look at the formation of 17 working groups consisting of "free"
Iraqis and experts, 14 of which met throughout 2002 and early
2003 to plan for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq.
In March 2002, the State Department sent a Congressional Notification
of $5 million to support the Future of Iraq Project. The first
planning meeting with Iraqis took place at the Middle East Institute
in Washington D.C. from April 9-10, 2002. At the meeting, five
"priority" working groups were identified: Public
Health and Humanitarian Needs, Water, Agriculture and Environment,
Public Finance and Accounts, Transitional Justice and Public
Outreach. (See 20020410)
Concurrently, a provisional list of 15 working groups with descriptions
dated April 30, 2002 was produced, including the Defense Policy
and Institutions Working Group, with the recommendation to "develop
plans for restructuring the Iraqi armed forces into playing
a depoliticized, positive and unifying role to share in rebuilding
Iraqi society." (See 20020430)
Approximately one year later, as one of his initial decisions
as Coalition Provisional Authority Administrator in Iraq, Ambassador
L. Paul Bremer would completely disband the Iraqi army.
Also among the new documents is an undated sample letter addressed
to an "Iraqi Opposition Group" from Ryan C. Crocker,
the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern
Affairs. In it, Crocker writes, "The United States Government
seeks your advice regarding the names of Iraqi and international
experts who can participate in a series of working groups that
will focus on planning now for a better and more democratic
future for the Iraqi people." (See 20020000)
The boilerplate text gives some insight into how the Department
went about identifying who to seek out for inside expertise
on the reconstruction effort.
Two documents in particular detail requirements for putting
on conferences and meetings of working groups, suggesting a
total outlay of $1,533,900 for setting up five initial working
groups and for convening a "mini-conference" in Europe
with about "40-50 Iraqis and 10 or so international experts
to report on the progress of the working reports." (See
20020500
and 20020501)
Regarding the politically delicate issue of compensation for
Iraqis taking part in the exercise, another undated Bureau of
Near Eastern Affairs/Near Gulf Affairs memorandum with the subject,
"Payment to Participants of Iraq Working Groups,"
emphasizes the importance of avoiding "the perception that
participants are receiving generous payments from the USG, which
might have negative consequences both for the participants and
for the interests of the US government in post-Saddam Iraq."
(See 20020001)
Instead, the memo proposes an "expert fee" to "certain
non-USG working group participants not associated with a funded
NGO (such as the Iraq Foundation)."
While the State Department -- temporarily at least -- took
the lead in the project, State officials naturally looked to
other departments for specialized help, although in hindsight
they displayed a highly optimistic view of the time commitment
required. A letter dated December 24, 2002 from Deputy Assistant
Secretary Crocker to former Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) Administrator Christine Todd Whitman, for example, requests
that the EPA's International Services Division provide "assistance
and expertise to the Water, Agriculture and Environment working
group, on a non-reimbursable basis, for the next three to six
months." (See 20021224)
The letter also asks that Iraqi-Americans working for the EPA
and willing to participate in the "Future of Iraq Project"
be "allowed to devote a significant portion of their professional
time to this project over the next three to six months."
The released background materials refer repeatedly to "Iraqis"
participating in the various working group sessions -- but without
specifying Sunni, Sh'ite or Kurd, thus testifying to the Administration's
hope for the emergence of a united, post-Iraq war identity,
which has proven to be a lingering challenge. What remains unavailable
are records of all the names and backgrounds of the more than
200 participants, along with State's criteria for selecting
those Iraqis. In a majority of the documents, the names are
excised, under the b(6) exemption (personal privacy). One exception
is the "Iraqi Spokespersons" document (also included
in the "Future of Iraq Project" Study Overview section),
which mentions 88 spokespersons for 12 of the working groups,
including Mr. Laith Kubba, a prominent Iraqi exile at Washington's
National Endowment for Democracy, who participated in the Democratic
Principles and Procedures Working Group. (See 20020002)
External experts like Dr. Peter Galbraith (formerly of the National
Defense University), Roberta Cohen (Brookings Institute) and
Marianne Leach (CARE USA) also assisted the Project (See 20020003
and 20020004).
Summaries and progress reports from the respective group meetings
reveal recommendations that would later be incorporated into
the "Future of Iraq" study. For example, according
to a summary of the Transitional Justice Working Group's first
meeting from July 9-10, 2002 in Washington, which included ten
Iraqi jurists and four international experts (names redacted),
"one Iraqi intellectual stated the question of the Ba'ath
Party is at the heart of the transition," and that "it
is not possible to equate party membership with criminalization."
(See 20020709)
In their final report, the Democratic Principles Working Group
would warn against a policy of total de-Ba'athification without
the reintegration of former Ba'athists into society. Additionally,
after the first session of this working group from September
4-5, 2002, with 30 Iraqis present, "Many participants sent
the message that the USG needs to prepare for a stay of five
to ten years." (See 20020904)
Another undated document, entitled "The Future of Iraq:
the Iraqi Component," discusses options for the post-war
government in Iraq, including a proposed 3-5 person "Sovereignty
Council," whose primary mission would be overseeing the
"transition to democracy" and would consist of members
of "the highest integrity, widely respected inside Iraq."
(See 20020005)
In the same document, what appears crossed out are suggested
names of the "best candidates" to sit on the Sovereignty
Council, like Adnan Pachachi, an Iraqi Sunni and former foreign
minister, as well as the line, "someone agreeable to both
Barzani and Talabani," referring to Massoud Barzani, the
current President of the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq,
and Jalal Talabani, the President of Iraq. Below the aforementioned
line, the document concludes, "too soon to start naming
candidates" and suggests a timeframe of 26-36 months for
"a new Iraqi government" to take office. Ultimately,
Bremer would appoint a 25-member Governing Council on July 13,
2003, which included Pachachi, Barzani and Talabani as members,
along with Ahmed Chalabi from the Iraqi National Congress and
Iyad Allawi, who served as prime minister of Iraq's interim
government following the dissolution of the CPA on June 30,
2004.
These new details begin to fill some of the many blank spots
that remain in the American public's understanding of the framework,
concepts and methodologies employed by State Department officials
in the daunting task of reconstructing post-conflict Iraq. In
the coming months, the National Security Archive will continue
to post new materials on the subject as they are released by
State and other agencies that played roles in this undertaking.
PART
II - The Future of Iraq Project Report: Working Group Recommendations
For now, the Future of Iraq study, released earlier this year
to the National Security Archive and other requesters under
the FOIA, remains the single most important documentary record
for understanding U.S. reconstruction planning. Along with posting
the report, a number of pertinent points are worth raising as
part of an analysis of its contents.
Immediately apparent in the final study are the glaring differences
in content length (6 pages devoted to education
and 44 on local
government, versus over 200 on transitional
justice) and organization, characterized by the uneven balance
between detailed, short, medium and long-term policy recommendations
featured more prominently in the transitional
justice, economy
and infrastructure and democratic
principles groups, and less so in the groups on public
health and humanitarian assistance (which only met from
October 16-17, 2002), education,
free media
and local government.
In another instance, the working group tackling refugees and
internally displaced persons never even met, only holding preliminary
discussions on a lingering dilemma that has concurrently embroiled
neighboring countries including Jordan and Syria.
In this vein, also absent are strategies on engaging Iraq's
neighbors during the early and long-term phases of the post-war
reconstruction, with the exception of the bleak warning, "Medium-term
problems of declining water quality in the Euphrates - real
political problems with Turkey and Syria coming." (Overview)
As a long-term project, the Water,
Agriculture and Environment group thus suggested that the
sharing of the Euphrates and Tigris headwaters resources "be
negotiated with Turkey and Syria." More directly, the ORHA
"Rock Drill" briefing by Colonel Tom Gross and Colonel
Paul Hughes, prepared after the February 21-22, 2003 post-war
game exercise (including officials from Pentagon, State and
CENTCOM, among others) organized by Jay Garner at the National
Defense University, recommended engaging "Turkey, Jordan,
Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait to develop policy and
plans for use of available water, power, medical and other goods
and services." (Note 2)
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, State's year-long project
predicted several of the ongoing challenges facing the U.S.-led
occupation.
- Law
and Order - The first working group, on Transitional
Justice, met in July 2002, consisting of over forty Iraqi
judges, law professors and legal experts. In addition to drafting
laws to try Saddam Hussein and his top associates for war
crimes by an Iraqi court, they warned in their March 2003
report, "The period immediately after regime change might
offer…criminals an opportunity to engage in acts of
killing, plunder, looting, etc." ("The
Road to Re-establishing Rule of Law and Restoring Civil Society")
Security threats of this nature have since proven to be one
of the more destabilizing elements in Iraq today.
- Police
Reform and Anti-corruption - Anticipating
the security vacuum in post-Saddam Iraq, the Transparency
and Anti-corruption working group called for the "rapid
reform and training of a new police force to deal with both
the normal routine preservation of law and order and…the
exceptional circumstances of popular acts of vengeance as
well as to combat the further development of criminal syndicates."
More specifically, the authors had suggested that "ex
military personnel, not associated with torture and corruption
in police activities," could play a part in recruiting
and training new police members. The issue has indeed become
a serious one. According to the May 22, 2006 New York
Times, "A 2006 internal police survey conducted
northeast of Baghdad found that 75 percent of Iraqis did not
trust the police enough to tip them off to insurgent activity."
Earlier, the "Future of Iraq" authors had asserted,
"Restoring the faith of the Iraqi populace in all government
institutions, and particularly the police, will be an important
part of changing a climate of fear, corruption, and avarice."
("Building
a New Iraq: Towards a Civil Society," Transparency and
Anti-corruption working group)
- De-Ba'athification
- The Democratic
Principles working group overwhelmingly endorsed de-Ba'athification
"of all facets of Iraqi life," with the caveat that
such a program "would not consist of the total abolition
of the current administration, since, in addition to its role
of social control, that structure does provide a framework
for social order." Those former Ba'athists who are not
reintegrated into society, most notably members of the Iraqi
army, the group foreshadowed, "may…present a destabilizing
element, especially if they are left without work or ability
to get work." (4.3.1, Democratic Principles working group)
Ultimately, CPA Order 1, issued by Administrator L. Paul Bremer
on May 16, 2003, eliminated in its entirety the Ba'ath Party's
structures and removed former members from positions of authority
in the "new" Iraq. This decision has since faced
intense scrutiny and considerable criticism from outside observers.
- Vital
Infrastructure - The Economy
and Infrastructure working group emphasized the importance
of restoring and running Iraq's electrical grid immediately
as a "key to water systems, jobs" asserting that
this could "go a long way to determining Iraqis' attitudes
towards Coalition forces" (Overview, Economy and Infrastructure).
It proposed that Iraq's state of electricity undergo a "complete
restructuring in terms of adding new generation capacity,
… transmission line capacity, … modern substations,
and adding [a] new communication system." According to
the media, the Pentagon made much rosier assumptions about
the condition of this sphere of Iraqi life. Three years after
the invasion, Iraq's Prime Minister, Nuri al-Maliki, has inherited
the unfulfilled task of improving the operation of Iraq's
electricity, water treatment and sewage which remain "at
or below prewar levels." As one Iraqi explained, "I
want the government to give me a generator so I can have electricity
during the summer heat." (Note 3)
- Effects
of UN Sanctions - A less publicized feature
of the "Future of Iraq" project is the recurring
theme of the detrimental, long-term effects of the multilateral
UN sanctions imposed on Iraq in 1990, challenging even the
study's authors in devising plans to rebuild the country's
infrastructure following the ouster of Saddam Hussein. Inadvertently,
they make a compelling case against the future implementation
of comparable, comprehensive sanctions. The Transparency
and Anti-corruption group noted: "The international
sanctions of the last decade have had the effect of expanding
endemic corruption and black market activities into every
sector of the economic life. Survival has been the only engine
of the Iraqi economy beyond direct government expenditures
for the past decade. The rules of expediency that dominate
and characterize economic life and the methodology of corruption
are difficult to remove and replace." Concomitantly,
the Economy
and Infrastructure working group referred to the sanctions'
impact on the collapse of Iraq's domestic economy by drastically
limiting "the use of fiscal and monetary measures as
economic policy instruments. When sanctions allow export for
oil only in return for a list of humanitarian goods in a country
whose economic well being depends largely on its exports of
oil, the scope of independent economic policy making in every
area is seriously constricted." Thus, the authors concluded
that "rebuilding domestic markets in a post-sanctions
environment will require both patience and ingenuity."
Concerning the humanitarian consequences of the sanctions,
the same working group added, "…women are bearing
the brunt of years of war and sanctions in Iraq. The past
decade had seen a decline in educational opportunities for
women, a jump in female illiteracy and rising poverty."
- Oil
- On a note of optimism, the study understood that Iraq's
oil reserves represented "a tremendous asset which can
be used to benefit every last citizen of the country, regardless
of ethnicity or religious affiliation." "Thus, the
most promising policy for the day after is oil policy."
(Economy
and Infrastructure working group) This enthusiasm was
echoed by former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz,
who told the House Appropriations Committee on March 27, 2003,
"We're dealing with a country that can really finance
its own reconstruction, and relatively soon." Iraqis
would not embrace the idea of having the Coalition run the
country's oil industry, the report underscored, because "nationalism
in Iraqi oil industry is very strong." (Overview, Oil
and Energy) Anchoring the Oil and Energy group's recommendations,
the authors called for the decentralization of the oil industry
in order to "resolve the economic impoverishment of the
country." (Oil
and Energy Working Group) Contrary to post-war expectations,
the country's oil industry has maintained its lowest level
of output since the invasion, pumping an average of 2 million
bpd, exacerbated by insurgent attacks on maintenance crews,
corruption and mismanagement, according to the Washington
Post. (Note 4)
- Foreign
Investment - Departing from the former regime's
centrally planned economy, the study advised "encouraging
economic growth by creating a favorable investment climate
for foreign investors" and "restoring the use of
fiscal and monetary policy instruments by creating its preconditions--a
diversified market economy, an up-to-date tax system, and
sound banks." (Economy
and Infrastructure working group) It also urged that Iraq
join the World Trade Organization as "an essential part
of [its] development strategy." (Oil
and Energy working group) On September 19, 2003, Bremer
signed CPA Order 39, which stipulated that "foreign investment
may take place in all parts of Iraq" (Section 6.2) and
that the "amount of foreign participation in newly formed
or existing business entities in Iraq shall not be limited"
(Section 4.2), resulting in the privatization of 200 state
companies. In conjunction, a majority of reconstruction contracts
were awarded to major US companies, including KBR, a subsidiary
of Halliburton, which in 2003 received a $2.4 billion no-bid
reconstruction contract from the Army.
- Religion
and Statehood - Without delving into the vexing
issue of religion in the formerly secular Iraq, the Democratic
Principles working group raised the question, "What,
if any, is the relationship which ought to exist between the
new Iraqi state and religion, specifically the religion of
the overwhelming majority of Iraqis, Islam? Rather than responding,
the authors essentially acknowledged the intractability of
the issue, declaring simply: "This is an important question
which ultimately only the people of Iraq can decide upon in
the course of their deliberations during the transitional
period." (8.3.2, Democratic Principles working group)
Today, many observers regard the largely unresolved religious
factor in the country's governing structures to be central
to the question of Iraq's political viability in the long-term.
The "Future of Iraq" project was not universally
embraced as a blueprint for the reconstruction of Iraq. Among
its critics, David Kay, the former Chief Inspector of the Iraq
Survey Group, said, "It was not a plan to hand to a task
force and say 'go implement.'" (Note 5)
Retired Colonel Paul Hughes, who had served as chief of the
Special Initiatives Office for ORHA and as the director of the
Strategic Policy Office for the CPA, concurred, adding that
while "it produced some useful background information it
had no chance of really influencing the post-Saddam phase of
the war." (Note 6) In the October 13,
2003 New York Times, one senior defense official conceded
that the project was "mostly ignored." He added, "State
has good ideas and a feel for the political landscape, but they're
bad at implementing anything. Defense, on the other hand, is
excellent at logistical stuff, but has blinders when it comes
to policy. We needed to blend these two together." But
the State Department's efforts did receive closer scrutiny and
win some adherents following the Iraqi invasion. After the fall
of Baghdad, one senior CPA official remarked, "It's our
bible coming out here." (Note 7
Notes
1. See, for example, Eric Schmitt and Joel
Brinkley, New York Times, October 13, 2003.
2. Briefing in possession of authors Michael
R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II, 2006: 529.
3. Omar al-Ibadi, Reuters, May 21, 2006.
4. Jim Krane, "Iraq Oil Output Lowest
Since Invasion," Washington Post, April 28, 2006.
5. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor,
Cobra II, 2006: 159.
6. Ibid.
7. Eric Schmitt and Joel Brinkley, New
York Times, October 13, 2003.
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