Recent newspaper stories about the debate over whether to
develop "mini-nuke" "bunker-busters" and
the implications of new weapons for the current nuclear test
moratorium (Note 1) is reminiscent of the
pressure put on the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations
to end a moratorium on nuclear weapons tests to allow testing
of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons. Pressures for nuclear
testing on both sides of the Cold War line ended the moratorium
and shaped the Limited Test Ban Treaty which the U.S. government,
the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union signed forty years
ago this week on 5 August 1963. Negotiated after years of
effort to finalize a comprehensive test ban, the LTBT addressed
the problem of fallout from nuclear tests by banning tests
in the atmosphere, underwater, and in outer-space. (Note
2)
A significant event in both Cold War history and the history
of nuclear policy, the treaty eased global anxiety over fallout
from nuclear tests but it also suggested the possibility of
a new era in US and Soviet relations. At the same time, the
treaty deepened the split between the Soviet Union and China,
which was determined to test nuclear weapons despite the treaty.
While France and China would ignore the LTBT and test weapons
in the atmosphere for years to come, the treaty was a significant
international public health success by eliminating the atmospheric
testing of the nuclear superpowers. Nevertheless, the limited
test ban signified a deeper failure to negotiate the comprehensive
test ban that proponents saw as important for curbing nuclear
proliferation and checking the U.S.-Soviet arms competition.
Indeed, the LTBT facilitated superpower nuclear arms development
by making underground nuclear tests a routine event. Forty
years later, diplomats have negotiated a comprehensive test
ban treaty (CTBT) that bars all nuclear weapons tests, but
the United States and other major powers have yet to ratify
it.
This electronic briefing book begins with an overview of
the unsuccessful attempt between 1958 and 1963 to negotiate
a comprehensive nuclear test ban and the political dilemmas
that forced London, Moscow, and Washington to negotiate a
limited treaty. A selection of sixty-five declassified U.S.
government documents on the treaty negotiations follows; most
of them are published here for the first time. The documents
illustrate the concerns that drove the U.S. negotiating position--world
public opinion, pressure from allies, the status of the Soviet
nuclear weapons program, and concern about the proliferation
of nuclear capabilities. The documents also illustrate the
major controversies over verifying nuclear test ban treaties,
especially U.S. and British pressures for an international
inspection system. (Note 3)
The
Test Ban and Politics, 1955-1960
The Kennedy Administration holds the distinction of signing
off on the first test ban treaty, but the concept of an agreement
prohibiting nuclear tests emerged during the mid-1950s, when
Dwight D. Eisenhower was U.S. President and Nikita Khrushchev
was consolidating his leadership position in the Soviet Union.
Through 1958, both superpowers routinely held atmospheric
nuclear tests; between 1953 and 1958, the United States and
the Soviet Union, along with the United Kingdom, held a total
of 231 atmospheric tests. (Note 4) These
tests, some of which were of massive proportions, increased
global public apprehension over atomic weapons, especially
the dangers of radioactive fallout. The danger of fallout
exposure received wide publicity as Hiroshima victims ("the
Hiroshima Maidens") visited the United States for treatment.
Especially prominent was the case of the Japanese fishing
ship Lucky Dragon whose crew encountered fallout produced
by the fifteen megaton "Bravo" shot on 28 February
1954--an explosion whose explosive yield was the equivalent
of 1,000 Hiroshima bombs. Radiation exposure certainly played
a role in the death of one crew member. (Note
5)
Denying that atmospheric testing caused adverse health effects,
the Atomic Energy Commission went on the attack against critics.
But the AEC's own internal studies raised questions about
fallout contamination, especially the impact of strontium-90
(radiostrontium) on the food supply. During the 1960s, AEC
scientists and advisers would look closely at the impact of
radioiodine on the thyroid. Although debate about the impact
of low doses of radioactivity continues, a study completed
in 2001 by the National Cancer Institute-Center for Disease
Control tentatively concluded that exposure to fallout from
nuclear tests during the 1950s was associated with an increase
in U.S. cancer mortalities; fallout exposure may have caused
more than 11,000 deaths. (Note 6)
Growing concern over fallout fostered politically influential
antinuclear activism around the world. Adlai Stevenson, the
Democratic Party's presidential candidate in 1952 and 1956,
took strong positions in favor of a test ban. (Note
7) Dwight D. Eisenhower was personally interested in halting
nuclear tests but his administration was divided. Top advisors,
such as Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Lewis Strauss fervently
supported testing and downplayed the fallout problem. Strauss
along with senior Pentagon officials agreed that testing was
necessary to maintain the U.S.'s superiority over the Soviets
in nuclear weapons technology. (Note 8) Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles, along with Eisenhower himself,
realized that a moratorium on nuclear testing leading to a
comprehensive ban test ban would improve the US's image. During
a May 1954 National Security Council meeting, the 
president
stated "We could put [the Russians] on the spot if we
accepted a moratorium. . . Everybody seems to think that we're
skunks, saber-rattlers and warmongers. We ought not miss any
chance to make clear our peaceful objectives." (Note
9) Nevertheless, Eisenhower was reluctant to oppose the
AEC and the issue was stalemated.
The dynamics of the test ban issue changed in significant
ways during 1958. Eisenhower's prestigious President's Science
Advisory Committee (PSAC), upgraded in the wake of the Sputnik
crisis developed significant arguments on the merits of test
limitations and the possibilities of verifying a test ban.
The Soviets, who had been calling for a test ban since the
mid-1950s, took a major initiative in early 1958 when they
called for an American-British-Soviet test moratorium. At
the end of March, the Soviets announced that they were unilaterally
halting nuclear tests. This put Washington under great political
pressure. As a first step, before making any decisions on
a moratorium, Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Harold
Macmillan reached an agreement with Khrushchev to sponsor
an international conference of scientific experts to discuss
the problem of monitoring and verifying a test ban. This was
a key issue because detecting nuclear tests, especially underground
detonations, involved so many complex scientific and technical
problems. (Note 10)
The Conference of Experts met in Geneva during the summer
of 1958 and closely studied the major methods for detecting
nuclear tests: air sampling, acoustics, seismic, and electromagnetic.
University of California physicist (and winner of the 1939
Nobel Prize) Ernest Lawrence led the U.S. delegation. Despite
some U.S.-Soviet disagreements over the feasibility of telling
apart underground tests and earthquakes, Cold War rifts did
not prevent the participants from producing a report. The
experts concluded that a network of 170 control posts in and
around Eurasia and North America would be able to detect atmospheric
tests down to one kiloton and 90 percent of underground tests
down to five kilotons. Where the report was ambiguous was
who would work at the posts and how the international organization
that oversaw verification would decide whether an on-site
inspection was necessary to confirm whether an illegal nuclear
test had occurred. (Note 11)
Despite some ambiguities, the Geneva report was positive
enough to facilitate a U.S. decision to participate in a moratorium.
On 22 August 1958, the day after the experts had finished
their report, Eisenhower announced that the United States
would halt nuclear testing for one year if the Soviet Union
(and the United Kingdom) would do likewise. To determine whether
they would make the moratorium permanent, the three powers
agreed to begin test ban negotiations in Geneva on 31 October.
All three countries had last-minute nuclear tests during September
and October. (Note 12)
The Geneva test ban negotiations, which lasted from late
1958 through early 1962, were difficult and protracted largely
because of continued controversy over the requirements of
verification. The United States consistently pushed for on-site
verification to ascertain whether a questionable event was
an earthquake or a nuclear test. Some of the pressure was
based on a firm belief that remote instrumentation was not,
in itself, sufficient to conclude whether a suspicious event
was a test or not. Significantly influencing U.S. policy thinking
about inspection was the conviction that it was a way to open
up Soviet society to "qualified observers", as Eisenhower
put it in early 1959.
The Soviets insisted on what amounted to a veto over on-site
inspections by the control commission with the control posts
to be staffed mainly by the host country. While the Soviets
eventually dropped the veto requirement, another complicating
element was new U.S. information suggesting (erroneously as
it turned out) that the Geneva experts report had significantly
understated the difficulty of differentiating between underground
tests and earthquakes. Critics of the moratorium developed
elaborate theories on how a test ban could be evaded while
the Pentagon constantly pressed for a resumption of testing.
Senior officials such as Christian Herter (who succeeded Dulles
as Secretary of State) were willing to settle for an "imperfect"
system on the grounds that it would provide enough incentives
to discourage cheating, but conservative Republicans in the
Senate insisted on an ironclad system. (Note
13)
Various efforts to break the stalemate failed and disagreements
increased in late 1959 when the U.S. and the British tried
to prompt a discussion of the problem of seismic detection
in the light of the new data. Nevertheless, differences narrowed
during the spring of 1960. The negotiators reached an agreement
on a threshold test ban that would forbid atmospheric, outer-space,
and underwater tests, except for small underground tests,
on which a moratorium would be placed. At that point, the
three powers would have to resolve two issues at the highest
level: the number of inspections in each country and how long
the moratorium would last. (Note 14) The
possibility that an agreement would be reached at the Paris
Summit in May 1960 disappeared, however, in the wake of the
shoot-down of a U.S. U-2 reconnaissance plane flying over
Soviet territory on 1 May 1960. While the talks at Geneva
continued, disagreements over verification were not likely
to be overcome in the harsh post-U-2 crisis environment.
Kennedy
and the Test Ban
The administration of John F. Kennedy would continue the
test ban negotiations, but with even greater pressures to
resume testing. Like Eisenhower, Kennedy had to face pressure
from the Pentagon and the nuclear weapons laboratories, on
the one hand, and international political pressure favoring
a test ban on the other hand. Khrushchev was also under pressure
from the Soviet military to break the moratorium and he made
the first move on 1 September 1961. The moratorium collapsed
during an unfolding U.S.-Soviet crisis over the status of
West Berlin and the resumption of testing contributed to the
tensions. Kennedy followed with underground testing in mid-September
1961, but delayed atmospheric testing until the spring of
1962. Both sides tested more than 200 weapons during 1961
and 1962. (Note 15)
Besides his interest in meeting international opposition
to testing, and political pressure from such Democratic influentials
as Senator Hubert Humphrey (Mn), one of Kennedy's central
motives in seeking a test ban treaty was to check the proliferation
of nuclear weapons. In 1961, only four nations, the U.S.,
USSR, United Kingdom and France, had tested nuclear weapons.
Other countries such as China and Israel were on the verge
of attaining independent nuclear capabilities. Kennedy and
his advisers, including prominently Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara, worried that the global 
proliferation
of nuclear capabilities would make the world far more dangerous.
Thus, during a 21 March 1963 news conference, Kennedy expressed
his concern when he said, "I see the possibility in the
1970's. . . [of] the United States having to face a world
in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations may have these [nuclear] weapons.
I regard that as the greatest possible danger and hazard."
With a comprehensive test ban in place, however, would-be
proliferants would face greater international pressures not
to test and the possibility of detection could deter cheating.
(Note 16)
Among the would-be nuclear powers that concerned the Kennedy
administration, China's nuclear ambitions were the source
of great apprehension and a central consideration in Kennedy's
drive for a test ban. Mao Zedong and the Chinese leadership
had decided to push forward on nuclear weapons development
during the mid-1950s, soon after a confrontation with the
U.S. over Taiwan. Washington's stance was that the potential
threat to global stability posed by a nuclear China necessitated
a test ban agreement. Kennedy and his advisors believed that
a nuclear-armed China would pose a serious threat to U.S.
national security and win greater influence in Asia, limiting
U.S. influence in the region. (Note 17)
Senior Kennedy administration officials considered options
to prevent the Chinese from obtaining nuclear weapons, including
possible military action. They agreed that the best course
of action for curbing China's nuclear project, or at least
isolating Beijing from the rest of the world, was to sign
a test ban treaty with the Soviet Union. Such a treaty would
raise international pressure on China, and other countries,
to halt their efforts to arm themselves with nuclear weapons.
If there was a treaty in place and the Chinese still did not
halt their weapons program, Kennedy and his advisors considered
the possibility of a joint United States and Russian understanding
on military action against China. (Note 18)
Kennedy's staff reasoned that such a deal was possible with
the Russians because they, like the US, had to be aware that
China's weapons could just as easily strike Russia as they
could the United States. CIA official Sherman Kent pointed
out that the USSR would be loathe to see atomic weapons in
China because in the event that China took aggressive action
against a U.S. ally in East Asia, the Soviets would have to
make a decision: "Whether to stand by and see China .
. . knocked into a cocked hat [by the United States], or whether
to come to China's defense. . ." (Note
19) The latter course of action could force the Soviet
Union into an unwanted nuclear war with the United States.
The Soviets too, had their own fears of proliferation, which
contributed to their interest in a test ban. Soviet concern
centered on the possibility of an independent West German
nuclear capability as well as the U.S. proposal to establish
a Multilateral Force (MLF), which would involve continental
Western European allies in a sea-based nuclear force. While
the Kennedy administration saw the MLF as a way to check any
West German nuclear aspirations, the Soviets continued to
view the MLF with alarm. During discussions and negotiations
between the two nations, those issues arose repeatedly. When
meeting with Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin in August
1962, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk noted that while the
U.S. and the Soviets differed in opinion on which countries
would be more of a threat with nuclear armaments, "surely
we could agree that [the U.S. and Soviet Union] would both
be better off if none of them developed nuclear weapons."
(Note 20)
Some U.S. intelligence officials were not so confident that
Russia could influence the PRC decision to proceed with their
weapons program. For example, in October 1962, CIA Deputy
Director of Intelligence Ray S. Cline observed that China
would continue with its plans, and that the Soviets were not
likely to obtain "the leverage to produce a change in
this decision." (Note 21)
Whatever impact a treaty would have on China, the Kennedy
and Macmillan continued to negotiate with the Soviets. Pressures
from the Joint Chiefs to continue testing indefinitely complicated
the U.S. position and the verification problem remained a
critically important obstacle to agreement. During the early
1960s, a quota of 20 inspections annually was the standard
figure in U.S. discussions, based on the idea of a sampling
20 percent of unidentified seismic events in Soviet territory.
The Soviets, however, would only accept limited numbers of
inspections--three was the usual figure--but in late 1961
they reversed course insisting on reliance on national means
of verification. By the end of 1962, however, Khrushchev showed
some give suggesting that he was open to 2 or 3 inspections.
While the administration had treated 8 to 10 inspections annually
as sufficient to deter cheating, it treated the issue with
some flexibility and Kennedy was willing to consider 6 or
even 5 as long as there was agreement on arrangements for
inspection. The Soviets, however, showed no give on this issue.
Indeed, Khrushchev hated the idea of international inspectors
on Soviet territory; he later wrote in his memoirs that if
Moscow had allowed inspectors in, "they would have discovered
that we were in a relatively weak position." (Note
22)
Secretary of Defense McNamara saw some risk in the U.S. position
on inspections, but believed that the United States would
be in a worse situation in a world where nations were free
to test nuclear weapons. As he explained during an interagency
discussion, "the risk to the United States without a
test ban treaty was greater than with a test ban treaty."
(Note 23)
Kennedy and McNamara faced fierce internal and external criticism.
They could not count on the support of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, who were deeply skeptical of the administration's stance
during the test ban negotiations. Not only were the Chiefs
concerned about verification, especially of underground tests,
they believed that continued nuclear testing was central to
national security. As they argued in April 1963, "only
through an energetic test program in all environments can
the United States achieve or maintain superiority in all areas
of nuclear weapons technology." If the Chiefs testified
against a treaty during Senate hearings, their opposition
would doom the administration's plans. Edward Teller, the
former director of Livermore 
Radiation
Laboratory, was a prominent critic of the test ban movement;
he supported continued testing and, of course, argued that
the possibility of clandestine underground testing made a
comprehensive agreement unworkable. (Note 24)
The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, an event that brought the
United States and the Soviet Union close to the brink, renewed
public concern over the danger of nuclear war. The dangers
of the crisis increased interest on both sides in making progress
on the test ban treaty. Yet, it also became evident that an
agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty was impossible
because the negotiators failed to reach agreement on the modalities
of on-site inspection for verification purposes. After U.S.,
British, and Soviet negotiators had failed to reach an agreement,
an irritated Khrushchev told the British ambassador that the
U.S. and British scientists who favored an inspection system
were "only scientists employed by US and British government
which were seeking to introduce spies into USSR." (Note
25) Yet, until the late spring of 1963, Khrushchev rejected
out of hand a limited agreement, banning all but underground
tests. (Note 26)
Secret backchannel communications between Kennedy, Macmillan,
and Khrushchev, then President Kennedy's speech at American
University in June 1963, broke the ice. Praising Kennedy's
speech, which called for a reduction of Cold War tensions
and a fresh effort on the test ban talks, as "balm,"
Khrushchev said it was the "best speech by any president
since Roosevelt." The better political atmosphere reenergized
diplomacy and during the following weeks the three powers
agreed to a new round of high-level discussions in Moscow,
with attention focusing on a three environment test ban (atmospheric,
outer space and underwater) agreement that had been broached
by the United States in 1959, 1961, and 1962. For the special
mission to Moscow, Lord Hailsham and W. Averell Harriman represented
London and Washington respectively. (Note 27)
While the Soviets had a complex political agenda, such as
an East-West non-aggression pact that they sought to link
to the test ban, Harriman and Hailsham only gave Moscow lip
service on those issues and focused attention on negotiating
a limited agreement while discretely probing Khrushchev's
thinking on China. As the treaty negotiations unfolded, the
Sino-Soviet quarrel intensified not least because Beijing
saw the Soviet role in the test ban talks as explicitly anti-PRC.
(Note 28) Harriman believed that Khrushchev
wanted to use the test ban against the Chinese to isolate
them as "the only nation refusing to cooperate on this
highly emotional subject" (not quite the only, France
would also refuse to sign). The Chinese understood this perfectly
well and during more or less simultaneous talks with Mao's
representative, Deng Xiaoping, the latter vigorously attacked
Moscow's positions on a range of issues. While Kennedy had
instructed Harriman to probe the Soviets on the possibility
of joint action against the Chinese nuclear program, Khrushchev
was unresponsive to U.S. hints that Moscow ought to be concerned
about a Chinese nuclear capability. Indeed, Khrushchev argued
that once Beijing had nuclear "means" they would
be "more restrained." (Note 29)
By late July, American, British, and Soviet negotiators had
reached agreement on the text of the Limited Test Ban Treaty,
which the British, Soviet, and U.S. governments signed in
Moscow on 5 August 1963. Banning testing in the atmosphere,
underwater, and in space, the treaty left open only the possibility
of underground testing, a more expensive procedure. Some of
Kennedy's advisers, recognizing that a would-be nuclear power
could develop weapons through underground tests, were not
sure whether an atmospheric test ban could check nuclear proliferation.
Nevertheless, they "believed it was worth a try."
(Note 30)
Once the treaty was signed, the administration waged a major
campaign to win Senate ratification. Neutralizing important
opposition, the Joint Chiefs approved the LTBT as long as
the White House met its conditions on nuclear testing and
expanding national means to monitor the treaty. Like Eisenhower,
Kennedy treated the issue as a bipartisan question and lobbied
to win over doubtful Senate Republicans. The Republican ultra-right
and pro-testing scientists such as Edward Teller attacked
the treaty but years of campaigning by anti-nuclear activists
and White House efforts to develop support for the treaty
paid off; the LTBT enjoyed wide public approval. On 24 September
1963, the Senate ratified the treaty by a vote of 80 to 19.
Kennedy completed ratification by signing it into law on 5
October 1963. (Note 31)
In the following years, 108 countries signed the Limited
Test Ban Treaty, the major exceptions being France and China.
Although the Americans, British, and Soviets stopped atmospheric
testing, China and France saw the treaty as an example of
superpower hypocrisy and never signed it. (Note
32) The Chinese exploded their first nuclear device on
16 October 1964 and held 22 more atmospheric tests through
1980. France held 50 atmospheric tests in the South Pacific
from the mid-1960s through the mid-1970s.
As the Cold War came to an end, the movement for a test ban
revived. A new moratorium on testing began in the early 1990s
(although later broken by India and Pakistan) and a comprehensive
test ban treaty was negotiated under United Nations auspices.
The United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, and China
signed the CTBT in 1996. Technologies to monitor and detect
underground nuclear tests have improved significantly to the
point where tests above one kiloton in any environment are
detectable with "high probability." Nonetheless,
Senate Republicans blocked the treaty during the 1990s and
presidential candidate George W. Bush attacked the CTBT on
the grounds that it could not be verified or enforced. Thus,
among the 1996 signatories, China and the United States have
yet to ratify the CTBT. (Note 33)
Documents
Note: The following documents are in
PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free
Adobe
Acrobat Reader to view.
Part
I: The Eisenhower Administration
Document 1: Armed Forces Special Weapons
Project, "Technical Analysis: Radioactive Fall-Out Hazards
from Surface Bursts or Very High Yield Nuclear Weapons,"
May 1954, Excised Copy
Source: Department of Energy, FOIA release
This document is an analysis of the effects of radiological
fallout produced by the notorious Castle Bravo test held in
the South Pacific of 28 February 1954, whose yield, 15 megatons,
far exceeded the 8 megatons that the weapons testers anticipated.
Producing what has been called the "worst radiological
disaster in American history," the fallout from BRAVO
spread hundreds of miles touching the crew of the Lucky
Dragon and generating a storm of controversy around the
world. (Note 34) This technical analysis,
prepared by the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project--the
predecessor of today's Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)--discussed
the size and patterns of fallout and how variables such as
wind can affect the movement and scope of fallout. The conclusions
showed the deadly power of the Bravo shot: the detonation
of a 15 megaton weapon contaminated "very large areas"
on the order of 5,000 square miles "in such intensities
as to be hazardous to human life." The "radioactive
fall-out hazard [was] a primary anti-personnel effect"
of such high-yield weapons.
Document 2: "Report of NSC Ad
Hoc Working Group on the Technical Feasibility of a Cessation
of Nuclear Testing," 27 March 1958
Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Records of the Special
Assistant for Science and Technology--Bethe Report
In the fall of 1957, as a consequence of the political shock
caused by Sputnik, President Eisenhower upgraded the role
of scientists on the White House staff by appointing MIT president
James Killian as his science adviser and by creating the President's
Science Advisory Committee (PSAC). Hans Bethe, the Cornell
University physicist (and future Nobel Prize winner), served
on PSAC and chaired a special National Security Council ad
hoc working group on nuclear tests. The Bethe report was a
significant step in the efforts by White House science advisers
to mobilize arguments and information that would convince
President Eisenhower to support a nuclear weapons test ban.
Especially significant was the conclusion that a test ban
would leave the United State with important technical advantages
over the Soviets: by the end of 1958, the "U.S. should
be ahead of the USSR in nearly all weight classes [of nuclear
weapons]," although smaller, lighter weight weapons and
so-called "clean weapons" will not have "reached
ultimate performance." Moreover, the Bethe panel argued
that it was technically feasible to verify a comprehensive
test ban through a combination of monitoring stations, on-site
inspection, and overflights. "With such a system agreed
to and implemented the Working Group feels that the USSR could
not utilize testing to improve significantly its nuclear weapons
capability, except for small yields without running a great
risk of being detected." Nevertheless, the panel acknowledged
the difficulty of detecting underground tests, a problem that
would dog the test ban movement for years. (Note
35)
Document 3: Letter from Philip J. Farley,
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy,
to Joseph J. Wolf, Director, Office of Political Affairs,
United States Mission to NATO and European Regional Organizations
(USRO), 28 March 1958
Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Department of
State Records (hereinafter RG 59), Records of the Special
Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy and
Outer Space, Records Relating to Atomic Energy Matters, 1944-1963,
box 349, 18.14 Weapons Test Moratorium f. Unilateral Suspension
by the USSR, 1958
In light of Moscow's campaign for a halt in nuclear tests,
analysts at the State Department looked closely at Soviet
motives. During mid-1950s discussions, Soviet diplomats had
made the argument that a ban on nuclear testing would raise
barriers to "countries which do not yet possess [nuclear
weapons]" because they could not be developed without
testing. Writing on behalf of himself, intelligence analyst
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, and European affairs specialist Robert
McBride, Farley suggested that the "Soviets probably
do believe that a test ban would be a relatively cheap way
of stopping or at least inhibiting fourth country nuclear
weapons capability." This could raise obstacles to U.S.
nuclear weapons cooperation with NATO Europe but it could
also help the Soviets "resist any pressure" from
China and other "satellites" for the delivery of
nuclear weapons.
Document 4: Department of State memorandum
of conversation (hereinafter, memcon), "Meeting with
Disarmament Advisors," 28 April 1958, excised copy
Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Office of the Special
Assistant for Science and Technology, box 1, Disarmament -
General April 1958
During Eisenhower's second term, the Secretary of State,
John Foster Dulles and his successor Christian Herter, met
regularly with a special panel of disarmament advisers, such
former senior officials and Northeastern establishment luminaries
as Robert Lovett and John J. McCloy. During this meeting,
Secretary of State Dulles expressed his concern about the
need for U.S. action to neutralize its international image
as a "militaristic" nation. A move toward peace
such as a nuclear test ban would give the United States a
propaganda coup over the Soviet Union. Besides a test ban,
Dulles laid out a variety of disarmament proposals, including
a cut-off of fissionable materials production and "the
idea that outer space … be used only for peaceful purposes."
While Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Lewis Strauss strongly
objected to a halt in nuclear testing, Dulles argued that
failure to take arms control measures could cause the loss
of major allies such as Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
"Do we want further refinement of nuclear weapons at
the cost of the moral isolation of the United States?"
Document 5: Department of State memcon,
"U.S. Policy on Nuclear Tests," 13 August 1958
Source: National Archives, RG 59, decimal files, 1955-1959,
700.5611/8-1358
This discussion, held just as the Geneva Conference of Experts
was winding up, further illuminates the internal U.S. government
controversy over participation in a nuclear test ban agreement.
The Geneva conference had developed a proposal for an international
monitoring system that would permit relatively high confidence
(80 to 90 percent) in detecting atmospheric and underground
tests, but senior scientists in the nuclear weapons establishment
engaged in controversy over whether it was possible to conceal
underground tests. Thus, Edward Teller, the director of Livermore
Radiation Laboratory, a major opponent of a test ban, argued
that it would be possible to "dampen" the seismic
signals produced by underground tests while Carson Mark, of
Los Alamos Laboratory, took a contrary view. During this meeting,
strong Defense and AEC views in favor of continued testing
surfaced. The new Atomic Energy Commissioner, shipping magnate
John McCone argued that the United States should not stop
testing because negotiations were "likely to go on indefinitely."
Presidential science adviser James Killian suggested, however,
that it was worth taking a chance because "the talks
at Geneva had accomplished something never achieved before
in the way of serious discussions of disarmament controls."
Document 6: Memorandum for the Files
of Lewis L. Strauss, 20 August 1958
Source: Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, Lewis Strauss
Papers, box 69, AEC Memo for the Record
This record of a meeting with President Eisenhower, prepared
by former Atomic Energy Commissioner Lewis Strauss, reflects
his displeasure over White House and State Department decisions
in favor of U.S. participation in a nuclear test moratorium.
Livermore Laboratory director Edward Teller had wanted McCone
to lobby Eisenhower, but the new AEC director did not want
a confrontation and asked Strauss to intervene. While Strauss
saw the decision on testing as a triumph for the Russians
and the U.S. Democrat Party opposition, Eisenhower argued
that the flaw in the AEC position was that "it offered
no prospect except an arms race into the indefinite future."
Eisenhower and Strauss did agree, however, to meet Macmillan's
request for nuclear weapons design information; that would
assure British participation in the test moratorium as well
as allow London, in Macmillan's words, to "take [its]
proper station in the defense of the free world." (Note
36)
Document 7: Department of State memcon,
"October 31 US-UK-USSR Negotiations on the Suspension
of Nuclear Tests," 30 September 1958
Source: National Archives, RG 59, decimal files 1955-1959,
700.5611/9-3058
Despite Eisenhower's approval of the moratorium, such influentials
as Edward Teller did not hide their doubts. Pointing out to
"loopholes" in the Geneva system, such as the problem
of detecting small nuclear explosions or "interplanetary"
tests, he observed that Livermore Radiation Laboratory was
especially interested in the problem of developing small nuclear
weapons, with several small-yield "tactical" and
"defensive" devices to be tested before the moratorium
began. Noting the lack of knowledge about "what the Soviets
had "done in this yield range," Teller constructed
an argument about the possibility of concealing underground
tests by reducing the "coupling of the energy of nuclear
explosion by one-third or even one/tenth." Given this
problem, Teller sought an opening for underground nuclear
tests in a partial test ban system, such as permitting tests
"that could not be detected by the system" or with
yields below a specified magnitude.
Document 8: Department of State memcon,
"Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations," 18 November
1958
Source: National Archives, RG 59, decimal files 1955-1959,
700.5611/11-1858
On 18 November 1959, PSAC member Hans held a "private,
delicate" discussion on the negotiations with acting
secretary of state Christian Herter. While the talks were
going "slowly" Bethe saw the Soviet commitment to
the verification plans developed by the conference of experts
as a "hopeful" point. One sticking point was the
U.S. insistence that a test ban treaty be linked to progress
on disarmament generally; Bethe was not the only one who believed
that this position was unworkable and within a few months
Washington would officially abandon it. When Herter asked
about the impact of a long-term test moratorium on the U.S.
nuclear position, Bethe argued that the U.S. nuclear establishment
was "in a far better position to continue nuclear weapons
development" because it was ahead of the Soviets in understanding
of the inner workings of nuclear weapons ("diagnostics").
Perhaps thinking about Teller's arguments in favor of testing,
Herter asked whether the U.S. needed to "improve [its]
small weapons position." Bethe replied that improvements
were possible but that it was not a critically important issue:
Washington had weapons of "every type in every yield."
He was more concerned about the British position on verification
because he believed that they would "be willing to settle
for substantially less than we will" on the grounds that
any controls that the Soviets accepted would be "gravy."
Document 9: Memorandum from President's
Science Adviser James Killian to Acting Secretary of Defense
Donald Quarles, "Review of HARDTACK II Seismic Data,"
9 December 1958
Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Special Assistant to
the President for Science and Technology, box 13, Nuclear
Test Suspension-Seismic Data (1)
A series of underground tests held in 1958, HARDTACK II produced
technical data which complicated the status of the Geneva
monitoring system but erroneously so. According to a preliminary
analysis by AFOAT-1, the Air Force Office of Atomic Energy-1,
which was responsible for tracking foreign nuclear weapons
developments, the data suggested that "it will be much
more difficult to identify a seismic event as a natural earthquake."
Moreover, "the number of earthquakes equivalent to a
given low yield is considerably higher than previously estimated."
Those problems would require a greater number of inspections
to determine whether a suspicious event was an earthquake
or a nuclear explosion. To analyze further the data and the
new conclusions and their implications for the Geneva report,
James Killian and John McCone agreed to create a "board
of senior seismologists" in cooperation with AFOAT-1.
As it would later turn out, AFOAT-1 had based its re-evaluation
on estimates of the frequency of small Soviet earthquakes
that were "too high by a significant factor." While
the Soviets had rightly challenged the numbers and even Air
Force scientists were wondering about their validity, their
work was so highly classified that it would take several years
before a reevaluation would discover the error. (Note
37)
Document 10: U.S Consulate Geneva Cable
SUPNU 165 to Department of State, 7 January 1959
Source: National Archives, RG 59, decimal files 1955-1959,
700.5611/7-559
Well before the Hardtack errors were discovered, on 5 January
PSAC publicly announced the gist of new data on underground
explosions: that "there will be a substantial increase
in the number of earthquakes that cannot be distinguished
from underground nuclear tests by seismic means alone."
This information, which cast doubts upon the findings of the
Geneva conference of experts, was duly communicated to the
British and Soviet delegations at the Geneva test ban treaties.
The Soviets had already expressed disagreements with U.S.
proposals on the control system, e.g., they had supported
the right to veto recommendations for inspections by control
authorities, and made plain their unhappiness with Washington's
bombshell. Treating the statement on new data as a "diversion",
the Soviets declared that it was "inadmissible that this
political [conference] could take up technical subjects which
would only protract its work." The "only technical
basis on which [they] could proceed" was the report of
the Geneva experts.
Document 11: John S. D. Eisenhower,
"Memorandum of Conversation with the President January
12, 1959 -- 9:00 AM," 19 January 1959
Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Ann Whitman File. Dwight
D. Eisenhower Diary, box 38, Staff Notes. January 1959 (II)
(Published in U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations
of the United States 1958-1960, Volume III (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996), pp. 687-690)
During this White House meeting, Eisenhower agreed on the
importance of breaking the disarmament-test ban linkage, supporting
the view that the issue of the "control system"
was the "heart of the matter and that the "breaking
point" with the Soviets had to be the control system.
During the course of the discussion, Eisenhower and his colleagues
reviewed U.S. motivations for supporting the moratorium ("propaganda
mileage"), doubts that the Soviets would ever approve
a "true agreement," the importance to the "Free
World" of inserting "qualified observers within
the USSR," and the difficulties that the United States
would have "in carrying out a treaty of this type."
If an agreement allowing for many observation posts was not
negotiated, Eisenhower believed that the difficulties in test
detection could make it necessary for the United States to
conduct small underground tests. The more difficult, immediate
problem, as Dulles observed, was "our reversal of position
as to the size of the explosion which may be detected underground."
This "will appear to the Soviets as a breach of faith."
The United States was in a "bad spot."
Document 12: State Department Memcon,
"U.S. Position in Geneva Test Negotiations," 30
January 1959
Source: National Archives, RG 59, decimal files 1955-59, 396.12-GE/1-359
AEC chairman McCone was less concerned about a "breach
of faith" than he was with the impact of the new data
on the U.S. nuclear position. During a meeting with Dulles,
he pushed for change in the U.S. negotiating position: ban
atmospheric nuclear tests but permit underground testing until
the verification issues had been resolved. Dulles heard McCone
out, but argued that the AEC proposal was politically impossible.
Even if there was only a small, one in a hundred, chance that
Moscow would accept U.S. terms for a treaty, "public
relations" necessities required Washington to stick to
the plan for a comprehensive test ban. If the McCone proposal
was put on the table, it would "allow the Russians to
break off the negotiations with the United States with the
United States bearing the entire blame for their failure."
As it was, Dulles believe that press coverage had already
inflamed tensions with the Soviets with the latter arguing
that the articles confirmed that "we were looking for
a way to break the negotiations off." Recognizing that
he could not win an argument with Dulles, McCone backed away
from his proposal although suggesting that Dulles' own State
Department may have been the source of the leaks that had
inspired the press coverage.
Document 13: John McCone, Memorandum
to the File, 23 March 1959
Source: Freedom of Information Act Request to Department of
Energy
In March 1959, British Prime Minister Macmillan, concerned
about the ongoing Berlin crisis and the test ban stalemate,
traveled to Washington to meet with Eisenhower. With Dulles
hospitalized and out of action, McCone had another opportunity
to lobby for his limited test ban proposal. He believed that
Eisenhower supported his position and was confident that "AEC's
position is now pretty well recognized as the proper
one." Nevertheless, Macmillan believed it was more important
to "break on the question of the veto and … not
inject these new technical considerations at this time."
Macmillan also pointed to the role of non-proliferation concerns
in the movement for the test ban treaty. Suggesting that permitting
any testing could give a loophole to would-be nuclear powers,
Macmillan said that the problem of "Nth power development"
made it unwise to permit continued underground testing.
Document 14: State Department memcon,
"Nuclear Test Negotiations," 26 March 1959
Source: National Archives, RG 59, decimal files 1955-1959,
700.5611/3-2659
A meeting of the Committee of Principals, the most senior
inter-agency group on arms control issues, held a few days
later led to agreement that if the Soviets stuck to ideas
about a veto on inspections, the U.S. and the British should
offer a ban on atmospheric nuclear tests with "collaboration
on a program of underground tests to test improvements in
the detection system." If, however, the Soviets dropped
the veto, acting Secretary of State Herter observed that Washington
would have to live with an "imperfect" detection
system. "The President feels that we need to be sure
only that there is a reasonable level of deterrence."
This worried McCone who thought it was a "new concept"
but test ban negotiator James Wadsworth and State Department
official Philip Farley argued that the notion of deterrence
had been part of the government's thinking on the test ban
since negotiations began; "the inability to achieve 100
percent perfection was recognized."
Document 15: Department of State cable
TOSEC 59 to U.S. Consulate Geneva, 16 May 1959, enclosing
letter from Khrushchev to Eisenhower dated 15 May 1959
Source: National Archives, RG 59, decimal files 1955-1959,
700.5611/5-1959
With the impasse over the veto, on 13 April, Eisenhower,
with Macmillan's support, presented a new proposal that was
close to McCone's suggestions: a ban on tests in the atmosphere
up to 50 kilometers, with additional negotiations eventually
expanding the scope of the agreement. (Note
38) The Soviets rejected this proposal in the name of
a comprehensive test ban, but as this document shows Khrushchev
was giving ground on the veto question. He suggested that
sending inspectors to investigate suspicious physical phenomenon
would be the principal means for verifying the treaty. According
to Khrushchev, an agreement on a specific number of inspection
team visits would "preclude the necessity of voting on
obtaining agreement on that question within the control commission."
He did not propose any specific number but suggested that
"no large number would be necessary." The fact that
they could occur, he argued, would have a "sobering effect"
on the signatories, tacitly deterring any cheating. Whether
London, Moscow, and Washington could agree on what "no
large number" meant would be a decisive issue in reaching
a negotiated test ban.
Document 16A: State Department memcon,
"Geneva Nuclear Test Detection Negotiations," 17
June 1959
Source: National Archives, RG 59, decimal files 1955-1959,
700.5611/6-1759, excised copy
The Principals met on 17 June for more detailed discussion
of the problem of on-site inspection (after first briefly
reviewing ongoing studies of high-altitude test detection).
Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles gave a short
and optimistic briefing of the role that intelligence could
play in detecting treaty violations, e.g., the relative ease
in detecting moving earth for underground tests. While Under
Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates was not so sure that intelligence
could spot violations, Spurgeon Keeny, on the staff of the
White House Science Adviser, saw a hopeful note: the statistician
John Tukey was developing concepts for "maximizing the
effectiveness of a choice of inspections" and that intelligence
could provide data to increase the effectiveness of the "Tukey
system". (Note 39) The uncertainties
led the group to commission another study that James Killian
was already directing. Further discussion of on-site inspection
brought out the possibility that a "budget of 100 inspections
per year" would provide a "high probability of catching
any violations." Even a lower figure would provide a
"high probability." McCone suggested that 100 would
not be quite enough: "100 inspections would allow inspection
of all events above 5 kilotons and about five percent of those
under that figure." That plainly innocuous sentence was
excised from the 1998 release at the National Archives although
it was declassified during the early 1990s at the Eisenhower
Library. See Document 16B for
a comparison. [Source of 16A: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library,
Records of Special Assistant to the President for Science
and Technology. Killian-Kistiakowsky Records, box 8, Disarmament-Nuclear
Test Policy, May 1958-Oct 1960]
Document 17A: State Department memcon,
"Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations -- Meeting of the Principals,"
9 July 1959, excised copy
Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Office of Special Assistant
for Science and Technology, box 8, Disarmament - Nuclear Test
Policy. May 1958 - October 1960 (folder 2)
While negotiations continued, the Committee of Principals
met to hear a report on detection and on-site inspection of
underground tests by Caltech scientist Robert F. Bacher. Noting
that the seismology was "still in its infancy",
he suggested that theories about evading test detection through
decoupling "held forth possibilities which could change
the underground detection situation completely." He was
skeptical, however, of the "complicated" decoupling
theory that had RAND scientist Albert Latter had advanced
because it would "require an approximately 1 million-cubic
meters hole for a 10 kiloton explosion" at a cost of
2 to 4 million dollars. Nevertheless, Bacher declared that,
despite the "Latter hole's" apparent impracticality,
it "has stood up against severe theoretical scrutiny."
(Note 40) Bacher also made a series of recommendations
on the problem of on-site inspections, especially whether
inspection should be based on a percentage or a quota. While
some of his recommendations are excised, they pointed to the
uncertainties of detecting underground tests and the need
for continued study on ways to reduce the doubts. Further
study would eventually lead to the Vela project findings that
U.S. experts had overestimated the problem of small earthquakes
in Soviet territory.
This document has been through several declassifications,
most recently in State Department records at the National
Archives. In 1998, the Department of Energy reviewed it and
withheld even more information than it had withheld in 1990.
Interestingly, however, it released innocuous language from
page 3 that had been excised in 1990. See Document
17B for a comparison. [Source: National Archives,
RG 59, decimal files, 1955-1959, 700.5611/7-759)
Document 18: Comments on Bacher panel's
report delivered by White House Science Adviser Kistiakowsky
during meeting with Eisenhower, 23 July 1959
Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Office of Special Assistant
for Science and Technology, box 9, Disarmament - Nuclear Testing
Policy (4)
Not long after the Committee of Principals heard the Bacher
panel report, President Eisenhower heard a briefing from science
adviser George Kistiakowsky summarizing Bacher's findings.
Using the erroneous data about the frequency of small earthquakes
on Soviet territory, George Kistiaskowsky, who had replaced
Killian as White House Science Adviser, underlined the uncertainties
of underground test detection. Unless the United States inspected
all seismic events in the Soviet Union that were the equivalent
of a half-kiloton explosion, about 1715 annually, he argued
that the "probability of identifying at least one out
of a series of below 5 kilotons is negligible." The possibility
of decoupling the seismic signal from an underground nuclear
test through the "Latter Hole" increased the uncertainty.
Hypothetically, a nuclear power could test a 100 kiloton weapon
decoupling it by a "factor of 200." The resulting
half kiloton signal would be virtually undetectable. Briefed
on these uncertainties, Eisenhower concluded that it "appeared
impossible to control underground tests". (Note
41) During the months that followed, Eisenhower began
to favor a limited agreement involving a joint U.S.-British-Soviet
study program of underground test detection. It would take
some time, however, before the administration was ready to
take a step that represented a significant detour from the
goal of a comprehensive ban.
Document 19: State Department memcon,
"Meeting of the Secretary's Disarmament Advisers,"
3 November 1959
Source: National Archives, RG 59, decimal files 1955-1959,
600.0012/11-359
Sharp inter-agency disagreements over whether to publicly
abandon the goal of a comprehensive test ban and resume nuclear
testing persisted but the State Department's stance against
any sudden policy changes prevailed. Instead, the Department
supported proposals for technical discussions with the Soviets
as a way to "sharpen the issue of underground control
to the point where we could propose a limited agreement"
that would include provisions for a research program on underground
test verification. (Note 42) During an early
November 1959 meeting with "establishment" disarmament
advisers, Philip Farley reviewed the state of play. At Geneva,
the U.S. had presented the Soviets with technical conclusions
on underground testing that could bring Washington "face
to face with the question of whether we are going ahead with
a proposal for a limited treaty and either resume tests or
declare our freedom of action with respect to further testing."
The Soviets were unlikely to accept a limited treaty while
the British were seeking a three year moratorium on underground
testing. That concerned the State Department because, as Herter
put it, the West would "get nothing in return."
Nevertheless, he recognized the need for some give in the
West's position because world opinion was suspicious of the
U.S. stance. As former Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)
General Gruenther explained many believed that the U.S. was
pushing the difficulty of underground test verification as
a "device to get out of the negotiations." Killian
explained the theoretical challenge posed by the "Latter
Hole" although McCloy was doubtful because "the
difficulties of constructing the big hole were almost insurmountable."
The advisers also discussed the UN disarmament committee,
the Charles Coolidge study on disarmament, and the problem
of "stability in the missile age," which concluded
with Gruenther's sardonic statement that to "to proceed
with disarmament we will have to increase our defense expenditures."
Document 20: Atomic Energy Commission
"Record of Cabinet Meeting, 11 December 1959 Consideration
of Test Moratorium Negotiations," 14 December 1959, excised
copy
Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Special Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs, NSC Series, Briefing
Notes Subseries. Box 2. Atomic Testing Suspension of Nuclear
Testing and Surprise Attack (3)
In mid-December, cabinet and sub-cabinet level officials
met with Vice President Nixon to discuss the parameters for
a forthcoming presidential decision: whether to extend the
moratorium into 1960. While the Soviet delegation had, in
November 1959, assented to Anglo-American proposals for technical
discussions of the underground test verification problem they
would refuse to accept the conclusion that the Geneva monitoring
system needed rethinking. In Washington, Secretary Gates and
the Defense Department continued to press for resumed testing
but other Principals were more focused on the verification
problem. Plainly, the resumption of testing was not feasible;
as Nixon observed in his wrap-up, given Eisenhower's recent
"good-will trip", the anticipated heads of state
summit, and a scheduled Presidential trip to Russian, it would
be difficult for Eisenhower to announce a program of underground
tests without sharpening global tensions. Therefore, at the
end of the month, Eisenhower publicly expressed his concern
over the state of the negotiations and the "politically
guided Soviet experts" who would not take seriously scientific
findings on seismic detection. Giving something to McCone
and the Pentagon, he announced that the moratorium would end
on 31 December, leaving the United States "free"
to resume testing; nevertheless, in a bow to anti-testing
sentiment, the United States would suspend testing on a voluntary
basis and try to negotiate a treaty. (Note 43)
Document 21: Letter from Harold Brown
to John McCone, 26 December 1959
Source: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, John McCone Papers,
box 7, Test File - December 1959 (1)
Harold Brown, soon to be director of Livermore Radiation
Laboratory and a future Secretary of Defense, served as scientific
adviser to the U.S. test ban negotiating team at Geneva during
1958-1959. In this letter, he related his discouragement over
the technical talks with Soviet scientists on the problem
of underground test detection. While the Soviets had been
cooperative in private discussions, even accepting U.S. claims
about decoupling, in public sessions "they denied it."
Moreover, Brown argued that in recent weeks U.S. scientists
in Geneva had concluded that detection "system capability
is considerably less than believed even a few months ago."
Not only did successful on-site inspection have a "very
small" probability of success, but "large hole decoupling"
was "much easier than had been thought." Brown's
comments on the possibilities of evasion suggested that the
demands on U.S. intelligence capabilities were much greater
than Allen Dulles had suggested a few months earlier (see
Document 17). Just as McCone
had suggested a "threshold" test ban in the meeting
with Nixon, Brown was thinking along the same lines, in this
instance a ban on atmospheric tests and on "underground
for yields higher than about 100 or 150 kilotons." These
suggestions presaged future policy developments. Thus, in
early February 1960, the U.S. proposed a limited test ban
treaty banning atmospheric, underwater, and high altitude
tests and underground tests above a 4.75 seismic magnitude
reading--the equivalent of 19 or 20 kilotons of explosive
yield--the threshold at which underground tests could be adequately
monitored. Moreover, the three powers would begin a joint
research program on improvements of underground test detection
below the threshold.
Document 22: State Department memcon,
"Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations: Meeting of Principals,"
22 March 1960
Source: National Archives, RG 59, decimal files 1960-63, 397.5611-GE/3-2260
The Soviets, not wanting to break the momentum behind the
negotiations, accepted the threshold proposal on the condition
that Washington accept a moratorium on sub-threshold underground
tests while the parties conducted joint research program on
test detection. Meeting on the eve of a visit by Prime Minister
Macmillan to Washington, the Principals reviewed the issues.
Macmillan strongly supported extending the moratorium; while
his support was not necessarily determining that made it more
difficult to reject the Soviet offer outright. McCone and
Deputy Secretary of Defense Douglas argued against a commitment
to extend the moratorium without "controls" but
they did not persuade other officials who believed that Washington
had to address positively this "first magnitude"
problem. Acknowledging that the Soviet proposal was not a
good one, that Eisenhower could not commit his successor to
a moratorium, and that Moscow had made no concessions on on-site
inspection, Herter and his colleagues reminded the Principals
that "the international state of mind is one of opposition
to nuclear tests." Science adviser Kistiakowsky observed
that a three year research program "could result in major
progress on the detection and identification" fronts,
but there was no "guarantee" that it would. As it
turned out, Eisenhower rejected some elements of the Soviet
proposal but disregarded AEC-Defense advice by accepting a
one-year moratorium on underground tests (with the next president
deciding on whether to continue it). He realized there were
risks but that "he could not stand out against some kind
of reasonable solution on this issue." The final arrangement
would have to be negotiated at the summit, including the number
of inspections which Khrushchev would not discuss except at
the highest level. (Note 44)
Document 23: State Department memcon,
29 March 1960
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy Planning Staff Records,
1957-1961, box 140, Great Britain, 1960-1961
With Eisenhower and Macmillan in agreement on an approach
to the Soviets on the test ban, it was necessary to discuss
the problems of a joint research program with Moscow on underground
tests detection. Kistiakowsky believed that more research
might enable the 180 station network to reach the 90 percent
level of certainty posited by the Geneva experts, although
the problem of "muffled or decoupled shots" would
remain. Eisenhower remained unruffled about the low prospects
for a 100 percent certainty and Kistiakowsky assured him that
with a "reasonable number" of on-site inspections,
"any potential violator would face a real risk of getting
caught." The participants also discussed the problem
of special nuclear weapons tests for research purposes and
agreed that it was possible to establish safeguards so that
the Soviets would not think that Washington was trying to
improve its nuclear stockpile. In what would turn out to be
a short-lived proposal, Kistiakowsky suggested declassifying
for this purpose a "simple gun-type of nuclear weapon
which would be of little value to a potential Nth country"
proliferant. Apparently, he assumed that a would-be nuclear
power would be interested in acquiring more efficient, advanced-design
nuclear weapons. That the problem of nuclear proliferation
was assumed to preoccupy the Soviets is also plain from Macmillans'
statement that the Soviets wanted a sound agreement because
of their concerns about the spread of nuclear weapons. Noting
the development of gas centrifuges for producing highly-enriched
uranium, McCone implied that the nuclear proliferation problem
could become a serious one.
Document 24: State Department memcon,
"Nuclear Test Negotiations - Meeting of Principals,"
10 May 1960
Source: National Archives, RG 59, decimal files 1960-63, 700.5611/5-1060
By early May, the U-2 crisis was unfolding which doomed the
Paris summit. Nevertheless, in the hope that something might
turn up, the Principals met to discuss black boxes and seismic
research, high altitude tests, and the U.S. position on inspection
quotas. Interestingly, the participants had second thoughts
about declassifying nuclear weapons designs for special tests;
as Herter observed, "black box" seismic stations
would "obviate the necessity of declassifying devices
which might have served to increase the nuclear capability
of other States." Detecting high altitude tests and missile
launches had been a continuing concern and the Principals
discussed the latest research which would permit ground-based
systems to detect the former and Midas satellites that could
discern the latter. Doyle Northrup, Technical Director for
Air Force Technical Application Center (AFTAC), the organization
responsible for detecting nuclear weapons programs abroad,
startled the Principals when he stated that a recent cost
estimate for establishing 22 control posts in the Soviet Union
with 100 seismic arrays at each one was between one and five
billion dollars. Northrup promised the budget-conscious Principals
more research on costs noting that no one had tried to estimate
the expense of establishing "unmanned stations"
in the Soviet Union. The number of inspections received inconclusive
discussion, although the Principals eventually agreed to a
proposal for inspection of 20 percent of unidentified events
above the 4.75 threshold, about 20 inspections annually. The
group also heard a briefing by Albert Latter on a RAND Corporation
study on ways and means to increase the effectiveness of control
posts in identifying seismic events. Through redistributing
and increasing control posts on Soviet territory, Latter suggested
that it would be easier to identify earthquakes and narrow
the range of events that required inspection. Herter received
the RAND briefing with enthusiasm suggesting that it pointed
to "tremendous" possibilities in identifying seismic
events.
Document 25: Central Intelligence Agency,
Office of Current Intelligence, Current Intelligence Weekly
Summary, 24 August 1960, excerpt on "The Nuclear
Test Ban Talks"
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Charles E. Bohlen,
1952-1963. Box 16. Miscellaneous 1960
This CIA document provides a useful account of the verification
issues that divided the United States and the Soviet Union
during first two years of the test ban negotiations. It is
particularly useful for summarizing developments after the
collapse of the summit. Abandoning their position that the
number of inspections could be discussed only at the heads
of state level, in July 1960 the Soviets offered three "veto-free"
annual inspections inside the Soviet Union of any suspicious
events. They rejected the U.S.-British proposal for 20 inspections
a year. These positions set the stage for a protracted debate
on on-site inspection that would force both sides back to
a limited test ban proposal.
[Note: a typographical error occurs on document's first page,
second column: December 1959 should read December 1958.]
Part
II: The Kennedy Administration and the Search for a Comprehensive Test Ban
Document 26: Glenn Seaborg, Chairman,
Atomic Energy Commission, Journal Entry for 19 April 1961
Source: Journals of Glenn T. Seaborg, Volume 1, February 1,
1961-June 30, 1961 (Berkeley, CA: Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory,
1989)
At a meeting of the National Security Council, Eisenhower's
successor, John F. Kennedy, showed his lack of enthusiasm
for the early resumption of nuclear testing. Not only would
world opinion likely to be "very adverse", other
factors had to be considered, one of which--whether the Soviets
were covertly cheating--was raised by Kennedy's national security
assistant McGeorge Bundy. DCI Allen Dulles could not give
any assurances either way; it would be a "matter of luck"
whether the intelligence system detected a low-yield Soviet
test. Kennedy raised a number of issues that would have to
be addressed before he was ready to make any decision, such
as whether there was to be any give in the Soviet position,
the location of testing, and how long testing would continue.
Document 27: Memo from Woodruff Wallner,
Bureau of International Organizations, to Assistant Secretary
of State for International Organizations, Harlan Cleveland,
"Meeting of the Principals on Future United States Policy
on Nuclear Test Negotiations," 24 May 1961
Source: National Archives, RG 59, decimal files 1960-63, 711.5611/5-2461
The NSC meeting on 19 May included a briefing by Director
of Defense Research and Engineering Harold Brown (formerly,
director of Livermore Radiation Laboratory and a member of
the U.S. delegation to the Geneva test ban talks); Seaborg
did not include any details in his journal, but some of Brown's
points may appear in this record of a Committee of Principals
meeting from a week later. After the Committee heard negotiator
Arthur Dean on the "dim" prospects for an agreement,
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara argued that a new round
of tests would reduce the costs and increase the effectiveness
of the weapons stockpile. While the intelligence on Soviet
intentions was ambiguous but laden with suspicion, the feeling
among scientists and defense officials was that the United
States "could not afford not to move forward in the nuclear
testing field because we don't know what others will do."
Some observers found this less than convincing and, like his
predecessors, Secretary of State Rusk "pointed out the
serious political reaction that we would have to expect were
we to resume testing." Rusk left the meeting early and
the meeting was inconclusive, but the momentum to end the
moratorium would prove irresistible, especially when tensions
with Moscow sharpened during the summer of 1961.
Document 28: State Department Instruction
to U.S. Embassy Japan, W-24, "Briefing of the Japanese
Government Concerning Developments in Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations,"
22 July 1961
Source: National Archives, RG 59, decimal files 1960-1963,
600.0012/7-2261
While pressure for resume testing mounted, the Kennedy administration
continued the negotiating track at Geneva. The Japanese government
had a special interest in the test ban and the Kennedy administration
realized that it was critically important to show Tokyo that
it was making a good faith effort on this issue, in order
to assure Japan's support for securing a UN General Assembly
endorsement of a treaty with "effective controls."
With this message to the embassy in Tokyo, the State Department
sent briefing material showing its efforts to negotiate a
treaty. Included in the briefing paper was a description of
the "compromise proposals" that the Americans and
the British had tabled in March and May. As before the treaty
posited a threshold test ban but the moratorium on underground
tests was increased from two to three years, the number of
on-site inspections could be as low as 12 (instead of 20),
while the number of number of control posts in the Soviet
Union would be reduced to 19 (instead of 22). From the State
Department standpoint, the Soviets had "made no constructive
response" to this proposal.
Document 29: McGeorge Bundy, "Memorandum
of decision, July 27, 1961: test ban scenario," 28 July
1961
Source: National Archives, RG 59, decimal files 1960-1963,
600.0012/7/2859 (also published in Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1961-1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and
Disarmament (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1995), pp. 114-115
The deepening crisis over West Berlin, in the wake of the
chilly Kennedy-Khrushchev Vienna summit made the White House
far more interested in testing. Against the background of
decisions on military preparations for a possible confrontation
over Berlin, Kennedy requested science advisers to prepare
a study on the technical issues associated with the resumption
of testing. The report, chaired by Stanford University physicist
Wolfgang Panofsky, did not see any urgent necessity to resume
testing and acknowledged that without tests, "the U.S.
would retain a degree of technological superiority in nuclear
weapons for some time." Whether the Soviets were secretly
testing, as some in the military were charging, was an unknown.
Given the ambiguous picture, the panel concluded that "non-technical"--that
is, political and military considerations--would have to shape
a final decision on testing. As this decision memo suggests,
Kennedy believed that the problem of international opinion
made it difficult to start testing soon, without another stab
at test-ban diplomacy and appearances before the United Nations.
Nevertheless, measures should be taken to prepare for tests
"not earlier than 1962." A few days later, the State
Department recommended the "achievement of a state of
technical readiness" for "significant test series",
although the problem of international opinion made it necessary
to defer any announcement of testing. In light of this recommendation
and even stronger one from the Joint Chiefs (who were highly
critical of the Panofsky report), Kennedy told the National
Security Council in early August that "we have here a
major political problem. We should clearly resume testing
fairly soon, but the UN problem is a serious one." (Note
45)
Document 30: State Department cable
6955 to U.S. Embassy India, 24 August 1961
Source: National Archives, RG 59, decimal files 1960-1963,
600.0012/8-2461
In late August, the negotiating track at Geneva continued,
with Ambassador Dean offering a new proposal that involved
lowering the threshold as well as clustering monitoring stations
in earthquake zones. President Kennedy was worrying about
the position of the neutral Third World nations, not least
the government of India, which had supported a United Nations
resolution in favor of an unlimited moratorium without the
controls that Washington found essential. Writing to his close
acquaintance, the famous economist and Ambassador to India
John Kenneth Galbraith, Kennedy wanted Prime Minister Nehru
to understand that despite the U.S.'s efforts, the Soviets
had "lost interest in any effective treaty." Kennedy
expected that any renewed U.S. initiative at Geneva would
be rebuffed and that Washington would have to approach the
United Nations for a "good resolution of our own on nuclear
testing." While Kennedy hoped that Galbraith's "strong
effort" could persuade Nehru to support the U.S. position,
a few months later the Indian government would win UN support
for a resolution favoring a comprehensive test ban without
inspections.
Document 31: Draft "JAEIC Statement,
1430 Hours, 1 September 1961"
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Assistant
to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy. Country and Subject
Files Relating to Atomic Energy Matters, 1950-1962, box 5,
1961 USSR Test Papers and Memos
The Soviets solved the White House's political problem by
testing first, which they announced a day ahead on 31 August
1961. Acoustic sensors that were part of AFTAC's Atomic Energy
Detection System (AEDS) identified the first Soviet detonation
almost as soon as it had occurred. Other sensors, electromagnetic
and seismic, had not yet yielded any information so the analysts
could only guess that the detonation's yield was about 150
kilotons. The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC),
which was responsible for coordinating nuclear intelligence,
promulgated the first details as soon as they had been assessed.
A few days later, on 3 September, Kennedy and Macmillan publicly
responded to the Soviet tests with a joint statement calling
for an atmospheric test ban that would be policed by national
verification systems. (Note 46)
Document 32: Atomic Energy Commission
Chairman Glenn Seaborg, Journal Entry for 5 September 1961
Source: Journals of Glenn T. Seaborg, Volume 2, July 1,
1961-December 31, 1961 (Berkeley, CA: Lawrence Berkeley
Laboratory, 1989)
Khrushchev formally rejected the Kennedy-Macmillan proposal
on 9 September, but events a few days earlier convinced Kennedy
that the Soviets had already made a decision. On 5 September,
during a talk with AEC chairman Seaborg, he discussed plans
to resume underground testing later in the month. To avoid
"adverse comment" about U.S. military power; he
wanted the first test to have a yield that was "larger"
than the first Soviet test whose explosive yield was 100 kilotons.
Seaborg told him that the AEC could not arrange a large test
before 15 September; a larger one involving the Terrier air
defense missile would occur later. Kennedy did not make a
decision at the meeting, but when he learned that the Soviets
had held their third test, he ordered the resumption of underground
testing, with the first detonation to occur on 15 September.
Kennedy was not sure if it was the "right decision,"
he later explained to UN Ambassador Stevenson, but "What
choice did we have? They had spit in our eye three times.
… [Khrushchev] wants to give out the feeling that he
has us on the run. The third test was a contemptuous response
to our note." No doubt Kennedy was disappointed by the
explosive yield of the first test that occurred on 15 September:
2.6 kilotons. (Note 47)
Document 33: State Department memcon,
"The International Situation," 8 September 1961
Source: National Archives, RG 59, decimal files 1960-1963,
600/0012/9-861
This conversation between Robert Matteson, a Foreign Service
Office assigned to the U.S. mission to the United Nations,
and one of his Soviet counterparts, Igor Usatchev, highlights
the tensions over Berlin and nuclear testing. Soviet threat
to sign a treaty with the GDR, which would "do away with
the occupation rights in West Berlin," remained a source
of great anxiety in the West, even after the East Germans
had started to build the wall. Usatchev also shed light on
the concerns motivating Moscow's decision to break the moratorium;
he saw Soviet military activity as a "reaction"
to President Kennedy's military buildup but also to the more
advanced U.S. nuclear weapons program. While the U.S. had
tested "over a hundred" (actually, closer to 200),
the Soviets had conducted 70. The Soviet diplomat may have
astonished his interlocutor with his emphasis on Moscow's
interest in a 100 megaton weapon, which he saw as advantageous
militarily, partly because it would conserve scarce fissile
materials. The Soviets did not test a 100 megaton device but
some weeks later tested one of half that strength, an event
that would shock the world.
Document 34: "Policy Planning
Council-JCS Joint Staff Meeting," 14 September 1961,
with enclosures: State Department cable to U.S. Embassy Moscow,
7 September 1961 and Moscow embassy cable to State Department,
9 September 1961
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Policy Planning Staff Records,
1957-1961, box 133, State-Defense Relationship
During one of their regular consultations, State and Pentagon
officials considered possible Soviet motivations for resuming
nuclear test. Besides Moscow's interest in the development
of smaller yield weapons, the Soviets wanted to test anti-ballistic
missile weapons as well as a "triggering device for a
huge nuclear weapon." "[P]sychological" reasons
were briefly mentioned; the participants may well have agreed
that Khrushchev was trying to overawe the West during the
Berlin crisis. This did not perturb the Joint Staff representatives
who believed that the Khrushchev "must know that we have
enough power now to knock Russia `off the map'." The
Joint Staff agreed with an assessment signed by Ambassador
Lwelleyn Thompson, the State Department's astute Khrushchev
watcher. Noting Moscow's "defensive" posture and
the possibility that the Soviets "consider their position
relative to our as worsened", Thompson nevertheless cited
Khrushchev's private statements that "we are substantially
equal in our ability to damage each other." Like other
observers, Thompson saw the Soviet test series as an effort
to "obtain more sophisticated warheads which would require
less material for the same effect."
Document 35: AEC Chairman Glenn Seaborg
to President Kennedy, 19 October 1961
Source: John F. Kennedy Library, National Security Files,
box 267, Atomic Energy Commission
While the U.S. was conducting its underground test series,
the directors of the AEC nuclear weapons labs reinforced earlier
pressure to resume atmospheric nuclear testing, to test large
yield weapons but also a variety of tactical nuclear weapons.
Testing would occur in the Pacific, although some at the Nevada
test site, with total fission yield limited to reduce fallout.
Despite the interest in atmospheric testing, costlier underground
testing would continue "to improve our techniques"
in the event an atmospheric test ban came to pass. Seaborg
suggested that President Kennedy approve atmospheric tests
while the Soviets were holding their own series because the
"reaction and pressure against it might be much more
severe" if Washington held such tests later. Kennedy
had authorized preparations for them, although he would not
make a final decision for several months.
Document 36: State Department Circular
Cable 728 to All U.S. Diplomatic Posts, 18 October 1961
Source: National Archives, RG 59, State Department Decimal
File, 761.5611/10-1861
As Igor Usatchev had noted, the Soviets had plans for enormously
high-yield nuclear tests; the State Department got word that
Khrushchev had announced, at the Party Congress, an impending
test of a 50 megaton weapon at the end of October. Washington
quickly seized this development by instructing U.S. diplomats
to attack the planned test as "nuclear blackmail",
as "totally unnecessary" and "irresponsible"
and "motivated primarily by desire for political rather
than military advantage." Mindful of preparations to
resume atmospheric testing, the Department cautioned diplomats
to focus on the problem of high yield atmospheric tests and
to take care to avoid a "situation in which it would
not be politically possible for us to conduct certain atmospheric
tests should be it … prove essential to do so."
The U.S. campaign against the test was highly successful and
resulted in a UN General Assembly resolution urging Moscow
not to hold the test. In addition, the General Assembly supported
a test ban treaty with the verification and control measures
that London and Washington had supported. Nevertheless, on
30 October the Soviets exploded a 50 megaton monster bomb
at a height of 4,000 meters. "The flash of light was
so bright that it was visible at a distance of 1,000 kilometers,
despite cloudy skies. A gigantic, swirling mushroom cloud
rose as high as 64 kilometers." (Note 48)
Document 37: Memorandum from Air Force
Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay to Gerald W. Johnson, Assistant
to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), "USAF Briefing
for Dr. Teller on Nuclear Testing," 31 October 1961,
with enclosing memoranda by Generals Victor Haugen and Roscoe
Wilson and report on "Priority of Nuclear Weapons Tests
of Primary Interest to the Air Force," 25 October 1961
Source: Library of Congress, Curtis LeMay Papers, box 127,
Chief Scientist, 1961
General Curtis LeMay, the Air Force Chief of Staff, the founding
father of the Strategic Air Command, and a fervent proponent
of nuclear testing, sought scientific support for testing
of Air Force weapons. His advisers turned to the Air Force's
official scientific advisers but also to Edward Teller, then
serving as Professor at Large in the University of California
system. Indeed, Teller and the Air Force Scientific Advisory
Board "strongly" supported atmospheric testing in
order to provide scope for a variety of tests. Among those
experimental items (X) on the wish list were the XW-50 (deployed
on the Pershing I missile in 1963), XW-56 and 59 (later deployed
on Minuteman), and the TX-43 bomb (later deployed on a number
of aircraft). (Note 49) When commenting
on the Soviet 50 megaton test, Teller and his associates observed
that that event had "reawakened interest in high-yield
testing by the United States." Astonishingly, they suggested
consideration of weapons with yields up to 1000 megatons (!)
"for their possible military use." The subject of
high yield weapons would generate much thinking and planning
in the following years, but the fantastic notion of 1,000
megaton weapons appears to have dropped by the wayside.
Document 38: State Department cable
3639 to U.S. Embassy France, 29 December 1961
Source: National Archives, RG 59, decimal files 1960-63, 700.5611/12-2959
In November 1961 the Soviets proposed a three environments
test ban, with an indefinite moratorium on underground tests
while a control system was developed. National verification
systems would monitor the treaty; there were no provisions
for inspection. In early 1962, when the Geneva talks reconvened,
the Americans and British rejected the proposal and the conference
adjourned indefinitely. The doubtful future of negotiations
made a decision for atmospheric testing likely; during meetings
held in Bermuda, Kennedy and Macmillan reviewed the situation.
This State Department cable summarizes the key discussions.
Informing Kennedy's views was the consensus among American
and British technical experts that, despite the Soviet test
series, the United States "retains over-all nuclear advantage,"
without U.S. atmospheric testing, the Soviets could "gain
over-all advantage in two or three years," especially
in anti-intercontinental ballistic missile (AICBM) weapons
tests. Appalled by the "risks" and "waste"
of the arms race, Macmillan urged Kennedy to reach out to
Khrushchev to reach a test ban agreement. Kennedy believed,
however, that a personal appeal to Khrushchev would reduce
U.S. freedom of action to make "nuclear advances necessary
to our security." Yet Kennedy had not made a firm decision
to resume atmospheric testing; he wanted to keep his options
open. (Note 50)
Document 39: Atomic Energy Commission
Chairman Glenn Seaborg, Journal Entry for 18 April 1962
Source: Journals of Glenn T. Seaborg, Volume 3, January
1, 1962-June 30, 1962 (Berkeley, CA: Lawrence Berkeley
Laboratory, 1989)
While the Geneva talks had folded, a new forum for the negotiations,
the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), emerged
in March 1962 although talks held there failed to break the
impasse. With diplomacy failing, a reluctant Kennedy headed
toward final decisions on atmospheric tests. Even after 2
March, when he gave a speech announcing the government's plans
to begin a new test series, he collaborated with Macmillan
in an early April, last ditch effort, to win Soviet acceptance
of the principle of international verification. Otherwise,
testing would resume at the end of April. On 18 April, he
privately met with McNamara and authorized an atmospheric
test series, beginning 25 April. He then met with the NSC
to review the test program, with most of the participants
unaware of Kennedy's decision (and some, such as UN Ambassador
Stevenson, vainly hoping they could head it off). (Note
51) Having given the go-ahead, Kennedy was concerned about
the public relations implications of atmospheric testing;
he was plainly concerned that a test scheduled for the Nevada
Test Site would produce a mushroom cloud that could be photographed.
While Seaborg suggested that the explosion might not produce
such a cloud, Kennedy wanted the test to be placed at the
end of the series, perhaps hoping that it then would attract
less attention. An inconclusive discussion of the timing of
an announcement followed, with Kennedy assuring the Council
that the AEC would get at least five days of "lead time"
making it possible to announce the tests just as they were
beginning.
Document 40: Walt W. Rostow, Policy
Planning Council Director, to Secretary of State, "Prospective
Results of New Series of Soviet Atmospheric Tests," 26
April 1962
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Special Assistant
to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy. Country and Subject
Files Relating to Atomic Energy Matters, 1950-1962, box 5,
1962 USSR-Test
What the Kennedy administration saw as an obdurate Soviet
position on inspections led to suspicions in Washington that
the Soviets were "marking time" as if "waiting
for something to happen." Khrushchev, who was readying
his decision to deploy nuclear missiles to Cuba, was aware
that something would "happen" but Washington officials
wondered if the Soviets might make a technical "breakthrough"
from nuclear testing that could significantly increase their
global influence. A group of intelligence and politico-military
analysts examined that proposition and concluded that such
a technical breakthrough was unlikely. For example, Moscow
could make "solid progress" in developing an AICBM,
but it would lack the resources needed for developing a weapons
system that could do more than defend such "key centers"
as Moscow. In any event, the United States would find it "technically
manageable" to counter an AICBM with decoys (a point
still made by critics of National Missile Defense). The "advantage
in missilery is still with the offense." In light of
the "political and psychological advantages" that
the Soviets had gained from their nuclear tests, the analysts
believed that Washington needed to develop a political strategy
in response to the Soviet test series.
Document 41: Memorandum from Secretary
of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy, "US-USSR Military
Balance With or Without a Test Ban" circa July 1962
Source: John F. Kennedy Library, President's Office Files,
box 100a, Disarmament - Nuclear Test Ban Series, 7/30/62 Meeting
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara shared the relative
optimism of the intelligence analysts (and PSAC in 1958) that
the United States was holding its technical advantage over
the Soviets in the nuclear weapons realm. After reviewing
the status of U.S. strategic and tactical nuclear weapons
programs, McNamara advised the president that a comprehensive
test ban "is likely to be to the advantage of the United
States" because it was already ahead of the Soviets in
developing smaller, high-yield nuclear weapons. Under a comprehensive
test ban, the rate of increase of yield-to-weight ratios would
slow and the United States would be unable to continue investigations
into nuclear weapons but the Soviets would have the same disadvantage.
A test ban limited to the atmosphere would allow the United
States to continue underground tests without having to worry
about Soviet cheating.
Document 42: John McCone, Memorandum
for the Record, "Meeting of Principals," 24 July
1962; excised copy
Source: U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1961-1963, Volumes VII, VIII and IX
Supplement: Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign
Economic Policy (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office,
1997) (hereinafter cited as FRUS 1961-1963, Supplement)
With the test ban talks stalemated, senior Kennedy administration
officials considered possibilities for breaking the deadlock.
(Note 52) Their discussions took place in
the light of advances on seismic detection stemming from Project
VELA, which was sponsored by the Defense Advance Research
Projects Agency (DARPA). VELA found that there were fewer
small seismic shocks on Soviet territory that could be confused
with explosions than had been previously estimated, that the
type of rock surrounding an underground explosion would determine
the signal's strength, and that there were promising new technical
means to detect underground tests. With the new data becoming
public, the Soviets argued that it showed that on-site inspection
and international control stations were unnecessary. Nevertheless,
Kennedy's foreign policy advisers believed that both were
necessary to deter cheating and measure compliance even if
VELA findings eased verification. (Note 53)
As McCone's record of this discussion suggests, the Committee
of Principals agreed to table a new draft CTBT to find a basis
for agreement on verification. It would ban all nuclear tests
(with allowance for "peaceful" explosions), but
there would be no threshold. Rather than specifying numbers
of control posts and inspections, those issues would be left
open to see whether it would be possible to reach agreement
on the necessity for inspection. The discussion shows considerable
concern about the problem of nuclear proliferation and the
degree to which a CTBT or an atmospheric test ban could deter
new national nuclear capabilities. The enduring strong Soviet
position against inspection encouraged the Principals to look
closely at an atmospheric test ban as a "fall-back position."
By the end of August, Washington and London had reached agreement
on the text of a CTBT and a fallback three environments treaty
(no atmospheric, underwater, and outer space tests), both
of which they presented to the Soviets on 27 August. The concept
of a limited treaty as a fall-back presaged developments in
the negotiations the following summer. In the meantime, Washington
began to prepare for more atmospheric tests in the Pacific.
The Soviets quickly rejected the alternative treaties because
of their objection to outside inspection and international
control posts. (Note 54)
Document 43: State Department Memcon,
"1. Nuclear Test Ban 2. Non-proliferation," 30 November
1962
Source: State Department Freedom of Information Release
The unfolding of the Cuban crisis prevented new initiatives
but post-crisis talks with Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan
showed the gap between the two sides. Mikoyan brought up an
interesting issue, the possible use of "sealed"
or "black box" automatic seismological stations
for detecting underground tests as a substitute for "manned
stations" which the Soviets assumed would be used for
espionage. Rusk refused to put major reliance on black boxes
because he did not believe that the technology could, by itself,
differentiate nuclear tests from earthquakes. Nevertheless,
he welcomed evidence from the Soviets about the capabilities
of "unmanned boxes." Rusk and Mikoyan had mutual
concerns about nuclear proliferation but the former was reluctant
to concede to anything that would undercut nuclear sharing
arrangements with NATO. Nevertheless, because Kennedy's nuclear
sharing policy opposed physical transfer of the weapons to
allies in peacetime, Rusk undoubtedly saw common ground in
the proposition that the United States "is not interested
in increasing the number of governments who have nuclear weapons."
No doubt Rusk also believed that Mikoyan would endorse the
proposition that the United States did not "want other
governments to be in a position to use nuclear weapons by
their own decisions."
Documents 44A, 44B,
and 44C: Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency memcons, "Nuclear Testing," 23, 29, and 31
January 1963
Source: National Archives, Record Group 59. Department of
State Central Records, 1960-1963. 700.5611/1-2963 and 1-3163
At the close of 1962, Khrushchev wrote Kennedy a letter about
nuclear testing that accepted the principle of "reasonable
inspection"; what turned him around, he claimed, was
a statement allegedly made by U.S. negotiator Arthur Dean
on 30 October to Soviet diplomat V. Kutzensov that Washington
would accept "two-to-four concessions." (Although
no U.S. record of the discussion exists, the interpreter Alexander
Akalovsky supported Dean's claim that he had never mentioned
such a small number.). (Note 55) The U.S.
position was 8-10 inspections, a significant reduction of
the 12-20 inspections that had been previously offered. On
the question of international control, Khrushchev tilted to
the Western position by acknowledging that foreign personnel
could play a role in managing "black boxes." In
his reply, Kennedy welcomed Khrushchev's acceptance of the
"principle of on-sight inspection," but a new round
of talks held in late January 1963 at the Soviet UN Mission
in New York between U.S., British, and Soviet diplomats showed
that there was no agreement. These three representative records
of the discussions brought out sharply the basic disagreement
on the number of on-site inspections that would be necessary
to verify compliance with a comprehensive test ban. The Soviets
would agree to only two or three on-site inspections while
the Americans and the British argued that 8-10 inspections
were necessary. Significantly Kennedy had authorized Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) chief William C. Foster
to settle at five inspections but the Soviets were not interested
in numbers other than two or three. Even if a compromise could
have been reached, no doubt other problems would have thwarted
an agreement. (Note 56)
Document 45: Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, "Relationship of Nuclear Test Ban to Problem
of Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," 13 February 1963
Source: National Archives, Record Group 359, White House Office
of Science and Technology, box 215, Disarmament--Nuclear Test
Ban--1963
As noted, the relationship between a test ban treaty and
the problem of nuclear proliferation received considerable
attention from the Kennedy administration. ACDA analysts did
not believe that a test ban would pose a significant obstacle
to nuclear proliferation; nevertheless, they believed that
with a test ban in place, "the chances of taking other
measures which might successfully cope with the problem of
non-proliferation are significantly greater." Moreover,
a test ban, ACDA experts argued, mistakenly as it turned out,
could put pressure on China and France to bring nuclear testing
to an "early halt", which would help the cause of
"non-dissemination" of nuclear capabilities. Along
with others at the time, the analysts stressed the need for
a "withdrawal clause" in a test ban treaty that
would "protect the United States from being trapped in
a treaty …which we no longer wanted because the Chinese
Communists were conducting an extensive test program. One
possibility was exploring with the Soviets a withdrawal clause
that would "become operative [after] only a given period
of time", such as two or three years. This would give
the French time to "finish testing before the Chinese
really got started."
Document 46: "Maintenance of a
Condition of Readiness Under a Test Ban Treaty," Attached
to Memorandum from Atomic Energy Commissioner Leland Haworth
to McGeorge Bundy, 14 February 1963
Source: John F. Kennedy Library, National Security File, box
257, ACDA-Disarmament General 1/1/63-2/14/63
In order to win over the Joint Chiefs and the weapons labs
to the concept of a test ban treaty, it became necessary to
assure them that, if Washington found it necessary to withdraw
from the treaty (because of , for example, extensive Chinese
testing), and resume testing, an infrastructure would be in
place that would make that possible. The state of play on
plans to maintain "test readiness" is described
in this Atomic Energy Commission memorandum from early 1963.
Prepared before the White House had decided to negotiate a
limited test ban treaty, the AEC developed an ambitious readiness
plan that included "strong" weapons labs (including
a new one to focus on weapons effects), low-yield "nuclear
experiments", underground testing capabilities in Nevada,
and atmospheric testing facilities in the Western Pacific.
The AEC would not get all of its wish list, but in tandem
with the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the AEC established what
became known as the "Safeguard C" program which
maintained facilities in Nevada, Hawaii, and Johnston Island
for the emergency resumption of atmospheric testing. Until
Congress terminated Safeguard C in 1993, the AEC and its successors
maintained ships, labs, aircraft, and a "dedicated staff"
at a total cost of between $1.6 and 3 billion. (Note
57)
Document 47: Memorandum for the President
from the Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, "The Diffusion
of Nuclear Weapons with or Without a Test Ban Agreement."
16 February 1963
Source: National Archives, Record Group 359, Records of White
House Office of Science and Technology. Box 215. Disarmament-Nuclear
Test Ban-1963
McNamara provided Kennedy with an estimate of the number
of countries that had the capability to develop nuclear weapons
in the coming years and the general motives for countries
to or not to do so. Owing to the heavy costs of nuclear programs
and the likelihood of international pressure, he believed
that it was unlikely that all countries able to produce nuclear
weapons would do so during the next decade. Like the ACDA
analysts, McNamara believed that a comprehensive test ban
was necessary but not sufficient to deter countries from developing
atomic weapons. He also discussed the problem of the Chinese
nuclear program. China, of course, was unlikely to sign a
test ban agreement, but the possibility of Moscow putting
pressure on Beijing to sign was no more likely than Washington
joining with Moscow to place pressure on France to halt its
nuclear program.
Document 48: "Khrushchev-Trevelyan
Talks March 6," United States Embassy, Soviet Union,
cable 2236 to Department of State, 11 March 1963
Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Department of
State Subject-Numeric Files, 1963, POL 17-1UK-USSR
A talk between Khrushchev and British Ambassador Sir Humphrey
Trevelyan illustrated the conflicted nature of the test ban
dialogue. Still interested in relying on "black boxes,"
Khrushchev would make no further concessions on inspections;
he "would add not a single one." To the British
argument that scientists saw inspections as crucial, Khrushchev
responded with the familiar argument that U.S. and British
scientists were part of a plan to "introduce spies into
the USSR." Khrushchev may have been especially fixated
with espionage because only a few months earlier, the KGB
had caught Oleg Penkovsky, a military intelligence officer
who had provided American and British intelligence with highly
significant information on the Soviet strategic position.
Moreover, given the top-level U.S. statements about the intelligence
benefits of inspection, Khrushchev's suspicions were not completely
off the mark. It would be years before senior Soviet officials
would countenance the degree of domestic openness that was
compatible with the acceptance of on-site inspection.
Document 49: ACDA memcon, "Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty Meeting of Committee of Principals,"
17 April 1963
Source: FRUS 1961-1963 Supplement
This Committee of Principals discussion suggests the bleak
political climate for the test ban negotiations during the
spring of 1963. The U.S. negotiating position was under attack
from Republican and Democratic conservatives who argued that
its verification procedures were insufficiently tough. While
Kennedy, Macmillan, and Khrushchev had secret exchanges of
correspondence on the possibilities of further negotiations,
top policymakers continued to treat the CTBT as a legitimate
goal because they saw nowhere else to turn. (Note
58) For Rusk and McNamara a CTBT, even without ironclad
verification provisions, was better than any alternative:
as McNamara put it, "the risk to the United States without
a test ban treaty was greater than with a test ban treaty."
As bad as the problems with Congress was the opposition by
the Joint Chiefs, who saw a treaty without a threshold as
an invitation to cheating. While declassifying information
on the relative U.S.-Soviet nuclear weapons position would
show the U.S. lead, the Principals were not willing to take
that step (which, in any event, could have complicated the
Soviet position in the negotiations). Whether a treaty would
include provisions for peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs)
was one of the most contentious issues during this discussion.
The Atomic Energy Commission anticipated using "clean"
nuclear devices for a variety of public works project, but
critics among the Principals thought that a PNE development
program raised too many problems, such as the possibility
of disguising weapons tests.
Part
III: Consensus on a Limited Test Ban
Document 50: Commencement Address by
President John F. Kennedy at American University in Washington,
DC, 10 June 1963
Source: Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:
John F. Kennedy Containing the Public Messages, Speeches,
and Statements of the President. January 1 to November 22,
1963. (United States Government Printing Office: Washington,
DC. 1964), pp. 459-464
In this famous speech, Kennedy broke the ice with Khrushchev
by making a public declaration in favor of peace and arms
control. An important influence was the writer and editor
Norman Cousins who had met secretly with Khrushchev several
times since 1962 in an attempt to get the two powers beyond
the dispute over the number of inspections. Even some of Cousin's
own language, such as "making the world safe for diversity"
found its way into the text. (Note 59) Toward
the end of the speech, after Kennedy discussed the test ban
negotiations and the problem of nuclear proliferation, he
announced that the United States would not conduct any more
atmospheric tests as long as other nations refrained from
doing so. Drawing upon the understanding that he, Macmillan,
and Khrushchev had already reached about high-level talks,
Kennedy also declared that Washington, London, and Moscow
would soon resume negotiations on a test ban treaty and that
United Kingdom and the United States would send a senior delegation
to Moscow for the discussions. While Kennedy did not name
any names, he quickly settled on Ambassador-at-Large W. Averell
Harriman, who had met with Khrushchev before and had the stature
needed for a mission of this sort.
Document 51: CIA Information Report,
"Soviet Reaction to June 10 Speech of President Kennedy,"
11 June 1963, excised copy
Source: John F. Kennedy Library, box 100, Disarmament-Nuclear
Test Ban Negotiations, 4/62-8/63
That President Kennedy's speech had an immediately favorable
impact on Soviet opinion is suggested by this CIA information
report based on intelligence gleaned from a Soviet official
working for the secretariat of an international organization,
probably the United Nations. The source believed that the
speech improved prospects for a test ban, although he (or
she) was too confident in believing that the problem of inspections
could be easily resolved. The source was also overoptimistic
in believing that impending Sino-Soviet talks "can only
be a step forward" because the discussions turned out
to be among the most acrimonious in the history of the relationship.
(Note 60)
Document 52: ACDA Memcon, "Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty Meeting of Committee of Principals,"
14 June 1963
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for Politico-Military Affairs, Records Relating to
Disarmament and Arms Control, box 6, Def 18-8 Testing and
Detection, 1963-1966 (Also published in FRUS 1961-1963,
VII, pp. 719-726)
A few days after the President's speech, Kennedy's advisers
discussed the significance of the Harriman mission to Moscow
and the prospects for a comprehensive agreement. While Rusk
had "no illusions" about the prospects, he cited
Kennedy's thinking that the Harriman trip was a "last
chance" for an understanding with the Soviets; Rusk also
believed that the Soviet concern about "bloc problems"--which
ranged from Sino-Soviet tensions to growing divergences between
Eastern Europe and Moscow-- might produce some flexibility.
The administration had tabled various CTBT drafts since 1961,
but the Principals were now reluctant to publish the latest
draft for fear that it invite controversy--a "head-on
collision"--especially if the Joint Chiefs of Staff criticized
the draft when testifying before Congress. That the Joint
Chiefs, according to Chairman Maxwell Taylor, were possibly
more amenable to an atmospheric test ban offered some hope,
but only if the Soviets switched gears. Plainly Rusk was unhappy
about some of the critics such as Edward Teller, whom he thought
was not "talking as a technical man when he talked about
the test ban." A continuing element of controversy was
whether a treaty would authorize PNEs, which the AEC continued
to support. When Seaborg mentioned a program to build a new
Panama Canal with nuclear explosive, a skeptical White House
staffer Spurgeon Keeny observed that building a canal "would
require dozens or hundreds of shots, which would be wholly
inconsistent with a test ban treaty." Seaborg, however,
hoped that such a provision would interest Moscow.
Document 53: ACDA memcon, "July
15, 1963 Moscow Talks," 20 June 1963
Source: National Archives, RG 59. Department of State Subject-Numeric
Files, 1963, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO)
Kennedy's and Macmillan's correspondence with Khrushchev
in the spring of 1963 led to a mutual decision to hold high
level talks in Moscow on the test ban problem, with Harriman
representing the U.S. and Lord Hailsham the U.K. (Note
61) This meeting, between Harriman, Foster, and the president's
longtime friend, British Ambassador Ormsby-Gore, showed the
latter trying to find a basis for an agreement on inspections.
While Foster raised the possibility of a limited agreement
with a numerical quota of underground test, Ormsby-Gore questioned
whether the Soviets would climb down from their comprehensive
agreement or nothing position. The discussion of agreements
on side issues---U.S. proposals on non-proliferation and Soviet
proposals for a NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression pact (NAP)--suggested
that significant problems, such as the U.S. multilateral force
(MLF) proposal and Western European concerns about a NAP,
were likely barriers to any agreements on those proposals.
In any event, as Ormsby-Gore suggested, the possibility of
a test ban agreement depended on the outcome of high-level
Sino-Soviet discussions.
Document 54: U.S. Embassy in United
Kingdom cable SECTO 20, to Department of State, 28 June 1963
National Archives, RG 59, Department of State Subject-Numeric
Files, 1963, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO)
At the end of June, as President Kennedy's visit to Western
Europe, including West Berlin unfolded his party had substantive
discussions with the British which produced an agreed U.S.-UK
position for the Harriman-Hailsham trip to Moscow. As before,
the two sides would try to reach a settlement on a comprehensive
agreement; to minimize disagreements with Khrushchev, they
would initially avoid discussing numbers of inspections, but
emphasize the principle of inspections and offer safeguards
against espionage. If a comprehensive agreement could not
be negotiated, then the "next object" should be
a limited, three environments agreement, with no restrictions
on underground tests. If the Soviets also rejected that, other
fallback positions were possible. If the Soviets brought up
proposals for a non-aggression pact, Harriman and Hailsham
would emphasize the importance of prior agreement on test
ban and non-proliferation treaties.
Document 55: Memorandum from Acting
Secretary of State George W. Ball, "Analysis of Language
of Khrushchev Speech Regarding Test Ban and NATO Warsaw Pact,"
2 July 1963, excerpt
Source: National Archives, RG 59, State Department Subject-Numeric
Files, DEF 18-4
On 2 July, Nikita Khrushchev refocused the test ban debate
when he gave a speech in East Berlin. Accusing the West of
using the inspection issue as a cover for "intelligence
purposes", he called for a three environments test ban
that made the inspection issue irrelevant. Arguing that a
test ban was not enough to ease Cold War tensions, Khrushchev
also called for a "nonaggression pact between the two
main military blocs -- the NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact
States." The signing of two agreements, Khrushchev argued,
would "create a new international atmosphere, more favorable
for settling the outstanding issues of our time." Although
State Department analyst wondered whether Khrushchev would
insist on simultaneous agreement on a limited test ban and
a non-aggression pact (NAP), they believed that the language
was ambiguous enough to "permit Khrushchev freedom of
maneuver." For the State Department, an NAP was something
to avoid because it raised "issues very divisive in the
Alliance", such as the prospect of the "acceptance
and stabilization of an unsatisfactory status quo,
including the division of Germany."
Document 56: Atomic Energy Commission
Chairman Glenn Seaborg, Journal Entry for 9 July 1963
Source: Journals of Glenn T. Seaborg, Volume 6, July 1,
1963-November 22, 1963 (Berkeley, CA: Lawrence Berkeley
Laboratory, 1989)
Early in the evening of 9 July, Kennedy met with the NSC
to discuss the Harriman mission. Still unsure whether a limited
three environments test ban treaty was negotiable, the participants
briefly discussed an agreement that permitted a quota of underground
tests. Nevertheless, if an atmospheric test ban was feasible,
Rusk wanted Harriman to be able to conclude an agreement "on
the spot." Bundy wondered whether the French should be
consulted, which raised the question of whether it would be
possible to induce Paris to sign a limited test ban treaty.
Maxwell Taylor's comments questioning the advantages of an
atmospheric test ban raised the continuing problem with the
Chiefs, but Kennedy declared that the issue was settled: "such
a ban is to the advantage of the U.S." Nevertheless,
Taylor vainly pushed away on the issue.
Document 57: Memorandum, "Instructions
for Honorable W. Averell Harriman," 10 July 1963, attached
to National Security Council Record of Actions, NSC Action
2468. Instructions for Harriman Mission (Revised Draft July
9 Instructions for the Harriman Mission)
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files, Box 319,
CF 2284 Moscow Negotiations of Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons
Tests 7/11-27/63 (Also published in FRUS 1961-1963,
VII, pp. 785-788)
The instructions that Kennedy and his advisers approved on
9 July gave Harriman great discretion to negotiate a limited
test ban agreement, if a comprehensive agreement proved unreachable.
On other issues, such as non-proliferation (or "non-dissemination"),
Harriman was to express U.S. interest in an agreement, but
that progress depended on Moscow and Washington winning acceptance
of a test ban on the part of "those powers associated
with it." In other words, the United States would have
to work with West Germany and other allies to contain any
nuclear ambitions on their part, while the Soviet Union would
be expected to curb Beijing's nuclear efforts. While the instructions
do not mention the MLF, Kennedy gave Harriman considerable
discretion in using it as a "bargaining chip" to
make progress on such issues as China or nuclear non-proliferation.
Harriman also received instructions for exploring Soviet intentions
in a number of areas, including the proposal for a NATO-Warsaw
Pact non-aggression pact. Harriman was to separate a NAP from
the test ban issue and to make the Soviets understand that
the former could not be considered seriously because it raised
too many difficult questions about Central Europe. (Note
62)
Document 58: U.S. Embassy to Soviet
Union Cable 154 to Department of State, 16 July 1963, Summary
of Harriman/Hailsham/Khrushchev/Gromyko Meetings on 15 July
1963
Source: National Archives, Record Group 59. Department of
State Subject-Numeric Files, 1963, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO)
Not long after Harriman and Hailsham had arrived in Moscow,
a long meeting with Khrushchev settled the test ban problem,
if not all the details. This was Khrushchev's day and he talked
and talked about the Soviet Union's economic progress and
his diplomatic agenda: a test ban, a NATO-Warsaw Pact nonaggression
pact (NAP), a freeze in military spending, and a peace treaty
between the two Germanies. Hailsham and Harriman were mainly
interested in the test ban and nuclear proliferation but they
politely heard Khrushchev out, making only a few interjections,
with Harriman showing strong interest in determining Khrushchev's
thinking about the Chinese nuclear program.
On the test ban issue, Harriman and Hailsham raised a comprehensive
test ban to show that it was their preference, but the desultory
discussion showed that it was a non-starter because Khrushchev
took back all concessions relating to inspection. The two
Western negotiators suggested that a treaty could include
safeguards against espionage, but Khrushchev would hear none
of that: "this reminded him of cat saying he would not
eat mice and not bacon lying in [the room." Not that
Khrushchev opposed espionage; he happily and indiscreetly
disclosed [see page 17, section VIII, paragraph 1] Moscow's
success in intercepting a cable that showed the U.S. role
in stopping West German pipeline sales to the Soviet Union.
(Note 63)
Khrushchev would only accept a three environments test ban,
which he believed met the demands of world opinion. The question
of an atmospheric test ban was settled and Harriman, Hailsham,
and Russian Foreign Minister Gromyko negotiated a treaty "on
the spot" within a matter of days.
Document 59: U.S. Embassy to Soviet
Union Cable 211 to Department of State, 19 July 1963
Source: National Archives, Record Group 59. Department of
State Subject-Numeric Files, 1963, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO)
During the following days, Gromyko, Harriman, and Hailsham
(who was instructed to follow the U.S. lead (Note
64)) fleshed out the details of a treaty. While the U.S.
side had agreed to language for an article on peaceful uses
for nuclear explosions, it was quickly dropped. Khrushchev
believed that it was premature to include any language permitting
nuclear explosions because world opinion would not understand
it. As this cable shows, Gromyko pushed on the non-aggresion
pact question but Harriman and Hailsham successfully delayed
serious consideration; as they noted, London and Washington
would have to consult with their allies before anything could
be done. Thus, the NAP was left to the communiqué.
A more difficult problem was Article IV, which would allow
signatories to withdraw from the treaty. For the White House,
this had central importance because it was a condition for
Senate support. Harriman came to Moscow with language that
was specifically related withdrawal from the treaty to "nuclear
explosions" violating it. For Washington, that could
mean testing by such countries as China, but for the Soviets
it would mean tests by France. The Soviets had proposed more
general language but it made withdrawal look too easy and
Washington rejected it. Gromyko, however, rejected any references
to nuclear explosions possibly because of the inference that
Moscow was under pressure from Washington "to do something
about [the] Chinese nuclear threat." The Soviets came
back with language linked withdrawal to "extraordinary
events" related to the specific subject of the treaty,
which could only mean nuclear explosions. That Harriman and
the White House found acceptable. As long as the treaty suggested
that the United States could withdraw from the treaty if "extraordinary
events … jeopardized the supreme interests", it
would be enough to win Senate support. (Note
65)
Document 60: CIA Cable 243 to CIA Station,
Moscow, 19 July 1963, excised copy
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Subject-Numeric Files 1963,
Def 18-4
While Harriman was in Moscow, the CIA sent him (and Ambassador
Kohler) "eyes only" daily reports, which included
digests of the Chinese and Soviet press and related intelligence
information. In this report, Chinese opposition to the test
ban and the deleterious impact of the test ban negotiations
on Sino-Soviet relations is evident.
Document 61: U.S. Embassy Soviet Union
cable 303 to Department of State, 24 July 1963
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Subject-Numeric Files 1963,
Def 18-4
In an "eyes only" report to the State Department,
Ambassador Kohler reported on a brief exchange with the "outspoken"
Mrs. Gromyko during a Polish embassy reception. The foreign
minister's spouse elucidated the anti-Chinese aspect of Moscow's
interest in the test ban, as a way to "call [Beijing]
to account" when it had its first nuclear test.
Document 62: "CIA Presentation
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 30 July 1963"
Source: National Archives, Record Group 200, Robert McNamara
Papers, box 63, Test Ban Treaty Safeguards 1963
Apparently the text of a briefing by DCI McCone to the Chiefs,
this report includes analyses of Khrushchev's possible motivations
for supporting a limited test ban, the impact of the agreement
on the nuclear policy of other countries, and European reactions
to the test ban. For the CIA, a variety of considerations
shaped Soviet interest in negotiating the treaty: non-proliferation,
anti-PRC, and détente in Europe which could facilitate
defense cuts at home. The CIA also considered the treaty's
impact on the nuclear programs and ambitions of France, Israel,
and India. France was unlikely to sign the treaty, even with
such inducements as the provision of "complete designs
and materials." Significantly, the Kennedy administration
had already tried this; in a letter to de Gaulle, Kennedy
made a general, but highly leading, offer: "the United
States government would be willing to explore alternatives
which might make French testing in these three environments
unnecessary." DeGaulle refused to sign the treaty and
rejected Kennedy's offer: France could not receive assistance
from any government "without conditions which would limit
right to use such weapons" because that would be "incompatible
with sovereignty." (Note 66)
Document 63: U.S. Embassy to Federal
Republic of Germany Airgram 250 to Department of State, "Secretary
McNamara's Conversation with Chancellor Adenauer," 2
August 1962
Source: Freedom of Information Appeal Release by Department
of State
DeGaulle's close ally, West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer,
showed his pique over the LTBT during a conversation with
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. The administration's
relationship with Adenauer had been strained, involving quarrels
over the Berlin question, among other issues, so the Chancellor's
dissent could not come as a surprise. Adenauer was bitter
that Washington had not consulted with Bonn about the treaty,
which came as a shock. Although the LTBT implicitly checked
any nuclear weapons interests that West German leaders might
have entertained, Adenauer steered clear from that issue and
focused on a perennial complaint: the possibility that some
Western action, in this instance, the test ban treaty, might
tacitly involve the recognition of the East German regime.
No doubt aware that Harriman had reached an understanding
with Gromyko that no such recognition was implied if the GDR
signed the treaty, McNamara rejected Adenauer's charge. He
emphasized what he saw as the positive value of the treaty:
"it will leave the United States with an atomic technology
which the Soviets will never be able to obtain." (Note
67)
Document 64: Statement of the Position
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Three-Environment Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty, 12 August 1963
Source: FRUS 1961-1963 Supplement
The negotiation of the LTBT proceeded relatively quickly
and Dean Rusk was soon on his way to Moscow for the formal
treaty signing on 5 August. A week later, the Joint Chiefs
signed off on an analysis of the impact that the treaty would
have on US national security. Looking at the pros and cons
of the treaty, the Chiefs saw some military disadvantages,
for example, they believed that Moscow was ahead of the United
States in testing high-yield nuclear weapons. Like Adenauer,
they saw political disadvantages: "euphoria in the world"
could erode the "vigilance" needed to wage the Cold
War. But for the Chiefs, the advantages outweighed the disadvantages,
not only would the treaty exacerbate the Sino-Soviet split,
it would help stabilize international politics. The Chiefs
believed that any disadvantages could be reduced if four safeguards
were in place. As Carl Kaysen later remarked, they charged
a "high price" for supporting the test ban: 1) an
"aggressive" program of underground testing, 2)
maintainance of the nuclear weapons laboratories to assure
steady progress in weapons technology, 3) a state of readiness
to test in the atmosphere should national security require
it, and 4) improvements in capabilities to monitor overseas
nuclear activities. (Note 68)
Document 65: Memorandum, Adrian Fisher,
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to John McNaughton, General
Counsel, Department of Defense, "Verification of Compliance
of the Nuclear Weapons Test Ban Treaty," 19 August 1963
Source: National Archives, Record Group 359. Records of the
White Office of Science and Technology, box 215, Disarmament--Nuclear
Test Ban 1963, vol. II
As the ink on the treaty was drying, senior officials considered
ways and means to expand and improve the U.S. Atomic Energy
Detection System. Adrian Fisher commented on AFTAC plans to
expand the AEDS by establishing monitoring stations in Scandinavia,
East Asia, and the Southern Hemisphere, so as to permit world-wide
coverage. Fisher cataloged the major AEDS techniques for detecting
underwater, atmospheric, and space nuclear tests and described
plans to expanding and improve those capabilities. In particular,
he was interested in plans to deploy satellites, in part because
the "mere existence of surveillance satellites in orbit
provides evidence of our determination to police all environments."
In addition, Fisher strongly supported ARPA-VELA's ongoing
research and development activities on verification technologies,
but requested major emphasis on remote seismic detection as
well as the detection of underwater and atmospheric events.
During the years that followed, AFTAC was significantly beefed
up so that its monitoring apparatus could detect nuclear activities
in China, the Soviet Union, and elsewhere.
Notes
1. Tom Squitieri, "Bush Pushes for
New Nukes, USA Today, 7 July 2003; Editorial, "Nuclear
Doubts in the House," New York Times, 16 July
2003; Jake Thompson, "Big Guns Will Discus Nuke Policy,"
Omaha World-Herald, 31 July 2003; William J. Broad,
"Facing a Second Nuclear Age, New York Times,
3 August 2003.
2. For the text of the treaty, see <http://www.ourdocuments.gov/content.php?page=transcript&doc=95>.
3. The State Department's historical document
series, Foreign Relations of the United States, provides
critically important starting points for research on the subject.
See U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United
States 1958-1960, Vol. III (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1996), and U.S. Department of State, Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume VII, Arms
Control and Disarmament (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1995) (herein cited as FRUS 61-63,
VII).
4. Natural Resources Defense Council, Archive
of Nuclear Data, at <http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab15.asp>.
For more details on U.S. nuclear tests, see U.S. Department
of Energy, United States Nuclear Tests July 1945-September
1992 at <http://www.nv.doe.gov/news&pubs/publications/historyreports/pdfs/DOENV209_REV15.pdf>.
5. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival:
Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years. (New
York: Random House, 1988), p. 329; Barton C. Hacker, Elements
of Controversy: The Atomic Energy Commission and Radiation
Safety in Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1947-1974. (Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press, 1994), pp. 148-152, 157-158;
Lawrence Wittner, The Struggle Against the Bomb, Vol. 2:
Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament
Movement, 1954-1970 (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1997), pp. 146-148, 153-154, 157-159. See also Richard G.
Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for Peace and War: 1953-1961:
Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission. (Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press, 1989), pp. 271-295.
6. Hacker, Elements of Controversy,
pp. 181-182, 198, 222-230; Wittner, The Struggle Against
the Bomb, pp. 134-140; Peter Eisler, "Fallout Likely
Caused 15,000 Deaths," USA Today, 28 February
2002; James Glanz, "Almost All in the U.S. Have Been
Exposed to Fallout, Study Finds," New York Times,
1 March 2002; For material relating to the National Cancer
Institute-Center for Disease Control studies, see the Web
sites of the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability, <http://www.ananuclear.org/falloutrelease.html>,
the Center for Disease Control,
<http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/radiation/fallout/default.htm>,
and the National Cancer Institute,
<http://rex.nci.nih.gov/INTRFCE_GIFS/WHTNEW_INTR_97.htm>.
For the executive summary of the NCI-CDC study that suggested
11,000 extra deaths, see <http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/radiation/fallout/report.pdf>.
For the National Research Council's assessment of that study,
see "Cancer Risk Study was Competently Performed,"
Nuclear News, April 2003.
7. Wittner, The Struggle Against the
Bomb. For an early major study, see Robert A. Divine,
Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate 1954-1960
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).
8. Gregg Herken, Cardinal Choices: Presidential
Science Advising from the Atomic Bomb to SDI. (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1992), p.82.
9. Herken, Cardinal Choices, p. 84.
10. For useful background on these developments,
see Divine, Blowing on the Wind, pp. 174-212.
11. Ibid. pp. 225-227; Greg Herken, Brotherhood
of the Bomb (New York: Henry Holt, 2002), pp. 325-327.
12. Robert J. Watson, History of the
Office of the Secretary of Defense. Volume IV. Into the Missile
Age, 1956-1960. (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office,
Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1997), pp. 699-700.
13. Ibid., pp. 702-704; Divine, Blowing
on the Wind, pp. 243-244.
14. Ibid., p. 303; McGeorge Bundy, Danger
and Survival, pp. 332-333.
15. For useful sources on the Kennedy administration
and the test ban, see Glenn T. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev,
and the Test Ban (Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press, 1981), and Kendrick Oliver, Kennedy, Macmillan,
and the Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1961-63 (New York: Macmillan
Press, 1998). See also Carl Kaysen, "The Limited Test
Ban Treaty of 1963," and Bernard J. Firestone, "Kennedy
and the Test Ban: Presidential Leadership and Arms Control,"
in Douglas Brinkley and Richard T. Griffiths, eds., John
F. Kennedy and Europe (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1999). For tests during 1961 and 1962, see Natural
Resources Defense Council, Archive of Nuclear Data. Nuclear
Weapons & Waste: In Depth: Index, at <http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab15.asp>.
16. Public Papers of the Presidents
of the United States: John F. Kennedy Containing the Public
Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President. January
1 to November 22, 1963. (United States Government Printing
Office: Washington, DC. 1964), p. 107.
17. William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson,
"Whether to 'Strangle the Baby in the Cradle': The United
States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-1964,"
International Security, Vol. 25, No.3 (Winter 2000/2001),
p.61
18. Gordon Chang, Friends and Enemies:
The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972.
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 245-246.
19. Memorandum from the Assistant Director
of Central Intelligence for National Estimates to the Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 8 July 1963, FRUS
61-63, VII, p.771.
20. Memorandum of Conversation, 8 August
1962, FRUS 61-63 VII, p.541. For the impact of the
West German nuclear question on U.S. and Soviet policy, see
Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the
European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1999), Part III, passim.
21. Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA,
to Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1
October 1962, FRUS 61-63, VII, p. 582.
22. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and
the Bomb, pp. 40-41, 180-181; Kaysen, "The Limited
Test Ban Treaty of 1963," p. 108; Oliver, Kennedy,
Macmillan and the Nuclear Test Ban Debate, pp. 154-155;
Wittner, Resisting the Bomb, p. 400..
23. See document 49 below.
24. Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of
Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara, 20 April 1963, FRUS
61-63, VII, p. 684; Edward Teller, The Legacy of Hiroshima,
pp. 200-201.
25. See document 48 below.
26. William Taubman, Khrushchev
(New York, 2003), pp. 583-584
27. Ibid., pp. 602-607.
28. Burr and Richelson, p. 75. During an
October 10 meeting with President Kennedy, Soviet Foreign
Minister Andrei Gromyko agreed that the treaty would, "make
China's political situation more difficult and delicate, presumably
by increasing the PRC's isolation and raising pressures on
it to follow nonproliferation standards." Ibid.
29. Vladislav Zubok, "Look What Chaos
in the Beautiful Socialist Camp: Deng Xiaoping and the Sino-Soviet
Split, 1956-1963," Bulletin of the Cold War International
History Project 10 (March 1998): 153-162, <http://wwics.si.edu/topics/pubs/ACF185.pdf>;
State Department telegram to Embassy in Soviet Union, 15 July
1963 and Embassy Telegrams to State Department, 18 and 27
July1963, FRUS 61-63, VII, pp. 801, 808, and 858-860.
30. See document 42.
31. Firestone, "Kennedy and the Test
Ban: Presidential Leadership and Arms Control," pp. 91-93;
Wittner, Resisting the Bomb, pp. 424-432; William J.
Broad, Teller's War: The Top Secret Story Behind the Star
Wars Deception (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1992),
p. 51. See document 64 for details of the JCS position.
32. Wittner, Resisting the Bomb,
p. 430.
33. For the text of the CTBT, see <http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/ctb.html>.
For a 2002 report by the National Academy of Sciences on the
"good" verification capabilities of the CTBT system,
see <http://www4.nas.edu/news.nsf/isbn/0309085063?OpenDocument>.
For candidate Bush's opposition, see Dan Balz, "Bush
Favors Internationalism; Candidate Calls China a 'Competitor,'
Opposes Test Ban Treaty." Washington Post, 20
November 1999.
34. For details on the Bravo Castle test,
see <http://nuketesting.enviroweb.org/hew/Usa/Tests/Castle.html>.
35. For background on the creation of PSAC
and the Bethe report, see Herken, Cardinal Choices,
pp. 101-109. The idea of "clean" thermonuclear weapons
that would produce little or no fallout and could be used
for major construction projects was a pressure point against
a test ban but led to no significant results. Early tests
of "clean" bombs produced much more fallout than
the weapon dropped on Hiroshima. See Broad, Teller's War,
pp. 45-49, and Herken, Brotherhood of the Bomb, pp.
324-325.
36. Ibid, p. 327.
37. Memo from Carl Kaysen to President
Kennedy, "New Data on Detecting Underground Nuclear Explosions,"
20 July 1962, FRUS 61-63, VII, pp. 489-491.
38. Editorial note, U.S. State Department,
Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960, Vol.
III (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996),
p. 730.
39. Tukey, the famous inventor of the "bit"
concept, would play a key role in developing methodology for
distinguishing nuclear tests from earthquakes. See obituary
in Physics Today at <http://www.physicstoday.org/pt/vol-54/iss-7/p80.html>.
40. Even Hans Bethe "confirmed Latter's
decoupling theory, admitting that he had erred in his own
earlier assumptions that it made no difference how an underground
test was detonated." Divine, Blowing on the Wind,
p. 254.
41. Memorandum of conference with the President,
23 July 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960,
III, National Security; Arms Control and Disarmament (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996) (hereinfafter cited
as FRUS 1958-60, III) pp. 759-762.
42. State Department memcon, 6 October 1959,
FRUS 1958-60, III, pp. 777-789.
43. Public Papers of the Presidents of
the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower Containing the Public
Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President. January
1 to December 31, 1959. (United States Government Printing
Office: Washington, DC. 1960), p. 883; Wittner, Resisting
the Bomb, p. 408.
44. Memorandum of conference with President
Eisenhower, 24 March 1960, Ibid, pp. 861-863.
45. FRUS 1961-63, VII, pp. 106-109,
124-127, 131-132, and 137.
46. Ibid., pp. 149, 160.
47. Ibid. p.162; Kennedy quoted in Carl
Kaysen, "The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963," p.
103.
48. Wittner, Resisting the Bomb,
p. 412; quotation from Victor Adamsky and Yuri Smirnov, "Moscow's
Biggest Bomb: The 50-Megaton Test of October 1961," at
<https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/CWIHP/BULLETINS/b4a13.htm>.
49. For a list of nuclear warheads, deployed
or otherwise, see Stephen I. Schwartz et al., Atomic Audit:
The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1998), pp. 86-92.
50. Oliver, Kennedy, Macmillan, and the
Nuclear Test Ban Debate, pp. 58-61.
51. FRUS 1961-1963, VII, p. 441;
Kaysen, "The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963," pp.
104-105. For statistical data on U.S. (as well as Soviet)
atmospheric tests during 1962 and 1963, see the compilation
by the Natural Resources Defense Council at <http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab15.asp>.
52. President Kennedy taped White House
discussions of the test ban during the summer of 1962 and
printed renditions of the recordings are available in Timothy
Naftali, ed., The Presidential Recordings John F. Kennedy
The Great Crises, Volume One (New York, W.W. Norton, 2001),
pp. 80-185.
53. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and
the Test Ban, pp. 161-163.
54. Ibid., pp. 168-171; FRUS 1961-1963,
VII, pp. 559-561 and 566-568.
55. Editorial note, ibid., pp. 622-624;
Oliver, Kennedy, Macmillan, and the Nuclear Test Ban Debate,
pp. 146-147.
56. "Second Oral History Interview with
Carl Kaysen," July 1966, by Joseph E. O'Connor, John
F. Kennedy Library, p. 123; Kaysen, "The Limited Test
Ban Treaty," p. 112.
57. Schwartz, Atomic Audit, p. 83.
58. Oliver, Kennedy, Macmillan, and
the Nuclear Test Ban Debate, pp. 169-174.
59. Wittner, Resisting the Bomb,
pp. 416-419.
60. Zubok, "Look What Chaos in the
Beautiful Socialist Camp: Deng Xiaoping and the Sino-Soviet
Split, 1956-1963,"pp. 153-162, <http://wwics.si.edu/topics/pubs/ACF185.pdf>
61. For Macmillan's choice of Hailsham,
whose performance during the Moscow talks had mixed reviews,
see Oliver, Kennedy, Macmillan, and the Nuclear Test Ban
Debate, p. 189.
62. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace,
pp. 388-389.
63. In April 1964, the U.S. Embassy in
Moscow discovered a number of listening devices that the Soviets
had installed some years before. See "Estimate of Damage
to U.S. Foreign Policy Interests (From "Net of Listening
Devices in U.S. Embassy Moscow," 2 October 1964, U.S.
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States,
1964-1968, Vol. XIV, The Soviet Union (Washington, D.C,
, Government Printing Office, 2001), pp. 111-114.
64. For Hailsham's role during the talks,
see Oliver, Kennedy, Macmillan, and the Nuclear Test Ban
Debate, pp.197-198.
65. FRUS 1961-1963, VII, pp. 813-814,
816-817, and 823-824.
66. Ibid., pp. 851-853, 866-868.
67. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace,
pp. 394-395.
68. Kaysen, "The Limited Test Ban
Treaty of 1963," p. 111.
